The
Ballistic Fingerprinting Scam
by
John R. Lott, Jr.
by John R. Lott, Jr.
Ballistic
fingerprinting was all the rage just a couple of years ago. Maryland
and New York were leading the way where a computer database would
record the markings made on the bullets from all new guns. The days
of criminals using guns were numbered.
Yet,
a recent report by the Maryland State Police's forensic-sciences
division shows that the systems in both states have been expensive
failures. New York is spending $4 million per year. Maryland has
spent a total of $2.6 million, about $60 per gun sold. But in the
over four years that the systems have been in effect neither has
solved a single crime. To put it bluntly, the program "does not
aid in the mission statement of the Department of State Police."
The
systems have drained so many resources from other police activities
that ballistic fingerprinting could end up actually increasing crime.
In New York, how many crimes could 50 additional police officers
help solve?
The
police explain the program's inability to reduce crime because criminals
have simply not been using the guns that have been entered into
the database. In some cases the claim is that the wrong data has
been entered into the computers.
The
physics of ballistic fingerprinting are straightforward enough.
When a bullet travels through the barrel of a gun, the friction
creates markings on the bullet. If the gun is new, imperfections
in the way the barrel is drilled can produce different markings
on the bullet; such imperfections are most noticeable in inexpensive
guns. In older guns, the bullet's friction through the barrel can
cause more noticeable wear marks that help differentiate between
guns. Many other factors influence the particular markings left
on the bullets for instance, how often the gun is cleaned and
what brand of cartridge is used.
Precisely
because friction causes wear, a gun's ballistic fingerprint changes
over time making it drastically different from such forensic evidence
as human fingerprints or DNA. The recording of a child's fingerprints
or DNA still allows for identification much later in life; the same
is not true of the bullet markings. A ballistic fingerprint is less
like a human fingerprint than it is like the tread on a car tire.
Brand-new
tires are essentially identical, so new-tire tracks at crime scenes
leave investigators with pretty limited information. Unless there
happens to be a particular imperfection, only the brand and model
of the tire can be identified. Imprints on bullets are similar.
When a bullet is fired from a new gun, investigators can typically
identify only the type of ammunition and the type of gun. Over time,
though, friction causes the tread on tires to wear. It would be
easy to take the tire tracks left at a crime scene and match them
with a suspected criminal's car; but the more the car is driven
after the crime, the harder it is to match the tire tracks left
at the scene to the tires when they are eventually found. Similarly,
the greatest friction on a gun occurs when the gun is first fired
and that dramatically reduces the usefulness of recording the
gun's ballistic fingerprint when it is purchased.
Moreover,
ballistic fingerprinting can be thwarted by replacing the gun's
barrel just as criminals can foil tire matching by simply replacing
their tires. In general, the markings on bullets can be altered
even more quickly and easily than the tread marks on tires: Scratching
part of the inside of a barrel with a nail file would alter the
bullet's path down the barrel and thus change the markings. So would
putting toothpaste on a bullet before firing it.
Ballistic
fingerprinting faces other difficulties. For example, even if the
gun was not used much between the time the ballistic fingerprint
was originally recorded and the time the crime occurred, police
still have to be able to trace the gun from the original owner to
the criminal but only 12 percent of guns used in crimes are obtained
by the criminal through retail stores or pawn shops. The rest are
virtually impossible to trace.
A
recent study by the State of California points to further practical
difficulties with ballistic fingerprinting. The study tested 790
pistols firing a total of 2,000 rounds. When the cartridges used
with a particular gun came from the same manufacturer, computer
matching failed 38 percent of the time. When the cartridges came
from different manufacturers, the failure rate rose to 62 percent.
And this study does not even begin to address problems caused by
wear, so the real-world failure rate can be expected to be much
higher. The California report warned that "firearms that generate
markings on cartridge casings can change with use and can also be
readily altered by the users." Further, it warned that the problems
of matching would soar dramatically if more guns were included in
the sample. The study's verdict: "Computer-matching systems do not
provide conclusive results...potential candidates [for a match must]
be manually reviewed."
While
registering guns by their ballistic fingerprints is a relatively
new concept, we have had plenty of experience using gun registration
in general, and it has come up woefully short. A few years ago,
I testified before the Hawaii state legislature on a bill to change
registration requirements. Hawaii has had both registration and
licensing of guns for several decades.
In
theory, if a gun is left at the crime scene, licensing and registration
will allow the gun to be traced back to its owner. Police have probably
spent hundreds of thousands of man-hours administering these laws
in Hawaii. But despite this massive effort, there has not been a
single case in which police claimed that licensing and registration
have been instrumental in identifying a criminal.
The
reason is simple. First, criminals very rarely leave their guns
at a crime scene, and when they do, it is because the criminals
have been killed or seriously wounded. Second and more important
for ballistic fingerprinting would-be criminals also virtually
never get licenses or register their weapons. The guns that are
recovered at the scene are not registered.
Good
intentions don't necessarily make good laws. What counts is whether
the laws actually work, and end up saving lives. On that measure,
ballistic fingerprinting is just another failure in a long line
of gun-control measures.
February
5, 2005
John
Lott [send him mail], a resident
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of The
Bias Against Guns (Regnery 2003).
Copyright
© 2005 John Lott
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