Devolution
by
Clyde Wilson
by Clyde Wilson
This
is the preface to Mike Tuggle's Confederates
in the Boardroom.
Equipped
with an abundant knowledge of history, Michael Tuggle has cast a
discerning eye on the trends of the present. Not the ‘trendy’ trends
but the real ones, those which can guide our steps into the future
(as far as the future can be known to us mortals). The trends suggest
to him something very hopeful the probability and suitability
of a change in the principle by which human affairs are governed.
We have been living for a long time by the organising principle
of command from the top down something the American Founding
Fathers decried as ‘consolidation’ and the opposite of liberty.
Throughout
most of the course of Western Civilisation, until a little over
two centuries ago, centralised government was regarded as something
bad and alien, characteristic of ‘Oriental despotism.’ The Greeks,
for example, were divided into self-governing city-states. They
were never united under one authority during the time when their
excellence in knowledge, art, and government reached levels that
still astonish the world. Herodotus, the first historian, ascribed
the Greeks' defeat of the Persian Empire to the resilience flowing
from their freedom from arbitrary control. In typical fashion, government-worshipping
historians of the nineteenth century forward preached the contrary:
that the decline of the ancient Greeks resulted from their lack
of unity.
However,
a more reasonable interpretation is that, although they were damaged
by fighting among themselves, the Greeks met with irredeemable disaster
only after Athens had centralised a dangerous power to dictate to
the other city-states. Thus, the Greeks' liberties and creativity
ended precisely when they were united under the Macedonian monarchy.
John
C. Calhoun, one of the great anti-consolidationist thinkers of the
nineteenth century, pointed out that the Romans achieved their greatest
freedom and strength as a people when there existed two centres
of power the Senate and the Tribunes each with an absolute veto
over the other's actions. The workings of the state required co-ordination
and agreement among the elements of society rather than dictation
from above. Contrary to government-worshippers who complained that
the lack of a commanding central authority made society helpless,
Calhoun observed that an independent consensus of the parts led
to actions that were highly effective and more satisfactory to the
whole. No central authority could match the strength of free men
who co-operated willingly. Mr. Tuggle enlightens us as to the current
appropriateness of Calhoun's insight.
Even
under the Roman Empire (while it was healthy), although policies
were sent out from the centre, vast areas of initiative remained
in the provinces and cities in military affairs, taxation, local
government, and religion.
The
Middle Ages were par excellence the age of decentralisation; there
was scarcely any real power that was not local. Kings and lesser
lords essentially depended upon the voluntary co-operation of their
vassals. The Church, at least in appearance, was centralised in
its own affairs, but it preached the rightness of subsidiarity in
government. Our modern thinkers who extol the necessity and glory
of the nation-state consolidated under one supreme authority tell
us that decentralisation was the cause of the ‘darkness’ of those
times. Looked at another way, perhaps it was the creative force
of many different points of light that illuminated the way of the
West out of the darkness a darkness brought on by the inevitable
collapse of the muscle-bound inflexibility of the imperial government.
Certainly, the lights came on earliest in the free and self-governing
cities, while the Renaissance blazed most brightly in the free and
independent cities of northern Italy not in some centrally-managed
society.
In
the seventeenth century it was thought that the ‘Sun King’ of France,
Louis XIV, had brought centralised government to the height of its
possibilities. Louis could oppress individuals; however, he could
not except through the traditional hodgepodge of taxes oppress entire
classes. He could declare wars, but he could no more command all
the manpower and resources of the kingdom for his wars than he could
the rotation of the planets. It was his nationalist successors of
the Revolution and the Empire who marshalled the ability of a centralised
government to command a whole society. Their handiwork was copied
all over the Western world. The consolidated nation-state became
the material and psychological focus of entire peoples while the
ensuing conflicts among such states became the prevailing pattern
of history. The American Revolution and the Articles of Confederation
and Constitution which followed preceded the triumph of the nation-state.
During the long colonial period, Americans enjoyed the benign neglect
of the British Crown. The thirteen colonies barely felt the hand
of central government (their citizens scarcely feeling the controlling
hand of any government). It was the British governments attempt
to end this happy condition that brought them to declare that the
thirteen ‘are and ought to be free and independent states.’
The
American Founders intended to create a Union which would institutionalise
bonds of co-operation among those states and among the new commonwealths
that their descendants would create out of wilderness in the future.
They did not intend to establish a central authority, such as the
one they had just thrown off, from which there was no escape or
appeal except by the sword. They dreaded the spectre of ‘consolidation’
which, if allowed, would bring an end to their individual freedom
and the self-government of their natural communities. Human associations
in community were distinct from and took precedence over governments.
Good governments were the servants of society, not its master.
The
forces that reshaped the States United into the United State in
the middle of the nineteenth century did so only as the result of
the destruction of the essential elements of self-government and
a holocaust of American lives.
The
supposed deep thinkers of the nineteenth century (especially in
Germany and the United States) celebrated the brutality employed
against their fellow countrymen that was necessary in order to establish
the nation-states they desired. Each sang the praises of his own
country's new ability to mobilise the property and allegiances of
the masses to the ends of the central state. Nationalist mania stipulated
that the centralised state was a prerequisite for the liberation
and progress of humanity.
Lord
Acton, an immensely learned historian of liberty, was, like Calhoun,
a nay-sayer of the nineteenth century, bringing into common reference
the phrase ‘Power corrupts.’ The progress of man depended upon ordered
liberty; and liberty depended upon the restraint and dispersal of
power. Acton demonstrated that freedom in the Western world was
a product of restrictions on power that had been painfully accumulated
bit by bit over the course of centuries. Taking the long view, Acton
wrote, the crushing of the principle of states' rights in the American
war of 18611865 was not a victory for liberty, but a defeat.
One
wonders why in the twenty-first century anyone should continue to
give devotion to the principle of consolidation. The postulate of
the all-commanding central government has resulted, for the first
time in mankind's long and painful existence, in what were literally
World Wars. The central state has given rulers the power to murder
the innocents of their own and other countries by the millions.
Even at its least destructive, the central state inevitably, as
Calhoun also observed, preys upon the people, or a part of them,
for the benefit of those who hold power and their clients.
Surely
the premier empirical truth that emerged from human affairs in the
twentieth century is that free markets are better than central planning.
At least better for society as a whole, aside from those who profit
from the Plan. As Tuggle makes clear, confidence in the necessity
of centralised power in industrial management, education, and the
organisation of many other human affairs has proved to be a delusion
over the past two centuries. The wisdom of experience and of insight
into the real trends of the present which the author has brought
to bear tells us that centralisation has not fulfilled the promises
of its apologists. Command from the top down has proven itself to
be not only arbitrary and inimical to freedom, but also inefficient
and unable to adapt to changing circumstances.
The
wave of the future, the cutting edge, the hope of efficiency, abundance,
and freedom for societies is just what the Western tradition has
always told us devolution of power to competing and co-operating
authorities. There is no lesson that it is more important to take
to heart at this moment in time. It seems that John C. Calhoun was
right after all.
October
24, 2003
Dr.
Wilson [send him mail]
is professor of history at the University of South Carolina and
editor of The
Papers of John C. Calhoun.
Copyright
© 2003 LewRockwell.com
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