An
Authorized Biography of the State
by
Michael Tennant
by Michael Tennant
DIGG THIS
Would you trust
an authorized biography or an autobiography to give you the whole
truth about a person’s life? It would be foolish to do so because
the subject has every incentive to emphasize the positive things
he has done and to deemphasize or even exclude the negative ones.
Most mainstream
history texts are nothing more than authorized biographies of government.
They overemphasize government’s achievements and downplay its failures,
which makes sense when you consider that a sizable percentage of
historians are employed by publicly funded colleges and universities
and thus are naturally sympathetic to government activism and, in
addition, have no desire to play a tune that fails to please the
one who is paying the piper.
Since the state
runs almost all the schools and thus purchases the overwhelming
majority of textbooks, textbook publishers have little incentive
to produce texts critical of the government for there would be no
profit in doing so. Hence, while history texts may criticize certain
individual politicians or programs, they dare not call the entire
enterprise of the state into question.
It therefore
comes as no surprise that the latest history textbook being approved
for use in Russia celebrates the centralization of power in Moscow,
the destruction of liberty in the name of security, and the rule
of authoritarian leaders who strengthened the Kremlin’s hold on
society. The only surprising thing is that anyone is really caught
off guard by this, as blogger
Yasha Levine appears to be. A study of the history textbooks
used in other Western countries would surely have led one to expect
precisely such a result.
Levine summarizes
what he considers some of the most outrageous assertions and themes
of this new textbook.
First, writes
Levine, the book argues that "[t]he abolition of directly elected
regional governors was a good thing because ‘regional governments
could not effectively function during a crisis-type situation’ (e.g.
responding terrorist attacks) [sic]. The implication here is that
rigid, top-down vertical political structures are a necessity in
Russia's democracy."
Isn’t this
what we’re told here in the good old U. S. of A.? Lincoln’s crushing
of state sovereignty and centralization of power in Washington,
D.C., were good things, we are led to believe, and necessary to
move America into the modern, egalitarian era. Local governments
and private organizations cannot be trusted to deal with disasters
– hence FEMA, with its bang-up job of recovery from Hurricane Katrina
and its fake news
conferences – or terrorism – hence the Department of Homeland
Security, ridiculous and invasive security procedures at airports,
and ever more militarized state and local police forces.
Levine later
argues that the book states or strongly implies the following: "Some
countries give up sovereign rule to other more powerful countries
in exchange for security. Case in point: Georgia after Saakashvili
was elected in 2004. Countries such as these are puppets and do
not represent their people's will. As such, they are illegitimate."
Again, how
different is this from what our historians tell us about practically
every foreign intervention by the U.S. government? When Uncle Sam
invades, topples the government of, or otherwise interferes in a
foreign country, even if it’s a democracy, it is always for the
good of the citizens of those countries and for the safety and security
of Americans.
Even now we
are being prepared for war with Iran, which the Bush administration
and all its allies in the media portray as an Islamic dictatorship
run with an iron fist by Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Ahmedinejad, however,
was democratically elected and has little real power; most power
is in the hands of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameni. Furthermore,
Bush himself, by labeling Iran part of the "axis of evil"
and continuing to harp on Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions, weakened
the previous, reform-minded president, Mohammed Khatami, and
strengthened anti-American sentiment in Iran, paving the way for
Ahmedinejad. Then, before the first round of the elections that
brought Ahmedinejad to power had even taken place, Bush was already
describing the elections
– and, by implication, the winner of those elections – as illegitimate.
In other words, as Levine put it, the Ahmedinejad government is
a "[puppet] and do[es] not represent [the] people’s will."
Therefore, it needs to be toppled by the U.S. government in order
to liberate the Iranian people and provide more security for both
them and us. Now how much different from former KGB agent Putin
is Bush? How far apart are each country’s court historians?
Levine next
describes the textbook’s take on Josef Stalin: "Stalin was
an ‘effective manager,’ taking Russia from the plow to the atomic
bomb in just a few years. His repressions were necessary to mobilize
for war and industrialize Russia so quickly."
Does this not
sound like most historians’ hagiographies of Lincoln, Wilson, and
FDR? Sure, they violated civil liberties and other constitutional
restraints repeatedly, but such violations were necessary to drag
a backward country, kicking and screaming, into the modern era.
FDR, in particular, is praised for maneuvering the country into
war by the back door of Pearl Harbor despite the overwhelmingly
noninterventionist tendencies of the American people at the time
and for enacting so many welfare-state programs, effectively managing
the entire country from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Maybe he didn’t
get us out of the Depression too quickly, and maybe he did lock
up 100,000 or so innocent Japanese-Americans, but it was all for
our own good. He even got us the bomb (with a slight assist from
Truman, another lauded president) before his buddy, "Uncle
Joe" Stalin, did. What a heroic leader!
Finally, Levine
could be describing practically any American history book (substituting
appropriate presidents’ names for the Soviet premiers’ names, of
course) with this characterization of the new Russian textbook:
"In general, the ratings of past leaders goes [sic] like this: Khrushchev
is bad because he weakened the government; Brezhnev is good because
he restored it; Gorbachev and Yeltsin are both bad because they
let the Soviet Union fall apart; Putin has been Russia's best leader
because he restored strong ‘vertical’ power (which was established
by Stalin)."
Sound familiar?
Take a look at any
mainstream "greatest presidents" list, and you’re
sure to find the presidents who increased federal power the most
at the top of the list, with Lincoln leading the pack. (Credit is
due to the person who edited that Wikipedia article to include libertarian
dissent on these presidential rankings, citing numerous LRC and
Mises Institute writers.) Historian Eric Foner, as Tom
DiLorenzo has pointed out more than once, considers Lincoln
far greater than Gorbachev and Yeltsin precisely because Lincoln
kept the American Union together at the point of a gun while Gorbachev
and Yeltsin allowed the Soviet Union to dissolve peacefully.
Levine is right
to be angry about the authoritarian bent of the new Russian history
text, but he surely should not be surprised by it. When the state
authorizes its own biography, one can hardly expect the ghostwriters
to portray the subject in a negative light.
Perhaps the
real problem is that history is almost invariably written as the
story of government, which explains why it’s often boring and seemingly
irrelevant to the average person and why it can frequently be downright
depressing. Perhaps it will always be thus, but wouldn’t it be nice
for historians to start treating human history as the story of individuals
and private institutions instead of the state collective? Since
every last bit of progress has been made by the private sector,
it would surely be a far more uplifting, interesting, and relevant
approach than the constant drumbeat and cheering on of institutionalized
force that passes for history in most quarters.
Until such
time as history becomes an account of peaceful interchange between
individuals, though, Levine asks if there might not be a "Russian
Howard Zinn" to correct the state worship of the new textbook.
Levine clearly lacks vision. What Russia needs is not a Howard Zinn
equivalent but a Tom Woods equivalent. Why, the Stalin era alone
could yield a good 33,000
questions Russians aren’t supposed to ask – or at least were
shot for asking before the weak-kneed Gorbachev and Yeltsin let
Uncle Joe’s grand project go to seed.
January
16, 2008
Michael
Tennant [send
him mail] is a software developer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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