M(3)urder Will Out!
by
Sean Corrigan
by Sean Corrigan
Since conspiracy
theories abound regarding the Fed's mysterious and rather sudden
decision to discontinue collating the M3 data, we offer this – only
partly tongue-in-cheek – as a further, suitably alarmist example
of the genre.
Firstly, we
must ask whether it could be wholly a coincidence that, just as
we are to read the obsequies over our beloved aggregate in March
2006, Iran (if not yet "wiped off the map" by the Imperial
legions or their auxilia) is due to open its long-heralded oil bourse;
an exchange where trading will be conducted – horror of horrors!
– in Euros, not USD.
Now, if this
were to spark a reserve shift and/or a more general flight from
a dollar currently back in vogue with the leveraged crowd – a switch
perhaps aided by moves from those other energy kings, Mssrs. Chavez
and Putin – dear old Ben Bernanke would probably be compelled to
help American banks monetize much more of Uncle Sam's debt, in order
to keep domestic bond yields from soaring.
Though the
mere fact of opening another financial casino might not, of itself,
seem to pose much of a threat to the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the
pax Americana, it could, in fact be the crack in the levee
which allows the dollar’s unsteady hegemony to be swept away in
an ensuing deluge of fear.
For one, America's
main creditors – the Asian central banks – are undeniably nervous
about the $2.7 trillion Faustian bargain they have struck with their
most importunate customer, as HK Monetary Authority chief, Joseph
Yam, reminded an audience only this week, when he told his listeners:
"Whether
we like it or not, we now find ourselves in the unenviable position
of holding a substantial part of our savings in the financial
liabilities of an economy that does not save, fearing that
a diversification of a small part of such holdings might lead
to a sharp fall in the value of the rest, thus shooting ourselves
in the foot."
"We
also find ourselves somewhat stuck with recycling a large part
of our savings through the developed markets back into the region
in a much more volatile form, occasionally creating havoc in our
monetary and financial systems."
Moreover, though
the participants have understandably been chary of divulging any
specifics of the scheme thus far, the six oil-rich members of the
Gulf Co-operation Council are aiming to "reach agreement on the
principles of a monetary union by 2006" and "to press ahead with
preparations for a single currency along the lines of the euro"
– under the guidance of none other than the European Central Bank
itself.
At present,
all these candidate currencies are pegged to the almighty dollar,
but it would hardly stretch credibility to imagine that the Arabs’
European advisers might see fit to hint that a broader basket of
reference currencies – to include those of their other, major trading
partners – might be more suited to the purpose.
With the IMF
estimating that, as a group, the world’s oil exporters will enjoy
cumulative current account surpluses of no less than $900 billion
this year and next – and with the Gulf inevitably bound to reap
the lion’s share of that enormous bounty – the question of the ultimate
fate of this mountain of petrodollars is hardly a trivial one.
It should be
obvious that, given the potential sums involved, even a proportionately
minor shift, on the part of the oil producers, in favour of a wholly
sensible reserve diversification, could have profound implications
for markets in the chronically over-borrowed and acutely over-stretched
US of A.
Furthermore,
if the Bank of Japan can shake off the snarling pack of political
dogs who are threatening to legislate against its operational independence
in the event it should actually choose to exercise that same privilege,
the close of the current fiscal year – March, 31, 2006 – might also
be an opportune moment for it to commence the delicate task of weaning
its recovering economy off the drug of its ‘quantitative easing’
policy and to begin edging interest rates up from their present,
wholly unnatural, zero setting.
Then, absent
the multi-billion, one-way bet which relies on further copious BOJ
largesse, both local Japanese investors and the hordes of greedy
gaijin – who finance a great deal of their speculative trades
almost for free, by borrowing Yen and then selling it for dollars
– could find it expedient either to liquidate their positions outright,
or to finance them directly in dollars – so pressuring asset prices
and interest rates in the US, in turn.
Bernanke's
putative problem could be further exacerbated next Spring by dint
of the fact that last year's soggy stock market is not likely to
produce much of an April tax windfall in 2006 and so bad deficit
headlines will once again be in prospect just as the Administration
will want to be ladling out extra dollops of vote-winning pork ahead
of the mid-term Congressional elections.
A similar rational
would come into play if, by then, any of the following, homegrown
exigencies arise:
- the finally-exhausted
US consumer finds herself in need of a little Rooseveltian assistance
from the public purse;
- the impending
pensions bust intensifies (post GM?) to the point where a new
Resolution trust is deemed necessary;
- any of the
mortgage, M&A, or LBO bubbles begin to produce a few shockers
for the financial sector
(Timing here,
however, is necessarily much less exact.)
Finally, who
knows what retaliatory action – or even unintended consequences
– might redound if those Solons of virtue and wisdom, Senators Charles
Schumer and Lindsey Graham, at last succeed, by the March 26 procedural
deadline, in raising a punitive tariff on Chinese imports and so
inscribe their names in the roll of economic history, right next
to their illustrious predecessors, Senator Reed Smoot and Representative
Willis C. Hawley.
Ergo, if, in
order to deal with any of the above, a heliborne rescue mission
of the accelerated monetization of government debt were seen to
be needed next March, the simultaneous suppression of the M3 data
would usefully serve to obscure the extent of the US banks' role
in the scheme by no longer revealing – as one of the aggregate’s
particular components – what would then be the banks’ rapidly swelling
repurchase agreement liabilities (all of them held against USTs
& government Agency bonds).
Thus, the abandonment
of M3 could disguise this Reichsbank-like response to America’s
hypothetical future ills for some little while thence, delaying
market fears of a hyperinflationary outcome, and so keeping "Blackhawk"
Bernanke hovering over the scene of the emergency for a little longer
than might otherwise be the case.
As with all
good conspiracy theories, we hope this sounds just credible enough
to keep you wondering whether it might even be true, even though,
at this juncture, we have to emphasise that it represents nothing
more than the rankest of rank speculations.
After
all, it would surely be simpler to assume that the new Chairman
might just have taken pity on the poor, overworked public servants
– toiling selflessly away in the dreary depths of the Marriner S.
Eccles building – and that he has therefore decided to lighten the
drudgery entailed in crunching the same, weary old set of numbers
they have routinely had to process for each of the past 47 years.
Only time will
tell.
November
19, 2005
Sean
Corrigan [send him mail]
writes from Switzerland.
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© 2005 LewRockwell.com
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