What
Happened in Mumbai
by
William
S. Lind
by William S. Lind
DIGG THIS
Applying operational art in Fourth Generation war is so difficult
it is hard to point to many successful examples of it. The recent
assaults in Bombay are among the few and also among the best, bordering
on brilliant. We may regret brilliance on the part of our opponents,
but that should not prevent us from acknowledging it.
The operational logic is evident:
-
The United States wants Pakistan to focus on fighting al Qaeda
and the Taliban.
- To be able to do so, Pakistan must shift its focus away from
the Indian threat, which requires a détente with India.
A piece by Jane Perlez of the New York Times which ran
in the November 28 Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that
Reconciliation between India and Pakistan has emerged as a
basic tenet in the approaches to foreign policy of President-elect
Barack Obama, and the new leader of Central Command, Gen. David
H. Petraeus. The point is to persuade Pakistan to focus less
of its military effort on India, and more on the militants in
its lawless tribal regions….
- Friends of al Qaeda and the Taliban need to block this shift
in focus by Pakistan. To do so, they must ramp up the hostility
between India and Pakistan. How could they do that?
- With a special operation in India’s most important city. Remember,
a special operation must have operational significance to qualify
as "special ops." If its meaning is only tactical, it’s
just a bunch of yahoos running around making noise.
-
The special operation was tactically well planned and carried
out. To work operationally, India must blame it on Pakistan.
Early indications suggest that may happen.
-
If India does blame Pakistan and Pakistan feels the Indian
threat is increasing, the American strategy of convincing Pakistan
to focus on the Taliban and al Qaeda will have been defeated.
That is operational art at its best.
Meanwhile, in Iraq, an odd combination of events may offer a strategic
win-win-win opportunity for all parties: the U.S., the al-Maliki
government and al Qaeda. Last week, the Iraqi parliament passed
the new status of forces agreement that would keep American troops
in Iraq through 2011. Washington regards that as a success, which
it is not. What America needs most is to get out of Iraq before
the next round in the Iraqi civil war starts.
However, to get Sunni support for the agreement, the al-Maliki
government had to agree to submit the deal to a national referendum
next year. If the agreement is defeated in that referendum, everyone
could win. American troops would have a better chance of getting
out while Iraq is still quiet. The al-Maliki government could gain
some legitimacy by obeying the expressed will of the Iraqi people
and telling the Americans to pack and go. Al Qaeda could claim that,
in the end, the Americans were expelled from Iraq rather than leaving
on their own preferred timetable, which in fact stretches far beyond
2011.
Here,
al Qaeda has an operational opportunity, and it will be interesting
to see if it can grasp it. At present, al Qaeda in Iraq is on the
ropes, largely because its brutality toward the Iraqi population
has cost it its political base among the Sunnis. If al Qaeda can
think operationally, it will announce that it is suspending all
combat operations until the referendum. That truce would allow it
to patch up its relations with its base. Further, al Qaeda would
state that if the status of forces agreement is defeated, it will
not resume combat operations. It would have no need to do so, since
it could claim victory. And its pledge would encourage Iraqis, who
are tired of seemingly random bombings, to vote no. Al Qaeda in
Iraq could recover at the ballot box from the defeat it has inflicted
on itself in the field.
A strategic win-win-win would be a strange outcome indeed for this
phase of the Iraq war (there is more to come). But such are the
vagaries of Fourth Generation war. We will see similar oddities
in Afghanistan as that war moves toward settlement. The sooner Washington
can stop thinking in binary terms and get used to strange outcomes,
the better.
December
4, 2008
William
Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the
Center
for Cultural Conservatism for the Free
Congress Foundation.
Copyright
© 2008 William S. Lind
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