Polybius
and the Modern State
by
Sean Corrigan
In
the VIth Book of his
Histories, written to explain Rome's rise to what today's geopolitical
inarticulates would term "hyperpowerdom"' or "full
spectrum dominance," the Greek statesman and historian, Polybius,
outlined his theory of the cycle of political revolution.
In
his schema, there successively arose three "good" forms
of government kingship, aristocracy, and democracy only for
each to succumb to corruption and for its ensuing realization in
its perverted form respectively tyranny, oligarchy (Rockerfellerdom?),
and ochlocracy, or mob rule to be overthrown by the benign phase
of the next.
In
his progression, successively more people shared power as a safeguard
against abuse until the degeneracy of democracy again led to conditions
auspicious for the acceptance of the "Fuehrerpinzip."
Readers
of Hoppe's Democracy:
The God that Failed would recognise Polybius's description
of the demise of the republic of the free:
Thus
the only hope still surviving unimpaired is in themselves, and
to this they resort, making the state a democracy instead of
an oligarchy and assuming the responsibility for the conduct
of affairs.
Then
as long as some of those survive who experienced the evils of
oligarchical dominion, they are well pleased with the present
form of government, and set a high value on equality and freedom
of speech.
But
when a new generation arises and the democracy falls into the
hands of the grandchildren of its founders, they have become
so accustomed to freedom and equality that they no longer value
them, and begin to aim at pre-eminence; and it is chiefly those
of ample fortune who fall into this error.
So
when they begin to lust for power and cannot attain it through
themselves or their own good qualities, they ruin their estates,
tempting and corrupting the people in every possible way. And
hence when by their foolish thirst for reputation they have
created among the masses an appetite for gifts and the habit
of receiving them, democracy in its turn is abolished and changes
into a rule of force and violence.
For
the people, having grown accustomed to feed at the expense of
others and to depend for their livelihood on the property of
others, as soon as they find a leader who is enterprising but
is excluded from office by his penury, institute the rule of
violence; and now uniting their forces massacre, banish, and
plunder, until they degenerate again into perfect savages and
find once more a master and monarch.
What
is also revealing is the way Polybius's own life has resonances
with modern times.
In
168 BC, as a military commander and diplomat, he was one of those
Greek statesmen denounced as part of the "Axis of Evil"
by the pro-Roman Callicrates after the defeat of the Greek king
Perseus at the decisive battle of Pydna.
In
those days, too, it seems, smaller states were either "with
us or against us" and, in the words of F.W. Walbank's introduction
to the Penguin Classics edition of his work, he was among "a
thousand Achaeans summoned to Italy for examination, and kept there
for sixteen years without either examination or trial."
However,
it is to our good fortune that, rather than languishing in some
Etrurian Guantanemo Bay, he became the mentor of one of the leading
young knights of Rome, Publius Scipio the son of a man adopted
by the conqueror of Hannibal himself Scipio Africanus.
Given
access, then, to the highest in the land, indeed, being given a
place in their councils, and yet an outsider, Polybius was well
placed to pronounce on what he saw as Rome's peculiar aptitude for
conquest and hegemony.
Specifically,
he saw it as Rome's especial virtue that she had broken the anacyclosis
of revolution by happening upon a separation of powers between all
three elements the monarchical consulate, the aristocratic senate,
and the democratic tribunate.
Listen
to what he had to say of the structure of the State:
The
three kinds of government that I spoke of above all shared in
the control of the Roman state. And such fairness and propriety
in all respects was shown in the use of these three elements
for drawing up the constitution and in its subsequent administration
that it was impossible even for a native to pronounce with certainty
whether the whole system was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical.
This
was indeed only natural. For if one fixed one's eyes on the
power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely monarchical
and royal; if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic;
and when one looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly
to be a democracy.
The
parts of the state falling under the control of each element
were and with a few modifications still are as follows.
The consuls, previous to leading out their legions, exercise
authority in Rome over all public affairs, since all the other
magistrates except the tribunes are under them and bound to
obey them, and it is they who introduce embassies to the senate.
Besides this it is they who consult the senate on matters of
urgency, they who carry out in detail the provisions of its
decrees.
As
for preparation for war and the general conduct of operations
in the field, here their power is almost uncontrolled; for they
are empowered to make what demands they choose on the allies,
to appoint military tribunes, to levy soldiers and select those
who are fittest for service.
They
also have the right of inflicting, when on active service, punishment
on anyone under their command; and they are authorized to spend
any sum they decide upon from the public funds, being accompanied
by a quaestor who faithfully executes their instructions.
So
here we have FEMA, the Office of Homeland Security, the Department
of Defense, and the CINCs combined. The power of life and death
over all in times of "urgency," unchecked by any wartime
appeal to a higher authority, and subject to no fiscal or other
budgetary constraint. No wonder the Carthaginian traders could never
turn grand tactical success into lasting strategic gain – elephants
or no.
Polybius
then tells us that, for its part, the senate exerts its control
largely because it holds the purse-strings, as well as having the
power to conduct investigations of capital crimes and to offer ultimate
arbitration in civil disputes.
To
pass to the senate. In the first place it has the control of
the treasury, all revenue and expenditure being regulated by
it. For with the exception of payments made to the consuls,
the quaestors are not allowed to disburse for any particular
object without a decree of the senate.
And
even the item of expenditure which is far heavier and more important
than any other the outlay every five years by the censors
on public works, whether constructions or repairs is under
the control of the senate, which makes a grant to the censors
for the purpose.
But what of the masses? Polybius struggles here a little to make
his case. The people have the right:
To
confer honours and inflict punishment, the only bonds by which
kingdoms and states and in a word human society in general are
held together.
They
also try lesser cases and have to ratify legislation and the treaties
proposed by the other branches of government. Again, all very modern,
but the nub of the matter lies in that mention of the senate’s power
over the public purse, for how is a man to be unknowingly enslaved
unless the State confiscates a share of his labours and then directs
its use the forging of his own bonds?
Through
the whole of Italy a vast number of contracts, which it would
not be easy to enumerate, are given out by the censors for the
construction and repair of public buildings, and besides this
there are many things which are farmed, such as navigable rivers,
harbours, gardens, mines, lands, in fact everything that forms
part of the Roman dominion.
Now
all these matters are undertaken by the people, and one may
almost say that everyone is interested in these contracts and
the work they involved. For certain people are the actual purchasers
from the censors of the contracts, others are the partners of
these first, others stand surety for them, others pledge their
own fortunes to the state for this purpose.
Now
in all these matters the senate is supreme. It can grant extension
of time; it can relieve the contractor if any accident occurs;
and if the work proves to be absolutely impossible to carry
out it can liberate him from his contract.
There
are in fact many ways in which the senate can either benefit
or indicate those who manage public property, as all these matters
are referred to it. What is even most important is that the
judges in most civil trials, whether public or private, are
appointed from its members, where the action involves large
interests.
So
that all citizens being at the mercy of the senate, and looking
forward with alarm to the uncertainty of litigation, are very
shy of obstructing or resisting its decisions. Similarly everyone
is reluctant to oppose the projects of the consuls as all are
generally and individually under their authority when in the
field.
Confiscatory
taxation, arbitrary, often prejudicial, litigation, the opportunity
of making a living as a government employee, or the need to curry
favour with bureaucrats, the threat of the draft and the possibility
of being subject to summary military justice – these are the very
modern factors Polybius identifies as the means by which the freedom
of the individual is curtailed.
Has
so little changed in the past 22 centuries? Sadly, it appears so.
But,
Polybius argued, this was a small price to pay, for, when "national
security" was threatened, the Cheneys, Ashcrofts, Wolfowitzes,
Blairs and Blunketts of the second century BC knew that:
For
whenever the menace of some common danger from abroad compels
them to act in concord and support each other, so great does
the strength of the state become, that nothing which is requisite
can be neglected, as all are zealously competing in devising
means of meeting the need of the hour, nor can any decision
arrived at fail to be executed promptly, as all are co-operating
both in public and in private to the accomplishment of the task
which they have set themselves; and consequently this peculiar
form of constitution possesses an irresistible power of attaining
every object upon which it is resolved.
How
very reassuring for the rest of us.
June
4, 2002
Sean
Corrigan [send
him mail] writes from London on the financial markets, and edits
the daily Capital
Letter and the Website Capital
Insight.
Copyright
© 2002 LewRockwell.com
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