State Intervention: An Ethical Perspective
by
Michael S. Rozeff
by Michael S. Rozeff
DIGG THIS
Mankind, for
the time being, has states as its prime form of political organization.
History is rife with states violently intervening unasked in other
states. We in the U.S. have grown accustomed to wars and other interventions
in the name of national security or some other interest. We seem
to forget that these interventions are a matter of life and death
for all the peoples involved. In that forgetting, we become increasingly
a brutal people. We badly need to evaluate our foreign interventions
ethically.
The issue of
state intervention comes down to what violence is called for (justifiable)
and what is not called for, that is, what violent actions are ethical
or just. This is the issue of just war. I do not address that subject
here because I think that before getting into that topic, there
is another that is equally important. We need to develop the habit
of thinking about the state’s interventions in ethical terms. This
article discusses the state’s violent foreign interventions against
a background of ethics.
The proper
ethics that I assume should guide us in assessing interventions
are the standard prohibitions against such acts as theft, murder,
pillage, and rape. More generally, they are the prohibitions against
doing uncalled for violence against one’s fellow man and his property.
We need to
frankly adopt the ethical perspective at the outset when we consider
violent state interventions. What will this do for us? We’ll be
able to understand the meaning of the violent acts of our state
in terms of justice, not simply in terms of the so-called interests
of the state. The latter are always vague and always reducible in
any case to the interests of particular individuals. State officials
use "interests" to bulldoze us so that we overlook the
morality of the state’s actions. We’ll start thinking in terms of
evaluating our existing institutions and our ways of dealing with
interventions in terms of their contribution to justice. We will
position ourselves to discover difficulties and lapses in the existing
ways we handle interventions. We will point ourselves toward the
improvements in our behavior, individual and social, that are consistent
with underlying considerations of justice. We will begin to discern
the difficulties we face in controlling the state’s interventions.
These are the first steps in solving or ameliorating the problems
raised by state interventions.
We can view
the state in two ways. We can view it as an organization whose members
act as the political agents of the people in the nation that the
state rules. We might do this because the people financially, materially,
and politically, support their state in its actions. They provide
an active support, so to speak. Alternatively, we can view the state
as an independent body, acting on its own, that interacts with the
people it rules so as to extract the resources it requires. We might
do this because the state has discretion in its actions. It leads
and the people follow, more or less passively. It taxes to pay its
bills. In this view, only imperfectly is the state the agent of
the people. It acts on its own behalf.
Both views
describe the reality. At least some of the people actively support
the state. Many more are passive supporters. And a great many more
provide the resources and actions that bring the state’s wishes
to pass. But, on the other hand, the state’s members clearly instigate
and coordinate most violent interventions. While not forgetting
the role of the people at large, we should view the state’s members
as the main proponents of violent interventions.
By considering
the ethical responsibilities of an entire people and the members
of its state, we emphasize that the state’s actions are first and
foremost on a human level. We avoid the possibly misleading conception
of discussing the state as some sort of abstract entity that interacts
with other abstract entities because of vague interests. The U.S.
does not merely invade Iraq, one abstraction against another abstraction.
Real people of the U.S. violently act against real people of Iraq.
Violent interventions typically involve large numbers of people
of the affected countries. These are not bloodless and soulless
confrontations.
Viewing the
people of a nation at large as the active body in an intervention,
we may say that one people is intervening violently and without
invitation in the affairs of another people. Viewing the state as
the active body that precipitates intervention, it is the state’s
members who mobilize the population and its resources to intervene
with another people.
A first theorem
follows from recognizing that all actions are carried out by individuals:
If a violent intervention is wrong, one or more individuals is responsible.
The moral responsibility for a violent intervention is not a magician
who does a disappearing act. It always lodges in some individuals.
The responsibility does not disappear because the intervening nation
spells out legal conditions in its constitution or in statutes that
supposedly justify intervention. It does not disappear because the
nation is a democracy, or because it is diffused over an amorphous
mass of unidentified voters or public opinion. It does not disappear
because of a supposed emergency or because conditions are said to
demand action. It does not disappear because individuals are sworn
in as state officials.
Taking the
ethical perspective as axiomatic, we have a second simple theorem.
Since the state acts on our behalf, we should ethically assess the
state’s violent interventions. If we uphold those ethics, we should
condemn both improper violent interventions and the individuals
behind them. Ideally, the interventions should be assessed before
the state acts. Ethics imply ethical responsibility. This means
that if actions are improper, we may rightly morally condemn those
responsible for the wrong-doing caused by those acts.
Society does
not necessarily possess well-functioning or effective institutions
of justice to provide legal recourse, remedies, or penalties for
the state’s improper violent interventions. But, even if such institutions
as exist are limited in scope, the ethical perspective points us
in the direction of recognizing their importance, improving the
functioning of those we do have, and finding new ones if the old
ones don’t work.
Who is then
ethically responsible for a state’s actions? A fine-tuned attribution
of responsibility requires knowledge of the particulars of a given
case and judgment. It is safe to say that, because of its support,
the body of people bears some responsibility for what its state
does. But since this responsibility is spread far and wide, it is
also spread very thinly and unevenly.
More speculatively,
we digress very little to observe that one set of non-state institutions
that bears greater responsibility is the media. It reflects public
opinion to an extent, but it also heavily influences public opinion.
The media tend to act irresponsibly in situations that involve violent
interventions by being cheerleaders. There is no obvious mechanism
that subjects the media to sanctions or holds them responsible for
their tendencies to stir up trouble, exaggerate tragedies, and support
violent interventions. In fact, the opposite is the case. Major
media companies are licensed by the state and fear the state’s retribution;
and this factor leads them to be supportive of the state. Furthermore,
many people who work in the media are educated by persons who are
beholden to state support and inculcate the state’s values. The
result of all this is that we have an institutionalized yellow press.
Because of
the state’s primary role in every single detail, major and minor,
that relates to violent intervention and because Congress has the
legal power to declare war or otherwise attempt to place a legal
glaze over an intervention, the responsibility is far and away the
heaviest on those who compose the state than on those outside it
who are its supporters and cheerleaders.
If society
monitored the members of the state in some regular ways and exposed
them to sanctions if they misbehaved ethically, they would behave
better. As matters stand, we in America, not without some minor
exceptions, virtually do the opposite. We adulate officials and
pay them exorbitant pensions no matter how badly they behave in
office. Officials are able to capture huge emoluments by speaking
engagements and by writing books. The worse they behave, the greater
attention they are accorded. Ignoring and/or ostracizing bad actors
is something we don’t know how to do.
Again assuming
the ethical perspective is axiomatic, we can state a third theorem:
Violent state interventions must be (or should be) given
ethical justification by the members of state. Otherwise, they are
unethical. They necessarily have to be shown to be just.
For if they are not so shown, then those who initiate violent intervention
simply perpetrate uncalled for violence; and that is on the face
of it unethical, q.e.d.
The important
corollary is that the burden of proof for violent intervention logically
rests on those who are urging the violent acts, which means primarily
the members of the state. The logical presumption implied by the
ethical perspective is a presumption that is analogous to a presumption
of innocence. It is a presumption of no intervention. The
members of the state are not justified in executing a violent intervention
unless they have first proven that the intervention is proper. This
is the same principle we apply to everyone else in society. No individual
anywhere else in society is justified in perpetrating violent acts
on another person without being justified. The members of the state
are as much under the ethical law of non-violence as anyone else
is.
In fact, we
should logically expect society’s leaders to uphold even tougher
and more restrictive ethical standards than the average person.
That we do not in our contemporary American society observe this
high expectation carried into practice, that we in fact observe
flagrant disregard of it, proves that the general level of ethical
knowledge and behavior is nowhere near where it should be. It tells
us that our society has a very serious problem in regard to ethics.
How high should
the standard of proof be? How thoroughly should the justice of an
intervention be demonstrated? There are three major evidentiary
standards in the U.S. Ranging from lowest to highest, they are the
preponderance of the evidence (or the balance of probabilities),
clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. Given
the serious consequences that most interventions entail, the standards
should be high. They should only be lowered if the potential costs
of inaction are high; but it is very hard to think of a case of
American intervention when the country would have suffered if it
had done nothing.
When a country’s
leaders propose or undertake interventions, we do not ordinarily
think in terms of making them prove their case. We have no real
institutional means of doing this. We do not have referenda on interventions.
We do not have an independent body or bodies whose specific role
is to assess the matter. Everything is done inside the legislative
and executive branches; we rely solely on that division for the
checking and balancing. We then rely on speeches and the press.
This process doesn’t work.
We in fact
have very severe weaknesses in the ways in which we assess the justice
of an intervention. This can be seen by reviewing how this nation
has been taken to war and into interventions. At times, the actions
have been secret and/or CIA-led. At other times, all it has taken
is a president’s speech, a perfunctory Congressional debate, and
a one-sided vote, to lead us into a protracted war. Sometimes, the
president has provoked a war. Sometimes, his executive orders and
actions have created the intervention unilaterally. In all of these
situations, there has been no significant burden of proof placed
upon the state. There has been no due consideration of evidence
in a manner that provided sufficient checks upon state power. The
ethical perspective has more or less been buried. We have not been
properly evaluating the rightness or wrongness (in ethical terms)
of actions of the state that have extremely important consequences.
Certainly,
we will find a great many commentators and individuals who react
to any violent state intervention by assessing its morality. The
ethical perspective is by no means absent. But we also observe a
tendency to greater support than evaluation or criticism. We observe
much biased support, much blind support, much mistaken support,
much emotional support, much support based on pragmatic considerations,
much support based on false historical interpretations, much support
rooted in self-interest and potential profit, much laxity in terms
of legal necessities, much one-sided propaganda from government
officials, and much passive support or non-participation from those
lacking a way to make their opinions known.
No individual
can initiate violence without being called to account for it in
a court. This usually happens after the fact because we do no know
what an individual is contemplating or may do. In the case of a
state making war or violently intervening in another country, matters
are different. We are as a body publicly contemplating a violent
act. In most cases, our representatives are leading the charge and
provoking or strongly encouraging the act. Who is to be the conscience
of the state? Who is to be the moral monitor? Who is to exercise
self-control? We cannot allow the state to shoot first, after which
we ask questions. By then, it is too late. By then, the nation is
committed to a costly course of protracted action. If the burden
of proof is upon the state that proposes to initiate violence, how
is the proof to be presented? Who is the monitor or the court that
can restrain the state?
We plainly
are lacking in institutions for restraining the state’s interventions
before they occur. Institutions cannot make a people good. Even
good institutions will be subverted if people want to get out from
under them. The American system of violent interventions, let run
on and on no matter how improper they may be, is the system that
many of us want, which is why it is in place. But the state is still
the main player. The state wants the interventions. The Constitution
has facilitated the growth of the American Empire. This was its
domestic purpose and the mission was accomplished. But then foreign
empire became the goal of the state; the Constitution proved to
be no bulwark against that ambition. If we are bereft of institutions
to stop the war machine, that has been the design for a long time.
It is a little late in the game to observe the degraded and low
state of ethics that the Empire and its interventions have spawned.
But for the sake of future polities, it is well to spell out what
has happened here and understand how and why it has happened. Had
the American people had a firm commitment to and understanding of
ethics backed up by appropriate institutional arrangements to prevent
the state’s violent interventions, the world-straddling octopus
that is the U.S. might never have occurred.
Another serious
case occurs when violent intervention is triggered by some past
treaty or agreement. In effect, the state commits itself via treaty
to a possible future intervention contingent on some events coming
to pass such as an attack on a partner nation. All of the reservations
already expressed about intervention apply, and then some. The burden
of proof is upon those who support the treaty. But a treaty looks
to the future, and the future is highly uncertain. How can the state
prove its case when the circumstances are so intangible? Why should
this nation’s future be made to depend on the uncertain actions
of other nations? The standard answer is that an alliance by treaty
lowers the odds of a war by creating a stronger entity. However,
in fact, the effects of alliances are ambiguous and depend on many
factors such as the reliability of one’s allies.
And these questions
do not get at the even more serious moral infractions that occur
when the state acts in secret to provoke hostilities, or when the
state manipulates or suppresses critical information, or when the
state acts in haste or unilaterally, to take a nation into a war.
In such instances, there is no real or unbiased public assessment
of the intervention. If we think of the public as responsible because
it has delegated this power to the state or because it fails to
hold its public officials to account even after the fact, then the
public has placed its collective conscience on the inmost recesses
of a deep and dark closet shelf and forgotten where it is. If we
think of the members of the state as responsible, then, in each
of these cases there is also an inexcusable moral lapse of a most
serious nature.
Is it possible
for the national government to monitor itself and stop improper
violent interventions before they occur? To a small degree, but
it is not in its interest to monitor itself vigorously. We have
divided government functions and divided financing. We do have a
modicum of hearings, usually politically not ethically inspired,
and we have occasional mention of possible impeachments. Perhaps
even worse excesses are being avoided. But these control mechanisms
are dreadfully weak. They have not kept the nation out of war.
A properly
functioning country would not need a Department of Homeland Security.
We would be able to rein in past errors, which we can’t seem to
do. We would not be constantly prone, as we are, to committing new
errors.
Our leadership
is not raising and asking the ethical issues. It is not sanctioning
improper violent interventions. It is causing them.
Since our society
places such heavy reliance on its central government and its election
system, we as a people are bereft of control over our state. The
horrible human rights record in Iraq alone over the past 20 years
and several administrations illustrates how out of control the U.S.
state is. We have no workable institutions to change this situation
except to elect different leaders. That hasn’t worked for a very
long time because of party control of candidates.
We
face big problems. Our system has grave institutional defects in
restraining unethical foreign violent interventions. We as a people
are ethically off course. The negative consequences of our state’s
unethical actions around the world have come home to roost. This
will continue.
September
26, 2007
Michael
S. Rozeff [send him mail]
is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.
Copyright
© 2007 LewRockwell.com
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