A Tiger In Your Portfolio: The 'Debt Weapon'
by Daniel M. Ryan
by Daniel M. Ryan
DIGG THIS
Sometimes,
even large markets can turn on a dime. We saw that recently in one
of the largest markets in the world: the U.S. dollar. Less than
two months ago, the trade-weighted
U.S. dollar index was touching 70. As of last Friday, it got
to almost 76. In about the same timeframe, the Euro has gone from
about $1.60 US to about
$1.41. Although the recent rally looks like a mere blip on the
longest-range
St. Louis Fed’s chart, it was still enough to knock gold
and silver,
as well as oil,
right out of bull-market-recovery mode. According to post-mortems,
the greenback reversal’s cause was co-ordinated
central bank intervention – which included
the central bank of China.
In a sense,
this explanation is counter-intuitive. The U.S. dollar market nowadays
is too large to control, even by a team of central banks. It’s much
larger than the gold market was as the70s opened, and the co-ordinated
team effort of the London Gold Pool didn’t halt gold’s rise back
then. Central banks can’t fight the fundamentals, as a certain government
official found
out in 1999.
Consequently,
there’s only one way that the recent intervention could have succeeded
in its aim: it was well-timed. The U.S. dollar must have been sorely
undervalued at that point, or at least deeply oversold. There’s
been a long learning process, but central bank officials are discovering
that governmental force means little when compared with world supply
and demand. They have to pay attention to fundamentals and timing
just as any private-sector trading entity does, else their intervention
is for naught.
This point
is important, as it explains the most efficacious intervention undertook
by a multi-government consortium in the last forty years. It’s one
that’s remembered even to this day by Joe Average.
Freedom
Hatred, And What To Do About It
The standard
line as to the cause of 9/11 is President Bush’s: "they hate
us for our freedoms." Rather than mention such impolite terms
as blowback, I’m going
to take it straight by assuming that there’s an evil genius called
Useenhim bun Evil. He hates U.S. freedoms and has made it a holy
cause to end what he considers to be the pernicious influence of
the U.S. on the world. How would he go about hatching his plot?
What strategy would he have?
Since Useenhim
fears and loathes U.S. freedoms and their influence on the world,
his obvious strategy is to bait the U.S. into ending them. A U.S.
government that practices what it preaches makes bun Evil lose on
the world stage. A U.S. government that continually acts hypocritically
on the world stage makes bun Evil a winner. If the U.S. government
abolishes at home those freedoms it ballyhoos abroad, then Useenhim
wins. A pharisaical U.S. State is no threat to the kind of tyranny
that bun Evil holds dear.
So, it’s obviously
in bun Evil’s interest to goad the United States into becoming a
police
state, if not a military dictatorship. That’s how Useenhim would
win. Who amongst the peoples Useenhim holds dear would regard the
U.S. government as anything other than an ignorable fraud should
those same freedoms be eroded in the U.S. itself? The continual
U.S. campaign for "human rights" would turn into little
more than hot air.
More to the
point, a U.S. of that sort would not be seen as a liberator anymore.
That would make a war of "liberation" almost impossible
to win. Baiting the U.S. government into eroding freedoms in the
U.S. itself is the perfect Fourth
Generation Warfare strategy. In addition to rendering any claims
of "liberation" hollow in the invaded nation, it also
creates a group of U.S. sympathizers at home – who sympathize for
their own reasons. Case in point: a group of thirteen rebellious
colonies, whose grievances touched a common chord amongst citizens
of the Empire to which they belonged. "What they’re doing to
us, they’re doing to you" makes for the kind of strategic alliance
that requires no entangling treaty. Wild
tales to that effect gaining
widespread credibility is a sign that bun Evil’s strategy is
working for him.
Going On
Offense
The above scenario
is confined to defensive maneuvers. Within the confines of the "human
rights" game, there is a way to go on offense – the "holier
than thou" maneuver. We saw these offensive ploys during the
Cold War: the U.S.S.R. became quite good at them. In the case of
"radical Islam," the best tactic would be rigorous observance
of certain civil liberties that haven’t
exactly been in a bull market these last seven years. This strategy,
and others like it, goes with the flow. It doesn’t create conditions;
it works with already-existing conditions that have been "plausibly
denied."
This go-with-the-flow
aspect is also a feature of other means by which not-so-friendly
foreign powers can get nasty with the U.S. That above-mentioned
intervention, by a consortium of governments, was one of them. It
was OPEC’s use of the "oil weapon" in 1973.
We now know
that this bolt from the blue was the result of the oil price failing
to catch up with U.S. inflationist policies, leaving a huge equilibrium
gap that OPEC could exploit. The price of other commodities, most
particularly gold, had leapt up by a comparable amount in the early70s. The oil weapon only worked because the U.S. practice of "exporting
inflation" caught up with Americans.
Nowadays, there’s
no such inflation gap to be filled in the oil market. In addition,
we’ve become inured to sharp rises in petroleum-product prices.
These two changes suggest that, if the oil weapon is deployed nowadays,
it would largely fizzle as a terror tactic. Another embargo would
hurt, but it would not shock as it did back in 1973.
On the other
hand, there is a continued equilibrium gap that would shock
us if exploited. It’s the "debt weapon."
To be more
specific, it would be an embargo on holding and refinancing U.S.
treasury debt. What makes this debt weapon so packed with a punch
is the extraordinarily low interest rates the U.S. has enjoyed,
relative to U.S. inflation. If you believe the official statistics,
the U.S. government has been enjoying a recent negative-real-rate
ride for about a year now. If John
Williams’ alternate measure is correct, then the U.S. government
has been stiffing Treasury debtholders for at least three years.
This gap can only go on for so long before it’s filled.
The Tiger
In The Tank
Although the
total amount of foreign
holdings of U.S. government debt seems eye-boggling, it’s not
overweening as compared with total
U.S. treasury debt outstanding. What’s most noticeable about
the foreign-holders list is that the nation with the most is a long-time
U.S. ally, Japan. Close in second is the People’s Republic of China.
The U.S. government, despite the continual China-bashing in the
human-rights game, has little to fear from either of the two as
of now. The nation that’s #3 on the list is the U.K., a second long-time
ally.
Fourth on the
list is "oil exporters," a category that not only includes
many Islamic countries but also several Latin American nations and
a few African ones. Russia, #8 on the list, has only $65.3 billion
in U.S. treasury securities. The oil-exporting nations, collectively,
have only $170.4 billion. These two sums are only small fractions
of the
whole: even current Federal
Reserve holdings of U.S. treasury debt make them look small
by comparison.
Breaking down
the securities by maturity reduces the alarm rate even further.
The total amount of U.S. Treasury bills held by all non-U.S. governments including the above-mentioned Japan, China and the U.K. is a
mere $225.8 billion. Looking at this total suggests that the debt
weapon will prove to be a wet firecracker.
Markets, though,
are made at the margin. If the U.S. government is getting an after-inflation
free ride on the debt market, then all holders of its debt are somewhat
asleep at the switch with respect to real yield. Many of them may
have other reasons for investing in U.S. treasury securities, such
as safety or convenience, which make the after-inflation yield not
that relevant to them as of now.
If safety is
the reason for this lassitude, then the safety premium has hit quite
a high. The average interest rate of the entire U.S. debt, as
of August 31st, is 3.902% for marketable securities
and 4.827% for non-marketable securities; the total average interest
cost is 4.36%. All of these numbers are well below the 12-month
trailing official
inflation rate, 5.6%. In other words, if the CPI figure is an
accurate gauge of purchasing-power depreciation, the U.S. government
has been enjoying an after-inflation free ride for all of its borrowings.
Historically, this is an unusual benefit that doesn’t last very
long.
Fore-shadows
Given that
the debt weapon would only carry a huge sting if the real rate of
U.S. Treasury borrowings remains negative for quite some time, it’s
realistic to assume that it wouldn’t be used for a few (if not several)
years. The after-inflation free ride currently enjoyed by the U.S.
treasury hasn’t lasted sufficiently long for general complacency
to set in. That complacency won’t set in until the worried person
who brings it up at parties becomes a well-known bore or laughingstock.
We’re not at that point yet.
In addition,
as noted above, foreign holdings aren’t that massive in comparison
to the whole load. As also noted above, a mistimed use of the debt
weapon will fizzle…just as the Gold Pool’s interventions did.
Nevertheless,
even a relatively small intervention can start an avalanche if the
timing’s right. It may only be a coincidence, a decision prompted
solely by market fundamentals, but the Russian State has declined
to renew most of its holdings in Fannie and Freddie debt. Despite
official
assurances that those shifts were not a dumping maneuver, it
seems to have had the effect of one – although the Chinese State
selling some of its own agency holdings seems to have been the final
yell that started a pre-emption
of an avalanche.
Despite its
lack of imminence, though, the above-described "debt weapon"
shows that the U.S. government has a lot to lose through throwing
weight around on the world stage. What seems to be foreigners’ gullship
may turn out to be a prudent investment in geopolitical stability.
We won’t know until it’s too late.
Thanks to last
weekend’s scramble,
though, we do know that the People’s Republic of China has the most
noticeable creditors’ clout. The PRC State has tended to be "businesslike"
in its diplomacy so far…and not
just with the United States.
September
9, 2008
Daniel
M. Ryan [send him mail]
is a Canadian with a past. Visit his
website.
Copyright
© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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