The
Latest Reported Bankruptcy: Mainstream Economics
by
Robert Higgs
by Robert Higgs
Banks, home
builders, and auto manufacturers are not the only ones going belly-up
these days. If we may credit Louis Uchitelle's January 7
report in the New York Times, mainstream economists have,
in effect, declared their intellectual bankruptcy. According to
Uchitelle,
Frightened
by the recession and the credit crisis that produced it, the nation's
mainstream economists are embracing public spending to repair
the damage – even those who have long resisted a significant government
role in a market system. . . . Hundreds of economists who gathered
here [in San Francisco] for the annual meeting of the American
Economic Association seemed to acknowledge that a profound shift
had occurred. At their last meeting, ideas about using public
spending as a way to get out of a recession or about government
taking a role to enhance a market system were relegated to progressives.
The mainstream was skeptical or downright hostile to such suggestions.
This time, virtually everyone voiced their support, returning
to a way of thinking that had gone out of fashion in the 1970s.
At this point,
one cannot help but recall Proverbs 26:11: "As a dog returneth
to his vomit, so a fool returneth to his folly."
Modern economics
suffers from a variety of weaknesses and defects, among which faddishness
ranks high. The chronic pursuit of fads, however, springs from a
more serious problem: the mainstream profession's faulty epistemological
foundation – positivist presumptions that lead economists to believe
that by aping nineteenth-century physicists they are acting as "scientists."
Laboring under this grave misconception, they are destined to be
blown erratically by the winds of changing events. So tenuous is
the contemporary appreciation of economic verities that the slightest
apparent breakdown of the economic order completely befuddles the
economists and sends them running about wildly in search of a new
model that will predict better than the old, now discredited one.
Some are so
discombobulated by unexpected turns of events that they project
the breakdown of their superficial understanding onto the economic
actors themselves. Thus, Professor Peter Gottschalk of Boston College
tells Uchitelle: "Our models are built on the assumption that on
average people behave rationally and they do the right thing, but
this time people did very much the wrong thing."
Had Professor
Gottschalk so much as dipped his toes into the deep waters of Ludwig
von Mises's treatise Human
Action, he would understand that even the most rational
actors may make mistakes. Moreover, he would be equipped to understand
how various government policies – subsidizing near-universal home
ownership, generating artificially cheap credit, intimidating reluctant
lenders, and in effect promising to bail out any huge financial
institution on the brink of bankruptcy – created incentives that
led perfectly rational people to act in a way that now seems to
have been mistaken or even irrational. Gottschalk's misconception,
however, scarcely puts him in a class by himself.
According
to Janet Yellen, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
"The new enthusiasm for fiscal stimulus, and particularly government
spending, represents a huge evolution in mainstream thinking," which
she expects to persist, in Uchitelle's words, "for as long as the
profession is dominated by men and women living through this downturn."
If this forecast turns out to be correct, a profession that allowed
its misinterpretation of economic events during the Great Depression
and World War II to lead it in the wrong direction for three or
four decades will, after having reversed course somewhat since the
1970s, be reverting to the same misguided thinking it embraced in
the immediate postwar period – this time, however, without the excuse
of the confusion engendered by a genuinely great depression.
As befits
economists who lack sound theoretical moorings, those gathered at
San Francisco had "plenty of proposals," and "their proposals were
all over the lot." Modern economics is nothing if not trendy. Often
this trendiness reflects only the high marks given to the economist
who uses a new and even more incomprehensible analytical tool
a mathematical theorem or a statistical procedure cribbed from math
and stats journals – but sometimes, as now, it simply demonstrates
how a drowning thinker will grasp any intellectual plank he happens
to notice floating past.
The assembled
economists did agree, however, on one important point: "many said
that once the recession ended, the nation should not go back to
the system that held sway from Ronald Reagan's election in 1980
to the present crisis. It was one in which taxes, regulation
and public spending were minimized." Is it possible that the
statement I have emphasized in the preceding quotation actually
represents the beliefs of most economists? If so, then we can only
conclude that they have somehow removed themselves from this planet
and taken up residence in another world.
The idea that
since 1980 "taxes, regulation and public spending were minimized"
cannot honestly be held by any sentient being who has paid the slightest
attention to the events of the past thirty years a period
during which federal receipts rose from $1,137 billion in 1980 to
$2,588 billion in 2007 (in constant 2007 dollars), federal outlays
rose from $1,312 billion to $2,730 billion (in constant 2007 dollars),
real state and local taxes and expenditures increased by more than
150 percent, and regulations spewed out of Washington and the fifty
state capitals as if the bureaucrats saw no need for taking heed
of the morrow. Notwithstanding all of these events and a great many
others pointing in the same direction, the recent converts to active
fiscal interventionism would have us believe that this ongoing blizzard
of bigger and bigger government represented taxes, spending, and
government regulation being minimized? The mind boggles
at such flagrant nonsense.
Nor are mistaken
views of recent economic history the only obtuseness reported from
the AEA conference. "Nearly every economist who spoke here agreed
that a dollar invested in, say, a new transit system or in bridge
repair is spent and respent more efficiently than a dollar that
comes to a household in a tax cut." Say what? Politicians and bureaucrats
use people's money more judiciously than do the people who earned
it? Granted that Uchitelle seems to have been referring here to
whether the funds would be spent repeatedly for consumer goods,
rather than being saved, and he simply misused the economic term
"efficiently," yet the observation's inanity remains. Do today's
economists really take seriously the vulgar Keynesian idea of the
Paradox of Thrift? Can they be such idiots that they suppose every
dollar of income not spent for consumption goods goes under the
mattress and stays there? How, one wonders, do they imagine the
massive capital apparatus of the modern world came into being –
by people's spending for immediate consumption every cent of income
they ever received?
Ah,
yes, we must recall: modern macroeconomics proceeds in serene disregard
of capital, its composition, its complex role in the time-structure
of production, and its origin in saving. Macroeconomics deals in
unadorned aggregates, if it deals at all. For today's macroeconomist,
the aggregate capital stock is a "given," and the present is all
that matters, indeed, all that exists. In the long run, all macroeconomists
are dead.
I do
not wish to conclude this little diatribe without acknowledging
that a substantial amount of interesting and important work still
goes on in the economic mainstream – as the saying goes, some of
my best friends are mainstream economists (and I was once one myself).
Yet such work is the exception to the rule. Much of the decent work
takes place in fields such as economic history, the new institutional
economics, public choice, and other applied areas that the profession's
aristocrats the so-called theorists and the theoretical econometricians
view with disdain as labor fit only for the profession's
heavy-browed hod carriers.
No
part of modern economics comes so close to being completely worthless
as macroeconomics. Looking back at the seventy-years since John
Maynard Keynes's General
Theory brought this style of analysis to prominence, one
sees a series of stunningly simple-minded ideas, fallacious arguments,
and utter disregard for basic questions at the foundation of the
field, such as, "What does national output mean, anyhow?" and "Should
government spending be included in GDP?" Although a few economists
have pondered these questions, their reflections for the most part
have been flushed away by the never-ending flood of mindless mathematical
exercises:
call it Q,
call it C, call it I, call it G;
do not trouble
yourself as to what it might mean.
When in doubt,
assume, assume, assume. Then write down your assumptions in an arbitrary
mathematical form and proceed as if the stipulated variables and
their postulated relationships bore some relation to reality.
Now, with
the financial debacle, the bailout fiasco, and the onset of a recession
as provocations, mainstream economists are casting overboard the
few little packets of their macroeconomics that contained half-plausible
concepts and ideas, treating them as expendable cargo in a storm.
As if this hasty jettisoning were not enough, the frightened sailors
are also snatching bits and pieces of jetsam left over from the
theoretical and policy wreckage of the 1970s. It's a pretty ugly
sight, and as the storms intensify, it will probably get uglier.
January
10, 2009
Robert
Higgs [send him mail] is
senior fellow in political economy at the Independent
Institute and editor of The
Independent Review. He
is also a columnist for LewRockwell.com. His
most recent book is Neither
Liberty Nor Safety: Fear, Ideology, and the Growth of Government.
He is also the author of Depression,
War, and Cold War: Studies in Political Economy, Resurgence
of the Warfare State: The Crisis Since 9/11 and Against
Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society.
Copyright
© 2009 Robert Higgs
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