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That
Pre-9/11 Mindset:
Meet the New Normal, Same as the Old Normal
by
Roderick T. Long
by Roderick T. Long
Critics
of the current régime's so-called "War on Terror" are often accused
of having a "September 10th" or "pre-9/11" mindset. (Our ever-articulate
Prince President garbled both descriptions into the phrase "pre-September
10th mentality" during the first
debate.) The suggestion is that everyone's worldview should
have been radically transformed by the events of September 11th;
anyone whose worldview wasn't so altered, anyone who continues to
favour diplomacy over a resort to military force, must simply be
blind to reality.
But there's a problem with this argument: it assumes that everyone's
worldview needed changing. After all, any worldview that
was radically altered by the September 11th attacks must
have been radically mistaken to begin with. But anyone whose
understanding of the world was substantially correct would
not have had his or her overall view of things shaken by those events.
Why didn't more of us ("us" being those of the anti-war/anti-state
persuasion, whether "left" or "right") abandon our way of thinking
in response to 9/11? Because 9/11 didn't teach us anything we didn't
already know. We've been saying for decades that the U.S. government's
arrogant interventions around the world have only been increasing
the risk of blowback, and that the State, in the event of such blowback,
would be as ineffective at protecting the civilian population as
it is at everything else. The 9/11 attacks simply corroborated
our "pre-9/11 mindset."
In 2000, for example a year before 9/11 the Mises Institute's
Jon Basil Utley was predicting
that the United States' disregard of international law was fueling
a potential terrorist backlash. And the year before that, our own
Lew Rockwell observed
that thanks to its "foreign policy, imperial military reach, and
global arrogance, the U.S. government is the most hated in the world,"
so it's "not surprising" that terrorists might "blame us for the
actions of the government."
The Cato Institute also saw what was coming. In 1996, Cato analyst
Stanley Kober wrote a rather moderate
piece (referring, whether naïvely or diplomatically, to the
U.S. government's "noble intentions") in which he warned of the
rising terrorist threat from someone named Osama bin Laden, whose
"motivation stems from the American assistance to Saudi Arabia when
it was threatened by Iraq." Noting that the United States "has been
all but oblivious to the way some of its actions are perceived by
ordinary Arabs and Muslims," Kober suggested that terrorist "bombings
in Saudi Arabia should not be viewed as isolated aberrations. …
The danger for the United States is that it will also become the
target of those extremists."
Two years later, in 1998, Cato's Ivan Eland was explaining:
One of three terrorist attacks worldwide is directed against a
U.S. target. And that's not because the United States is a rich
capitalist nation. There are plenty of countries that fit that
description. It's not because the United States exports its "decadent"
culture overseas. Other nations export Western culture, and some
of their exports are as "decadent" as or more "decadent" than
those of the United States. No, terrorists attack the United States
primarily for what it does, not what it is.
In light of
the fact that "[e]ven comparatively weak terrorist groups can now
inflict massive damage on a superpower," Eland argued that "the
only viable way to significantly reduce the chances of a catastrophic
attack" was for the U.S. government to "concentrate its efforts
on minimizing the motivation for such attacks in the first place."
He concluded that "Americans should not have to live in fear of
terrorism just so Washington's foreign policy elite can attempt
to achieve amorphous and ephemeral gains on the world chessboard."
And in 2000, Cato's Doug Bandow wrote
that rather than "[s]imply threatening the attackers," the U.S.
government should "review U.S. policies that encourage terrorism."
Quoting an al-Qaida representative's remark that it is "time to
take action against this iniquitous and faithless force the U.S.
which has spread troops through Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia,"
Bandow concluded that the United States' "promiscuous intervention
in small but bitter foreign conflicts" and "[f]oolish attempts at
nation-building risk turning all of America into a war zone."
What about the Libertarian Party? The 1990
party platform contained the following language:
We call upon the United States government to cease all interventions
in the Middle East, including military and economic aid, guarantees,
and diplomatic meddling, and to cease limitation of private foreign
aid, both military and economic. … We oppose the incorporation
of the Persian Gulf and the countries surrounding it into the
U.S. defense perimeter. We oppose the creation of new U.S. bases
and sites for the pre-positioning of military material in the
Middle East region. We condemn the stationing of American military
troops in the Sinai peninsula as a trip-wire that could easily
set off a new world war.
And in 1988,
I myself warned
that "when we wade ignorantly into some third-world mess and throw
our support behind the slimiest right-wing thug we can find, we
not only betray our principles, we also create generations of fervent
anti-Americans; Shahs beget Ayatollahs. It's hard to see how the
manufacture of enemies can be conducive to the national interest."
Of course it's not only libertarians who were sounding the alarm;
recognition of the threat that America's foreign policy posed to
its own civilians was being voiced across the political spectrum.
On the left, Noam Chomsky worried
in 1993 that the first "bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York on February 26, which killed 6 people and caused great damage,
may be a portent of things to come." Until the American people "questioned
crimes that their government commits against the people of the traditional
colonial domains," their acquiescence in their government's foreign
policy would continue to invite "further torment." On the right,
Pat Buchanan was
asking in 1999:
With the Cold War over, why invite terrorist attacks on our citizens
and country, ultimately with biological, chemical or nuclear weapons?
… [B]attling terrorism must go beyond discovering and disrupting
it before it happens and deterring it with retaliation. We need
to remove the motivation for it by extricating the United States
from ethnic, religious and historical quarrels that are not ours
and which we cannot resolve with any finality.
And of course
there were plenty of books available like Jonathan Kwitny's 1984
Endless
Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World and Chalmer Johnson's
2000 Blowback:
The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. Indeed, the
Clinton administration's own Hart-Rudman Commission noted
in 1999 that the United States was widely perceived as "exercising
its power with arrogance and self-absorption," leading "[m]uch of
the world [to] resent and oppose us," and concluded that "[s]tates,
terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of
mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them." The
upshot? "Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in
large numbers."
Such was the "pre-9/11 mindset" of those who, today, criticise the
"War on Terror" as likelier to provoke more terrorism than it prevents.
The reason the 9/11 attacks didn't shake our view of the world was
that they were the most eloquent confirmation of that view.
Those whose worldview was shaken by the 9/11 attacks must
have had their heads in the sand. It may sound rude to say "we told
you so," but given that our opponents' decision to ignore our warnings
has led to thousands of deaths, perhaps a bit of rudeness is in
order. We told them so.
Of course, if truth be told, the 9/11 attacks didn't have much of
an effect on our opponents' worldview either. The neoconservative
D.C. establishment favours the same policies of imperial aggrandisement
now that they favoured before 9/11; the attacks merely made it easier
for them to get away with what they had been hankering after all
along. We know from Richard Clarke and other White House insiders
that plans for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq had already
been drafted, and were simply awaiting a pretext. Not only freedom's
friends, but freedom's foes too, are continuing in their pre-9/11
mindset.
November
29, 2004
Roderick
T. Long [send him mail]
is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Auburn
University; President of the Molinari
Institute; author of Reason
and Value: Aristotle versus Rand; Editor of the Libertarian
Nation Foundation periodical Formulations;
and an Adjunct Scholar of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1992,
and maintains the website Praxeology.net,
as well as the web journal Austro-Athenian
Empire.
Copyright
© 2004 LewRockwell.com
Roderick
T. Long Archives
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