State Education: Plans of Aft and Gley
by Daniel M. Ryan
by Daniel M. Ryan
DIGG THIS
The recent
crack-up of the UN-pushed climate change models is, I am sure, going
to prompt yet another spate of back-to-basics navel-gazing. The
realization that one single, and rather cheaply-done, experiment
has
cast real doubt upon years of munificently-financed
climatology research will probably cause the "re-evaluation
process" to get rolling again. Only this time, higher education
will be the focus.
To this end,
I submit one of those high-school multiple-choice decision memos
for your inspection. In order to play, you need to go through the
following four models of higher education and try to pick one that
will encourage the most scholarship, unless you think I’m pulling
a trick and decide to abstain. Here they are:
The Elitist
Model
This one is
relatively easy to describe because our present educational system
got implemented through elbowing it out a long time ago. The elitist
model assumes that some people are inherently fit for scholarship,
and the rest aren’t. Since only a small minority of citizens are
going to wind up in scholarship anyhow, elitist models of higher
education see no inherent difficulty in limiting the pool of qualified
candidates to a small minority.
The most august
kind of elitism is elitism by birth and/or social position. The
ultimate justification for this system is the principle of specialization.
Only certain kinds of people are fit for scholarship; bringing the
rest in would simply waste their time and (perhaps others’) money.
Since only a small minority of citizens will become professional
scholars of any worth anyway, the restriction on entrant numbers
to a small minority shouldn’t matter all that much.
The most creative
justification of the arbitrary-disqualification element of such
a system came from an eighteenth-century Prussian, Justus Möser.
He argued that the arbitrary imposition of qualifications for scholarly
positions will be good for the masses, because each member of the
disqualified part of the citizenry can content him- or herself with
the thought, "okay, so it’s unfair, but it doesn’t say anything
about my own abilities. I just wasn’t born to be a scholar."
(Ludwig von Mises discusses this argument in Section 1, subsection
4 of The
Anti-Capitalistic Mentality.) Building on this justification,
it could be argued that arbitrary criteria for admission will inculcate
a sense of guilt and/or shame in the favored classes, which will
impel them to work hard in order to justify their privileges to
the rest of the citizenry.
Of course,
the arbitrariness of the qualifications, with respect to scholarly
merit, is precisely the drawback of the elitist model. This drawback
does not exist for the second model of higher education.
The Hard-Democratic
Model
The hard-democratic
model of higher education uses a rigorous selection process too,
but substitutes measures of individual accomplishment for collectivistic
admission criteria. In contradistinction to the elitist model, anyone,
no matter how modest their social rank or socio-economic status,
can reach the top in the hard-democratic system – provided that
the successful person in question gets top-notch grades and produces
top-notch work.
One advantage
to the hard-democratic model is that it provides a plausible way
to achieve excellence in scholarship, in a democratic polity. To
do so, all that is required is to ramp up the requirements for getting
in. Grade cutoffs can be raised; entrance exams can be added; work
pressures can be piled up to weed out the lackadaisical. In addition,
character screenings can be added, too: if a science student "fudges"
the data while in the lab, he or she can be expelled for cause.
The same thing goes for cheating of any kind. Professors who "creatively
adapt" someone else’s work can be sacked for cause. It can
be argued that the character component is even more democratic than
the performance component, because there
is no such thing as a "character quotient" but there is
such a thing as an intelligence quotient. Interestingly enough,
rote memorization, as a performance metric, doesn’t favor the high-I.Q.
type that much either. Nor does cold-decking a student for non-sequitur-ridden
thinking.
Another general
advantage of the hard-democratic model is that it doesn’t mandate
excellence. If excellence in scholarship is not wanted, then the
criteria can be relaxed a little. The issues that dominate scholarship
at the top level are rarefied, after all; a more pragmatic age tends
to see them as being of little use.
This model,
though seemingly ideal for a democratic society, has one drawback,
which is more well known now than it was forty years ago. The hard-democratic
model relies upon merit criteria that may very well be too narrow,
thus opening up the possibility of a third option.
The Soft-Democratic
Model
The soft-democratic
model of higher education discards rigor for the sake of pluralism.
Multiple points of view are encouraged; optimization criteria are
discarded as being too narrow-minded. Instead of output-based selection
criteria, input-based criteria are used: credentials. You put in
the time, and don’t goof off, you qualify.
The obvious
disadvantage of this kind of system – tenured mediocrity – is dealt
with by reliance upon the marketplace of ideas, and by "strength
in numbers." It matters little if one scholar is a screw-up,
as long as he or she has a needed knack that can contribute to the
progress of the field. A more rigorous, but more narrow-minded,
colleague can correct the errors of the former. The latter type
of scholar derives a benefit from being inspired by the former.
Thus, the soft-democratic model relies upon the principle of specialization,
too intra-group specialization.
If the whole
field seems ridden by screw-ups, then a shift to critical thinking
can set the ship of scholarship aright. In addition, many scholars
with bad habits can set themselves aright through normal maturation.
A screw-up will grow out of it.
The advantage
of such a system is that it never drives away potential, whereas
a more rigorous system might. Also, it brings the most scholars
into the field. The disadvantage, of course, is credentialism becoming
a substitute for competence.
The Regimentation
Model
This last model
differs profoundly from the first three, and is the most alien to
us. All of the others rely upon initiative: the elitist model uses
class pride; the hard-democratic model uses pride in individual
accomplishment; the soft-democratic model uses career incentives.
The regimentation model, on the other hand, uses punishment.
In this model,
classes are run like a boot camp. Laxity in paying attention, and
in homework, is met with a swift penalty, such as being yelled at,
or "punishment drill," or going without break time. It’s
hard to see an advantage in this kind of higher-education model,
as it can only produce good epigones. The regimentation model is
only considerable when epigonery is prized, and mistakes of any
kind are anathema. Needless to say, the regimentation model is the
most foreign to a free society, let alone a democratic society.
What should
be clear about all of these models is that they have both strengths
and drawbacks. It is impossible to prove, without smuggling in value
judgments, which system of these four is the best one. None of them
are objectively ideal.
Interestingly
enough, though, all of them can be corrupted by the substitution
of State financing for private (or self-)financing – all of them.
Here’s how:
- The elitist
model can become a gravy train for a privileged class, thanks
to the influx of tax dollars. This result goes by the name of
a "Family Compact" in my home land of Canada.
- The hard-democratic
model is put at risk by "the few and the proud" making
up a small pressure group. Thus, although the hard-democratic
model seems to be better than the elitist model, it is more vulnerable
to shifts in the political wind due to its successes not being
born to any shade of impressive and therefore influential purple.
- The soft-democratic
model does have the advantage of a relatively large class of beneficiaries,
which makes it less politically brittle than the hard-democratic
model, but the credentialist nature of it does tend towards sinecure.
- The regimentation
model, dominated as it is by obedience, is easy for the State
to corrupt into pseudo-scholarship.
And, of course,
all of them will be bent out of shape by the fact that the State
pays the piper, and thus calls the tune. The marketplace of ideas,
like the marketplace period, exists to serve the consumer. When
the consumer is the State, then the demand by the State, for a certain
kind of scholarship, will call forth a corresponding supply.
It also introduces
a corresponding disincentive as well. Governments do not like being
embarrassed, after all, and can not only de-fund any obstreperous
scholar, but can also go after any would-be private patron too,
through changes in the laws. A private patron cannot go after the
State; he or she can only plead to the State.
The American
academy, as of now, is dominated by a largely soft-democratic model,
with a residue of the hard-democratic model that used to be predominant
when State financing was in its earlier stages. Present-day climatology
has been developed in a contemporaneous soft-democratic milieu,
with lavish State funding included; it is in conformance to this
model that it lost its head for so many years. I note, in closing,
that climatology
has required the services of a Viscount to regain its bearings.
Should there be any navel-gazing as a result of the breakdown of
the "generally" accepted climate-change models, I humbly
suggest the inclusion of this fact into any such effort.
February
14, 2007
Daniel
M. Ryan [send him mail]
is a Canadian with a past. He's currently wearing out his
thumb with pen and paper.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
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