The Emerging Mythology of Defeat
by
Charles H. Featherstone
by Charles H. Featherstone
DIGG THIS
I've long been
worried about just how Republicans and conservatives (or rather,
the muscular, militant nationalists who pretend to be conservatives
these days) are
going to deal with the defeat of the US arms in Iraq. Some version
of the "stabbed-in-the-back" mythology will be the prevailing explanation,
but just how that "stabbed-in-the-back" myth will work, given that
the war was planned, launched, conducted and overseen by Republicans
– who have for as long as I can remember sold themselves as the
only people competent enough to wage both foreign policy and war
in the world in which we live – I do not know.
Alan
Bock, Orange Counter Register columnist and weekly contributor
to Antiwar.com, thinks he knows, and
in a review of an essay by Spencer Ackerman in the The New Republic,
I think he's right on the money:
In brief,
they [war supporters] have shifted from emphasizing the prospects
for victory to warning about the dangers of defeat – and placing
the blame for possible defeat not on conditions on the ground
or the wisdom of the war itself but on a lack of will to win among
strategic elites back home. We’re losing not because the future
of Iraq is not, or should not be, America’s to dictate, but because
critics of the war, and even of the administration’s prosecution
of the war, are sapping the will to fight brutally enough to win.
In short, it
is the fault of all of us who failed to have faith in our leadership
– and that would be Bush Jong Il and his ill-fated administration
(odd, but these rules about faith in wartime leadership never seem
to apply in quite the same way to Democrats, like Lyndon Johnson
or the militarily promiscuous Bill Clinton) – that cost the United
States the war.
This is magical
thinking. To believe that doubting the regime is the cause of that
regime's military failure is akin to believing that harboring bad
thoughts about someone is the cause of their misfortune should misfortune
arise. Yes, war is about the will to fight, but that's not all war
is about, and simply having the will to fight is pointless if the
goals put forth are simply not achievable. And the domination of
and rule over others against their will is, in most cases today,
not an achievable goal. Especially if one leaves home and travels
halfway across the globe to wage that war.
This "lack
of will" talk is a recipe for authoritarianism and tyranny. It gives
government the power, in fact the duty, to punish those who
do not believe in the war, because the fate of the war hinges entirely
on whether everyone supports it, and not whether it was smart to
start the war in the first place. And it allows people to ignore
their contributions to the disaster. The best example of this is
what happened to the German Imperial Army following its defeat in
late 1918. Because the German army was never forced to face its
very real battlefield defeat (in the allied offensives beginning
in late August), because the German government that launched and
waged that war was never forced to face the consequences of losing
the war it launched (this, however, was Woodrow Wilson’s fault,
and not that of the Germans), the German right easily and eagerly
accepted the story of the "November criminals" (those Social Democrats
who led the post-imperial republican government and accepted the
armistice), and that story became an essential part of German right-wing
mythology in the 1920s. And Nazism as well.
We know what
Republicans did with this kind of talk after Vietnam – the war in
Southeast Asia was winnable, if only "the politicians"
(code for "Democrats") had let the military do its job
properly and without restrictions. (Whatever that means. More bombing?
Was it possible to have bombed Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia more
than it was actually bombed?) In fact, all American wars are winnable
if only the right people wage them (code for "not Democrats").
And America needed to "flex its muscles" and use its power
in the world. The long, sorry march to Baghdad in the early spring
of 2003 can really be said to have begun in the Gulf of Sidra in
1981, when US Navy jets downed two Libyan MiGs in what was, for
the time, an amazing and brazen show of force. And will.
It remains
to be seen how the failure of the Iraq war will play out in Republican
politics – it may be that because the war was in fact launched and
conducted by a very self-consciously Republican and supposedly conservative
administration, that some reasonably smart people will be inoculated
against the kind of thinking I’ve described in this essay. But I
rather doubt it, because bad ideas die hard. What I've seen on the
web tells me that some, at any rate, are willing to blame the media
and Democrats exclusively for the defeat. How that works
mechanically, especially given how little power they have in determining
policy, is anyone's guess. But we are talking about magical thinking
after all.
It also means
that Republicans, if they take this line of thinking to its logical
conclusion (and thankfully most of them don't), are going to demand
something akin to one-party authoritarian government the next time
they wage war. A government with the power to keep all possible
secrets, detain all possible opponents and control all domestic
media. Why do anything less if success in war – and thus the future
of civilization itself – hinges on it? Given the level of love
for an unbound, near-dictatorial presidency among Republicans (a
feature of Clinton Democrats as well), these things are a distant,
but very real, possibility.
But not even
dictatorship will save Republicans from the consequences of stupid
and unwinnable wars. Because dictatorship doesn’t save anyone.
(Did it save Hitler? Mussolini? Brezhnev? Saddam Hussein?)
Which means the next logical step is the rack and the inquisition
– "Do you support the war? Do you love and trust your leaders?"
And torture and death for those who do not. That is, after all,
what the state does when it demands the allegiance and support of
all its citizens. However, how they will explain defeat in
those circumstances is beyond me. But magical thinking tends to
have no bounds and is rarely accountable to reason.
At any rate,
the Bush Jong Il regime will likely run out the clock on Iraq, keeping
soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen killing and dying there until
the dear leader himself can hand the entire disaster over to his
successor. Who can then take the entire blame for the debacle. Especially
if he (she) is a Democrat.
Bock continues
with a short but important review of American "grand strategy":
Most of all,
it can’t be because the grand national strategy of "extraregional
hegemony" – which Christopher
Layne, author of the fascinating new book The
Peace of Illusions, argues has been the de facto U.S.
grand strategy since at least shortly before World War II – by
its very nature gets the U.S. involved in conflicts that are not
only hard to win but utterly marginal to core U.S. interests.
Almost all elected Republicans and Democrats, while they might
not cop to the term, subscribe to this territorially and ideologically
aggressive foreign policy, though they may quibble over where
to intervene to create yet another test of American "credibility"
next. We certainly can’t expect them to rethink something so intrinsic
to their very political natures as to be virtually unnoticed as
an ideological position at all.
And this, I
think, gets to the heart of the matter. Ruling the world is not
only intrinsic to the identity of America's permanent ruling elites
– those who populate and make up what Murray Rothbard called the
"Rockefeller
World Empire" – its college-educated, development and international
aid do-gooders (all of whom have tremendous economic stakes in the
preservation and extension of America’s world empire), but it has
also become very important to the millions of men and women who
populate the heartland and the suburbs, people who know little of
the world and respect it even less but somehow see American soldiers
as missionaries of order and civilization, bestowing upon the world
something it needs, or merely beating it into submission and keeping
it at bay. This identity is too important, I think, for Americans
of all political flavors to ever question in any great depth or
ever consider any alternatives. Even alleged "progressives"
are far too attached to an American world empire to ever give it
up voluntarily. Or even contemplate giving it up.
I would like
to see Americans lay down their aspirations to global power. It
has gotten us nothing of value (certainly neither prosperity nor
real national security) and frankly, it would be the best course
for us and for everyone else in the world. However, I also know
this will almost certainly not happen. I don't think it will be
ripped from our hands either. But it is crushing us, this overweening
desire to rule the world, this notion that we think we can, and
we will go bankrupt, we will collapse, under the weight of it. That
is both my fear. And my hope.
Because it
is the only way we will be rid of it.
November
6, 2006
Charles
H. Featherstone [send
him mail] is a seminarian and freelance editor
living in Chicago. Visit his
blog.
Copyright
© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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