The Next Act
by
William S. Lind
by William S. Lind
Wars, most
wars at least, run not evenly but in fits and starts, settling down
into sputtering Sitzkrieg for long intervals, then suddenly
shooting out wildly in wholly unpredicted directions. The war in
Iraq has fallen into a set pattern for long enough that we should
be expecting something new. I can identify three factors – there
may be more – which could lead to some dramatic changes, soon.
- Osama bin
Laden’s latest message. Most observers, including the White House,
seem to have missed its significance. In it, bin Laden offered
us a truce (an offer we should have accepted, if only to attempt
to seize the moral high ground). The Koran requires Moslems to
offer such a truce before they attack. The fact that bin Laden
himself made the offer, after a long silence, suggests al Qaeda
attaches high importance to it.
Why? My guess
is because they plan a major new attack in the U.S. soon. I would
be surprised if the plan were for something smaller than 9/11,
because that could send the message that al Qaeda’s capabilities
had diminished. Could this be "the big one," the suitcase
nuke that most counter-terrorism experts expect somewhere, sometime?
That would certainly justify, perhaps require, a truce offer from
Osama himself. Of course, al Qaeda’s plan may fail, and it may
be for an action less powerful than setting off a nuke on American
soil. But the fact that Osama made a truce offer should have set
off alarm bells in Washington. So far, from what I can see, it
hasn’t.
-
In Iraq,
Shiite country is turning nasty. The Brits are finding themselves
up against Shiite militias around Basra. Muqtada al Sadr has
made it clear he is spoiling for another go at the Americans,
saying his militia would respond to any attack on Iran. In Baghdad,
the Shiites who run things are finding American interference
increasingly inconvenient. We are now talking to at least some
Sunni insurgents, as we should be, but that means our utility
to the Shiites as unpaid Hessians is diminishing. Put it all
together and it suggests the improbable Yankee-Shiite honeymoon
may soon end. When it does, our lines of supply and communication
through southern Iraq to Kuwait will be up for grabs.
-
We are
moving towards war with Iran. Our diplomatic efforts on the
question of Iranian nuclear research and reprocessing are obviously
designed to fail, in order to clear the boards for military
action. It will probably come in the form of Israeli air strikes
on Iran, which, as the Iranians well know, cannot be carried
out without American approval and support.
In Israel,
it was Sharon who repeatedly refused the Israeli generals’ requests
for air strikes; he is now out of the picture. His replacement,
Olmert, is weak. The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections
gave Olmert’s main opponent, Likud’s Netanyahu, a big boost. How
could Olmert best show the Israeli electorate he is as tough as
Netanyahu? Obviously, by hitting Iran before Israel’s elections
in late March.
In Washington,
the same brilliant crowd who said invading Iraq would be a cakewalk
is still in power. While a few prominent neo-cons have left the
limelight, others remain highly influential behind the scenes.
For them, the question is not whether to attack Iran (and Syria),
but when. Their answer will be the same as Israel’s.
Washington
will assume Iran will respond with some air and missile strikes
of its own. Those may occur, but Iran has far more effective ways
of replying. It can shut down its own oil exports and, with mining
and naval action, those of Kuwait and the Gulf States as well.
It can ramp up the guerilla wars both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
It could
also do something that would come as a total surprise to Washington
and cross the Iran-Iraq border with four to six divisions, simply
rolling up the American army of occupation in Iraq. Syria might
well join in, knowing that it is only a question of time before
it is attacked anyway. We have no field army in Iraq at this point;
our troops are dispersed fighting insurgents. A couple dozen Scuds
on the Green Zone would decapitate our leadership (possibly to
our benefit). Yes, our air power would be a problem, but only
until the Iranians got in close. Bad weather could provide enough
cover for that. So could the Iranian and Syrian air forces, so
long as they were willing to expend themselves. Our Air Force
can be counted on to fight the air battle first.
As
I said, when a war has been stuck in a rut for a long time, thoughtful
observers should expect some dramatic change or changes. Any one
of these possibilities would deliver that; together, they could
give us a whole different situation, one in which our current slow
defeat would accelerate sharply.
Beware
the ides of March.
February
2, 2006
William
Lind [send him mail]
is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free
Congress Foundation. The views expressed in this article are those
of Mr. Lind, writing in his personal capacity.
Copyright
© 2006 William S. Lind
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