Can
Uncle Sam Ever Let Go?
by
Patrick
J. Buchanan
by
Patrick J. Buchanan
"In 1877, Lord
Salisbury, commenting on Great Britain's policy on the Eastern Question,
noted that 'the commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcass
of dead policies.'
"Salisbury
was bemoaning the fact that many influential members of the British
ruling class could not recognize that history had moved on; they
continued to cling to policies and institutions that were relics
of another era."
"Relics
of another era" – thus did Stephen Meyer, in Parameters in 2003,
begin his essay "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO."
NATO has
been irrelevant for two decades, since its raison d'ętre – to keep
the Red Army from driving to the Rhine – disappeared. Yet Obama
is headed to Brussels to celebrate France's return and the 60th
birthday of the alliance. But why is NATO still soldiering on?
In 1989,
the Wall fell. Germany was reunited. The Captive Nations cast off
communism. The Red Army went home. The USSR broke apart into 15
nations. But, having triumphed in the Cold War, it seems the United
States could not bear giving up its role as Defender of the West,
could not accept that the curtain had fallen and the play was closing
after a 40-year run.
So, what
did we do? In a spirit of "triumphalism," NATO "nearly doubled its
size and rolled itself right up to Russia's door," writes Richard
Betts in The National Interest.
Breaking
our word to Mikhail Gorbachev, we invited into NATO six former member
states of the Warsaw Pact and three former republics of the Soviet
Union. George W. Bush was disconsolate he could not bring in Georgia
and Ukraine.
Why did
we expand NATO to within a few miles of St. Petersburg when NATO
is not a social club but a military alliance? At its heart is Article
V, a declaration that an armed attack on any one member is an attack
on all.
America
is now honor-bound to go to war against a nuclear-armed Russia for
Estonia, which was part of the Russian Empire under the czars.
After the
Russia-Georgia clash last August, Bush declared, "It's important
for the people of Lithuania to know that when the United States
makes a commitment – we mean it."
But "mean"
what? That a Russian move on Vilnius will be met by U.S. strikes
on Mother Russia? Are we insane?
Let us
thank Divine Providence Russia has not tested the pledge.
For can
anyone believe that, to keep Moscow from re-establishing its hegemony
over a tiny Baltic republic, we would sink Russian ships, blockade
Russian ports, bomb Russian airfields, attack Russian troop concentrations?
That would risk having some Russian general respond with atomic
weapons on U.S. air, sea and ground forces.
Great powers
do not go to war against other great powers unless vital interests
are imperiled. Throughout the Cold War, that was true of both America
and Russia.
Though
he had an atomic monopoly, Harry Truman did not use force to break
the Berlin blockade. Nor did Ike intervene to save the Hungarians,
whose 1956 revolution Moscow drowned in blood.
John
F. Kennedy did not use force to stop the building of the Berlin
Wall. Lyndon Johnson fired not a shot to halt the crushing of Prague
Spring by Soviet tanks. When Solidarity was snuffed out on Moscow's
orders in 1981, Ronald Reagan would not even put the Polish regime
in default.
In August
1991, George Bush I, in Kiev, poured ice water on Ukraine's dream
of independence: "Americans will not support those who seek independence
in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They
will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon
ethnic hatred."
Many Americans
were outraged. But outrage does not translate into an endorsement
of Bush 43's plan to bring Ukraine into NATO and risk war with Russia
over the Crimea.
Bush
43 bellowed at Moscow last summer to keep hands off the Baltic states.
But his father barely protested when Gorbachev sent special forces
into all three in 1991.
Bush I's
secretary of state, Jim Baker, said it was U.S. policy not to see
Yugoslavia break up. Bush 43 was handing out NATO war guarantees
to the breakaway republics.
"Washington
... succumbed to victory disease and kept kicking Russia while it
was down," writes Betts. "Two decades of humiliation were a potent
incentive for Russia to push back. Indeed this is why many realists
opposed NATO expansion in the first place."
Few Americans
under 30 recall the Cold War. Yet can anyone name a single tripwire
for war put down in the time of Dean Acheson or John Foster Dulles
that we have pulled up?
Dwight
Eisenhower, writes Richard Reeves, in his first meeting with the
new president-elect, told JFK, "'America is carrying far more than
her share of the free world defense.' It was time for the other
nations of NATO to take on more of the cost of their own defense."
Half a
century later, we are still stuck "to the carcass of dead policies."
March
28, 2009
Patrick
J. Buchanan [send
him mail] is co-founder and editor of The
American Conservative. He is also the author of seven books,
including Where
the Right Went Wrong, and A
Republic Not An Empire. His latest book is Churchill,
Hitler, and the Unnecessary War.
Copyright
© 2009 Creators Syndicate
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