Rothbardian
Ethics
by
Hans-Hermann Hoppe
by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
The
Problem of Social Order
Robinson
Crusoe, alone on his island, can do whatever he pleases. For him,
the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct social
cooperation simply does not arise. Naturally, this question
can only arise once a second person, Friday, arrives on the island.
Yet even then, the question remains largely irrelevant so long as
no scarcity exists. Suppose the island is the Garden of Eden.
All external goods are available in superabundance. They are "free
goods," such as the air that we breathe is normally a "free" good.
Whatever Crusoe does with these goods, his actions have repercussions
neither with respect of his own future supply of such goods,
nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods
for Friday (and vice versa). Hence, it is impossible that
there could ever be a conflict between Crusoe and Friday concerning
the use of such goods. A conflict becomes possible only if goods
are scarce, and only then can there arise a problem of formulating
rules which make an orderly conflict-free social cooperation
possible.
In
the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist: the physical body
of a person and its standing room. Crusoe and Friday each have only
one body and can stand only at one place at a time. Hence, even
in the Garden of Eden conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise:
Crusoe and Friday cannot both simultaneously want to occupy the
same standing room without coming thereby into physical conflict
with each other. Accordingly, even in the Garden of Eden rules of
orderly social conduct must exist rules regarding the proper
location and movement of human bodies. And outside the Garden of
Eden, in the realm of scarcity, there must be rules that regulate
not just the use of personal bodies but of everything scarce
so that all possible conflicts can be ruled out. This is
the problem of social order.
The
Problem Solution: The Idea of Original Appropriation and Private
Property
In
the history of social and political thought many proposals have
been advanced as an alleged solution to the problem of social order,
and this variety of mutually inconsistent proposals has contributed
to the fact that today the search for a single "correct" problem
solution is frequently deemed illusory. Yet as I will try to demonstrate,
there exists a correct solution; and hence, there is no reason
to succumb to moral relativism. I did not discover this solution,
nor did Murray Rothbard, for that matter. Rather, the solution has
been essentially known for hundreds of years if not for much longer.
Murray Rothbard’s claim to fame is "merely" that he rediscovered
this old as well as simple solution and formulated it more clearly
and convincingly than anyone before him.
Let
me begin in formulating the solution first for the special
case represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the
general case represented by the "real" world of all-around scarcity
and then proceed to the explanation of why this solution,
and no other one, is correct.
In
the Garden of Eden, the solution is provided by the simple rule
stipulating that everyone may place or move his own body wherever
he pleases, provided only that no one else is already
standing there and occupying the same space. And outside of
the Garden of Eden, in the realm of all-around scarcity, the solution
is provided by this rule: Everyone is the proper owner of his own
physical body as well as of all places and nature-given goods that
he occupies and puts to use by means of his body, provided only
that no one else has already occupied or used the same places
and goods before him. This ownership of "originally appropriated"
places and goods by a person implies his right to use and transform
these places and goods in any way he sees fit, provided only
that he does not change thereby uninvitedly the physical integrity
of places and goods originally appropriated by another person.
In particular, once a place or good has been first appropriated
by, in John Locke’s phrase, "mixing one’s labor" with it, ownership
in such places and goods can be acquired only by means of a voluntary
contractual transfer of its property title from a
previous to a later owner.
In
light of widespread moral relativism, it is worthwhile to point
out that this idea of original appropriation and private property
as a solution to the problem of social order is in complete accordance
with our moral "intuition." Isn’t it simply absurd to claim that
a person should not be the proper owner of his body and the
places and goods that he originally, i.e., prior to anyone
else, appropriates, uses and/or produces by means of his body? For
who else, if not he, should be their owner? And isn’t it also obvious
that the overwhelming majority of people including children
and primitives act in fact according to these rules, and
do so unquestioningly and as a matter-of-course?
A
moral intuition, as important as it is, is not a proof, however.
Yet there also exists proof of our moral intuition being correct.
The
proof can be provided in a twofold manner. On the one hand, in spelling
out the consequences that follow if one were to deny the validity
of the institution of original appropriation and private property:
If a person A were not the owner of his own body and the
places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this
body as well as of the goods voluntarily (contractually) acquired
from another previous owner, then only two alternatives exist. Either
another person B must be recognized as the owner of A’s body
as well as the places and goods appropriated, produced or acquired
by A. Or else all persons, A and B, must be considered
equal co-owners of all bodies, places and goods.
In
the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and
object of exploitation. B is the owner of A’s body and all places
and goods appropriated, produced, and acquired by A, but A in turn
is not the owner of B’s body and the places and goods appropriated,
produced and acquired by B. Hence, under this ruling two categorically
distinct classes of persons are constituted Untermenschen
such as A and Übermenschen such as B to whom different
"laws" apply. Accordingly, such ruling must be discarded as a human
ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being (rational
animal). From the very outset, any such ruling can be recognized
as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent
law. Because for a rule to aspire to the rank of a law a
just rule it is necessary that such a rule apply equally
and universally to everyone.
Alternatively,
in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership the requirement
of equal law for everyone is fulfilled. However, this alternative
suffers from another, even more severe deficiency, because if it
were applied all of mankind would instantly perish. (And since every
human ethic must permit the survival of mankind, this alternative,
then, must be rejected, too.) For every action of a person requires
the use of some scarce means (at least the person’s body and its
standing room). But if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then
no one, at no time and no place, would be allowed to do anything
unless he had previously secured every other co-owner’s consent
to do so; and yet, how can anyone grant such consent if he were
not the exclusive owner of his own body (including his vocal chords)
by means of which his consent must be expressed? Indeed, he would
first need others’ consent in order to be allowed to express his
own, but these others cannot give their consent without having first
his, etc.
This
insight into the praxeological impossibility of "universal communism,"
as Rothbard referred to this proposal, brings me immediately to
a second, alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original
appropriation and private property as the only correct solution
to the problem of social order. Whether or not persons have any
rights and, if so, which ones, can only be decided in the course
of argumentation (propositional exchange). Justification
proof, conjecture, refutation is argumentative justification.
Anyone who were to deny this proposition would become involved in
a performative contradiction, because his denial would itself constitute
an argument. Even an ethical relativist, then, must accept this
first proposition, which has been accordingly referred to as the
a priori of argumentation.
From
the undeniable acceptance the axiomatic status of
this a priori of argumentation in turn two equally necessary conclusions
follow. The first follows from the a priori of argumentation when
there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict
arising from the existence of scarcity. Suppose in my earlier scenario
of Crusoe and Friday, that Friday was not the name of a man but
of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe can run into conflict regarding
his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so he might
do so with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy
the same space that Crusoe is already occupying. In this case, at
least if the gorilla is the sort of entity that we know gorillas
to be, there is in fact no rational solution to their conflict.
Either the gorilla wins, and devours, crushes, or pushes Crusoe
aside that is the gorilla’s solution to the problem
or Crusoe wins, and kills, beats, chases away, or tames the gorilla
that is Crusoe’s solution. In this situation, one may indeed
speak of moral relativism. With Alasdair MacIntyre, a prominent
philosopher of the relativist persuasion, one may concur asking
as the title of one of his books, Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? Crusoe’s or the gorilla’s.
Depending on whose side one chooses, the answer will be different.
However, it is more appropriate to refer to this situation as one
where the question of justice and rationality simply does not arise:
that is, as an extra-moral situation. The existence of Friday the
gorilla poses for Crusoe merely a technical problem, not a moral
one. Crusoe has no other choice but to learn how to successfully
manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he must
learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of his environment.
By
implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging
in argumentation with one another, can one speak of a moral problem
and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful.
Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether
he looks like a man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation
(even if he has shown himself to be so capable only once), can he
be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct
solution to the problem of social order exists make sense. No one
can be expected to give an answer indeed: any answer
to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the
point, who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the
form of an argument. In that case, this "other" cannot but be regarded
and treated like an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity.
Only if this other entity can in principle pause in his activity,
whatever it might be, step back so to speak, and say "yes" or "no"
to something one has said, do we owe this entity an answer and,
accordingly, can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct
one for both parties involved in a conflict.
Moreover,
secondly and positively it follows from the a priori of argumentation
that everything that must be presupposed in the course of an argumentation
as the logical and praxeological precondition of argumentation
cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed as regards its
validity without becoming thereby entangled in an internal (performative)
contradiction. Now, propositional exchanges are not made up of free-floating
propositions, but rather constitute a specific human activity. Argumentation
between Crusoe and Friday requires that both possess, and mutually
recognize each other as possessing, exclusive control over their
respective bodies (their brain, vocal chords, etc.) as well as the
standing room occupied by their bodies. No one could propose anything
and expect the other party to convince himself of the validity of
this proposition or else deny it and propose something else, unless
his and his opponent’s right to exclusive control over their respective
bodies and standing rooms were already presupposed and assumed as
valid. In fact, it is precisely this mutual recognition of the proponent’s
as well as the opponent’s property in his own body and standing
room which constitutes the characteristicum specificum of
all propositional disputes: that while one may not agree regarding
the validity of some specific proposition one can agree nonetheless
on the fact that one disagrees.
Moreover,
this right to property in one’s own body and its standing room must
be considered a priori (or indisputably) justified by proponent
and opponent alike. For anyone who wanted to claim any proposition
as valid vis-à-vis an opponent would already have to presuppose
his and his opponent’s exclusive control over their respective body
and standing room simply in order to say "I claim such and such
to be true, and I challenge you to prove me wrong." [So much for
John Rawls’ claim, in his celebrated Theory
of Justice, that we cannot but "acknowledge as the first
principle of justice one requiring an equal distribution (of all
resources)," and his comment that "this principle is so obvious
that we would expect it to occur to anyone immediately." What I
have demonstrated here is that any egalitarian ethic such as this
proposed by Rawls is not only not obvious but must be regarded
instead as absurd, i.e., as self-contradictory nonsense. For if
Rawls were right and all resources were indeed equally distributed,
then he literally would have no leg to stand on and support him
in proposing the very nonsense that he does pronounce.]
Furthermore,
it would be equally impossible to engage in argumentation and rely
on the propositional force of one’s arguments, if one were not allowed
to own (exclusively control) other scarce means (besides one’s body
and its standing room). For if one did not have such a right, then
we would all immediately perish and the problem of justifying rules
as well as any other human problem simply would not
exist. Hence, by virtue of the fact of being alive, property rights
to other things must be presupposed as valid, too. No one who is
alive could possibly argue otherwise.
And
if a person were not permitted to acquire property in these goods
and spaces by means of an act of original appropriation, i.e., by
establishing an objective (intersubjectively ascertainable) link
between himself and a particular good and/or space prior to anyone
else, but if, instead, property in such goods or spaces were granted
to late-comers, then no one would be permitted to ever begin using
any good unless he had previously secured such late-comers consent.
Yet how can a late-comer consent to the actions of an early-comer?
Moreover, every late-comer would in turn need the consent of other
still later-comers, and so on. That is, neither we, nor our forefathers
or our progeny would have been or will be able to survive if one
were to follow this rule. However, in order for any person
past, present, or future to argue anything it must be obviously
possible to survive then and now; and in order to do just this property
rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and unspecific with
respect to the number of persons concerned.
Rather,
property rights must necessarily be conceived of as originating
by acting at definite points in time and space for definite individuals.
Otherwise it would be impossible for anyone to ever say anything
at a definite point in time and space and for someone else to be
able to reply. Simply saying, then, that the first-user-first-owner
rule of the ethics of private property can be ignored or is unjustified,
implies a performative contradiction, as one’s being able to say
so must presuppose one’s existence as an independent decision-making
unit at a given point in time and space.
Simple
Solution, Radical Conclusions: Anarchy and State
As
simple as the solution to the problem of social order is and as
much as people in their daily lives intuitively recognize and act
according to the ethics of private property just explained, this
simple and undemanding solution implies some surprisingly radical
conclusions. For, apart from ruling out as unjustified all activities
such as murder, homicide, rape, trespass, robbery, burglary, theft,
and fraud, the ethics of private property is also incompatible with
the existence of a state defined as an agency that possesses a compulsory
territorial monopoly of ultimate decision-making (jurisdiction)
and/or the right to tax.
Classical
political theory, at least from Hobbes onward, had viewed the state
as the very institution responsible for the enforcement of the ethics
of private property. In regarding the state as unjust indeed,
as "a vast criminal organization" and reaching anarchist
conclusions instead, Rothbard did of course not deny the necessity
of enforcing the ethics of private property. He did not share the
view of those anarchists, ridiculed by his teacher and mentor Mises,
who believed that all people, if only left alone, would be good
and peace-loving creatures.
To
the contrary, Rothbard wholeheartedly agreed with Mises that there
will always be murderers, thieves, thugs, con-artists, etc., and
that life in society would be impossible if they were not punished
by physical force. Rather, what Rothbard categorically denied, was
the claim that it followed from the right and need for the protection
of person and property that protection rightfully should or effectively
could be provided by a monopolist of jurisdiction and taxation.
Classical political theory, in making this claim, had to present
the state as the result of a contractual agreement among private
property owners. Yet this, Rothbard argued, was false and an impossible
undertaking. No state can possibly arise contractually, and accordingly
it can be demonstrated that no state is compatible with the rightful
and effective protection of private property.
Private-property
ownership, as the result of acts of original appropriation, production,
or exchange from prior to later owner, implies the owner’s right
to exclusive jurisdiction regarding his property; and no private
property owner can possibly surrender his right to ultimate jurisdiction
over and physical defense of his property to someone else
unless he sold or otherwise transferred his property (in which case
someone else would have exclusive jurisdiction over it). To be sure,
every private property owner may partake of the advantages of the
division of labor and seek more or better protection of his property
through the cooperation with other owners and their property. That
is, every property owner may buy from, sell to, or otherwise contract
with anyone else concerning more or better property protection.
But every property owner also may at any time unilaterally discontinue
any such cooperation with others or change his respective affiliations.
Hence, in order to meet the demand for protection it would be rightfully
possible and is economically likely that specialized individuals
and agencies arise which provide protection, insurance, and arbitration
services for a fee to voluntarily paying clients.
However,
while it is easy to conceive of the contractual origin of a system
of competitive security suppliers, it is inconceivable how private
property owners could possibly enter a contract that entitled another
agent irrevocably (once and for all) with the power of ultimate
decision-making regarding his own person and property and/or the
power to tax. That is, it is inconceivable how anyone could ever
agree to a contract that allowed someone else to determine permanently
what he may or may not do with his property; for in so doing this
person would have effectively rendered himself defenseless vis-à-vis
such an ultimate decision maker. And likewise is it inconceivable
how anyone could ever agree to a contract that allowed one’s protector
to determine unilaterally, without consent of the protected, the
sum that the protected must pay for his protection.
Orthodox,
i.e., statist, political theorists, from John Locke to James Buchanan
and John Rawls, have tried to solve this difficulty through the
make-shift of "tacit," "implicit," or "conceptual" agreements, contracts,
or state-constitutions. All of these characteristically tortuous
and confused attempts, however, have only added to the same unavoidable
conclusion drawn by Rothbard: That it is impossible to derive a
justification for government from explicit contracts between private
property owners, and hence, that the institution of the state must
be considered unjust, i.e., the result of moral error.
The
Consequence of Moral Error: Statism and the Destruction of Liberty
and Property
All
errors are costly. This is most obvious with errors concerning laws
of nature. If a person errs regarding laws of nature this person
will not be able to reach his own goals. However, because the failure
of doing so must be born by each erring individual, there prevails
in this realm a universal desire to learn and correct one’s errors.
Moral errors are costly, too. Unlike in the former case, however,
their cost must not, at least not necessarily so, be paid for by
each and every person committing the error. In fact, this would
be the case only if the error involved were that of believing that
everyone had the right to tax and ultimate decision-making
regarding the person and property of everyone else. A society
whose members believed this would be doomed. The price to
be paid for this error would be universal death and extinction.
However, matters are distinctly different if the error involved
is that of believing that one agency the state
only has the right to tax and ultimate decision-making (rather
than everyone, or else, and correctly so, no one).
A society whose members believed this that is, that
there must be different laws applying unequally to masters and serfs,
taxers and taxed, legislators and legislated can in
fact exist and endure. This error must be paid for, too. But not
everyone holding this error must pay for it equally. Rather, some
people will have to pay for it, while others the agents of
the state actually benefit from the same error. Hence, in
this case it would be mistaken to assume a universal desire to learn
and correct one’s errors. To the contrary, in this case it will
have to be assumed that some people, rather than learning and promoting
the truth, have a constant motive to lie, i.e., to maintain and
promote falsehoods even if they themselves recognize them as such.
In
any case, then, what are the "mixed" consequences of, and what is
the unequal price to be paid for, the error and/or lie of believing
in the justice of the institution of a state?
Once
the principle of government judicial monopoly and the power
to tax is incorrectly admitted as just, any notion of restraining
government power and safeguarding individual liberty and property
is illusory. Rather, under monopolistic auspices the price of justice
and protection will continually rise and the quality of justice
and protection fall. A tax-funded protection agency is a contradiction
in terms an expropriating property protector and will
inevitably lead to more taxes and less protection. Even if, as some
classical liberal statists have proposed, a government
limited its activities exclusively to the protection of pre-existing
private property rights, the further question of how much
security to produce would arise. Motivated (like everyone else)
by self-interest and the disutility of labor, but endowed with the
unique power to tax, a government agent’s answer will invariably
be the same: To maximize expenditures on protection
and almost all of a nation’s wealth can conceivably be consumed
by the cost of protection and at the same time to minimize
the production of protection. The more money one can spend and
the less one must work to produce, the better off one will be.
Moreover,
a judicial monopoly will inevitably lead to a steady deterioration
in the quality of justice and protection. If no one can appeal to
justice except to government, justice will be perverted in favor
of the government, constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding.
Constitutions and supreme courts are state constitutions and agencies,
and whatever limitations to state action they might contain or find
is invariably decided by agents of the very institution under consideration.
Predictably, the definition of property and protection will continually
be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the government’s
advantage until, ultimately, the notion of universal and immutable
human rights and in particular property rights will
disappear and be replaced by that of law as government-made legislation
and rights as government-given grants.
The
results, all of them predicted by Rothbard, are before our eyes,
for everyone to see. The tax load imposed on property owners and
producers has continually increased, making the economic burden
even of slaves and serfs seem moderate in comparison. Government
debt and hence, future tax obligations has risen to
breathtaking heights. Every detail of private life, property, trade,
and contract is regulated by ever-higher mountains of paper laws.
Yet the only task that government was ever supposed to assume
of protecting our life and property it does not perform.
To the contrary, the higher the expenditures on social, public,
and national security have risen, the more our private property
rights have been eroded, the more our property has been expropriated,
confiscated, destroyed, and depreciated. The more paper laws have
been produced, the more legal uncertainty and moral hazard has been
created, and lawlessness has displaced law and order. Instead of
protecting us from domestic crime and foreign aggression, our government,
equipped with enormous stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction,
aggresses against ever new Hitlers and suspected Hitlerite sympathizers
anywhere and everywhere outside of its "own" territory. In short,
while we have become ever more helpless, impoverished, threatened,
and insecure, our state rulers have become increasingly more corrupt,
arrogant, and dangerously armed.
The
Restoration of Morality: On Liberation
What
to do, then? Rothbard has not only reconstructed the ethics of liberty
and explained the current morass as the result of statism, he has
also shown us the way toward a restoration of morals.
First
and foremost he has explained that states, as powerful and invincible
as they might seem, ultimately owe their existence to ideas and,
since ideas can in principle change instantaneously, states can
be brought down and crumble practically overnight.
The
representatives of the state are always and everywhere only just
a small minority of the population over which they rule. The reason
for this is as simple as it is fundamental: one hundred parasites
can live comfortable lives if they suck out the life blood of thousands
of productive hosts, but thousands of parasites cannot live comfortably
off of a host population of just a hundred. Yet if government agents
are merely a small minority of the population, how can they enforce
their will on this population and get away with it? The answer given
by Rothbard as well as de la Boétie, Hume, and Mises before him,
is: only by virtue of the voluntary cooperation of the majority
of the subject population with the state. Yet how can the state
secure such cooperation? The answer is: only because and insofar
as the majority of the population believes in the legitimacy
of state rule. This is not to say that the majority of the population
must agree with every single state measure. Indeed, it may well
believe that many state policies are mistaken or even despicable.
However, the majority of the population must believe in the justice
of the institution of the state as such, and hence, that even if
a particular government goes wrong, these mistakes are merely accidents
which must be accepted and tolerated in view of some greater good
provided by the institution of government.
Yet
how can the majority of the population be brought to believe this?
The answer is: with the help of the intellectuals. In the old days
that meant trying to mold an alliance between the state and the
church. In modern times and far more effectively, this means through
the nationalization (socialization) of education: through state-run
or state-subsidized schools and universities. The market demand
for intellectual services, in particular in the area of the humanities
and social sciences, is not exactly high and none too stable and
secure. Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the values and choices
of the masses, and the masses are generally uninterested in intellectual-philosophical
concerns. The state, on the other hand, notes Rothbard, accommodates
their typically overinflated egos and "is willing to offer the intellectuals
a warm, secure, and permanent berth in its apparatus, a secure income,
and the panoply of prestige." And indeed, the modern democratic
state in particular, has created a massive oversupply of intellectuals.
This
accommodation does not guarantee "correct" statist
thinking, of course; and as well and generally overpaid as they
are, intellectuals will continue to complain how little their oh-so-important
work is appreciated by the powers that be. But it certainly helps
in reaching the "correct" conclusions if one realizes that without
the state the institution of taxation and legislation
one might be out of work and may have to try one’s hands at the
mechanics of gas pump operation instead of concerning oneself with
such pressing problems as alienation, equity, exploitation, the
deconstruction of gender and sex roles, or the culture of the Eskimos,
the Hopis, and the Zulus. And even if one feels underappreciated
by this or that incumbent government, one still realizes that help
can only come from another government, and certainly not from an
intellectual assault on the legitimacy of the institution of government
as such. Thus, it is hardly surprising that, as a matter of empirical
fact, the overwhelming majority of contemporary intellectuals are
far-out lefties and that even most conservative or free market intellectuals
such as Friedman or Hayek, for instance, are fundamentally and philosophically
statists.
From
this insight into the importance of ideas and the role of intellectuals
as bodyguards of the state and statism, then, it follows that the
most decisive role in the process of liberation the restoration
of justice and morality must fall on the shoulders of what
one might call anti-intellectual intellectuals. Yet how can such
anti-intellectual intellectuals possibly succeed in delegitimating
the state in public opinion, especially if the overwhelming majority
of their colleagues are statists and will do everything in their
power to isolate and discredit them as extremists and crackpots?
Time permits me to make only a few brief comments on this fundamental
question.
First:
Because one must reckon with the vicious opposition from one’s colleagues,
and in order to withstand it, and to shrug it off, it is of utmost
importance to ground one’s case not in economics and utilitarianism,
but in ethics and moral arguments. For only moral convictions provide
one with the courage and strength needed in ideological battle.
Few are inspired and willing to accept sacrifices if what they are
opposed to is mere error and waste. More inspiration and courage
can be drawn from knowing that one is engaged in fighting evil and
lies. (I’ll return to this shortly.)
Second:
It is important to recognize that one does not need to convert one’s
colleagues, i.e., to persuade mainstream intellectuals. As Thomas
Kuhn has shown, this is rare enough even in the natural sciences.
In the social sciences, conversions among established intellectuals
from previously held views are almost unheard of. Instead, one should
concentrate one’s efforts on the not-yet intellectually committed
young, whose idealism makes them also particularly receptive to
moral arguments and moral rigorism. And likewise, one should circumvent
academia and reach out to the general public (i.e., to the educated
laymen), which entertains some generally healthy anti-intellectual
prejudices into which one can easily tap.
Third
(returning to the importance of a moral attack on the state): It
is essential to recognize that there can be no compromise on the
level of theory. To be sure, one should not refuse to cooperate
with people whose views are ultimately mistaken and confused, provided
that their objectives can be classified, clearly and unambiguously,
as a step in the right direction of the de-statization of society.
For instance, one would not want to refuse cooperation with people
who seek to introduce a flat income tax of 10 percent (although
we would not want to cooperate with those who would want to combine
this measure with an increased sales tax in order to achieve revenue
neutrality, for instance). However, under no circumstances should
such cooperation lead to or be achieved by compromising one’s own
principles. Either taxation is just or it isn’t. And once it is
admitted as just, how is one then to oppose any increase in it?
The answer is of course that one can’t!
Put
differently, compromise on the level of theory, as we find it, for
instance, among moderate free-marketeers such as Hayek or Friedman
or even among the so-called minarchists, is not only philosophically
flawed but is also practically ineffective and indeed counterproductive.
Their ideas can be and in fact are easily co-opted
and incorporated by the state rulers and statist ideology. Indeed,
how often do we hear nowadays from statists and in defense of a
statist agenda cries such as "even Hayek (Friedman) says, or, not
even Hayek (Friedman) denies that such and such must be done by
the state!" Personally, they may not be happy about this, but there
is no denying that their work lends itself to this purpose, and
hence, that they, willy-nilly, actually contributed to the continued
and unabating growth of state power.
In
other words: Theoretical compromise or gradualism will only lead
to the perpetuation of the falsehood, evils, and lies of statism,
and only theoretical purism, radicalism, and intransigence can and
will lead first to gradual practical reform and improvement and
possibly final victory. Accordingly, as an anti-intellectual intellectual
in the Rothbardian sense one can never be satisfied with criticizing
various government follies, although one might have to begin with
this, but one must always proceed from there to a fundamental attack
on the institution of the state as a moral outrage and its representatives
as moral as well as economic frauds, liars, and impostors
as emperors without clothes.
In
particular, one must never hesitate to strike at the very heart
of the legitimacy of the state: its alleged indispensable role as
producer of private protection and security. I have already shown
how ridiculous this claim is on theoretical grounds: how can an
agency that may expropriate private property possibly claim to be
a protector of private property? But hardly less important is it
to attack the legitimacy of the state in this regard on empirical
grounds. That is, to point out and hammer away on the subject that,
after all, states, which are supposed to protect us, are the very
institution responsible for an estimated 170 million death in the
twentieth century alone more than the victims of private
crime in all of human history (and this number of victims of private
crimes, from which government did not protect us, would have been
even much lower if governments everywhere and at all times had not
undertaken constant efforts of disarming its own citizens so that
the governments in turn would become ever more effective killing
machines)!
Instead
of treating politicians with respect, then, one’s criticism of them
should be significantly stepped up: almost to a man, they are not
only thieves but mass murderers. How dare they demand our respect
and loyalty.
But
will a sharp and distinct ideological radicalization bring the results
aimed at? I have no doubt. Indeed, only radical and in fact
radically simple ideas can possibly stir the emotions of
the dull and indolent masses and delegitimate government in their
eyes.
Let
me quote Hayek to this effect (and in doing so, I hope to indicate
also that my rather harsh earlier criticism of him should not be
misunderstood as implying that one cannot learn anything from authors
who are fundamentally wrong and muddled):
"We
must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual
adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia,
a programme which seems neither a mere defence of things as they
are nor a diluted kind of socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism
which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty..., which
is not too severely practical and which does not confine itself
to what appears today as politically possible. We need intellectual
leaders who are prepared to resist the blandishments of power
and influence and who are willing to work for an ideal, however
small may be the prospects of its early realization. They must
be men who are willing to stick to principles and to fight for
their full realization, however remote. Free trade and freedom
of opportunity are ideas which still may arouse the imaginations
of large numbers, but a mere ‘reasonable freedom of trade’ or
a mere ‘relaxation of controls’ is neither intellectually respectable
nor likely to inspire any enthusiasm....
"Unless
we can make the philosophical foundations of a free society once
more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task
which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest
minds, the prospects of freedom are indeed dark. But if we can
regain that belief in the power of ideas which was the mark of
liberalism at its best, the battle is not lost."
Hayek
of course did not heed his own advice and provide us with a consistent
and inspiring theory. His Utopia, as developed in his Constitution
of Liberty, is the rather uninspiring vision of the Swedish
welfare state. Instead, it is Rothbard who has done what Hayek recognized
as necessary for a renewal of classical liberalism; and if there
is anything that can reverse the seemingly unstoppable tide of statism
and restore justice and liberty, it is the personal example set
by Murray Rothbard and the spread of Rothbardianism.
May
20, 2002
Hans-Hermann
Hoppe [send him mail],
whom Lew Rockwell calls "an international treasure," is distinguished
fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute and professor of economics
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Democracy:
The God That Failed
is his eighth book. See also The
Economics and Ethics of Private Property.
Visit his website.
Copyright
© 2002 by LewRockwell.com
Hans-Hermann
Hoppe Archives
|