Credit Welfare and the FED
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
I’d like to
extend my remarks on Donald
Kohn’s recent speech in Nashville, because here we have a top
FED official clearly outlining the FED’s recent actions and, to
some extent, trying to justify them. His speech makes clear what
the FED has done and why it has done it.
The overall
picture he paints is clear. The FED has extended massive new credit
to new kinds of borrowers. It has also boosted credit enormously
to its traditional borrowers.
As I see it,
the immediate result is a huge expansion of credit welfare in the
American economy. This is an abundance of funding, usually under
favorable rates of interest, that the FED has single-handedly created
and bestowed upon parties that were being denied such funding by
others. This is a massive circumvention and contravention of free
capital markets. It is a massive transfer of wealth and buying power,
through inflationary means, to parties that have done nothing to
deserve it and away from those who are forced to compete with these
parties in using dollars. The parties not favored with the FED’s
largesse are forced to accept devalued dollars and lower interest
rates on their saving.
I will review
briefly the FED’s credit welfare programs and the FED rationales
for them. That will give me an opportunity to mention what I think
will be the long-term results of the FED’s actions,
Begin with
the popular investment vehicle, the money market funds. They make
short-term loans to borrowers such as business firms, states and
municipalities, banks, domestic and foreign governments, and government-sponsored
intermediaries like Fannie Mae. The business loans are called commercial
paper. Money market funds are relatively safe. Their prices tend
to hold at one dollar a share. The funds warn that the price may
fall below one dollar and that the investments are not guaranteed.
Kohn relates
that:
"Last
fall, when a run on money market mutual funds was severely constricting
their purchases of commercial paper, an important source of credit
to many businesses, we supported the funds, their customers, and
their borrowers by making credit available that allowed funds to
meet heavy redemption requests and also provided credit directly
to borrowers in the commercial paper market."
In this case,
the FED provided two streams of credit welfare. It supported the
funds, and it supported business firms by buying their commercial
paper that the funds were not buying. The people buying money market
funds had always exposed themselves to a risk of loss. The business
firms borrowing on commercial paper had always exposed themselves
to a risk of their funding being interrupted. When the economy moved
into a condition where these risks became realities, the FED prevented
or mitigated these losses. The FED acted as a kind of insurer providing
free insurance after the fact and at no cost to the parties receiving
the welfare.
We find this
same pattern repeated in the other of the FED’s credit extensions.
Kohn has a lengthy list of these recipients of credit welfare:
"...for
the first time since the 1930s, we extended credit to nondepository
institutions, granting discount window access to primary dealers...
"...we
eased the terms on which we lent to depository institutions (our
traditional borrowers) quite dramatically.
"We cooperated
with foreign central banks through currency swaps to make dollar
funding available to banks operating abroad.
"Most
recently, in collaboration with the Treasury, we have begun supplying
liquidity to purchasers of securitized credit.
"Another
aspect of our efforts to affect financial conditions has been the
extension of our open market operations to large-scale purchases
of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency debt, and longer-term
Treasury debt.
"My remarks
will concentrate on actions aimed at broad sectors of the financial
markets, not on those aimed at stabilizing individual systemically
important institutions, like The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.; American
International Group, Inc., or AIG; and several bank holding companies."
Each credit
extension by the FED is credit welfare, and credit welfare is a
form of bailout. Each credit extension mitigated losses that, by
all rights, should have been visited upon those who assumed those
risks.
All of the
FED’s new credit creation is inflationary. If a carpenter earns
$100 and saves $20, he transfers some buying power to borrowers.
His loanable funds reduce his buying power from $100 to $80, while
expanding the buying power of others. But since the FED does not
work and earn money, it does not transfer its hard-earned assets
to others. It creates new buying power via an electronic credit,
without in any way having itself worked and created goods and services.
Those new funds compete with the loanable funds that the carpenter
creates as a transfer of earned buying power. This inflation of
loanable funds robs the carpenter in two ways. He receives a lower
rate of interest than he otherwise would on his $20 of savings;
and he competes with the FED’s recipients to buy the available pool
of goods. This raises the prices of those goods. This reduces the
value of his $80.
The FED’s credit
welfare undermines the foundations of a free society. How? Credit
welfare subsidizes favorites, undermines private property, undermines
the profit-and-loss system, undermines competition, undermines the
dollar, and raises moral hazard.
Kohn admits
that the FED chooses favorites:
"...an
element of credit allocation is inherent in some of our interventions...we
have recognized that the resulting effects can be uneven across
markets and lenders."
Borrowers that
receive the FED’s credits are subsidized as compared with those
who do not. Competitors who do not receive credit welfare are disadvantaged.
This undermines competition.
The FED’s ex
post insurance changes private property contracts, conferring benefits
on some and losses on others. The contracts initially called for
various payoffs under various contingencies. The FED changed those
payoffs after the fact. This makes hash out of their initial pricing.
It introduces uncertainty into future contracting and influences
their pricing.
When the FED
provides de facto guarantees, even after the fact, it induces the
recipients to change their future risk-taking behavior. They are
inclined more greatly to ignore the FED-insured risks. They are
provided incentives to take on greater risks and leverage. The FED
increases moral hazard.
The FED’s credit
welfare competes with and thus undermines saving by private savers.
Saving is necessary for growth of the capital stock. The net result
is an economy whose wealth grows more slowly.
By inflation,
Kohn does not mean the money that the FED has already been creating.
He means price rises in goods and services. Let us hear Kohn out
fully as he addresses the inflation question:
"Will
These Policies Lead to a Future Surge in Inflation?
"No, and
the key to preventing inflation will be reversing the programs,
reducing reserves, and raising interest rates in a timely fashion.
Our balance sheet has grown rapidly, the amount of reserves has
skyrocketed, and announced plans imply further huge increases in
Federal Reserve assets and bank reserves. Nonetheless, the size
of our balance sheet will not preclude our raising interest rates
when that becomes appropriate for macroeconomic stability."
Kohn and the
FED are aware that they must address the reserves they have created:
"However,
our newly purchased Treasury securities and MBS will not mature
or be repaid for many years; the loans we are making to back the
securitization market are for three years, and their nonrecourse
feature could leave us with assets thereafter. But we have a number
of tools we can use to absorb the resulting reserves and raise interest
rates when the time comes. We can sell the Treasury and agency debt
either on an outright basis or temporarily through reverse repurchase
agreements, and we are developing the capability to do the same
with MBS. We are paying interest on excess reserves, which we can
use to help provide a floor for the federal funds rate, as it does
for other central banks, even if declines in lending or open market
operations are not sufficient to bring reserves down to the desired
level. Finally, we are working with the Treasury to promote legislation
that would further enhance our toolkit for absorbing reserves."
I have the
following reactions to his statements. This is guesswork and judgment.
(1) The FED
is not going to reverse its credit welfare anytime soon (in the
next 13 years.) The fact is that it is still expanding its
programs. Most of them show little or no signs of decrease. The
FED’s clients on welfare want it and are getting hooked on it.
Furthermore,
the FED has a history of waiting until a recovery is clearly in
view. Furthermore, any recovery may be slow and halting.
(2) With the
FED not reversing its credit welfare and expanding it, bank reserves
will not be reduced. The banks will have stronger and stronger incentives
to make loans as time passes and any sort of recovery occurs, whether
a natural one or a money-pumped one. Money supplies will expand.
In the long run, those expansions will be accompanied by
rising prices. In the short run, the behavior of prices is much
less certain. However, my guess is that even in the short run, consumer
price rises are more likely to surprise people by their strength
than by their weakness.
(3) The FED
will downplay any price rises and stay with their policies.
(4) The FED
will not raise interest rates on its own accord. If the market raises
interest rates, the FED will follow if it has to in order to control
its balance sheet. The FED at present is happy to be lowering certain
long-run interest rates selectively. As Kohn notes
"...the
extremely large volume of purchases now underway does appear to
have substantially lowered yields. The decline in yields reflects
‘preferred habitat’ behavior, meaning that there is not perfect
arbitrage between the yields on longer-term assets and current and
expected short-term interest rates."
The FED cannot
raise interest rates vigorously by selling off securities without
imposing capital losses on its clients whom it is now trying to
induce to buy long-term securities.
(5)
Even if a recovery gets underway, the dollar is vulnerable to severe
shocks. Any number of possible dollar shocks that are politically-induced
can undermine the American economy. Such unexpected events would
make hash of the FED’s rosy game plan. The FED itself is walking
a narrow and high tightrope. It acts as if the risks it is taking
will not transpire.
The American
economy historically has been a strong economy with sound foundations.
Over time, these have been eroding. The existing set of FED and
government policies does nothing to reverse this process of erosion.
The FED and the government are furthering the process. The American
economy is becoming a higher-risk economy. It is more vulnerable
to shocks from any number of sources, ranging from political problems
to natural disasters and diseases. The economy is less and less
resilient. It has more and more commitments with less and less productive
power to back them up. The government remains busy tying the economy
up in knots. People are growing more fearful and angry. It is clear
that important new directions are needed. It is equally clear that
we are not getting them.
April
22, 2009
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2009 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in
part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
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