Brutus
on the Evils of Standing Armies
by
Laurence
M. Vance
by Laurence M. Vance
Recognizing
his friend Brutus
among his assassins, Julius Caesar (in the words of William Shakespeare)
uttered the immortal phrase "Et tu, Brute?" This Latin
sentence meaning "Even you, Brutus?" is the only Brutus
that most Americans have ever heard of.
But
whether one has heard of Brutus from the study of Shakespeare’s
play Julius
Caesar or from a World history course, there is a Brutus
in American history that most Americans have never heard of.
The
Brutus of American history is one of the forgotten Anti-Federalists.
It was their principled opposition to the Constitution
that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. But because
the Federalists prevailed, the writings of the Anti-Federalists
have largely been forgotten.
Every
student of American government has studied the eighty-five essays
written between October 1787 and August 1788 in favor of the adoption
of the new Constitution. Known collectively as The
Federalist, they were all signed Publius (after the ancient
Roman statesman), but authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
and John Jay.
Brutus
was the name signed to sixteen essays written in opposition to the
new Constitution replacing the Articles
of Confederation. They were all published in the New York
Journal from October 1787 to April 1788. None of the essays
have titles, and most were addressed to the people or the citizens
of the State of New York. The first essay of Brutus actually appeared
nine days before the first essay of The Federalist. The essays
signed Brutus are generally ascribed to Robert
Yates (17381801), a New York judge who served on the committee
that drafted the first constitution for New York State. Yates, along
with John
Lansing (17541829) and Alexander Hamilton, was a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Yates and Lansing
withdrew from the Convention early and opposed the adoption of the
Constitution by the state of New York.
One
subject that Brutus speaks on at length is the evils of standing
armies. In four of his sixteen essays (numbers 1, 8, 9, 10), he
explains how the establishment and maintenance of standing armies
breeds fear, is destructive to liberty, and should be viewed as
a scourge to a country instead of a benefit.
On
the subject of war itself, Brutus believed that only a defensive
war was justifiable. He recognized that the countries of Europe
were plagued by destructive wars:
The European
governments are almost all of them framed, and administered with
a view to arms, and war, as that in which their chief glory consists;
they mistake the end of government it was designed to save
mens lives, not to destroy them. We ought to furnish the world
with an example of a great people, who in their civil institutions
hold chiefly in view, the attainment of virtue, and happiness
among ourselves. Let the monarchs, in Europe, share among them
the glory of depopulating countries, and butchering thousands
of their innocent citizens, to revenge private quarrels, or to
punish an insult offered to a wife, a mistress, or a favorite:
I envy them not the honor, and I pray heaven this country may
never be ambitious of it. The czar Peter the great, acquired great
glory by his arms; but all this was nothing, compared with the
true glory which he obtained, by civilizing his rude and barbarous
subjects, diffusing among them knowledge, and establishing, and
cultivating the arts of life: by the former he desolated countries,
and drenched the earth with human blood: by the latter he softened
the ferocious nature of his people, and pointed them to the means
of human happiness.
In
his first essay, Brutus brings up the subject of standing armies
in his discussion of the dangers of a consolidated central government
over a large territorial republic:
It might
be here shown, that the power of the federal legislative, to raise
and support armies at pleasure, as well in peace as in war, and
their controul over the militia, tend, not only to a consolidation
of the government, but the destruction of liberty.
In despotic
governments, as well as in all the monarchies of Europe, standing
armies are kept up to execute the commands of the prince or the
magistrate, and are employed for this purpose when occasion requires:
But they have always proved the destruction of liberty, and [as]
abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic. In England, where
they depend upon the parliament for their annual support, they
have always been complained of as oppressive and unconstitutional,
and are seldom employed in executing of the laws; never except
on extraordinary occasions, and then under the direction of a
civil magistrate.
A free republic
will never keep a standing army to execute its laws. It must depend
upon the support of its citizens. But when a government is to
receive its support from the aid of the citizens, it must be so
constructed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection
of the people. Men who, upon the call of the magistrate, offer
themselves to execute the laws, are influenced to do it either
by affection to the government, or from fear; where a standing
army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated by
the latter principle, and therefore, when the magistrate casts,
will obey: but, where this is not the case, the government must
rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which the
people have for their government and laws.
He
concludes that if the people have "no confidence in their legislature,
suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they
adopt, and will not support the laws they pass," then the government
will be "nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left
to render it otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute
the laws at the point of the bayonet a government of all
others the most to be dreaded."
In
his eighth essay, Brutus raises the subject of standing armies in
his discussion of the new federal government being authorized to
raise and support armies:
Let us then
enquire, whether standing armies in time of peace, would be ever
beneficial to our country or if in some extraordinary cases,
they might be necessary; whether it is not true, that they have
generally proved a scourge to a country, and destructive of their
liberty.
He
then reprints the text of a speech against standing armies recently
delivered in the British Parliament, because, as he says, it "is
so full to the point, and so much better than any thing I can say":
"I have
always been, and always shall be against a standing army of any
kind; to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of a parliamentary,
or any other designation; a standing army is still a standing
army by whatever name it is called; they are a body of men distinct
from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws,
and blind obedience, and an entire submission to the orders of
their commanding officer, is their only principle; the nations
around us, sir, are already enslaved, and have been enslaved by
those very means; by means of their standing armies they have
every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the
liberties of the people in any country can be preserved where
a numerous standing army is kept up. Shall we then take our measures
from the example of our neighbours? No, sir, on the contrary,
from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks
upon which they have split."
"It
signifies nothing to tell me that our army is commanded by such
gentlemen as cannot be supposed to join in any measures for enslaving
their country; it may be so; I have a very good opinion of many
gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any
such measures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be sure
how long they will be kept in command, they may all be dismissed
in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room. Besides,
sir, we know the passions of men, we know how dangerous it is
to trust the best of men with too much power. Where was a braver
army than that under Jul. Caesar? Where was there ever an army
that had served their country more faithfully? That army was commanded
generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune
and figure in their country, yet that army enslaved their country.
The affections of the soldiers towards their country, the honor
and integrity of the under officers, are not to be depended on.
By the military law the administration of justice is so quick,
and the punishment so severe, that neither the officer nor soldier
dare dispute the orders of his supreme commander; he must not
consult his own inclination. If an officer were commanded to pull
his own father out of this house, he must do it; he dares not
disobey; immediate death would be the sure consequence of the
least grumbling: and if an officer were sent into the court of
request, accompanied by a body of musketeers with screwed bayonets,
and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were
to vote: I know what would be the duty of this house; I know it
would be our duty to order the officer to be hanged at the door
of the lobby; but I doubt, sir, I doubt much, if such a spirit
could be found in the house, or in any house of commons that will
ever be in England."
"Sir,
I talk not of imaginary things? I talk of what has happened to
an English house of commons, from an English army; not only from
an English army, but an army that was raised by that very house
of commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was
commanded by generals appointed by them; therefore do not let
us vainly imagine, that an army, raised and maintained by authority
of parliament, will always be so submissive to them. If an army
be so numerous as to have it in their power to overawe the parliament,
they will be submissive as long as the parliament does nothing
to disoblige their favourite general; but when that case happens,
I am afraid, that in place of the parliament’s dismissing the
army, the army will dismiss the parliament."
Brutus
concludes from this speech that "if this great man’s reasoning
be just, it follows, that keeping up a standing army, would be in
the highest degree dangerous to the liberty and happiness of the
community and if so, the general government ought not to
have authority to do it; for no government should be empowered to
do that which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty."
In
his ninth essay, Brutus faults the proposed constitution for its
lack of a bill of rights. He acknowledges that the framers of the
new constitution believed in prohibiting or restricting the
general government from exercising certain powers. Nevertheless,
he wonders why, if there are sections in the proposed constitution
that prohibit bills of attainder and restrict the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, that there is no prohibition or restriction
against standing armies since they are likewise just as harmful:
Let us apply
these remarks to the case of standing armies in times of peace.
If they generally prove the destruction of the happiness and libertys
of the people, the legislature ought not to have power to keep
them up, or if they had, this power should be so restricted, as
to secure the people against the danger arising from the exercise
of it.
That standing
armies are dangerous to the liberties of a people was proved in
my last number If it was necessary, the truth of the position
might be confirmed by the history of almost every nation in the
world. A cloud of the most illustrious patriots of every age and
country, where freedom has been enjoyed, might be adduced as witnesses
in support of the sentiment. But I presume it would be useless,
to enter into a laboured argument, to prove to the people of America,
a position, which has so long and so generally been received by
them as a kind of axiom.
Some of the
advocates for this new system controvert this sentiment, as they
do almost every other that has been maintained by the best writers
on free government. Others, though they will not expressly
deny, that standing armies in times of peace are dangerous, yet
join with these in maintaining, that it is proper the general
government should be vested with the power to do it. I shall now
proceed to examine the arguments they adduce in support of their
opinions.
A writer,
in favor of this system, treats this objection as a ridiculous
one. He supposes it would be as proper to provide against the
introduction of Turkish janizaries, or against making the Alcoran
a rule of faith.
But, why
is this provision so ridiculous? because, says this author, it
is unnecessary. But, why is it unnecessary? ["]because, the
principles and habits, as well as the power of the Americans are
directly opposed to standing armies; and there is as little necessity
to guard against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit
the establishment of the Mahometan religion." It is admitted
then, that a standing army in time of peace, is an evil. I ask
then, why should this government be authorised to do evil? If
the principles and habits of the people of this country are opposed
to standing armies in time of peace, if they do not contribute
to the public good, but would endanger the public liber[ty] and
happiness, why should the government be [vested] with the power?
No reason can be given, why [rulers] should be authorised to do,
what, if done, would oppose the principles and habits of the people,
and endanger the public safety, but there is every reason in the
world, that they should be prohibited from the exercise of such
a power. But this author supposes, that no danger is to be apprehended
from the exercise of this power, because, if armies are kept up,
it will be by the people themselves, and therefore, to provide
against it, would be as absurd as for a man to "pass a law
in his family, that no troops should be quartered in his family
by his consent." This reasoning supposes, that the general
government is to be exercised by the people of America themselves
But such an idea is groundless and absurd. There is surely
a distinction between the people and their rulers, even when the
latter are representatives of the former. They certainly
are not identically the same, and it cannot be disputed, but it
may and often does happen, that they do not possess the same sentiments
or pursue the same interests. I think I have shewn, that as this
government is constituted, there is little reason to expect, that
the interest of the people and their rulers will be the same.
The idea
that there is no danger of the establishment of a standing army,
under the new constitution, is without foundation.
It is a well
known fact, that a number of those who had an agency in producing
this system, and many of those who it is probable will have a
principal share in the administration of the government under
it, if it is adopted, are avowedly in favour of standing armies.
It is a language common among them, "That no people can be
kept in order, unless the government have an army to awe them
into obedience; it is necessary to support the dignity of government,
to have a military establishment." And there will not be
wanting a variety of plausible reason to justify the raising one,
drawn from the danger we are in from the Indians on our frontiers,
or from the European provinces in our neighbourhood. If to this
we add, that an army will afford a decent support, and agreeable
employment to the young men of many families, who are too indolent
to follow occupations that will require care and industry, and
too poor to live without doing any business we can have little
reason to doubt, but that we shall have a large standing army,
as soon as this government can find money to pay them, and perhaps
sooner.
Brutus
then directly engages Hamilton, who had written several essays in
The Federalist trying to answer objections to standing armies:
A writer,
who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution, has
taken great pains to shew, that this power was proper and necessary
to be vested in the general government.
He first
attempts to shew, that this objection is futile and disingenuous,
because the power to keep up standing armies, in time of peace,
is vested, under the present government, in the legislature of
every state in the union, except two. Now this is so far from
being true, that it is expressly declared, by the present articles
of confederation, that no body of forces "shall be kept up
by any state, in time of peace, except such number only, as in
the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall
be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence
of such state." Now, was it candid and ingenuous to endeavour
to persuade the public, that the general government had no other
power than your own legislature have on this head; when the truth
is, your legislature have no authority to raise and keep up any
forces?
He next tells
us, that the power given by this constitution, on this head, is
similar to that which Congress possess under the present confederation.
As little ingenuity is manifested in this representation as in
that of the former.
I shall not
undertake to enquire whether or not Congress are vested with a
power to keep up a standing army in time of peace; it has been
a subject warmly debated in Congress, more than once, since the
peace; and one of the most respectable states in the union, were
so fully convinced that they had no such power, that they expressly
instructed their delegates to enter a solemn protest against it
on the journals of Congress, should they attempt to exercise it.
But should
it be admitted that they have the power, there is such a striking
dissimilarity between the restrictions under which the present
Congress can exercise it, and that of the proposed government,
that the comparison will serve rather to shew the impropriety
of vesting the proposed government with the power, than of justifying
it.
It is acknowledged
by this writer, that the powers of Congress, under the present
confederation, amount to little more than that of recommending.
If they determine to raise troops, they are obliged to effect
it through the authority of the state legislatures. This will,
in the first instance, be a most powerful restraint upon them,
against ordering troops to be raised. But if they should vote
an army, contrary to the opinion and wishes of the people, the
legislatures of the respective states would not raise them. Besides,
the present Congress hold their places at the will and pleasure
of the legislatures of the states who send them, and no troops
can be raised, but by the assent of nine states out of the thirteen.
Compare the power proposed to be lodged in the legislature on
this head, under this constitution, with that vested in the present
Congress, and every person of the least discernment, whose understanding
is not totally blinded by prejudice, will perceive, that they
bear no analogy to each other. Under the present confederation,
the representatives of nine states, out of thirteen, must assent
to the raising of troops, or they cannot be levied: under the
proposed constitution, a less number than the representatives
of two states, in the house of representatives, and the representatives
of three states and an half in the senate, with the assent of
the president, may raise any number of troops they please. The
present Congress are restrained from an undue exercise of this
power, from this consideration, they know the state legislatures,
through whose authority it must be carried into effect, would
not comply with the requisition for the purpose, if it was evidently
opposed to the public good: the proposed constitution authorizes
the legislature to carry their determinations into execution,
without the intervention of any other body between them and the
people.
In
his tenth essay, which is devoted exclusively to the evils of standing
armies, Brutus begins with a discussion of how a standing army can
subvert the very government whose authority it is supposed to be
under:
The liberties
of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not only
because the rulers may employ them for the purposes of supporting
themselves in any usurpations of power, which they may see proper
to exercise, but there is great hazard, that an army will subvert
the forms of the government, under whose authority, they are raised,
and establish one, according to the pleasure of their leader.
To
prove his point, he then adduces the historical examples of Rome
and Britain:
We are informed,
in the faithful pages of history, of such events frequently happening.
Two instances have been mentioned in a former paper. They
are so remarkable, that they are worthy of the most careful attention
of every lover of freedom. They are taken from the history
of the two most powerful nations that have ever existed in the
world; and who are the most renowned, for the freedom they enjoyed,
and the excellency of their constitutions: I mean Rome
and Britain.
In the first,
the liberties of the commonwealth was destroyed, and the constitution
overturned, by an army, lead by Julius Cesar, who was appointed
to the command, by the constitutional authority of that commonwealth.
He changed it from a free republic, whose fame had sounded, and
is still celebrated by all the world, into that of the most absolute
despotism. A standing army effected this change, and a standing
army supported it through a succession of ages, which are marked
in the annals of history, with the most horrid cruelties, bloodshed,
and carnage; The most devilish, beastly, and unnatural
vices, that ever punished or disgraced human nature.
The same
army, that in Britain, vindicated the liberties of that people
from the encroachments and despotism of a tyrant king, assisted
Cromwell, their General, in wresting from the people, that liberty
they had so dearly earned.
You may be
told, these instances will not apply to our case. But those
who would persuade you to believe this, either mean to deceive
you, or have not themselves considered the subject.
Continuing
his argument, Brutus contrasts Caesar and Cromwell with George Washington:
I firmly
believe, no country in the world had ever a more patriotic army,
than the one which so ably served this country, in the late war.
But had the
General who commanded them, been possessed of the spirit of a
Julius Cesar or a Cromwell, the liberties of this country, had
in all probability, terminated with the war; or had they been
maintained, might have cost more blood and treasure, than was
expended in the conflict with Great-Britain. When an anonimous
writer addressed the officers of the army at the close of the
war, advising them not to part with their arms, until justice
was done them the effect it had is well known. It affected
them like an electric shock. He wrote like Cesar; and had the
commander in chief, and a few more officers of rank, countenanced
the measure, the desperate resolution had been taken, to refuse
to disband. What the consequences of such a determination would
have been, heaven only knows. The army were in the full
vigor of health and spirits, in the habit of discipline, and possessed
of all our military stores and apparatus. They would have acquired
great accessions of strength from the country. Those who
were disgusted at our republican forms of government (for such
there then were, of high rank among us) would have lent them all
their aid. We should in all probability have seen a constitution
and laws, dictated to us, at the head of an army, and at the point
of a bayonet, and the liberties for which we had so severely struggled,
snatched from us in a moment. It remains a secret, yet to be revealed,
whether this measure was not suggested, or at least countenanced,
by some, who have had great influence in producing the present
system. Fortunately indeed for this country, it had at
the head of the army, a patriot as well as a general; and many
of our principal officers, had not abandoned the characters of
citizens, by assuming that of soldiers, and therefore, the scheme
proved abortive. But are we to expect, that this will always be
the case? Are we so much better than the people of other ages
and of other countries, that the same allurements of power and
greatness, which led them aside from their duty, will have no
influence upon men in our country? Such an idea, is wild and extravagant.
Had we indulged such a delusion, enough has appeared in
a little time past, to convince the most credulous, that the passion
for pomp, power and greatness, works as powerfully in the hearts
of many of our better sort, as it ever did in any country under
heaven. Were the same opportunity again to offer, we should
very probably be grossly disappointed, if we made dependence,
that all who then rejected the overture, would do it again.
Brutus
concludes:
From these
remarks, it appears, that the evil to be feared from a large standing
army in time of peace, does not arise solely from the apprehension,
that the rulers may employ them for the purpose of promoting their
own ambitious views, but that equal, and perhaps greater danger,
is to be apprehended from their overturning the constitutional
powers of the government, and assuming the power to dictate any
form they please.
Brutus
again directly engages Hamilton, who had argued in The Federalist
that we needed a standing army in peacetime to guard against Indians
and to repel an invasion from abroad:
The advocates
for power, in support of this right in the proposed government,
urge that a restraint upon the discretion of the legislatures,
in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would
be improper to be imposed, because they say, it will be necessary
to maintain small garrisons on the frontiers, to guard against
the depredations of the Indians, and to be prepared to repel any
encroachments or invasions that may be made by Spain or Britain.
The amount
of this argument striped of the abundant verbages with which the
author has dressed it, is this:
It will
probably be necessary to keep up a small body of troops to garrison
a few posts, which it will be necessary to maintain, in order
to guard against the sudden encroachments of the Indians, or
of the Spaniards and British; and therefore, the general government
ought to be invested with power to raise and keep up a standing
army in time of peace, without restraint; at their discretion.
I confess,
I cannot perceive that the conclusion follows from the premises.
Logicians say, it is not good reasoning to infer a general conclusion
from particular premises: though I am not much of a Logician,
it seems to me, this argument is very like that species of reasoning.
When the
patriots in the parliament in Great-Britain, contended with such
force of argument, and all the powers of eloquence, against keeping
up standing armies in time of peace, it is obvious, they never
entertained an idea, that small garrisons on their frontiers,
or in the neighbourhood of powers, from whom they were in danger
of encroachments, or guards, to take care of public arsenals would
thereby be prohibited.
The advocates
for this power farther urge that it is necessary, because it may,
and probably will happen, that circumstances will render it requisite
to raise an army to be prepared to repel attacks of an enemy,
before a formal declaration of war, which in modern times has
fallen into disuse. If the constitution prohibited the raising
an army, until a war actually commenced, it would deprive the
government of the power of providing for the defence of the country,
until the enemy were within our territory. If the restriction
is not to extend to the raising armies in cases of emergency,
but only to the keeping them up, this would leave the matter to
the discretion of the legislature; and they might, under the pretence
that there was danger of an invasion, keep up the army as long
as they judged proper and hence it is inferred, that the
legislature should have authority to raise and keep up an army
without any restriction. But from these premises nothing more
will follow than this, that the legislature should not be so restrained,
as to put it out of their power to raise an army, when such exigencies
as are instanced shall arise. But it does not thence follow, that
the government should be empowered to raise and maintain standing
armies at their discretion as well in peace as in war. If indeed,
it is impossible to vest the general government with the power
of raising troops to garrison the frontier posts, to guard arsenals,
or to be prepared to repel an attack, when we saw a power preparing
to make one, without giving them a general and indefinite authority,
to raise and keep up armies, without any restriction or qualification,
then this reasoning might have weight; but this has not been proved
nor can it be.
It is admitted
that to prohibit the general government, from keeping up standing
armies, while yet they were authorised to raise them in case of
exigency, would be an insufficient guard against the danger. A
discretion of such latitude would give room to elude the force
of the provision.
It is also
admitted that an absolute prohibition against raising troops,
except in cases of actual war, would be improper; because it will
be requisite to raise and support a small number of troops to
garrison the important frontier posts, and to guard arsenals;
and it may happen, that the danger of an attack from a foreign
power may be so imminent, as to render it highly proper we should
raise an army, in order to be prepared to resist them. But to
raise and keep up forces for such purposes and on such occasions,
is not included in the idea, of keeping up standing armies in
times of peace.
Brutus
then refutes yet another argument of Hamilton:
The same
writer who advances the arguments I have noticed, makes a number
of other observations with a view to prove that the power to raise
and keep up armies, ought to be discretionary in the general legislature;
some of them are curious; he instances the raising of troops in
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, to shew the necessity of keeping
a standing army in time of peace; the least reflection must convince
every candid mind that both these cases are totally foreign to
his purpose Massachusetts raised a body of troops for six
months, at the expiration of which they were to disband of course;
this looks very little like a standing army. But beside, was that
commonwealth in a state of peace at that time? So far from it
that they were in the most violent commotions and contents, and
their legislature had formally declared that an unnatural rebellion
existed within the state. The situation of Pennsylvania was similar;
a number of armed men had levied war against the authority of
the state, and openly avowed their intention of withdrawing their
allegiance from it. To what purpose examples are brought, of states
raising troops for short periods in times of war or insurrections,
on a question concerning the propriety of keeping up standing
armies in times of peace, the public must judge.
Brutus
also raises the subject of conscription in his discussion of the
evils of standing armies. After informing his readers that the power
to raise armies under the proposed constitution is "indefinite
and unlimited, and authorizes the raising of forces, as well in
peace as in war," he wonders whether "the clause which
impowers the Congress to pass all laws which are proper and necessary,
to carry this into execution, will not authorise them to impress
men for the army." For "if the general legislature deem
it for the general welfare to raise a body of troops, and they cannot
be procured by voluntary enlistments, it seems evident, that it
will be proper and necessary to effect it, that men be impressed
from the militia to make up the deficiency."
The
views of Brutus on the evils of standing armies were by no means
novel. How quickly do Americans forget that one of the complaints
of the Colonists against King George III in the Declaration
of Independence was that "he has kept among us, in times
of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures."
It should also be pointed out that Brutus did not merely attack
the idea of a free state having a standing army, he proposed a solution
to the problem of how to entrust the government with sufficient
authority to provide for the cases of an enemy attack, guard arsenals,
and garrison the frontier posts, while at the same time providing
"a reasonable and competent security against the evil of a
standing army." His solution was to add the following clause
to the new constitution:
As standing
armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and have often
been the means of overturning the best constitutions of government,
no standing army, or troops of any description whatsoever, shall
be raised or kept up by the legislature, except so many as shall
be necessary for guards to the arsenals of the United States,
or for garrisons to such posts on the frontiers, as it shall be
deemed absolutely necessary to hold, to secure the inhabitants,
and facilitate the trade with the Indians: unless when the United
States are threatened with an attack or invasion from some foreign
power, in which case the legislature shall be authorised to raise
an army to be prepared to repel the attack; provided that no troops
whatsoever shall be raised in time of peace, without the assent
of two thirds of the members, composing both houses of the legislature.
Brutus
believed that not only would a clause like this "afford sufficient
latitude to the legislature to raise troops in all cases that were
really necessary," it would at the same time provide "competent
security against the establishment of that dangerous engine of despotism
a standing army."
The
statements of Brutus on the evils of standing armies are also applicable
to the current U.S. foreign policy of interventionism, for if a
standing army is despotic in its own country, there is no telling
how much more it may be when transplanted to a foreign country.
[All
quotations from the essays of Brutus are taken from Regnery edition
of The
Anti-Federalists: Selected Writings and Speeches, edited
by Bruce Frohnen.]
February
27, 2004
Laurence
M. Vance [send him mail]
is a freelance writer and an adjunct instructor in accounting and
economics at Pensacola Junior College in Pensacola, FL. Visit his
website.
Copyright
© 2004 LewRockwell.com
Laurence
M. Vance Archives
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