'Rogues'
and Humpty Dumpty Judges
by
Thomas R. Eddlem
by Tom R. Eddlem
DIGG THIS
Note:
U.S. District Court Judge William G. Young labeled me a "rogue"
juror in a 43-page court memorandum issued July 25th.
I’ve
corrected them on my blog.
During jury
service earlier this year I sat in a judge’s robing chambers and
was asked to take an oath that I expect no juror in American history
was ever asked to take before or since:
"Would
you be able to set aside your own reading of the Constitution,
the judge’s past instructions, and judge the facts based solely
upon the judge’s explanation of the law?"
The judge,
U.S. District Court Judge William G. Young took 43-pages
in a court memorandum last month to call me a "rogue"
for not taking this unusual oath.
I’m not always
the quickest on my feet, but on the drive home from the courthouse
that day I thought a clever reply would have been: "Other than
the actual words that are written in the Constitution, what words
would you have me substitute when I think of the Constitution?"
I wouldn’t have given him such a smart-alec reply even if I had
thought of it at the time, though, as I was worried about a contempt
of court charge. I stayed polite.
Judge Young’s
oath had two parts: 1. Disregard the wording of the Constitution
and 2. Follow only the instructions of the judge.
It was an oath
to pledge to act as if we are not a government of laws, but instead
act as if we are a government of men, respectively. If I had taken
the oath, the judge could have said "the law says all Italians
are guilty" and I would have been bound to declare the defendant
guilty because the defendant was of Italian heritage.
I didn’t take
the oath, and was immediately dismissed from jury service.
The scene in
the judge’s robing chambers that day reminded me of a passage in
Lewis Carroll’s Through
the Looking Glass, where Alice is talking with Humpty Dumpty,
the latter having just taken words out of context. In other words,
Humpty Dumpty was lying:
"When
I use the word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I chose it to mean – neither more
nor less."
"The
question is," said Alice, " whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The
question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the
master – that’s all."
Judge Young’s
court presumed a world without an objective reality, just like Humpty
Dumpty’s worldview. There’s only my view and his view, and the only
question is "which is to be the master." It’s the kind
of worldview that C.S. Lewis described as "Men
Without Chests." In this world, there can never be such
a thing as the law. The law is a third thing, objective and distinct
from both his opinion and my opinion. When there’s only his opinion
and my opinion in a court, there’s no law, and only politics.
I was dismissed
from jury service exclusively for political reasons.
The whole robing
room incident started because of a preposition: "among."
The case I
was on was a Mafia drug trial, U.S. v. Luisi, and Boston
Mafia Capo Robert Luisi had been charged with "possession"
of cocaine. I asked the judge how the commerce clause of the Constitution
("Congress shall have the power … to regulate commerce … among
the several states") could apply to the Luisi case, as the
prosecution in the case did not even attempt to document Luisi had
transported drugs over a state line (or, for that matter, conspired
to do so). In fact, every fact of evidence presented in the case
that related to the drugs took place within Boston city limits.
This was not "interstate commerce." It was not even "intra-state
commerce." It was "intra-city" commerce. Such were
the facts of the case.
I would not
have hesitated to have convicted Luisi in a state court of possession
charges, nor in federal court of trafficking charges with sufficient
evidence. Even if no drugs had actually been transported across
a state line, but there was evidence of a conspiracy to do so, I
would have voted to convict Luisi.
These were
just ifs, however.
Luisi was charged
of mere "possession" under the U.S. Constitution’s commerce
clause. The limitations of the commerce clause on the ability of
the federal government to ban mere possession of drugs is firmly
established in history, as the 19th amendment (which
Congress felt obliged to pass in order to empower prohibition) gives
powerful testimony. Madison’s notes on the constitutional convention
of 1787 gives even more powerful evidence.
But my primary
reason for objecting was not the history, but rather the meaning
of the word "among." I had to memorize prepositions back
in 7th grade, and "among" was one of them.
I know the definition, and a review of various dictionaries after
the court case confirmed that "among" is not a synonym
for "within."
Young did not
take the trouble to correct me on my understanding of the word "among."
He did not consult any "third thing" to prove a fact,
such as a dictionary or historical record. There’s no need in a
Humpty Dumpty world. It’s only his view and my view, and the only
question was who was to be the master.
Young did not
take the straight-out liberal view that the commerce clause was
a "do whatever you want clause," though in his Humpty
Dumpty worldview of words it wasn’t much different. It means what
he wants it to mean, nothing more and nothing less. He asked me
if I thought courts had sometimes "gone too far" in being
liberal with the commerce clause, citing the Lopez gun case. Young
is a Republican appointee, and therefore supports the Second Amendment
at least in part. Thus, using the commerce clause to ban guns is
"going too far."
How far was
"too far," he never said. Nor did he have to. "Too
far" was further than he wanted, or perhaps further than higher
courts wanted. The actual wording of the Constitution has no effect
on the limitation of the clause, as far as Young ever established
in the court record.
Again, it’s
only a question of who’s the master.
The ironic
thing about the Luisi case is that Young actually did a better than
average job of explaining the law in the case, right up until the
jury started to deliberate. After that, he made entirely political
– as opposed to legal – arguments and engaged in persistent jury
tampering from the bench. As a result, the defendant did not receive
a fair trial in this case.
Judge Young’s
memorandum does say a few helpful things about the proper role of
judges. He appropriately quoted Marbury v. Madison, noting
that it was the "the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." Where he goes wrong is when he starts
saying things like jurors are "not free to determine any constitutional
questions
about the law." Just because it’s the judges’ responsibility
to say what the law is, it does not follow that no one else can
say what it is. Admittedly, only judges and lawyers have the training
to read the complex statutes coming out of Congress. These statutes
need an "interpreter," to use one of Young’s favorite
words, because much of what Congress puts out looks like a foreign
language.
But the Constitution needs no such "interpretation." If there’s
doubt, we have both dictionaries and historical documents to consult
to clear up any doubt. The Constitution was written in simple, declarative
English language sentences by farmers. It was written in our name,
"we the people." Not only does Young’s view belie the first three
words of the preamble of the Constitution, "We the people…", but
his philosophy essentially charges every social studies and civics
teacher across the country with conspiring to make their students
ineligible for jury service.
Juries cannot judge the law, Young says, even though he makes all
jurors who enter his courtroom swear an oath to judge the “facts
and the law.” Just how wacky Young is on this measure was revealed
in his memorandum where he took pains to explain that the jury didn’t
have the power to consider the First Amendment in the Callender
trial under the Alien and Sedition Acts. James Callender was a newspaper
editor who criticized President Adams in print, and the Alien and
Sedition Acts had – in a clear violation of the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press – criminalized criticism of the
President. Why couldn’t the jury consider the First Amendment? Because
the judge had told them not to, of course. The opinion of the judge
is all that matters to Young, not the clear and unequivocal wording
of the U.S. Constitution.
During the trial, Young stated repeatedly that jurors can’t judge
law but can only judge facts. But
that doesn’t make any sense. Jurors are charged with rendering a
verdict of either "guilty" or "not guilty."
How can a fact be "guilty"? How can a person be "not
guilty" of a fact? Isn’t it more accurate to say that a person
can only be guilty of law-breaking? "Guilty" and "not
guilty" are moral terms; they imply a right and a wrong. "Facts"
are neither moral nor immoral. Facts are either true or false, but
true or false does not imply a moral principle. Juries must judge
the law as well as the fact, which is why the federal oath of jury
service requires them to judge both with guidance from a judge.
This was true even in Young’s courtroom up until he made me swear
a second oath.
Young usurps
any meaningful function from juries. In fact, Young’s memo depicts
juries as nothing more than props designed to give some pretended
legitimacy to courts. In his words: "Juries have established
district courts’ authority to ‘say what the law is.’" Indeed,
if judges can legitimately instruct juries to enforce congressional
bans against newspapers criticizing public officials, as Young clearly
said they can, then juries are nothing more than stage props for
pretended legitimacy.
I agree with
Judge Young that it is not healthy to have juries "nullifying" laws.
I agree completely with his words that "no citizen is above
the law, and none is free to make his own law." Jurors are
required to uphold all law, even laws they don’t like. I would stress
that Young’s dictum applies even if the citizen is wearing a black
robe and sits at the head of a court.
I am against
the type of "rogues" Judge Young describes in his memorandum,
the kind of people who ignore their oaths to judge the "facts
and the law," throwing the law to the wind to substitute their
own political agenda. But as a whole, the handful of "rogues"
across the nation are far less dangerous to the rule of law than
Humpty Dumpty judges.
August
9, 2008
Thomas
R. Eddlem
[send him mail] is
a freelance writer who has been published in more than 20 periodicals,
and his essays have been re-published in five books. Recently, he
has written the introduction to William Norman Grigg’s latest book,
Liberty
In Eclipse, and has also contributed a chapter to an
upcoming biography on Rep. Ron Paul of Texas, Ron
Paul: A Life.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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