The Argument From Disagreement Deepened
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
In an earlier
article, I introduced the argument from disagreement, "that
the State and government are not and cannot be logically justified
or defended as long as there are those under their rule who disagree
with their (aggressive) impositions." Hoppe argued in his argumentation
ethics that whenever anyone argued for anything, he presumed the
property rights of his opponent. If a person argued for the State
and against property rights, he was then in contradiction. I went
further in the argument from disagreement. I concluded that socialists
and statists have no valid or logical arguments in support
of coercive measures or a State.
This article
revisits the argument. I deepen it to show its roots and how it
is linked to the issue of invalid interpersonal utility comparisons.
I wish to show that the argument for disagreement belongs in the
class of undeniable statements; that is, it’s a praxeological certitude
based in the logic of human action. I generalize it to conclude
that there are no valid arguments for the imposition of aggressive
force. I also provide an example of what the argument implies in
a situation such as the acceptance of something like a Constitution.
The
argument as applied to a Constitution
Suppose person
A argues against a State policy P while person S supports P. That
implies that S supports the State itself and also the State's imposition
of P. Person A does not support either the policy or its imposition.
Person S cannot,
without contradiction, defend P or argue for P (which means justify
it without coercion) and simultaneously approve of the coercion
involved in imposing P. If he approves coercion, why argue? Why
try to persuade A of something that A does not accept if the intent
is to force it on A anyway? If he is truly arguing, he can only
be arguing that person A voluntarily accept P as a policy.
But he isn't. He's arguing that the State impose P. This
is why arguing (which means arguing with someone who disagrees with
it) for any socialist policy is indefensible. Person S is
really saying that no matter what person A believes or argues, power
or might is a necessity. This of course is not an argument.
As an example,
consider the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. It was preceded
by much argumentation. The idea was that a group adopt a coercive
proposal that would bind the members of the group. The group needed
a valid rule of adoption, however, in order even to decide what
would validate adoption. Any procedure at all only has validity
if all of the group members agree to be bound by such a rule.
There must logically be a starting point at which majority rule,
for example, becomes an acceptable rule. Majority rule can’t be
decided by majority rule ab initio. That assumes majority
rule is already in place. Majority rule must be decided by unanimous
consent at the outset before it can be accepted and used. Thus,
if all had agreed to be bound by majority rule, a minority who disagreed
with the new Constitution would have no complaint if the Constitution
received 51 percent approval. On the other hand, if all had not
agreed to such an adoption rule (majority rule), then the argumentation
over whether or not a Constitution should be established that provided
rules binding on everyone was senseless or illogical because a subgroup
had the intention of imposing it on those who disagreed with it
whether they agreed to it or not.
Parenthetically,
I venture the (safe) guess that no historian has ever shown that
the American people, slaves included, agreed to majority rule as
a vehicle for deciding on the U.S. Constitution. This is a Spoonerian-flavored
observation. It is implicit in his saying that "...the act
of voting could bind nobody but the actual voters," but I think
it needs to be spelled out that even a vote does not bind voters
unless they have earlier agreed to be bound by a counting rule such
as majority rule.
Relation
to interpersonal utility comparisons
Let us return
to S and A. S (implicitly) favors force to impose his proposal.
If A disagrees with him on the proposal, which he does because they
are arguing, then S is at one instant trying to non-coercively justify
to A that the State's policy is beneficial while at the same time
supporting State force to implement the policy. The latter support
means that he really does not care what A thinks. His argumentation,
which is non-coercive justification, doesn't square with what he's
supporting, which is a coercive measure.
For example,
S argues with A who is red-headed that all red-heads should pay
a 90% income tax. A disagrees. He rejects the idea. S insists that
the State should do this for whatever reason, say that it will save
1 million lives. He's trying to argue that A hurt himself for a
"good" cause, and A says "No, I do not accept this." At that point,
when A disagrees with S’s proposal, S has no logical way
of justifying the State forcing A to pay the tax that does not
involve invoking the values of other people than A. This, I
suggest, is a praxeological truth. S can’t tell A "It’s for
your own good," because A already says that it is not for his
own good. And if S does say this, it brings in S’s valuation of
what A values. S can’t tell A that it’s for the good of society
without bringing in the values of others. If S argues for society’s
benefit, he is comparing A’s disutility with the utility of others.
But it is well known that S has no way to measure or prove his statements
about the utility of others. If S can only justify the State by
bringing in the values of others, and if such comparisons are invalid,
then S has no valid way of justifying the State to A.
Can anyone
logically argue for or defend the use of force by the State?
Hobbes did, and so have many others. But did their use of argumentation
make sense in the face of those who disagree and reject the State?
My answer is "No, all such arguments are invalid."
How might S
have valid arguments for a tax or a State? He might say to A that
he should voluntarily accept the tax or the State. But a voluntary
tax is not a tax, and accepting "coercion" makes it into
non-coercion. These transform payments and rules into goods. So
this case is trivial.
When A disagrees
with force being imposed on him, there is no argument that can persuade
A that does not involve an invalid interpersonal utility comparison.
This suggests that we can generalize the argument from disagreement
and assert: There is never a valid argument for imposing (aggressive)
force on third parties who have no say in the matter. The imposition
of force must lower their utility, or else force is not required.
They are being made to act in ways they would not voluntarily or
freely select. This can’t be justified except by appeal to some
greater good which has to involve the valuations of others. This
has to involve invalid interpersonal utility comparisons.
Conclusions
Socialists
and statists who argue for force actually have no valid arguments
to use on those of us who disagree and they have no valid arguments
for imposing force on those who have no say in the matter. They
have no valid arguments at all. There are no valid arguments for
the imposition of (aggressive) force. The statist position is exposed
as one of brute force.
Those who believe
in free markets and their opponents, the socialists, do not compose
a group of reasonable people who somehow agree in the end to have
a State or a variety of coercive measures. There is a gulf that
can’t be bridged by argumentation. In reaching this conclusion,
I presume that individuals know their own minds best and know best
what is or is not good for them. And when they reject impositions
and force being used on them, they are choosing their best courses
of action. This presumption is, in my view, a praxeological certitude,
that is, a statement that can’t be denied. When people choose freely,
we cannot interpret their acts in any other way than that they prefer
what they choose. On the other hand, socialists and statists do
not know what's good for freely choosing people in a better way
than the free people do that allows them to impose measures on others.
If socialists really do know what’s good for others, then others
can and will voluntarily act on the socialists’ suggestions. If
they do not so act, then the implication is that the socialists
are not proffering suggestions that others prefer. Force, then,
is not justified.
While
socialists have no valid way to argue for the State, freedom-lovers
can logically argue against it. And they can continue to justify
their opposition to all coercive measures of States and States themselves.
July
15, 2006
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is the Louis M. Jacobs Professor of Finance at University at Buffalo.
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© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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