To Be or Not To Be a State?
by
William S. Lind
by William S. Lind
When
Hamas won the Palestinian elections, a highly successful Fourth
Generation entity became a state. No doubt that was one of Hamas’s
highest aspirations. But by becoming a state, it became far more
vulnerable to other states than it was as a non-state entity. How
Hamas deals with this problem may say a great deal about the future
of Fourth Generation war.
Hamas
may have presumed that once it won a free election, other states,
including the United States and Israel, would have to recognize
its legitimacy. Great expectations are seldom fulfilled in the amoral
world of international politics. When the Washington Establishment
calls for "free elections," what it means is elections
that elect the people it wants to deal with. Hamas does not fall
into that category. Washington therefore greeted Hamas’s electoral
victory with a full-court press to destroy the new Hamas leadership
of the Palestinian Authority, a "state" that bears a state’s
burdens with none of a state’s assets. Both Machiavelli and Metternich
were no doubt delighted by this act of Wilsonian hypocrisy, a variety
that often exceeds their own and does so with a straight face, an
act they could never quite master, being gentlemen.
In
cooperation with Israel (can Washington now do anything except in
cooperation with Israel?) the U.S. imposed a starvation blockade
on the Palestinian territories. Instead of British armored cruisers,
the blockaders this time are U.S. banking laws, plus Israeli-withholding
of Palestinian tax receipts. As the government of a quasi-state,
Hamas found itself with no money. PA employees went unpaid and PA
services, such as they were, largely collapsed. The burden, as always,
fell on average Palestinians.
In
the past week, Israel has upped the ante by threatening a full-scale
military attack on Gaza. The Israelis had already been escalating
quietly: a raid here, a missile there, artillery shells somewhere
else. With Palestinian civilians dying, Hamas had to respond. It
did so with a raid on an Israeli army post, a legitimate military
target. (Attacks on military targets are not "terrorism.")
The well-planned and brilliantly conducted raid (so well done as
to suggest Hezbollah assistance) killed two Israeli soldiers and
captured one.
Normally,
that captured Israeli would be a Hamas asset. But now that Hamas
is a state, it has discovered Cpl. Gilad Shalit is a major liability.
Israel is refusing all deals for his return. If Hamas returns him
without a deal, it will be humiliated. If it continues to hold him,
Israel will up the military pressure; it is already destroying PA
targets such as government offices and arresting PA cabinet members.
If it kills him, the Israeli public will back whatever revenge strikes
the Israeli military wants. Hamas is now far more targetable than
it was as a non-state entity, but is no better able to defend itself
or Palestine than it was as Fourth Generation force. 4GW forces
are generally unable to defend territory or fixed targets against
state armed forces, but they have no reason to do so. Now, as a
quasi-state, Hamas must do so or appear to be defeated.
Does
the sign really say "No Exit" for Hamas? It may, so long
as Hamas remains a state, or has aspirations to be one. Washington’s
and Tel Aviv’s obvious goal is to push the Hamas government to the
point where it must choose between a humanitarian catastrophe for
the Palestinian people and resignation, with the return of corrupt
and compliant Fatah to power. Either way, Hamas will have suffered
an enormous defeat, to the point where it is unlikely to be a serious
alternative ever again.
There
is, however, another way out for Hamas. It can call and raise Washington’s
and Tel Aviv's bets. How? By voting to dissolve the Palestinian
Authority. Ending the PA would dump the Palestinian territories
and their inhabitants right back in Israel’s lap. Under international
law, as the occupying power, Israel would be responsible for everything
in the territories: security, human services, utilities and infrastructure,
the economy, the whole megillah (oy!). Israel could try to restore
the PA in cooperation with Fatah, but if Fatah joined Israel in
doing so, it would destroy what legitimacy it has left. Hamas could
meanwhile return to a 4GW war against Israel, unencumbered with
the dubious assets of a state, and with lots more targets as Israel
attempted to run the Palestinian Territories itself.
Hamas
faces what may be a defining moment, not only for itself but for
Fourth Generation entities elsewhere. Does it want the trappings
of a state so much that it will render itself targetable as a state,
or can it see through the glitter of being "cabinet ministers"
and the like and go instead for substance by retaining non-state
status? To be or not to be a state, that is the question – for Hamas
and soon enough for other 4GW entities as well.
July
6, 2006
William
Lind [send him mail]
is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free
Congress Foundation. The views expressed in this article are those
of Mr. Lind, writing in his personal capacity.
Copyright
© 2006 William S. Lind
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