Financial Markets on Crack
by
Kevin Duffy
by Kevin Duffy
DIGG THIS
Critics of
paternalist government were hardly surprised last Friday when the
Federal Reserve responded to the hopes, tantrums
and demands of the investor class (led by the likes of Larry Kudlow,
Jim Cramer, and Barton Biggs) by lowering the discount rate from
6.25% to 5.75%. Cramer immediately predicted the largest single
day Dow Jones Industrials Average point gain ever (wrong) and Dow
14,500 by the end of the year, up nearly 11% from Friday's close.
He also recounted the tread marks on his back from fighting the
Fed's response in October, 1998 to the Long-Term
Capital Management fiasco, professing
his allegiance to "don't fight the Fed" this time.
This is now
the third time in 9 years the Fed has acted as "fireman" as many
believe is part of its job description:
You can't
just say 'we told you so' and turn your back. The Fed is
the fireman of our economy, and there's a fire and they're gonna
put it out. That's their job. Their job is not to
sit around and scold people for making bad loans [and] for other
people for buying those bad loans. The Fed's job is to put
out the fire.
~
Peter Yastrow, market strategist, MF Global, August 9, 2007
|
Fed
rescue missions: 19982007
|
|
Date
of Discount Rate Cut
|
Date
of S&P 500 Peak
|
Trading
Days, Peak to Rate Cut
|
S&P
500, Peak to Rate Cut
|
S&P
500, Day of Rate Cut
|
Bank
Index, Day of Rate Cut
|
Trading
Days, Ensuing Rally
|
S&P
500, Ensuing Rally
|
|
Oct
15, 1998
|
Jul
17, 1998
|
63
|
15.3%
|
+4.2%
|
+6.6%
|
364
|
+51.9%
|
|
Jan
3, 2001
|
Sep
1, 2000
|
84
|
15.6%
|
+4.7%
|
+6.3%
|
19
|
+7.0%
|
|
Aug
17, 2007
|
Jul
19, 2007
|
21
|
9.1%
|
+2.5%
|
+3.5%
|
?
|
?
|
Let's review
all three rescue missions:
October 15,
1998 – In response to Russian default, rising credit spreads, and
a banking system on the hook for $1 trillion in notional bets by
LTCM, the Fed surprised the markets late on a Thursday afternoon
(well-timed right before an option expiration Friday) to catch short-sellers
off guard by dropping the discount rate from 5.00% to 4.75%. The
market had peaked 63 trading days earlier. The S&P 500 was 15.3%
off its highs, with the Banking Index (BKX) down 30.8% and the Broker/Dealer
Index (XBD) down 46.0%.
January 3,
2001 – In 84 trading days, the Nasdaq 100 (NDX) lost 48.1% while
the S&P lost 15.6% of its value. So the Fed, attempting to contain
the fallout from a tech bust and stave off any onset of the "deflation"
bogeyman, cut the discount rate from 6.00% to 5.75%. The next day
it chopped again, to 5.50%.
August 17,
2007 – Although the S&P 500 was only down 9.1% in just 21 trading
days before the Fed broke out its fire hose, the financials had
been weak most of the year. The BKX peaked in February and was 12.1%
and the XBD peaked in early June and was 20.3% prior to Bailout
Friday. The Fed’s rate cut came on the morning of an option expiration
in order to inflict maximum pain on the shorts.
As it turns
out, the Fed faithful were well rewarded in 1998 as the S&P
500 rallied 51.9% in 364 trading days to its March, 2000 climax.
2001 was entirely different, as the Nasdaq 100 went on a tear, up
19% the first day and up a total of 28% over 14 trading days. Sadly
for the dip buyers, the credit drug soon wore off, with the NDX
plunging as much as 69% over the next 2 1/2 years. All the Fed's
pumping and all the Fed's men, could not put the tech bubble back
together again. (Though they were wildly successful in fomenting
a credit bubble for the ages!)
Which brings
us to the current fork in the quagmire: Will Friday's stimulus work,
at least long enough for overleveraged speculators, banks, and Wall
Street to save their collective skins? Though self-professed "history
buff" Jim Cramer is convinced, we demur.
Our monetary
addiction is a progressive disease now in an advanced state.
Yes, there
were excesses in 1998, but nothing compared to 2000. In December,
1996 Sir Alan Greenspan fretted about "irrational exuberance" with
the Dow at 6500; by July, 1998 the Dow broke 9300. Yahoo! and Amazon.com,
though still in diapers from their IPOs in 1996 and 1997 respectively,
were each up over 11-fold by mid-1998. Yet Amazon.com was set to
quadruple and Yahoo! soar another 8 times before hitting the wall.
New Economy poster child Cisco Systems sported a modest $100 billion
enterprise value in 1998, or 95 times its annual R&D budget.
Two years later, Cisco fetched 185 times R&D – $500 billion
– and was expected by many to become the first $1 trillion stock.
(Today shares trade for a more pedestrian 37 times R&D.) In
mid-1998, technology funds made up just 20% of the total sector
fund asset pie; by March, 2000 they accounted for 60%.
Clearly, the
same patient who responded to the credit drug in 19981999
became overly dependent by 2000. Even the massive dose of easy credit
applied from 2001 to 2004 could not reflate the old tech/telecom
balloon. The new inflation instead created the 2005 housing bubble
and 2007 Wall Street bubble, both now bursting in unison.
Regardless
of this lesson in monetary impotence, the asset inflation Kool-Aid
drinkers are back in the pool:
"Everything’s
changed and it's looking a whole lot better. Now we don't have
to worry about putting safety first anymore... With the discount
rate cut, opportunity has come back to the market."
Although they
use slightly different metaphors than the Fed’s detractors:
"I actually
applaud them... This was not a shot of adrenaline to the economy.
This was more a shot of penicillin to an otherwise disconcerted
economy."
~
Dennis Gartman, The Gartman Letter, August 20, 2007
How does today's
credit bubble compare to its 1998 and 2000 predecessors? Derivative
exposure has more than tripled since 1998. And the balance sheets
of the top 5 investment banks have nearly tripled since 2000. Structured
finance was in its infancy 9 years ago and the collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) market was just being invented. LTCM was a liquidity
crisis; the current credit meltdown is a solvency crisis.
Cheap
and plentiful credit is what caused the current mess. More of the
same can only make it worse. It is only a matter of time before
this shot of credit heroin wears off. Sometimes the best medicine
is none at all.
August
22, 2007
Kevin
Duffy [send him mail]
is a principal of Bearing Asset Management.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
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