Fashion Has No Owner
by
Albert Esplugas and Manuel
Lora
by Albert Esplugas and Manuel Lora
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"[Locke’s
theory] speaks only to the ownership of atoms, not to the ownership
of bits. Locke himself did not try to justify intangible property… By invoking state power, a copyright or patent owner can
impose prior restraint, fines, imprisonment, and confiscation
on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet enjoyment
of their tangible property. Because it thus gags our voices, ties
our hands, and demolishes our presses, the law of copyrights and
patents violates the very rights that Locke defended."
~
Tom Bell, Copy
Fighting
If
passed into law, a bill
referred to Congress would extend copyright protection to fashion
designs, from dresses and shoes to belts and eyeglass frames. Prominent
designers argue that their designs are being copied even before
they appear on the market and this puts their business at risk.
They are demanding a three-year copyright over their creations,
claiming that they would have a greater incentive to innovate if
they were the only ones to get the benefit of their effort.
A
similar argument, however, could be advanced by philosophers or
economists to demand a copyright over their ideas. Why could a designer
copyright a design while a scientist cannot copyright his new theory
of evolution? What is the difference between registering a fashion
design and registering the Pythagorean Theorem, the law of diminishing
marginal utility or the plot of Shyamalan's latest film? If the
inventor of the supermarket, the wheel or the ladder had patented
his idea, would we say that he was merely protecting his property
or would we have accused him of protecting himself against competition?
Does the fashion lobby aim to defend their legitimate property or
to unjustly profit by shielding themselves from competition? Copyrights
and patents are intellectual property rights, that is, rights in
ideal objects. Why can some ideas be protected and not others? The
fact that even the defenders of intellectual property consider absurd
the proposal that any (and every) kind of idea should be protected
and that they must therefore establish an arbitrary limit suggests
that there is something strange about these "rights over ideal
objects" and that the parallel between property over material
objects and property over immaterial objects is only apparent.
From
a libertarian point of view, a person becomes the owner of an unowned
resource when he homesteads it (when he occupies or uses it before
anyone else) or when he receives it voluntarily from another owner.
He then has the right to do with it whatever he wants so long as
this use does not trespass on other’s legitimately acquired property.
According to the logic of copyrights and patents, however, you only
need to conceive of a new way of using a given type of resource
– whether you own it or not – to claim partial ownership of that
resource. You do not need to have homesteaded it first nor have
received it from a previous third-party owner.
Let's
look at an example of this. Suppose that George occupies and works
an unowned plot of land. He becomes the owner of that plot of land.
Richard, who lives across the country and has never even stepped
on George's land, conceives of the idea of crop irrigation. The
logic behind intellectual property would suggest that Richard, due
to his new invention, now acquires a partial property right over
George's plot of land; he obtains the right to prevent George from
applying this new technique on his own land. Regarding the
application of crop irrigation on George's land, he is no longer
the full owner of it anymore, since he must now obtain Richard's
permission. Richard can block George (and every land owner) from
applying his idea even though Richard was not the first occupier
(homesteader) of every piece of land over which he now claims control.
Is the exercising of this blocking not an invasion of George's land
by Richard since the latter prevents the former from doing whatever
he wants with his homesteaded land?
Let's
also suppose, hypothetically, that Richard is able to conceive of
every possible use of iron or steel and patents these ideas. In
such scenario, anyone who owns those metals would not be able to
do anything with them at all without Richard's permission. Thus,
Richard would have de facto appropriated all of the iron
and steel in the world without having even touched or used any of
it. (Should we not call this expropriate instead?) The same
happens, on a smaller scale, with patents and copyrights over concrete
uses of a resource.
Why
does intellectual property conflict with traditional private property?
Because those two concepts refer to goods of a different nature:
non-scarce goods (ideas) and scarce goods (tangible resources),
and given that rights are always enforced against tangible things
(since force is physical), if you grant a right over an idea then
this necessarily means granting a right in thousands or millions
of scarce resources onto which this idea might be imprinted. In
other words, the owner of the tangible goods would no longer be
the homesteader (first user/occupier) but instead anyone who can
think of a new way of using such property. This is why intellectual
property is in direct conflict with the principle of homesteading:
in the presence of patents and copyrights we are no longer full
owners of resources which we homestead or receive from others. As
Stephan Kinsella explains:
"[B]y
finding a new way to use his own property (recipe), the IP creator
instantly, magically becomes a partial owner of others’ property.
He has some say over how third parties can use their property.
IP rights change the status quo by redistributing property
from individuals of one class (tangible -property owners) to individuals
of another (authors and inventors)."
Many
people intuitively claim that we have the right to exclusively enjoy
the fruit of our intellectual creativity. Intellectual property
is seen as a mechanism to ensure a fair reward for our creative
efforts. However, we do not homestead things by merely making an
effort but rather because we first use or occupy it or receive it
voluntarily from someone else. It is true that efforts and merit
are closely linked to homesteading and wealth but this is not a
rigorous explanation as to why we become owners. When we win the
lottery we are legitimately enriched yet no one can say that such
large amounts of money were the result of our effort. When we inherit
real estate or money, we cannot say that this property becomes ours
because we have made the effort to obtain it and thus we deserve
it. When we receive a gift we become the owners of the gift, but
effort had nothing to do with it.
On
the other hand, sometimes we work arduously and do not receive the
desired reward. Life is filled with unrewarded effort. We always
try to obtain what we think we deserve, but we cannot say that it
is illegitimate not to obtain it every time. Therefore, it is not
true that property is the reward of our effort. It can be, and in
most cases it is (as is the case in the market), but it is not a
simple effort that turns us into property owners. It is through
homesteading and free trade that we become owners and any interference
over the use of our own property is tantamount to aggression. Authors
obviously have a right to profit from their creations and to try
to impede that others profit from them, but only through non-aggressive
means, means that do not violate the rights of others over their
respective property.
In
the case of fashion, why is it illegitimate that, after seeing a
dress in a catwalk or on a store display, we later reproduce it
with our own fabric? Whose rights do we infringe when we
apply the information in our mind on our property?
As Roderick Long points
out, we can only have a right to that which we can control (because
"property" means a "right to control"), and we cannot control an
idea that resides in the minds of others. An idea, of course, can
be kept secret (as is the case with trade secrets), but once it
has been made public, a right to its exclusive control cannot be
coherently claimed, because that idea is now being "controlled"
by anyone who has internalized it.
Zara and H&M
do just this when they reproduce the designs of more expensive brands:
their designers are on the lookout to see what others have done.
Then they internalize the concept and then it is applied to their
legitimately acquired fabric. Must a designer become a partial owner
of every piece of fabric in the world by the mere fact of
having thought of a way to use it? Further, rarely is an idea completely
original; only a small part of it is original and the rest is borrowed
from existing ideas. Quoting
Thomas Edison: "Genius is one per cent inspiration, ninety-nine
per cent perspiration." We do not live in a vacuum; it is impossible
to avoid using past knowledge and other’s ideas when living and
acting in the world. This is especially true in the case of the
fashion industry, whose innovation is largely based on preexisting
knowledge. Designers would be copyrighting an idea as it were completely
new and entirely conceived in their minds, when in reality they
borrow from other designs, history, art and things that surround
them.
The argument
that copyright serves as an incentive for creation does not seem
convincing. The fashion industry is one
of the most innovative, probably because designers can use preexisting
knowledge without restrictions, and constantly redefine and reinvent
ideas. As Michele Bodrin and David Levine say:
"While
each individual innovator may earn more revenue from innovating
if he has an intellectual monopoly, he also faces a higher cost
of innovating: he must pay off all those other monopolists owning
rights to existing innovations. Indeed, in the extreme case when
each new innovation requires the use of lots of previous ideas,
the presence of intellectual monopoly may bring innovation to
a screeching halt."
Copyrights
and patents, as the legal monopolies that they are, restrict competition
over the use of an idea. The intellectual monopolist faces less
competition, and thus he can charge higher prices and not improve
so diligently the quality of his products. Competitors also invent
around the monopolist’s patent, developing products that are slightly
different in order to not infringe on the patent. This is costly
and may result in worse products. Likewise, sometimes the monopolist
invents around his own patent so as to shield him from competitors
inventing around it. As Julio Cole puts
it, this means more R&D spending, but is it an efficient
use of available resources? We have also to consider the additional
resources spent on lawyers and lawsuits because of the existence
of intellectual property. Sharon Levine, the associate executive
director of the HMO Kaiser Permanente, thinks
that "[c]onsumers today are paying an inordinate premium under
the guise of creating the stream of innovation in the future. But
it's actually funding lawyers."
Indeed,
copyright and patent legislation is so far removed from its official
purpose that there are companies
that simply exist to patent "inventions" and to collect royalties
without ever producing a single good or service on the market. These
patent trolls
are non-producers who benefit by extorting the companies that do
produce a good or service based on their ideas.
A three-year
copyright would perhaps motivate designers before registering their
designs (to quickly profit), but would reduce incentives to come
up with new creations during those three years because they would
have a guaranteed income. Similarly, copyrights could artificially
boost innovation in the fashion industry (or in some fields within
this industry), but to the detriment of other industries (or fields
of the same industry) not protected by intellectual property. Murray
Rothbard explains
the distortion of incentives that is introduced by intellectual
property:
"Research
expenditures are therefore overstimulated in the early
stages before anyone has a patent, and they are unduly restricted
in the period after the patent is received. In addition, some
inventions are considered patentable, while others are not. The
patent system then has the further effect of artificially stimulating
research expenditures in the patentable areas, while artificially
restricting research in the nonpatentable areas."
Consequently,
as Cole says,
there might not be "more inventions" as a result of copyrights and
patents, but simply different kinds of inventions. To this we have
to add the other costs just mentioned above.
All
things considered, it would seem that designers appeal to the state
not to encourage innovation but to obtain perks and to profit by
limiting competition. It is becoming more and more obvious that
businesses demand rights over ideas so that they can profit at the
expense of everyone else. It is not a coincidence that copyright
terms have been expanded over time: from 14 years in 1790 (renewable
for another 14) to life of the author plus 70 years nowadays (and
90 years in the case of corporate copyright). This is eerily similar
to welfare or discrimination laws: new "rights" or classes
of people are continually added or expanded by the state so as to
benefit some people at the expense of others, all in the name of
some glorious end. Sometimes this happens in the name of "social
peace" or the "common good" and other times in the
name of "innovation" and "progress."
September
27, 2006
Albert
Esplugas [send him mail]
studies Audiovisual Communication. He is a founding member of the
Spanish libertarian think tank Instituto
Juan de Mariana and a contributor of the libertarian website
Liberalismo.org. You can read
his articles here
and here.
Manuel Lora [send him mail]
works at Cornell University as a TV and multimedia producer. Visit
his blog.
Copyright
© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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