The
Unconstitutional Tax on American Exports
(Or, James McPherson Shoots Himself in the Foot)
by
Thomas J. DiLorenzo
by Thomas J. DiLorenzo
The January
2004 issue of North & South magazine features a debate
on the topic, "Lincoln: Savior or Tyrant?" between myself
and Professor Gerald Prokopowicz of East Carolina University.
The debate occurred online between the two of us, and was then
published in North and South. The unscrupulous editor of
the magazine, one Keith Poulter, apparently couldn’t resist the
cheap shot of inviting Princeton historian James McPherson to
add an additional critique of one sentence of my contribution,
without offering me the opportunity to respond or without treating
my debating partner in the same way by asking someone to critique
some of his more dubious statements.
The sentence
that McPherson was asked to criticize was one in which I cite
Charles Adams who, in When
in the Course of Human Events, estimated that in 1860
Southerners were paying a disproportionate share of the federal
import tariff, which at the time accounted for 95 percent of all
federal revenues (See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970).
Southerners
had been complaining about such an injustice since the 1824 tariff
act, which received only 3 votes out of 107 from Southern congressmen
and 2 out of 25 U.S. senators who voted on the bill. South Carolina
nullified the even more heavily protectionist 1828 "Tariff
of Abominations," after which tariff rates were gradually
reduced. By the late 1850s, however, the protectionist Republican
Party regained the upper hand and more than doubled the average
tariff rate with the Morrill Tariff (named after Vermont congressman
and steel manufacturer Justin Morrill). Only 1 "yes"
vote on the Morrill Tariff (out of 105) came from a secessionist
state (Tennessee) during the 185960 session in the U.S.
House of Representatives.
North
and South editor Keith Poulter labeled McPherson’s comments
"The Truth About Tariffs" and promised they would "set
the record straight." It is easy to prove, however, that
McPherson’s comments are misleading, a-historical, and contrary
to standard economic theory.
McPherson
relied on his "authority" as the "dean" of
"Civil War" historians to make a "fair guess"
that Northerners paid 70 percent of the tariff in 1860. But in
the next sentence he essentially admits that his guess is completely
useless by admitting that "there is no way to measure this
precisely" since no statistics were kept on the final destination
of dutiable products.
McPherson’s
comments are worse than "data mining" – he merely speculates
and fumbles around without the benefit of any data at all. But
the more fundamental problem is that his comments are completely
uninformed by even elementary economic theory. Commenting on the
incidence of tariffs without the benefit of economic theory is
like trying to find one’s way around a foreign city without the
benefit of street signs.
Southern
congressmen were not being stupid or delusional in voting almost
unanimously against protectionist tariffs in 1824, 1828, and 1860,
or in outlawing protectionist tariffs altogether in the Confederate
Constitution – as McPherson and Poulter imply. They were voting
their economic self-interest, and the basic economics of international
trade – something that McPherson and Keith Poulter seem completely
oblivious to – bear this out.
It has
long been understood by economists that import tariffs impose
a disproportionate burden on export-dependent regions. And even
McPherson admits that the South in 1860 exported about 60 percent
of what it produced (others have estimated it as being closer
to 75 percent). As Wilson Brown and Jan Hogendorn explain in their
popular textbook, International Economics (p. 121), a tax
on imports is effectively a tax on exports as well. This is because
after a tariff causes the price of certain goods to rise,
.
. . consumers . . . include the . . . price increases in their
wage and salary demands.
Everybody tries to pass the tax to someone else. The only group
that
is powerless to pass the costs on further are the exporters, who
have to
sell at world prices and swallow these costs. In essence, a tax
on imports becomes
a tax on exports (emphasis added).
International
trade economists call this the "pass-through effect"
of a tariff. Unlike McPherson and Poulter, early nineteenth century
Southerners understood this perfectly well because they observed
how their incomes fell whenever tariff rates rose. As John C.
Calhoun explained in a September 1, 1828 letter to Micah Sterling
of Watertown, New York regarding his opposition to the Tariff
of Abominations, a protectionist tariff "gives to one section
[the North] the power of recharging . . . the duty, while to the
other [the South] it is a pure unmitigated burden." This
is so, wrote Calhoun, because the South "was engaged in cultivating
the great staples of the country for a foreign market, in a market
where we can receive no protection, and where we cannot receive
one cent more to indemnify us for the heavy duties we have to
pay as consumers" (Clyde Wilson, ed., The
Essential Calhoun, p. 190).
There is
a second, more roundabout way in which import tariffs impose a
disproportionate burden on exporters. As Wilson and Hogendorn
further explain:
As
tariffs cause imports to fall, less foreign exchange is needed
to purchase them and the demand for foreign currency declines.
The domestic currency will
thus rise in value on the foreign exchange market. Exporters find
that their
foreign-currency earnings purchase less domestic currency and
therefore they
suffer.
Milton
and Rose Friedman explain how tariffs discriminate against exporters
and export-dependent regions on an even more fundamental level
in their bestseller, Free
to Choose (Avon paperback, 1980, p. 38):
If
tariffs are imposed on, say, textiles, that will add to output
and employment in the domestic textile industry. However, foreign
producers who no longer can sell their textiles in the United
States earn fewer dollars. They will have less to spend in the
United States. Exports will go down to balance decreased imports.
Employment will go up in the textile industry, down in the export
industries. And the shift of employment to less productive uses
will reduce total
output.
This
again is exactly how the export-dependent South viewed all the
protectionist tariff bills promoted by the likes of Abraham Lincoln,
a lifelong protectionist, and his Republican Party. Apply the
Friedmans’ example to 1861, and one can easily see how higher
tariffs on textile imports benefited the New England textile manufacturers
and workers but harmed the export-dependent South. This is exactly
how protectionist tariffs are always and everywhere a tool of
political plunder. To make matters worse, as the Friedmans point
out, they also cause an overall reduction in total output in an
economy, making everyone poorer in an aggregate sense.
It wasn’t
just the antebellum South that was victimized by Republican Party
protectionism. By 1863, with the Southern Democrats out of Congress,
the Republican Party increased the average tariff rate to nearly
50 percent. It remained at such lofty levels until the income
tax was adopted in 1913. In a classic bait-and-switch con game,
the federal government temporarily reduced the average
tariff rate to gain support for the income tax, and then once
the income tax was adopted tariff rates rose sharply once again.
During
this time of Republican Party protectionist hegemony the farmers
of the American West and the Midwest, who also depended quite
heavily on foreign markets, were similarly plundered by tariffs.
This led to a political movement for lower tariffs on the part
of the "Populists." As explained by Frank Chodorov in
his classic book, The
Income Tax (pp. 3637):
The
plight of these farmers was made worse by the protective-tariff
policy of the
government. The best they could get for their products was the
competitive world
price, while the manufactures they bought, from the East, were
loaded down
with duties. Next to their demand for more money, the Populists
clamored for
lower tariffs.
Finally,
the great mid-nineteenth century British champion of free trade,
Richard Cobden, understood that 1) the South had a constitutional
right to secede; and 2) the North was waging a war of economic
plunder, not of humanitarianism. (Along with William Bright, Cobden
was responsible for getting the British government to abolish
almost all tariffs by the early 1850s). In a June 22, 1861 letter
to one W. Hargreaves, Cobden wrote:
I
have been reading Tocqueville’s Democracy
in America . . . he takes the Southern view of the right
of secession. He says, ‘The Union was formed by the voluntary
agreement of the States; and in uniting together they have not
forfeited their nationality, nor have they been reduced to one
and the same people. If one of the States chose to withdraw its
name from the contract, it would be difficult to disprove its
right of doing so; and the Federal Government would have no means
of maintaining its claims either by force or by right.’ He then
goes on to argue that among the States united by the Federal tie
there may be some which have a great interest in maintaining the
Union on which their prosperity depends; and then he remarks –
‘Great things may then be done in the name of the Federal Government,
but in reality that Government will have ceased to exist.’ Has
he not accurately anticipated both the fact and the motive of
the present attitude of the State of New York? Is it not commercial
gain and mercantile ascendancy which prompt their warlike zeal
for the Federal Government? At all events, it is a little unreasonable
in the New York politicians to require us to treat the South as
rebels, in the face of the opinion of our highest European authority
[Tocqueville] as to the right of secession (John Morley, The
Life of Richard Cobden (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1905), pp.
84950).
Thus, the
nineteenth century’s greatest European champion of free trade,
a British counterpart to John C. Calhoun, interpreted the War
to Prevent Southern Independence as being motivated primarily
by a lust for commercial gain on the part of the North, with the
protectionist tariff as one of its chief weapons.
Regardless
of what the exact percentage of tariffs that were ultimately paid
by North versus South in 1861 was, it is not debatable that Southern
secession and the creation of free trade in all the Southern ports
would have been a huge drain on federal revenues, fully 95 percent
of which came from tariff revenues. That is why, in his First
Inaugural Address, Lincoln stated that it was his duty "to
collect the duties and imposts," but beyond that "there
will be no invasion of any state." That is, fail to
collect the newly-doubled tariff rate, as the South Carolinians
did with respect to the 1828 Tariff of Abominations, and there
will be an invasion. He was true to his word.
The
founders wisely made taxes on exports unconstitutional because
they are so obviously harmful to American interests. What they
failed to understand, however, is the basic economics of tariffs,
which shows how a tax on imports is also effectively a tax on
exports as well. As with all forms of tax incidence, what matters
is who ultimately actually pays the tax, not who the law says
should (in theory) be paying. John C. Calhoun understood this,
as did most of his fellow Southerners since they were so burdened
by protectionism. Northern steel manufacturers like Congressmen
Justin Morrill of Vermont and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania
understood it as well, for the opposite reason: They were on the
receiving end of the plunder that was extracted by the Morrill
Tariff.
If taxes
on exports are unconstitutional, then so are taxes on imports,
or tariffs. Anyone who claims to believe in the U.S. Constitution
should therefore be in favor of one hundred percent free trade
with no tariffs, quotas, or trade barriers of any kind.
January
15, 2004
Thomas
J. DiLorenzo [send him mail]
is
the author of The
Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an
Unnecessary War,
which was just re-released in paperback with a new chapter by Three
Rivers Press/Random House.
Copyright
© 2004 LewRockwell.com
Thomas
DiLorenzo Archives at LRC
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DiLorenzo Archives at Mises.org
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