Defending
the Baltics
by
William
S. Lind
by William S. Lind
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I
recently returned from Estonia and the Baltic Defence College, where
the Russian counter-attack on Georgia had left a residual case of
nerves. They have little to fear in the short run, unless they duplicate
Georgia’s folly and attack Russia. But the question of how the Baltics
might be defended is worth considering, both in itself and in terms
of what it means for defending other small countries.
The
worst option, which Georgia took, is to create a toy army. A handful
of modern jet fighters, a battalion or two of tanks, a frigate for
the navy, all add up to nothing. Against a Great Power, a toy army
goes down to defeat in days if not hours. More, even a few modern
jet fighters or tanks cost so much there is no money left for a
real defense. Unless the Baltic states want to fight each other,
they should leave military toys to children.
Second,
the Baltics could try to ally with other near-by Powers strong enough
to balance Russia. But this option exists only in theory. Germany
could fill the role but has lost all Great Power ambitions, while
Sweden has been out the game for two centuries. There could be benefit
for all concerned in a union of the Baltic states and Finland under
the Swedish crown, all retaining complete domestic autonomy but
united for defense and foreign policy, but it is probably only historians
who can see the potential.
A
third option is to ally with distant Great Powers in order to balance
the threat from a local Great Power. That is what the Baltic States
have done through their membership in NATO. Unfortunately, while
central European states have attempted this over and over again
for centuries, it never works. It may involve Western Powers in
war with Russia, or in the past with Germany, but it does nothing
to protect the country in question. Poland is a recent example:
Britain and France went to war with Germany in 1939 over Poland,
but Poland remained an occupied country for 50 years.
NATO
membership also increases the pressure to build a toy army, or to
specialize in "niche" capabilities like water purification
that serve NATO but not home defense. Both are roads to military
irrelevance.
There
is a model that would work for the Baltic states and other small
countries: the Iraqi model. Instead of creating a toy army, they
should plan an Iraq-style insurgency against any occupier. This
requires a universal militia like Switzerland’s, where every male
citizen knows how to shoot and how to build and emplace IEDs and
where weapons and explosives are cached all over the country. In
the Baltics, this would be a rural rather than an urban defense:
Russia could take the cities but not the countryside. The "Forest
Brothers" kept up just such a resistance to the Soviet presence
well into the 1950s.
An
Iraqi-model defense would not make it impossible for Russia to conquer
the Baltic states. It could only make such a venture expensive for
Russia, hopefully too expensive.
For
long-term security, the Baltic states must approach the problem
not just at the military but at the grand strategic level. What
that means is that, like all small countries bordering Great Powers,
they must accommodate the Great Power’s interests. The model here
is Finland during the Cold War. Finland maintained complete sovereignty
in her domestic affairs, but she was careful to accommodate the
Soviet Union in her foreign and defense policies. She was a good
neighbor to Russia, as the Baltic states should strive to be good
neighbors to Russia now. Their goal should be to create a situation
where it is more in Russia’s interests for the Baltics to remain
independent than to reincorporate them into the Russian empire.
I
realize this advice is unpalatable to the Baltic peoples. Half a
century of Soviet occupation has left a residue of hatred for all
things Russian. But grand strategy must be based on facts and reason,
not emotion. The most important fact is geography. Geography dictates
that the Baltic states must accommodate Russian interests, whether
they want to or not. If they refuse, then the recent example of
Georgia may have more relevance than anyone would wish.
September
9, 2008
William
Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the
Center
for Cultural Conservatism for the Free
Congress Foundation.
Copyright
© 2008 William S. Lind
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