What Our Officials Most Fear
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
DIGG THIS
What do our
officials most fear? They fear the public’s loss of confidence.
Events are driving their improvised attempts to stem a general loss
of confidence in the dollar, in them, the financial and monetary
system, and the government as a whole.
It is not clear
that they recognize that this is their greatest fear. But even if
they do recognize that this is their greatest fear, they have no
clear roadmap for dealing with it.
Barack Obama’s
speeches have kindled some hope. If and when he takes office, he
can maintain that hope and a degree of confidence for a spell, by
strong government action, for, despite its perverse effects, strong
measures are what give many voters confidence in the system. They
feel good if something is being done, even if it means they’ll pay
double or triple in the end.
A recent news
headline reads "Obama gives Bernanke vote of confidence."
Obama is not even President yet, and he is already trying to bolster
confidence in the system.
On May 13,
2008, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke spoke of many things, as he often
does, of economic growth, of housing losses, of liquidity, of financial
strains, and so on. And in doing so, he obscured his main fear.
He fears our fears. He fears fear itself. He fears our loss of confidence
in the currency and the monetary system and in the entire system
itself. If he doesn’t, he should or soon will. Such a loss of confidence
is inevitable.
Bernanke does
not fully and openly express these broadscale fears. It would not
be politic to do so. He might fan the flames of fear. When he is
alone with himself in quiet moments, do these large fears cross
his mind? Maybe, but it is just possible that he is not fully aware
that these are his main fears. His self-knowledge may be deficient.
In his speech,
he expressed only part of this fear-cluster; but he expressed more
than enough to support my statement that our officials fear a loss
of confidence. I quote:
"Walter
Bagehot's Lombard
Street, published in 1873, remains one of the classic
treatments of the role of the central bank in the management of
financial crises. Bagehot noted that the basis of a successful
credit system is confidence. In one passage, he writes, ‘Credit
means that a certain confidence is given, and a certain trust
reposed. Is that trust justified? and is that confidence wise?
These are the cardinal questions’ (p. 11). He pointed out that
confidence is particularly important in banking and in other situations
in which the lender's own liabilities are viewed as very liquid
by its creditors. In such situations, as Bagehot put it, ‘…where
the 'liabilities,' or promises to pay, are so large, and the time
at which to pay them, if exacted, is so short,’ borrowers must
demonstrate ‘an instant capacity to meet engagements’ (p. 11)."
And Bernanke
went on to note that "the loss of confidence, even if not originally
justified by fundamentals, will tend to be self-confirming. If the
loss of confidence becomes more general, a broader crisis may ensue."
In this passage, he puts his finger on the larger fear, which is
a general loss of confidence.
The Fed Chairman
understands that confidence in the financial system and in banks
in particular is the foundation of the system. Without it, lending
evaporates and the economic system grinds to a halt until people
arrange new channels of borrowing and lending. Bernanke, being a
central banker, sees the solution to this as providing liquidity
in a host of new and creative ways. It is the "how" of
providing liquidity that interests Bernanke. The techniques of providing
liquidity while not introducing moral hazard and not inflating the
money supply are what fascinate him.
Our other major
financial official is Henry Paulson, who is Secretary of the Treasury.
I need only provide the titles of two of his speeches to make my
point. On July 22, 2008, he gave a speech with the title: "Reinforcing
Market Stability and Confidence." He stated unequivocally that
these were his "highest priority." He means it. On June
5, 2002, while still Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,
he made a speech titled "Restoring Investor Confidence: An
Agenda for Change."
Paulson in
his speech tackles the topic of confidence in a very broad way.
He touches upon banks, failing banks, the IndyMac failure, the FDIC,
the financial markets, and non-bank financial institutions. Paulson
is always attempting to reassure the people that the system is sound,
so that they will have confidence in it. On January 22, 2008, for
example, he said, "I continue to have confidence in the underlying
strength of the global economy."
Paulson, like
Bernanke, thinks in terms of confidence in the system. And so does
a former Secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence Summers. He supported
the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because, for one thing,
"Failure to pass even this minimal measure would undermine
confidence." Summers weights the confidence factor very, very
highly because his list of reservations
about the bailout bill is very long.
Is the focus
that these officials have on confidence misplaced? Not at
all. They are all right on target. Where we can fault them, if we
must, is that they do not express clearly and cogently enough the
precise nature of their fear that the American public will lose
confidence. They raise the issue clearly enough, but it is always
to pour the syrup of comforting reassurances into the public’s ears
so that any troubles will be smothered in sweet talk.
If we want
to understand what the most basic issue of confidence is really
about, we need to look elsewhere. One good place is Human
Action by Ludwig von Mises. Chapter 17 deals with Indirect
Exchange, that is, exchange using money and other media.
In a pre-FDIC
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) system, a bank traditionally
stands ready to redeem its notes in money (like gold or silver).
The bank’s assets, however, are mostly illiquid securities like
mortgages and loans. The bank needs to manage its position such
that if called upon to redeem a large volume of notes in money,
it can. But in this system, the banks issue money-substitutes or
what Mises calls fiduciary media. These are notes in excess of its
available money. Like Bagehot, Mises notes that confidence in the
bank is essential to the bank’s survival:
"People
deal with money-substitutes as if they were money because they
are fully confident that it will be possible to exchange them
at any time without delay and without cost against money. We may
call those who share in this confidence and are therefore ready
to deal with money-substitutes as if they were money, the clients
of the issuing banker, bank, or authority."
In the post-FDIC
system that we have, banks do not redeem notes in gold and silver.
They don’t redeem them at all! There is confidence in this arrangement,
not because the FDIC exists with its meager insurance fund, but
only because depositors regard the banking system’s assets – its
loans and mortgages – as sound. Liquidity is not an issue because
the central bank can print certificates on demand. If bank assets
in general come under suspicion, confidence will evaporate, nonetheless.
Mises points
out that the bank can undermine confidence (in the pre-FDIC system)
in several ways. One way is to increase its fiduciary media too
greatly, at which point the public may engage in a run on the bank
and demand redemption. The public will become suspicious when the
bank over-issues notes because it is in the bank’s interest to take
on any loan whatever that pays a rate of interest greater than the
cost of issuing money-substitutes. Hence, the bank will be tempted
to make bad loans as it extends credit. Sound familiar?
Nowadays, depositors
who are insured don’t seem to worry about this, which means that
a vital depositor control over bank lending is absent. The gap is
supposedly filled in by bank regulators and examiners, but the subprime
fiasco is evidence that such measures have failed to control bad
loans.
However, there
is another check on the system. As investors see that the assets
of the banking system are unsound, they mark down the stock and
bond prices of the banks. The banks find their capital costs rising
and they are forced to cut back on loans. Some banks go bankrupt
and the stock and bondholders lose, as well as large depositors
who are uninsured. A justifiable loss in confidence of the system
results in its contraction, and that negatively affects the entire
economy.
The second
way in which banks can undermine confidence is this:
"It
must not increase the amount of fiduciary media at such a rate
and with such speed that the clients get the conviction that the
rise in prices will continue endlessly at an accelerated pace.
For if the public believes that this is the case, they will reduce
their cash holdings, flee into ‘real’ values, and bring about
the crack-up boom. It is impossible to imagine the approach of
this catastrophe without assuming that its first manifestation
consists in the evanescence of confidence."
This path faces
us even in the post-FDIC system because if people lose confidence
in the money when they observe a rapid rise in prices of goods,
then they still have the option of converting cash and fixed-income
assets into real assets. Done in great volume, this conversion causes
a rash of speculation, asset and commodity price bubbles, and an
eventual crash.
Our officials
are worried about a loss in confidence, and they are trying to stem
it by shoring up institutions like Fannie Mae. The loss in confidence
is coming from one basic source, which is the banking system’s over
issue of fiduciary media. This has had the effects of a large volume
of bad loans and asset price bubbles. It may lead into the further
effect of a flight into real-valued assets.
The damage
to bank assets is system-wide. If the lion’s share of the banks
and other lenders have made bad loans or made loans that have gone
bad, then the amounts become unmanageably large for taxpayers and
their government to handle. There is, in fact, no action that government
can devise that will not make the situation worse. Bailouts are
bad. Nationalization is bad. Inflation is bad.
A loss in confidence
in the system is justified because the system is faulty to begin
with.
There is nothing
for it but to end legal tender laws and go to fully free markets
in banking and money. There is no need to legislate that gold, silver,
or anything else serve as money. People acting in free markets can
decide that on their own. The answer is free banking.
If there is
one thing that our officials fear more than a loss of confidence
in the existing banking system, it is free banking.
Von Mises knew
of this. I close with several quotations of his on free banking:
"It
is extremely difficult for our contemporaries to conceive of the
conditions of free banking because they take government interference
with banking for granted and as necessary."
"Today
even the most bigoted étatists cannot deny that all the
alleged evils of free banking count little when compared with
the disastrous effects of the tremendous inflations which the
privileged and government-controlled banks have brought about."
"The
establishment of free banking was never seriously considered precisely
because it would have been too efficient in restricting credit
expansion."
"Free
banking is the only method available for the prevention of the
dangers inherent in credit expansion."
"Only
free banking would have rendered the market economy secure against
crises and depressions."
July
29, 2008
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
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© 2008 LewRockwell.com
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