The
Trouble With Judicial Restraint
by Kevin R. C. Gutzman
by Kevin R. C. Gutzman
DIGG THIS
On
Monday, April 28, the Supreme Court of Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board allowed Indiana to continue to require voters
to produce government ID before they vote. The reasoning of the
plurality was notably non-constitutional. So, too, were some of
the conservative endorsements of the Bush Court’s handiwork.
The editors
of National Review Online, in an editorial posted April 29,
evaluated matters thus:
The decision
in Crawford … underscores the importance of nominating
conservative justices who understand the importance of judicial
restraint. More than half of the states have passed laws requiring
the presentation of some form of identification in order to vote.
It is easy to imagine a more activist court overturning those
democratically enacted laws based on a few liberal groups’ spurious
claims of democracy denied.
While they
were right to approve of Crawford, the editors of conservatism’s
flagship publication displayed notable confusion about the issues
at stake in today’s judicial culture.
"Judicial
restraint," in and of itself, is not a virtue. The idea of
judicial restraint first gained currency in legal academia in the
first third of the twentieth century. Then, it was the slogan of
such as Felix Frankfurter, an Ivy League law professor and high
ACLU mucky-muck who wanted conservative activists to cease imposing
their laissez-faire vision on America.
The laissez-faire
Supreme Court, in particular, was partly in the right and partly
in the wrong. In a series of cases, the Court of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century disallowed wage and labor legislation
passed by both state and federal legislatures. The Court was right
to do this in regard to the congressional statutes, because, as
the justices said, the Tenth Amendment represented the constitutional
principle of federalism – that control of those matters had been
reserved to the states.
Frankfurter
and other devotes of "judicial restraint" in this context
argued that democratic majorities generally deserved to have their
way; in other words, they wanted both state and federal laws regulating
the economy to be validated by the federal courts, despite the fact
that the federal ones were clearly unconstitutional.
With the
so-called "Revolution of 1937" (which, as Edward White
has shown, was actually far more complicated than that), "judicial
restraint" had its day. In other words, the Court got out of
the business of keeping the Congress from grabbing at power that
had been reserved to the states.
The Revolution
of 1937 did not mark the first occasion on which the Supreme Court
omitted to enforce the line between state and federal legislative
authority. Rather, in the 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland,
the Court allowed to stand a federal law incorporating the second
Bank of the United States. James Madison, one of the Constitution’s
chief draftsmen, wrote in response that if the people had known
in 178788 that the Court would read the Constitution as it
had in McCulloch, they would never have ratified the Constitution.
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One of National
Review Online’s legal bloggers has written at great length in
celebration of Chief Justice John Marshall’s performance in McCulloch.
Although his academic writings are obscure, his perch at NRO gives
him great potential influence. Alas, it seems that his anti-Madisonian
endorsement of "judicial restraint" may sway unsuspecting
conservatives away from originalism and toward support of the the
position on this question that has always been favored, from John
Marshall through Felix Frankfurter to the present, by devotes of
unfettered congressional majorities.
The NRO
blogger is not alone. Some conservative commentators have been led
by the federal courts’ career of judicial legislation these past
70+ years to the forthright conclusion that democratic majorities
should always have their way. What they favor is not constitutional
government, however, but the absence of constitutional restraint.
Proponents of constitutionalism hold that federal courts should
not be bound by the notion of "judicial restraint," but
should instead be in the business of doing what federal judges swear
to do: uphold the Constitution. If that means they must be active
strikers-down of unconstitutional statutes, so be it. Judicial activism
is only lamentable when the judges actively ignore the Constitution.
May
7, 2008
Kevin
R. C. Gutzman, J.D., Ph.D. [send
him mail], Associate Professor of History at Western Connecticut
State University, is the author of Virginia’s
American Revolution: From Dominion to Republic, 17761840
(newly available in paperback) and The
Politically Incorrect Guide to the Constitution. He
is also the co-author, with Thomas E. Woods, Jr., of Who
Killed the Constitution? The Fate of American Liberty from World
War I to George W. Bush (forthcoming from Crown Forum on July
8, 2008).
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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R. C. Gutzman Archives
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