One of the
deductions that Hans-Herman Hoppe is known for is his conclusion
that democracy differs from monarchy in the area of responsibility-continuity.
As he elaborates in Democracy:
The God That Failed, democracies are run by temporary custodians,
who must maximize their advantage in a short-term manner because
their position is only temporary. There is no incentive, beyond
an "idealism" that is much easier to bully-pulpit than
to seriously implement, to make permanent improvements to the nation’s
economy. Such incentives that are subject to the influence of promoting
a legacy (favorable mention in the history books) do not dovetail
with economic improvements. They do dovetail with winning the respect,
or awe, of the writers of the history books, which itself is subject
to the credibilities of the general public. Thus, there is no logical
connection between democracy and economic growth, even if there
seems to be in the short term. Such short-term incentives, though,
are confined to gaining credit for any growth trend, or assigning
blame for any contraction trend, in whatever way is most expedient
for gaining, or keeping, elected office.
Interestingly
enough, democracy can coexist with a somewhat free and growing market,
although not to the extent that the old democrats assumed. The trusteeship
nature of democracy does apply to war, as Joseph Schumpeter discussed
in the chapter "Imperialism As a Catch Phrase" in Imperialism
and Social Classes. Just as the democratic politician has
no incentive to add permanent improvements to a nation’s economy,
so it is that a democratic politician has no incentive to launch,
intentionally, a long-term war, one where the victory will not come
until he or she is either retired or dead. This is the root of the
notion that democracy and war are mutually exclusive. Note, though,
that it says nothing about short-term wars, ones that can be declared,
prosecuted, and "won" within the timeframe of a single
career as political head honcho. The typical war fought by the United
States – and there have been many of them – is prosecuted according
to this plan. In terms of time, the longest "hot" war
ever fought by the U.S. military has been the Vietnam War, which
lasted approximately ten years. Both Presidents that were Commanders-in-Chief
during its full prosecution left office in disgrace, essentially
for hypocrisy. This provides, for the United States specifically,
a lesson for any future President: long, drawn-out wars, ones that
get stuck in the "Big Muddy," entail political suicide.
The incentive for, and consequent expectation of, quick victory
is evidently self-reinforcing. So, a bias towards high time preference
in politics does have its advantages, as the obvious tendency of
national "statesmen" to treat the nation’s goods and people
as a War Treasury is limited by the short-term orientation of democratic
politics.
Given the obvious
disadvantages of a high-time-preference State, though, there does
emerge a kind of tension, or clash, between economic maximization
and maximization of political advantage. Economic growth under capitalism
does rest upon capital accumulation, which requires general habituation
to low time preferences. This habituation, though, is foreign to
democracy. Thus, capitalists and democrats have a tendency to look
askance upon each other. The grand compromise "democratic capitalism"
tends to rest upon capitalists being amenable to politicians taking
credit for the capitalists’ own accumulation, or to politicians
ascribing credit for it to "the people" – the voters.
When the latter course is taken, capitalist democracy enjoys a kind
of stability, because the "people" being given credit
do tend to be low-time-preference in habits. In this sense, the
people’s flattery, although it paints with too broad a brush, is
roughly accurate in a democracy with a low-time-preference culture.
Unfortunately,
this coexistence is not a stable one. One of the disturbing conditions
of such an arrangement is the rise of a class that is more capitalistically
inclined than the general populace. This development does occur
from time to time when a generally unrecognized competitive advantage
in cultivating a low time preference arises, because the advantages
of doing so are subtle, and are not easily assimilated. They are
generally scoffed at during times when the advantage is generally
unperceived. An unintended consequence of that competitive advantage
emerging, though, is that it makes "the people’s flattery"
more and more unrealistic. The politicians, who credit "the
people" for the extent of capitalistic development in a nation
in those times, appear as if they were assigning the name of the
"people" to a low-time-preference elite. This practice,
although rooted in capitalist democracy, appears undemocratic, and
may very well be so at the time it is seen through. Thus, "inequality
of wealth" is not a threat to capitalist democracy per se,
but sustained inequality of time preference is.
It should therefore
be of little surprise that the economics of Keynes, with its borrower-centric
bias, took the democracies of the world by storm in his time. Keynesian
politics does show a certain shrewdness in times when inequality
of time preferences is jarring, as it ascribes credit for "economic
growth" to the consumer, the borrower, and of course the government
itself. (The only category that the low-time-preference sort can
fit into is exporter.) Lord Keynes spoke very well to the biases
of his time, even if, in so doing, he inclined democratic politicians
to take credit for economic growth themselves, rather than discouraging
them from doing so. It is in this way that a Keynesian democracy
is inclined towards corporatism. Keynesian political economy takes
hold during times when the high-time-preference class has an opportunity
to wreak revenge (for being taken for granted) through democratic
politics, at the long-term cost of hobbling the economy.
As democratic
politicians grow in influence, so does the high-time-preference
lifestyle gain in prestige. Any child raised to be obedient to the
State, in such a democracy, will conclude that high-time-preference
behavior is good. Don’t the best statesmen act short term? Don’t
they demand results quickly? Don’t the best of them get results
quickly? Don’t they brag about the generosity of a deficit-running
government, and merely pay lip service to the idea of surpluses?
Aren’t they somewhat fast and loose with respect to mere promises?
If the electorate doesn’t mind that, why shouldn’t Our Leaders be
that way? They serve the people, don’t they?
Thus, in a
time of statolatry in a democracy, the high-time-preference example
set by the political class results in high-time-preference behavior
amongst the obedient young. They have indeed followed the example
of their "betters" in this regard.
There are equilibrating
trends in politics as well as economics. One means by which the
low-time-preference sort can limit the resultant hobbling of the
economy, as well as recurrent depredations of it, is to promote
the idea that anyone living the high-time-preference lifestyle is
a "winner" in some way. This makes the resultant inequalities
of wealth less aggravating to the electorate.
Nevertheless,
it tends to cleave incentives for social success apart from incentives
for economic success. In addition, it fails to explain why low-time-preference
people gain wealth and influence in everyday life. This latter clash
tends to show up in the culture, as a supply of movies, etc., arises
to satisfy the demand for explaining it. The typical plot line that
fills this demand, in American culture, includes the wicked moneylenders,
the wicked businessmen, or the wicked corporations that seem destined
to enslave us all. This last American myth reconciles the clash
between success in life and following behavioral cues from the political
leadership, by encouraging the notion that the wicked corporation
"forces" people to act in a low-time-preference manner.
The end result,
in a statolatized democracy, is a kind of elitism developing, one
where "overnight successes" compose the new elite. Anyone
who succeeds, or who appears to have succeeded, in a high-time-preference
manner, becomes a folk hero. Such people reinforce the popular stereotype
of "Instant Wealth," which reconciles the popular desire
for worldly success with popular deference to politicians. These
ostensibly favored few, mostly celebrities, serve an important function
in a statolatized democracy, as they show that it is possible to
"have it all" in a clash-ridden democratic polity. (No
need to wonder why they end up with political influence.) This reassures
the electorate, who would otherwise have qualms about an existent
clash between political success and economic success in a democracy
where government is looked up to.
There’s only
one way out of such a dilemma, for those who seek economic success
in a democracy: rehabilitation of low time preference habits in
the general populace. Since deference towards politicians inculcates
the habits of high time preference, the restoration of general respect
for the low-time-preference mode of life requires putting an end
to the practice of revering politicians. They have to be seen as
serviceable, and the ones who are good at it seen as rating a kind
of cold esteem.
February
9, 2007
Daniel
M. Ryan [send him mail]
is a Canadian with a past. He's currently wearing out his
thumb with pen and paper.