The ides
of March don’t always bring bad news for Caesar. The Roman Gaius
Julius might have been assassinated on that day in 44 B.C., but
here in the United States some 1,800 years later another conquering
general and paladin of executive power later accused of seeking
to establish a "military monarchy" was born. And this
year, somewhere in hell the shade of Andrew Jackson had more to
celebrate more than just his birthday.
As Fred Barnes
of the Weekly Standard would have it, we
are in the midst of a paleo moment – "paleo" as
in paleoconservative, that is. Grassroots Republicans have taken
to arms against the party’s leadership over illegal immigration,
the Dubai ports deal, untrammeled federal spending, and the morass
in Iraq. Barnes frets that this could cost the GOP dearly come
November. Not that he thinks the Bush administration should amend
its course; no, Barnes just fears that paleo-pessimism – "gloomy,
negative, defeatist, isolationist, nativist, and protectionist"
– will scare away all the Republican-voting Hispanics.
National
Review’s Rich Lowry has his own feelings of unease. In the
magazine’s March 27 issue he admonishes the fair-weather warmongers
he calls "to
hell with them" hawks, whose sin is a lack of faith in
the prospect of making good democrats out of the Iraqi people
or Muslims in general. Lowry calls them "to hell with them"
hawks, but there’s a simpler, more elegant term for these Americans
who favor an interventionist foreign policy but doubt the wisdom
of Wilsonian crusades for democracy: for fifty years now, they’ve
been plain-vanilla, no-prefix-needed conservatives.
They are
also, as Lowry acknowledges, Jacksonians. This is not a paleo
moment, it’s a new Age of Jackson. Citing Council on Foreign Relations
senior fellow Walter Russell Mead’s division of American foreign-policy
thought into four schools – Jacksonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian,
Hamiltonian – Lowry places the "to hell with them" hawks
firmly in the Jacksonian camp. But he understates just how important
this bloc is to the Bush coalition and the extent to which these
are the same people who reject Bush’s immigration policies. Fred
Barnes is right to be worried. Unfortunately, the rest of us have
cause for alarm as well.
Special
Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World
is the work in which Mead sets out the four strands of American
thinking on war and diplomacy. It deserves to be as widely read
as Samuel Huntington’s Clash
of Civilizations and is a much better book than Francis
Fukuyama’s The
End of History and the Last Man. But Mead’s volume doesn’t
have as sexy a title as Huntington’s or Fukuyama’s – and it had
the misfortune of being published in October 2001. With 80 percent
of the public rallying to President Bush, the divisions examined
by Mead might have seemed obsolete. In fact, as subsequent events
have shown, Mead’s work was prescient, and his discussion of the
Jacksonians accounts better for the course of the Iraq War in
the court of public opinion than most later analyses do.
(Mead’s title,
by the way, comes from a quip attributed to Bismarck: "God
has special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States
of America." For a more memorable hook, perhaps Mead should
have called the book Fools, Drunks, and Americans.)
The Jacksonian
American, as Mead describes him both in Special Providence
and in his 1999 essay "The
Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy," fits
the profile of the conservative Bush voter – and now Bush critic
– to a proverbial tee. By their own lights, Jacksonians are populists
(and "profoundly suspicious of elites," according to
Mead); unselfconsciously patriotic or nationalistic; and deeply
religious, with a tendency toward fundamentalism and its emphasis
on the individual’s relationship with God. Country music is their
quintessential cultural expression.
They admire
self-sufficiency, but unlike Jeffersonian libertarians, Jacksonians
are not averse to finding a positive role for government as long
as it fights on the right side of the cultural divide. "Jacksonians
believe that government should do everything in its power to promote
the well-being – political, moral, economic – of the folk community,"
Mead writes. The military is part of that community: "When
it comes to Big Government, Jeffersonians worry more about the
military than about anything else. But for Jacksonians, spending
money on the military is one of the best things governments do."
Moreover,
"while Jeffersonians espouse a minimalist realism under which
the United States seeks to define its interests as narrowly as
possible and defend those interests with an absolute minimum of
force, Jacksonians approach foreign policy in a very different
spirit – one in which honor, concern for reputation, and faith
in military institutions play a much greater role." This
honor, Mead notes, "in the Jacksonian imagination is not
simply what one feels oneself to be on the inside; it is also
a question of the respect and dignity one commands in the world
at large."
The trait
that most sets Jacksonians apart is their attitude toward war.
They are fierce, brave, and, all too often, bloodthirsty. As they
see it, "Our diplomacy must be cunning, forceful and no more
scrupulous than anybody else’s. At times, we must fight pre-emptive
wars. [Mead wrote this in 1999.] There is absolutely nothing wrong
with subverting foreign governments or assassinating foreign leaders
whose bad intentions are clear. Thus, Jacksonians are more likely
to tax political leaders with a failure to employ vigorous measures
than to worry about the niceties of international law."
Jacksonians
made Bush’s administration – providing both his hawkish national-security
voters and his fundamentalist values-voters, as well as much of
the country-music loving Republican base – and they can break
it. Jacksonians helped turn out of office Harry Truman, Lyndon
Johnson, Jimmy Carter, and arguably George H.W. Bush for failing
to fight hard enough; in any conflict, Mead warns, "once
engaged, politicians cannot safely end the war except on Jacksonian
terms." John Moser of Ashland University reiterated
the point two years ago – "Having been convinced that
the occupation of Iraq was a necessary component of the War on
Terror, [Jacksonians] will hold Bush accountable if they feel
the war is not being fought in earnest." That’s just what
they’re doing.
Jacksonians
have little patience with the rules of war; to them, as Mead writes,
"the use of limited force is deeply repugnant." Up to
a point, their nationalistic zeal and military prowess are of
great use to Wilsonians. But Jacksonians want total war – their
heroes are men like Curtis LeMay and William Tecumseh Sherman,
though the fact that so many Jacksonians are Southerners suppresses
their enthusiasm for him somewhat.
Wilsonians
fear that too much demonization of the enemy becomes a barrier
to democratization. Thus Rich Lowry says of "the contention
that Islam is a religion of peace" that "[e]ven if this
seems a polite fiction, it is an important one." He upbraids
Jacksonian conservatives for wanting "to write off reforming
Islam." And if liberal democracy has yet to show any glimmer
of taking hold in Middle East, well, "there are no shortcuts,
or guarantees of victory."
But Jacksonians
believe that there is a guarantee of defeat – failure to fight
with all the of nation’s resources, as ruthlessly as necessary.
Wilsonians like Lowry cite the post-World War II reconstruction
of Germany and Japan as examples of successful nation-building,
but the Jacksonians have a comeback to that: before Germany and
Japan could be rebuilt, they had to be destroyed – Tokyo and Dresden
firebombed, Nagasaki and Hiroshima nuked, hundreds of thousands
of civilians incinerated. Mead describes their philosophy:
Jacksonian
opinion takes a broad view of the permissible targets in war.
Again reflecting a very old cultural heritage, Jacksonians believe
that the enemy’s will to fight is a legitimate target of war,
even if this involves American forces in attacks on civilian
lives, establishments and property.
Probably
as a result of frontier warfare, Jacksonian opinion came to
believe that it was breaking the spirit of the enemy nation,
rather than the fighting power of the enemy’s armies, that was
the chief object of warfare. It was not enough to defeat a tribe
in battle; one had to ‘pacify’ the tribe, to convince it utterly
that resistance was and always would be futile and destructive.
For this to happen, the war had to go to the enemy’s home. The
villages had to be burned, food supplies destroyed, civilians
had to be killed. From the tiniest child to the most revered
of the elderly sages, everyone in the enemy nation had to understand
that further armed resistance to the will of the American people
– whatever that might be – was simply not an option.
The Wilsonian
leadership of the conservative movement would rather not admit
just how Jacksonian its grassroots really are. So Lowry says that
"Sotto voce, conservatives have said among themselves
of Islam, after some horrific terror attack, ‘This is a religion
of peace?’ And a small group of vocal right-wing experts have
knocked Bush for his ‘Islam is peace’ rhetoric from the beginning."
On the contrary, there is nothing either sotto voce or
small about conservative criticisms of Islam – at least at the
popular level. Think of all the loyal readers of Ann Coulter and
the anti-Muslim blogosphere.
Neoconservative
pundits have sometimes asked paleoconservatives just how it was
that supposed ex-Trotskyites came to hijack the Right. The answer
is simply that ordinary Middle American conservatives are neither
neo (Wilsonian) nor paleo (Jeffersonian or Adamsian), but Jacksonian.
Since 9/11, they have found common cause with the Wilsonians in
fighting real wars abroad and a different kind of "war on
terror" – or a war on civil liberties, anyway – here at home.
But the Wilsonian-Jacksonian
axis has always been wobbly. The "to hell with them"
hawks have defied National Review before. A measure of
their strength among the activists of the Right can be seen in
the career of Ann Coulter, whose popularity with attendees at
the conservative movement’s annual CPAC gathering has flourished.
She’s a rare Jacksonian pundit: after 9/11, she called for unlimited
warfare against Arab Muslims, demanding
that the U.S. "should invade their countries, kill their
leaders and convert them to Christianity. We weren’t punctilious
about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers.
We carpet-bombed German cities; we killed civilians. That’s war.
And this is war." NR
anathematized her after that column and its
follow-up. But the magazine that had earlier purged Old
Right Jeffersonians like Murray Rothbard failed this time;
at CPAC this year, Coulter’s Muslim-baiting remarks brought
down the house. She, much more than Lowry, speaks for the
movement’s rank-and-file.
The Dubai
ports flap was another clear example of Jacksonian rebellion.
National
Review and neoconservatives like Charles
Krauthammer – the man who gave
Rich Lowry his start in journalism – called for calm in the
early stages of that teapot tempest. But the Republican Congress,
sensitive to the Jacksonian disposition of its constituents, preferred
hysteria – as evidence, see Rep.
Sue Myrick’s astonishingly puerile letter to the president
protesting the deal.
And immigration
has long been a source of dissension between Hamiltonians and
Wilsonians on the one hand – believers, respectively, that immigration
should be a question of economic utility or a matter of ideological
assent to democratic humbug – and Jacksonians on the other. The
latter, as Mead describes them, "are … skeptical, on both
cultural and economic grounds, of the benefits of immigration,
which is seen as endangering the cohesion of the folk community
and introducing new, low-wage competition for jobs." Colorado
Republican Rep. Tom Tancredo – staunchly supportive of the 2nd
Amendment, anti-immigration, pro-war, and prone to the occasional
overheated remark that the
U.S. might bomb Mecca – is a model Jacksonian.
The Jacksonian
character begins with the Scots-Irish, including Jackson himself,
whose family came from Ulster. But today one doesn’t need Scots-Irish
blood to be a Jacksonian; the Scots-Irish ethos is highly
assimilationist. James Webb,
in Born Fighting, his history of the Scots-Irish, provides
an illustration of this when he relates a suggestion he once made
to a former member of the Irish Republican Army (the bracketed
remarks are Webb’s own):
Half facetiously,
I commented that perhaps [then prime minister] Maggie Thatcher
could alleviate the problem in Hong Kong and help resolve the
Troubles in Northern Ireland by allowing a hundred thousand
Hong Kong Chinese to emigrate to Ulster.
He laughed,
then grew deadly serious. ‘You’re wrong, you see, because you
underestimate the power of the Celtic culture. We’d absorb them,’
he said. ‘Within ten years we’d have the IRA [Catholic-supporting]
Chinese and the Orange [Protestant-supporting] Chinese.’
In matters
of immigration and assimilation, Jacksonians differ from Jeffersonians
as well as Hamiltonians and Wilsonians. Jeffersonians don’t necessarily
want to assimilate anyone else – they tend to be believers in
real cultural and geographic diversity, what Russell Kirk, an
Adamsian, called "affection for the proliferating variety
and mystery of human existence" – but don’t want to be assimilated
themselves, either. (Think of Jefferson, who took religious tolerance
seriously, but who removed his daughter from a French convent
school after she told him she was thinking of becoming a nun.
He didn’t hate Catholics, but neither did he want his daughter
becoming alienated from him by abandoning his beliefs – or non-beliefs
– and joining the Catholic Church.) Something like the discrete
patchwork cultures of Switzerland, rather than any sort of homogenized
national melting pot, is the Jeffersonian ideal.
Jacksonians,
on the other hand, are strong believers in a national culture
and community. In
the words of Anatol Lieven:
Like Jackson,
the numerous descendants of this tradition have had a strong
sense that this community is threatened by alien and savage
‘others.’ They have also had a sense that they constitute in
some way the authentic American people, or folk; the backbone
of the nation, possessing a form of what German nationalists
called the gesunder Volkssinn (‘healthy sense of belonging
to the people’), embracing correct national forms of religion,
social behavior and patriotism. With time, they have come to
accept people first of different ethnicities, then of different
races, as members of the American community – but only so long
as they conform to American norms and become ‘part of the team.’
And what
happens to the non-conformists and outsiders? "The freedom
of aliens and deviants, who do not share the folk culture,"
Lieven writes, "can therefore legitimately be circumscribed
by authoritarian and even savage means, as long as this is to
defend the community and reflects the will of the sound members
of the community." Andrew Jackson’s treatment of the Cherokee
– setting in motion the "Trail of Tears" – is emblematic,
all the more so because the Cherokee were civilized, Christianized
Indians who sought recourse to the Supreme Court rather than taking
to arms. But fine distinctions between "good"
Indians and "bad" Indians didn’t interest Jackson
or the Georgians who expelled the Cherokee from their homelands,
in an act of what would today be called ethnic cleansing. (Many
latter-day Jacksonians have just as much trouble distinguishing
between different kinds of Muslims and Arabs – hence the conflation
of Iraq with al-Qaeda and the knee-jerk hostility to Dubai.)
And of course,
when the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Cherokee, Jackson’s
response – possibly apocryphal – was to say, "John Marshall
has made his decision; now let him enforce it." Something
like that attitude toward the rule of law still exists among many
Jacksonians, who can see their way clear to circumscribing the
liberties of suspected terrorists and other enemies. A poll
from late 2004 found that 44 percent of Americans "favored
at least some restrictions on the civil liberties of Muslim Americans"
and "27 percent of respondents supported requiring all Muslim
Americans to register where they live with the federal government."
Where civil liberties are concerned, Jacksonians all too often
live down to the description Thomas Jefferson gave of his fellow
Southerners in a letter
to the Marquis de Chastellux of Sept. 2, 1785: "In the
South they are … zealous for their own liberties, but trampling
on those of others."
Jacksonians
are not always so indifferent or hostile to the rights of outsiders,
even in times of war, but there remains a sharp distinction between
their notions of freedom and those of the Jeffersonians, who tend
to believe, according to Mead, that "Liberty is infinitely
precious, and almost as infinitely fragile." "When the
U.S. government rounded up an undisclosed number of aliens and
held them for months without disclosing their names," he
writes in the paperback edition of Special Providence,
"Jeffersonians saw violations of precisely the values that
made the United States worth fighting for."
On the other
side of the ledger, "Jeffersonian squeamishness about American
power and the use of force strikes Jacksonian sensibilities as
weak and muddleheaded, while the Jeffersonian critiques of the
motives and morals of American foreign policy seem almost anti-American."
Wilsonians effectively exploited this division between Jacksonians
and Jeffersonians in the months after 9/11 – David Frum’s "Unpatriotic
Conservatives" stands as a good example – even though,
as Mead notes, "Jacksonians are smart enough to know that
the children of Wilsonian war hawks will generally stay far, far
away from the slaughterhouses of our future wars."
Now, with
the Iraq War looking more like tar pit every day, is a rapprochement
between Jacksonians and Jeffersonians in the offing? They have
found common ground before. Both in the 1990s were opposed to
the Bush-Clinton New World Order and skeptical of Hamiltonian
free (or, really, managed) trade agreements like NAFTA, and now
CAFTA. And, more importantly, there are some Jacksonians who have
pronounced Jeffersonian tendencies. Mead never intended his categories
to be mutually exclusive or scientifically precise.
One Jacksonian
with Jeffersonian leanings is James Webb, historian of the American
Scots-Irish and a former Reagan administration secretary of the
Navy, who is running as an outspokenly antiwar – at least, anti-Iraq
War – Democratic
candidate for the U.S. Senate in Virginia, opposing Republican
Sen. George Allen, a Bush stalwart and ’08 presidential prospect.
As well as having been against the Iraq War from the start and
calling for a reduction of U.S. forces abroad ("…this relocation
out of Europe needed to take place. What I worry about is the
smaller set of bases going into other countries, and (most importantly)
the logic of this Administration that we should be a permanent
occupying power in the Middle East"), Webb, in an interview
on the Daily Kos blog, sounds a Jeffersonian note in his comments
about Bush’s warrantless
wiretapping of Americans:
My strong
feeling is that we need to keep talking about these abuses,
and bring people into the Congress who will stand up to them.
Wouldn’t it be nice to have a Congress that was willing to subpoena
the right officials, and that demanded to see what the administration
was really doing, and who, exactly, was being listened to during
those NSA sessions?
And he’s
likely to please many Jeffersonians and Jacksonians alike with
his views on the Second Amendment and the limits of state power:
"I support the Second Amendment, for many of the same reasons
that I am more ‘liberal’ on social issues. I believe the power
of the government should stop at my front door, and that I should
have the ability to protect myself and my family."
On the whole,
however, despite the Jacksonians of the country turning against
the Wilsonian-Hamiltonian leadership of the Republican Party,
the constituency for war in this country remains enormous. And
whatever happens in 2006, the outlook for 2008 is dire, with the
presidential election likely to pit John McCain, a Jacksonian
of the worst sort who has said all along that the United States
should
escalate its prosecution of the Iraq War, against Hillary
Clinton, a Democrat eager to prove that a woman can be every
inch as manly as Old Hickory himself when it comes to war.
For the Jeffersonian,
politics offers no long-term answer. His mission must start, and
perhaps end, with education; Jefferson himself believed that only
an educated public could preserve its rights. Above all what is
needed now is education in the Jeffersonian tradition itself.
A year ago I gave a talk to a few students at a conservative organization
here in Washington, D.C., in which I commended to them the works
of Jefferson and later Jeffersonians. I was surprised to be told
by one student afterwards that he had long been told to discount
Jefferson for having been a votary of the French Revolution. Well,
yes, he was, and he also held slaves. Doctrinaires of the left
and right alike have found ample reason to denounce Jefferson.
But for all that, he still best represents the ideals of the early
republic – and to appreciate that republic, there’s no better
course of study than to examine the life and work of the man himself.
(Good places
to start: R.B. Bernstein’s short biography Thomas
Jefferson; the Viking Portable Library’s Portable
Thomas Jefferson, edited by Merrill Peterson; and Albert
Jay Nock’s exemplary character study Mr.
Jefferson. The University of North Carolina press has
also compiled the complete correspondence between Jefferson and
John and Abigail Adams in one indispensable volume, the Adams-Jefferson
Letters. And one can’t go wrong with the Library of America’s
edition of Henry Adams’s classic History
of the United States During the Administrations of Jefferson.)
The sage
of Monticello, though, is only the beginning of a tradition. The
foreign-policy Jeffersonianism that Mead traces is eclectic indeed,
ranging from John Quincy Adams1
(ironically, since Jefferson supported Jackson against Adams in
the 1824 presidential election) to such disparate figures as Mark
Twain, Charles A. Beard, George Kennan, and Gore Vidal. And it
should come as no surprise that, as Mead writes, "the libertarian
movement is an expression of Jeffersonian thought." Indeed,
"Jeffersonian skepticism about the merits of an active foreign
policy has libertarian roots, and more than any of the other schools,
Jeffersonians have consistently tried to ensure that the same
anti-big-government logic that is so often so powerful in domestic
politics be extended to the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy."
For 60 years
the U.S. has followed a Hamiltonian-Wilsonian line. The ’90s briefly
offered the prospect of retrenchment, but somehow the 9/11 attacks
were pinned on Jeffersonians – as if keeping bases in the Muslim
holy land, toppling Mossadegh, backing Saddam against Iran, and
supporting the Mujahideen so as to keep Afghanistan safe for Sharia
were Jeffersonian policies. Grand strategies plotted by Hamiltonians
and Wilsonians led to disaster, but the Jacksonian public, and
especially its right wing, vented its frustrations elsewhere.
Now the Jacksonians are beginning to realize their mistake. If
they are not to make the same error again, the Jeffersonian tradition
in one form or another will have to be revived. An age of Jackson
is no substitute for the Jeffersonian republic.
Note