Austrians
Can Explain the Boom and the Bust
by
Bob Murphy
by Bob Murphy
In a recent
debate, prominent Keynesian professor and blogger Brad DeLong claimed
that the Austrian explanation of the business cycle "does not work
as an intellectual enterprise."[1]
DeLong quotes
Paul Krugman who, back in December, apparently dealt the Austrian
diagnosis a crushing defeat on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
In the present
article, I will set the record straight. Krugman's theoretical criticism
of (what he dismissively calls) the "hangover theory" of recessions
is silly, and his empirical test is also a poor one. Once we set
up a more appropriate test, the "hangover" theory i.e., the
Mises-Hayek explanation passes with flying colors.
Krugman's
Two-Pronged Critique of the "Hangover Theory"
On his popular
New York Times blog, back in December, Krugman
lamented the idiocy of his colleagues. He can't believe that
John Cochrane would say something this (allegedly) foolish:
"We should
have a recession," Cochrane said in November, speaking to students
and investors in a conference room that looks out on Lake Michigan.
"People who spend their lives pounding nails in Nevada need
something else to do."
In response
to such (apparent) nonsense, Krugman offers first a theoretical
objection:
The basic
idea is that a recession, even a depression, is somehow a necessary
thing, part of the process of "adapting the structure of production."
We have to get those people who were pounding nails in Nevada
into other places and occupation, which is why unemployment
has to be high in the housing bubble states for a while.
The trouble
with this theory, as I pointed out way back when, is twofold:
- It doesn't
explain why there isn't mass unemployment when bubbles are
growing as well as shrinking why didn't we need high
unemployment elsewhere to get those people into the
nail-pounding-in-Nevada business?
Before dealing
with Krugman's second (and empirical) objection, let's handle this
theoretical objection.
You can't understand
Austrian business-cycle theory (ABCT) unless you first understand
the Austrian view of the capital structure of the economy. In this
article, I showed how Krugman was simply incapable of grasping
ABCT because he lacks a rich enough model of capital. For those
newcomers who are unfamiliar with ABCT, I strongly encourage you
to read the fuller discussion in the hyperlinked article.
For our purposes
here, a brief recapitulation of the argument: In a market economy,
prices really serve a function; they are not mere appendages of
exploitative power relations, but instead market prices signal real,
underlying scarcity and help everyone in the economy adjust his
plans in light of reality. The interest rates on various loans also
mean something; they are not arbitrary.
In particular,
the market interest rate coordinates the "intertemporal" (i.e.,
across-time) activities of investors, businesses, and consumers.
If consumers become more future oriented and want to reduce consumption
in the near term in order to provide more for later years, what
happens in the free market is that the increased savings push down
interest rates, which then signal entrepreneurs to borrow more and
invest in longer projects. Thus resources (such as labor, oil, steel,
and machine time) get redirected away from present goods, like TVs
and sports cars, and the freed-up resources flow into capital or
investment goods like tractors and cargo ships.
Now when the
Federal Reserve artificially reduces interest rates below
their free-market level, it sends a false message to entrepreneurs.
Firms begin expanding as if consumers have increased their savings,
but in fact consumers have reduced their savings (due to
the lower interest rates). Businesses that churn out durable goods,
such as furnaces, cargo ships, and, yes, houses will find business
booming, because these sectors respond positively to low interest
rates.
On the other
hand, other sectors don't need to contract, because (unlike the
scenario of genuine savings) nobody is cutting back on consumption.
This is precisely why the Fed-induced boom is unsustainable
real resources have not been released from consumer
sectors in order to fuel the expansion of the capital sectors. Because
modern economies are so complex, the charade can continue for a
few years, with entrepreneurs cutting corners and "consuming capital"
(i.e., postponing necessary replacement and maintenance on equipment)
while both investment and consumer goods keep flowing out of the
pipeline at increased rates. But the music eventually stops, since
(after all) the Fed's printing of green pieces of paper doesn't
really make a country wealthier. When the Fed "cuts interest
rates" it isn't really creating more capital for businesses to borrow;
it is instead distorting the signal that the market interest rate
was trying to convey.
So,
in this context, Krugman the Nobel laureate is confused. When the
Fed starts dumping wads of newly printed cash into particular sectors
of the economy, why does this foster a period of prosperity
however illusory and fleeting it may be? Why instead doesn't the
money drop cause millions of people to get laid off?
I admit I feel
sheepish even phrasing the question that way, but go reread Krugman's
blog post; that's what he's asking. The answer, of course, is that
businesses armed with newly printed Fed dollars must bid away
workers from their original niches in the structure of production.
Obviously, this process doesn't lead to mass unemployment. The workers
voluntarily quit their original jobs because the inflated
money supply has allowed a few firms to offer them higher salaries.
The Fed's injection of new money has not yet distorted
the whole economy, and so there is no reason for other businesses
to suddenly find themselves in trouble and lay off workers at the
beginning of the artificial boom.
In contrast,
once the bubble has popped, many firms realize they are embarked
on unsustainable projects. They need to lay off their workers. Unemployment
goes up, and only as workers reluctantly accept lower wages can
they be reintegrated into the economy. On average, workers are earning
less during the bust period than at the height of the boom. This
is because the salaries and wages of the boom period were exaggerations
of the true "fundamentals" of worker productivity, and also because
the fundamentals themselves have been hurt due to the waste of capital
during the boom period.
In short, workers
on average are not as economically productive during the recession
because the whole structure of production has been thrown out of
whack by the Fed's injections of funny money. It is much harder
for workers to switch jobs and take a pay cut versus quitting a
job in order to take a better one that pays more.
That's the
simple explanation for why the Fed-induced boom sees low unemployment,
while the necessary bust experiences high unemployment.
The Housing
Bubble Has Nothing to Do With Job Losses?!
After his theoretical
objection, Krugman turns to the data to raise a second objection
to the "hangover theory":
- It
doesn't explain why recessions reduce [employment] across
the board, not just in industries that were bloated by a bubble.
One striking
fact, which I've already
written about, is that the current slump is affecting some
non-housing-bubble states as or more severely as the epicenters
of the bubble. Here's a convenient
table from the BLS, ranking states by the rise in unemployment
over the past year. Unemployment is up everywhere. And while
the centers of the bubble, Florida and California, are high
in the rankings, so are Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas.
This is rather
surprising, isn't it? Forget the Austrian theory; Krugman is here
saying that the bursting of the housing bubble doesn't help explain
the onset of the recession! But don't worry, Krugman's analysis
is flawed; you're not going crazy.
First,
note that the BLS table Krugman links to looks at the over-the-year
change in unemployment (by state) from December 2007 to December
2008. Now, is that really a good measure of whether the bursting
of the housing bubble has anything to do with the recession? After
all, the bubble had well burst by December 2007. So if the "hangover
theorists" are right, you would expect the connection between unemployment
jumps and housing-price collapses to be weaker the farther along
you get from the bursting of the bubble.
In response
to an email from a grad-school friend, I decided to check on the
relation during a time frame that more tightly captures the bursting
of the housing bubble. The OFHEO
has quarterly data on home prices by state; I picked the top of
the bubble as the second quarter in 2006.
Then I picked
the other variable to be the change in unemployment (in terms of
absolute point changes, not percentages of percentages) from June
2006 to December 2008, which is available (though not in a very
convenient form) from the BLS.
Armed with
this data, I ranked the states according to these two criteria,
and looked at the worst 10 in both rankings. In other words, I looked
at the list of the 10 states that had seen the biggest percentage
decline in home prices since the 2nd quarter of 2006, and I also
looked at the list of the 10 states that had seen the biggest jump
in the unemployment rate from June 2006 to December 2008. The 7th
through 10th slots on the two lists didn't match up, but check out
the worst 6 slots in both lists:
Ranking
of States By Point Increase in Unemployment Rate, June 2006–December
2008
- Rhode
Island (+4.9)
- Florida
(+4.8)
- Nevada
(+4.8)
- California
(+4.4)
- North
Carolina (+3.9)
- Michigan
(+3.8)
Ranking
of States By Percentage Drop in OFHEO Housing Price Index, 2Q
2006–4Q 2008
- California,
–27%
- Nevada,
–26%
- Florida,
–22%
- Arizona,
–16%
- Rhode
Island, –11%
- Michigan,
–11%
Note
that North Carolina and Arizona are the only ones that don't match.
That seems like a very strong correlation. (Depending on how
we frame the problem, the chances of this matching occurring
randomly are anywhere from 1 in 8,400 to about 1 in 350,000.)
Conclusion
Brad
DeLong and Paul Krugman continue to mock the Austrian explanation
for the business cycle, but their ridicule is based on their own
deficient model of the economy's capital structure. Moreover, Krugman's
quick empirical points turn out, upon closer inspection, to support
the Austrian position. Unfortunately, because DeLong and Krugman
have so fundamentally misdiagnosed the problem, their "solutions"
are a recipe for further disaster.
Notes
[1]
DeLong's UC Davis debate against Michele Boldrin is available
here. DeLong's discussion of (what he calls) the "Marx-Hoover-Hayek
axis" of business-cycle theory can safely be joined at the 10:00
mark of the video.
This article
first appeared on Mises.org.
March 31, 2009
Bob
Murphy [send him mail],
adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute,
is the author of The
Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism,
The
Human Action Study Guide,
and The
Man, Economy, and State Study Guide.
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