Catholics
and Capitalism
by
Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
by Thomas E. Woods, Jr.
Catholics
are permitted a very substantial latitude of discussion on economic
matters, as anyone who has surveyed the history of Catholic economic
thought can see perfectly well for himself. Yes, there is the heavily
interventionist Wilhelm von Ketteler of the late nineteenth century,
but there are also the much more market-friendly sixteenth-century
Scholastics, whose views are ably recounted in Alejandro Chafuen’s
brilliant book Faith
and Liberty: The Economics of the Late Scholastics (2003).
The late Scholastics are not mere flukes, for the two greatest economic
thinkers of the late Middle Ages, Sant’Antonio of Florence and San
Bernardino of Siena, were largely in agreement with them on questions
ranging from prices and wages to money and entrepreneurship.
Now
I have no objection to vigorous and spirited debate on economic
questions or on most any topic for that matter. What I do object
to is the suggestion advanced by some writers that there is only
one kind of economic system to which Catholics may lend their support.
It does not seem to me that someone familiar with the broad expanse
of Catholic economic thought over the centuries could draw such
a conclusion, so diverse have Catholic perspectives been.
The
system most commonly advanced by Catholic opponents of the market
is distributism, in which people withdraw from the division of labor
of a market society and retreat instead into a kind of autarky,
in which they produce much of what they need themselves and trade
with a few others for whatever additional goods they may require.
The emphasis here is on having as many people as possible be owners
of their own land and of whatever means of production they employ.
Some forms of distributism are more frankly primitivist than others;
the website of one of my recent critics calls for a society in which
most roads are inaccessible to engine-driven vehicles. I hope no
one there is ever in a rush to get to a hospital.
Now
if a family, a group of families, or a whole town wishes to live
in this manner, they will encounter no objection from me; their
economic choices are not really any of my business anyway. My point
is that there are perfectly good reasons for not wishing to live
this way and for appreciating the benefits that accrue to us from
taking part in the large-scale division of labor that comprises
the market economy. My copy of the Nicene Creed says nothing about
testing someone’s fidelity to the Magisterium by whether he milks
his own cow.
It
is an open secret that I myself am a supporter and student of the
free market. I used to be one of the right-wing skeptics of capitalism
who can be found in the pages of many a traditional publication,
so I am as familiar with the objections to the market as those who
would raise them against me, but over time my study of economics
as practiced by the Austrian School convinced me that my objections
to the market were simply fallacious.
At
the end of next month, Lexington Books will publish my book The
Church and the Market, which offers a vigorous defense of
Austrian free-market economics from a traditional Catholic perspective.
From the Federal Reserve System (I’m against it) to prices and wages,
from business cycles to antitrust legislation, from foreign aid
to the welfare state, it’s all in there. In my opinion the book
amounts to some of the best work I have ever done, and I am hopeful
that people who have appreciated what I have had to say in other
areas will give it the fair hearing that I believe it merits. It
has already been endorsed by the chairmen of the departments of
economics at Christendom College and the University of Dallas.
It
is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to defend all the particulars
of my economic opinions here. I am more than familiar with the arguments
against them, but in my judgment these arguments misfire, and if
the correspondence I get is any indication, traditionalist objections
to market economics apply much more to the Chicago School of economics,
which I critique in my book, than to the Austrian School. My aim
here is much more modest: to offer a few thoughts to show that Catholics
can have good reasons for being skeptical of schemes like distributism.
The convinced distributist will not think they are good reasons.
My point is that they are at least debatable reasons. Let’s
not forget that some topics are open to debate among Catholics,
and on matters such as these we should be able to disagree without
resorting to accusations of heresy or perversity.
In
the traditionalist press I have heard it argued that pre-industrial
society is to be preferred over the society that emerged from the
Industrial Revolution. Community life was vibrant, people were independent,
and no one had to degrade himself by becoming a "wage slave"
(a derisive term used to describe someone who agrees to work for
someone else in exchange for a regular wage). This opinion is generally
advanced as if it were Catholic truth, apart from which there is
no salvation.
One
traditionalist, for example, has written that people in modern economies
(which, it should be noted, are mixed economies rather than pure
market economies) live in a state of "hand-to-mouth uncertainty,"
and lack the security that was the lot of most people in the pre-industrial
era. As a historian I am at a loss when faced with claims like these.
Were peasants in pre-industrial France – who were among the freest,
most independent peasantry in Europe – free of "hand-to-mouth
uncertainty"? Try telling that to a fourteenth-century mother
who has just lost her fourth child before his first birthday, lives
one bad harvest away from starvation, and resides in intolerable
squalor. As late as the eighteenth century, travelers consistently
spoke of the appalling conditions of the French peasantry and the
shockingly dilapidated state of rural housing. The same held true
for many who sought employment in a trade. A Norman parish priest
described the situation in 1774:
Day
laborers, workmen, journeymen and all those whose occupation
does not provide for much more than food and clothing are the
ones who make beggars. As young men they work, and when by their
work they have got themselves decent clothing and something
to pay their wedding costs, they marry, raise a first child,
have much trouble in raising two, and if a third comes along
their work is no longer enough for food, and the expense. At
such a time they do not hesitate to take up the beggar’s staff
and take to the road.
Taking
up the beggar’s staff and taking to the road: that is what was left
to them. To say that the free market led to the destruction of some
previously existing, harmonious community life is simply to defy
historical testimony. How could "community" exist when
people were starving and forced to take to the road for sustenance?
These appalling conditions applied at times to as much as one third
of the French population – some eight million people. Prior to industrialization,
there was no place for them in the economy. Period.
Fewer
and fewer historians, Marxists included, can be found any longer
who still accept the propaganda about the dreadfulness of the Industrial
Revolution that all of us learned about in school. In a major 1985
study, economist Nicholas F.R. Crafts estimated that real income
per capita doubled in England between 1760 and 1860. Oxford University’s
R.M. Hartwell devoted much of his career to this debate, and by
1970 he could proclaim, "Is the controversy over? As regards
the standard of living – the bundle of goods – it should be, and,
indeed, appears to be. Even [Marxist] E.P. Thompson, the most convinced
pessimist, now agrees that ‘no serious scholar is willing to argue
that everything got worse.’"
[N]one
of the suggested immiseration models fit the facts of history.
On the contrary, the historical facts were: average per capita
real income increased…after 1815 prices fell more than money
wages; per capita consumption of food and other consumer goods
increased…. To these facts should be added evidence about population.
Population was rising rapidly after 1780, the result almost
certainly of a rising birth rate and, more important, of a falling
death rate, the consequence not of improved medicine but of
environmental and nutritional improvements. As living standards
rose with industrialization parents had more children and more
survived.
Naturally,
for reasons I explain in my book, the conditions of the workers
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England were extremely poor
compared to the conditions of workers today (whose improved living
standards are themselves the logical result of the capital accumulation
that occurs in a free market). The point is that prior to the Industrial
Revolution conditions had been far worse. With the advent of industrialization
it appeared that for the first time greater and greater numbers
of people would be able not only to survive but also to enjoy a
rising standard of living.
On
the eve of the Industrial Revolution the economy was hopelessly
static, and possessed no outlet whatever for the increasingly sizable
number of people for whom a living in agriculture or domestic manufacture
was impossible. Professor Hartwell makes quick work of the mythology
surrounding an allegedly idyllic pre-industrial society:
Thus
much misunderstanding has arisen because of assumptions – mainly
misconceptions – about England before the industrial revolution;
assumptions, for example, that rural life was naturally better
than town life, that working for oneself was better and more
secure than working for an employer, that child and female labor
was something new, that the domestic system (even though it
often involved a house crammed with industrial equipment) was
preferable to the factory system, that slums and food adulteration
were peculiar products of industrialization, and so on; in other
words, the perennial myth of the golden age, the belief that
since conditions were bad, and since one did not approve of
them, they could not have been worse, and, indeed, must once
have been better! But, as Alfred Marshall pointed out, "Popular
history under-rates the hardships of the people before the age
of factories."
The
fact is, such views as Hartwell identifies among opponents of industrialism
are nothing but myth. Rural life was no better than urban life,
as eyewitness testimony amply reveals. Conditions in the countryside
were described by contemporaries as "a violation of all decency"
and "altogether filthy and disgusting." As many as twelve
people were packed into a single room. Insecurity was as prevalent
in the eighteenth century, when agricultural work was the norm,
as in the nineteenth, when "wage slavery" was becoming
more common.
"The
factory owners," writes Ludwig von Mises, "did not have
the power to compel anybody to take a factory job. They could only
hire people who were ready to work for the wages offered to them.
Low as these wage rates were, they were nonetheless much more than
these paupers could earn in any other field open to them. It is
a distortion of facts to say that the factories carried off the
housewives from the nurseries and the kitchens and the children
from their play. These women had nothing to cook with and to feed
their children. These children were destitute and starving. Their
only refuge was the factory. It saved them, in the strict sense
of the term, from death by starvation." (To those who argue
that the enclosure movement, which transformed the lands known as
"commons" into private property, was responsible for the
agricultural sector’s distress, I reply by pointing out that no
serious historian believes that the enclosure movement had anything
but the most marginal effects on English agriculture.)
Europe
witnessed an explosion in population from the mid-to-late-eighteenth
century through the nineteenth century that was without precedent
in world history. Population doubled in England during the eighteenth
century. The University of London’s T.S. Ashton, among the greatest
twentieth-century historians of the Industrial Revolution, observed
that the central problem of the first half of the nineteenth century
therefore involved "how to feed and clothe and employ generations
of children outnumbering by far those of any earlier time."
His own work on industrialization, which focused on England, showed
that industrialization, far from being a problem, was the solution
to the pressing question of how to deal with this population explosion.
England,
of course, was not alone in facing this problem. Ireland faced it,
too. But Ireland faced it without industrializing. In that country
no one’s aesthetic sensibilities would have been disturbed by the
presence of factories and smokestacks. But I hope they would have
been troubled by the fact that during the 1840s the population of
Ireland actually declined by 20 percent, either by emigration (of
the lucky ones) or starvation and disease resulting from the great
famine. A similar outcome would certainly have befallen England
as well had there been no Industrial Revolution and the alleged
ideal of small farmers and shops had remained as before. According
to Professor Ashton:
If
England had remained a nation of cultivators and craftsmen,
she could hardly have escaped the same fate, and, at best,
the weight of a growing population must have pressed down the
spring of her spirit. She was delivered, not by her rulers,
but by those who, seeking no doubt their own narrow ends, had
the wit and resource to devise new instruments of production
and new methods of administering industry. There are today on
the plains of India and China men and women, plague-ridden and
hungry, living lives little better, to outward appearance, than
those of the cattle that toil with them by day and share their
places of sleep at night. Such Asiatic standards, and such
unmechanized horrors, are the lot of those who increase their
numbers without passing through an industrial revolution [emphasis
added].
Likewise,
the eminent British historian Eric Evans invites us to consider
the terrible alternative to industrialization: "In judging
the Industrial Revolution it is relevant to mention a counterfactual
point. What would have happened to Britain’s teeming population
had industrial growth not rescued it from a Malthusian poverty trap?
It is difficult to see how a check on an even more catastrophic
scale than the Irish famine of 184547 could have been avoided….
[T]he Industrial Revolution brought the benefit of permitting a
much larger population to survive and in the long term thrive."
Before
we wax rhapsodic about the beauties of rural self-sufficiency, therefore,
we need to bear these cautionary facts in mind. Such a system would
not be able to support anything like the number of people who inhabit
the world today. Russell Kirk (19181994), a great conservative
thinker who had distributist sympathies, nevertheless pointed out
that "once in an industrial society, we cannot get out of it
without starving half the world’s population."
It
seems to me that we ought to be able to find room in our moral calculus
to appreciate a system that has made possible the sheer survival
of countless millions of people who, as the contrary examples above
amply reveal, would surely have perished were it not for industrialization.
A few issues ago I was rather shocked to see a Remnant writer
flippantly dismiss the dramatic reduction in infant mortality that
the market has made possible, implying that since this earth is
not our permanent abode, anyone who gives it too much care is obviously
too attached to this world for his own spiritual good. I do not
consider that a particularly useful way of thinking about parents
who grieve for a lost child.
St.
Augustine is said to have remarked, "In fide, unitas; in
dubiis, libertas; in omnibus, caritas" (in faith, unity;
in doubtful matters, liberty; in all things, charity). We are all
traditionalists, and the demands of charity urge us not to ascribe
base motives or dumb obstinacy to those with whom we disagree on
economics. If someone wishes to dismantle much of industrial society,
I believe he must address himself to the arguments I have raised
here and that I raise in my book, arguments that seem fully in accord
with Catholicism as I understand it. He owes it to his fellow traditionalists
not simply to assume that those with whom he disagrees are
of bad will, are merely materialistic, or are spiritually disordered
if they do not support distributism or whatever his social blueprint
happens to be. There are perfectly good, non-diabolical reasons
for being skeptical of such proposals, and those who put them forth
need in all fairness to acknowledge that fact before they can expect
their fellow Catholics to give them the hearing that I am sure they
desire.
And
after all, I don’t even know how to milk a cow.
November
12, 2004
Professor
Thomas E. Woods, Jr. [send
him mail] holds
an AB from Harvard and a PhD from Columbia. He teaches history,
is associate editor of The
Latin Mass Magazine, and is author, most recently, of The
Church Confronts Modernity: Catholic Intellectuals and the Progressive
Era (Columbia), The
Politically Incorrect Guide to American History (Regnery)
and The
Church and the Market: A Catholic Defense of the Free Economy
(Lexington).
A
version of this article first appeared in The Remnant.
Thomas
Woods Archives
|