Utils, Indifference and Austrian Economics

Letter 1

From: Sergey Fedorov

Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 10:39 PM

To: Walter Block <[email protected]>

Subject: question about infamous utility

Greetings, dear Professor Block!

I have a brief question about the “utility” and its aggregation and comparison.

(Please do not take it as an effort to justify Neoclassical models, my question is exclusively on methodology.)

Do we refuse to accept any substance behind the concept of “utility” on praxeological or empirical grounds? That is, would you say it is impossible by definition or impossible due to actual limitations and imperfections of our knowledge?

It seems to me that an objective measure of “subjective safisfaction” might make sense at least when taken to stand for “pleasure”, even if current technology does not allow it practically.

Certain regions of brain cortex activate and certain hormones and neurotransmitters change when a given emotion is experienced. (I am not an expert on brain biochemistry, but I think my statement is sufficiently accurate.) If so, it should be possible to measure these, which would allow us to introduce a common denominator, be it a number of activated neurons, level of hormone in blood or what not.

What do you think?

P. S. I do understand that it is a very narrowly defined “utility” (someone can see a value in a thing that is not pleasurable – on ethical grounds etc.).

Letter 2

On Fri, 18 Sep 2020 at 00:20, Walter Block <[email protected]> wrote:

Dear Sergey:

I don’t at all think that utility and praxeology are incompatible. For Austrians, ordinal utility is a legitimate concept. We only oppose cardinal utility, indifference curves, etc.

Right now, we can measure body temperature. Normal is 98.6 degrees. But what the thermometer measures is speed of molecules running around, if I understand this correctly. It is not the SAME as temperature. Heat and speed are different.

One day, perhaps, we’ll come up with a similar “meaure” of happiness.” Maybe, it will be something like speed of electrons running through the brain. Does this mean that on that day cardinal utility will be licit? The interpersonal comparisons of utility will be possible? I think not. For happiness and speed of electons, similarly, will not be the SAME.

The best thing ever written on this sort of thing is this:

Rothbard. Murray N. 1997 [1956]. “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics.” reprinted in “The Logic of Action” Vol. I. Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar. pp. 211-254; http://www.mises.org/rothbard/toward.pdf

Also see this very important contribution:

Gordon, David. 1993. “Toward a Deconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” The Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 99-112; http://www.mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/RAE6_2_4.pdf

Best regards,

Walter

Letter 3

From: Sergey Fedorov

Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2020 1:55 PM

To: Walter Block <[email protected]>

Subject: Re: question about infamous utility

Thank you very much for your reply!

You are right, I should have specified that I ask about “cardinal utility”. Obviously ordinal is totally okay.

As for your example about the temperature, regardless of the particular mechanism of measurement from the point of physics, can’t we in a meaningful sense compare temperatures of different objects and measure degrees of difference and not only more hot/more cold?

At the same time, upon an afterthought I am not sure purely biochemical measurements will accurately correspond to psychic experiences, since “default” level of neurotransmitters varies and perhaps magnitude of changes too. So perhaps you are right, it still won’t make cardinal utility legit.

Sincerely,

Sergey Fedorov

Letter 4

Dear Sergey:

Temperature measures the speed of molecules, somewhere in the body, I think. My temperature is 97.8. Yours in 98.6. Your temperature is higher than mine. No problem.

Now we get a “utility meter.” It also measures the speed of molecules, let’s posit, in the brain somewhere. You score a 50, I score a 25. Does this mean you are twice as happy as I am? Does this mean, even, that you have more utility than me? But, suppose I laugh a lot, tell jokes, and you are morose, depressed. What are we going to believe? The score on the “utility meter” or our lying eyes. Now invert the scores. You score a 25, I score a 50. Now, it is more believable that I am happier than you, even if not twice as happy. But why? Due to the score on the machine, or to our outward behavior. I think the latter

An analogy comes to mind. Indifference is a perfectly good English word. We all know what it means, even Austrian economists. But as a matter of technical economics, human action consists of preference; we can’t demonstrate indifference when we choose.

This “utility” meter might be like indifference is, for ordinary language. But for technical economics, I think it would be impossible for it to function.

Similarly, in physics, “work” is a function of mass and distance. Yet, if you hold 20 pound bar bells extended with elbows straight, you’ll be sweating, “working” but only in ordinary language, not in technical physics.

Best regards,

Walter

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7:03 am on December 28, 2020