Strategies
for a Libertarian Victory
by
Murray
N. Rothbard
by Murray N. Rothbard
This
article originally ran in the
Libertarian Review, Vol. 7, no. 7 (August 1978).
Libertarians
have given considerable thought to refining their basic principles
and their vision of a libertarian society. But they have given virtually
no thought to a vitally important question, that of strategy: now
that we know the nature of our social goal, how in the world do
we get there?
To the extent
that libertarians have thought at all about strategy, it has simply
been to adopt what I have called "educationism": namely,
that actions rest upon ideas, and therefore that libertarians must
try to convert people to their ideas by issuing books, pamphlets,
articles, lectures, etc. Now, it is certainly true that actions
depend upon ideas, and that education in libertarian ideas is an
important and necessary part in converting people to liberty and
in effecting social change. But such an insight is only the beginning
of arriving at a libertarian strategy; there is a great deal more
that needs to be said.
In the first
place, ideas do not spread and advance by themselves in a social
vacuum; they must be adopted and spread by people, people
who must be convinced of and committed to the progress of liberty.
But this means that liberty can advance only by means of a developing
libertarian movement. We must therefore be concerned not
only with the ideology, but also with developing the people to carry
the principles forward. Webster's defines "movement"
in a way clearly relevant to our concerns:

Some libertarians
have criticized the very concept of "movement" as "collectivist,"
as somehow violating the principles of individualism. But it should
be clear that there is nothing in the least collectivist in individuals
voluntarily joining together for the advancement of common goals.
A libertarian movement is no more "collectivist" than
a corporation, a bridge club, or any other organization; it is curious
that some libertarians, while conceding the merits of all other
such "collective" organizations, balk only at one that
would advance the cause of liberty itself.
Neither does
joining a movement mean that the joiner must in some way submerge
his individual sovereignty to the movement or the organization,
any more than the bridge club member must submerge his individuality
in order to advance the playing of bridge. The individual libertarian,
who places the triumph of liberty high on his value scale, decides
to join a movement that is requisite to the achievement of his goal,
just as does the member of a bridge club or the investor in a steel-manufacturing
corporation.
If the advancement
of liberty requires a movement as well as a body of ideas, it is
our contention that the overriding goal of a libertarian movement
must be the victory of liberty in the real world, the bringing
of the ideal into actuality. This may seem a truism, but unfortunately
many libertarians have failed to see the importance of victory as
the ultimate and overriding goal.
But why should
libertarians not adopt what might seem to be a self-evident
goal? One reason for not making such a commitment is that a person
may prefer the libertarian ideal as an intellectual game, something
to be merely contemplated without relevance to the real world; another
reason for weakening a person's desire to pursue the goal of victory
may be a profound pessimism that he may feel about any future prospects
for victory. In any case, holding the victory of liberty as one's
primary goal is only likely in those persons whose libertarianism
is motivated and molded by a passion for justice: by a realization
that statism is unjust, and by a desire to eliminate such glaring
injustice as swiftly as possible.
Hence, the
utilitarian, who is concerned not for justice and moral principle
but only for increased productivity or efficiency, may believe in
liberty as an ideal, but is not likely to place passionate commitment
into achieving it. The utilitarian, by his nature, is far more likely
to remain content with partial success than to press on to complete
victory. Indeed, such a weakening of the will toward victory was
partly responsible for the decline of classical liberalism in the
19th century.
It necessarily
follows, from our primary goal of victory, that we want victory
as quickly as possible. If victory is indeed our given end, an end
given to us by the requirements of justice, then we must strive
to achieve that end as rapidly as we can.
But this means
that libertarians must not adopt gradualism as part of their goal;
they must wish to achieve liberty as early and as rapidly as possible.
Otherwise, they would be ratifying the continuation of injustice.
They must be "abolitionists."
The objection
is often raised that abolitionism is "unrealistic," that liberty
(or any other radical social goal) can be achieved only gradually.
Whether or not this is true (and the existence of radical upheavals
demonstrates that such is not always the case), this common charge
gravely confuses the realm of principle with the realm of strategy.
As I have written elsewhere,
by making
such a charge they are hopelessly confusing the desired goal with
a strategic estimate of the probable outcome. In framing principle,
it is of the utmost importance not to mix in strategic estimates
with the forging of desired goals. First, one must formulate one's
goals, which ... would be the instant abolition of slavery or
whatever other statist oppression we are considering. And we must
first frame these goals without considering the probability of
attaining them. The libertarian goals are "realistic"
in the sense that they could be achieved if enough people agreed
on their desirability. ...
The "realism"
of the goal can only be challenged by a critique of the goal itself,
not in the problem of how to attain it. Then, after we have decided
on the goal, we face the entirely separate strategic question of
how to attain that goal as rapidly as possible, how to build a movement
to attain it, etc.
Thus, William
Lloyd Garrison was not being "unrealistic" when, in the
1830s, he raised the glorious standard of immediate emancipation
of the slaves. His goal was the proper one, and his strategic realism
came in the fact that he did not expect his goal to be quickly reached.
Or, as Garrison himself distinguished,
Urge immediate
abolition as earnestly as we may, it will, alas! be gradual abolition
in the end. We have never said that slavery would be overthrown
by a single blow; that it ought to be, we shall always contend.
(The Liberator, August 13, 1831)
From a strictly
strategic point of view, it is also true that if the adherents of
the "pure" goal do not state that goal and hold it aloft,
no one will do so, and the goal therefore will never be attained.
Furthermore, since most people and most politicians will hold to
the "middle" of whatever "road" may be offered them, the "extremist,"
by constantly raising the ante, and by holding the pure or "extreme"
goal aloft, will move the extremes further over, and will therefore
pull the "middle" further over in his extreme direction. Hence,
raising the ante by pulling the middle further in his direction
will, in the ordinary pulling and hauling of the political process,
accomplish more for that goal, even in the day-by-day short run,
than any opportunistic surrender of the ultimate principle.
In her brilliant
study of the strategy and tactics of the Garrison wing of the abolitionist
movement, Aileen Kraditor writes,
It follows,
from the abolitionist's conception of his role in society, that
the goal for which he agitated was not likely to be immediately
realizable. Its realization must follow conversion of an enormous
number of people, and the struggle must take place in the face
of the hostility that inevitably met the agitator for an unpopular
cause. ... The abolitionists knew as well as their later scholarly
critics that immediate and unconditional emancipation could not
occur for a long time. But unlike those critics they were sure
it would never come unless it were agitated for during the long
period in which it was impracticable. ...
To have dropped
the demand for immediate emancipation because it was unrealizable
at the time would have been to alter the nature of the change
for which the abolitionists were agitating. That is, even those
who would have gladly accepted gradual and conditional emancipation
had to agitate for immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery
because that demand was required by their goal of demonstrating
to white Americans that Negroes were their brothers. Once the
nation had been converted on that point, conditions and plans
might have been made. ...
Their refusal
to water down their "visionary" slogan was, in their eyes, eminently
practical, much more so than the course of the antislavery senators
and congressmen who often wrote letters to abolitionist leaders
justifying their adaptation of antislavery demands to what was
attainable. The abolitionist, while criticizing such compromises,
would insist that his own intransigence made favorable compromises
possible. He might have stated his position thus: If politics
is the art of the possible, agitation is the art of the desirable.
The practice of each must be judged by criteria appropriate to
its goal. Agitation by the reformer or radical helps define one
possible policy as more desirable than another, and if skillful
and uncompromising, the agitation may help make the desirable
possible. To criticize the agitator for not trimming his demands
to the immediately realizable that is, for not acting as
a politician, is to miss the point. The demand for a change that
is not politically possible does not stamp the agitator as unrealistic.
For one thing, it can be useful to the political bargainer; the
more extreme demand of the agitator makes the politician's demand
seem acceptable and perhaps desirable in the sense that the adversary
may prefer to give up half a loaf rather than the whole. Also,
the agitator helps define the value, the principle, for which
the politician bargains. The ethical values placed on various
possible political courses are put there partly by agitators working
on the public opinion that creates political possibilities (Means
and Ends in American Abolitionism, 1969; pp. 2628).
If the primary
and overriding goal of the libertarian movement must be the victory
of liberty as rapidly as possible, then the primary task of that
movement must be to employ the most efficacious means to
arrive at that goal.
To be efficacious,
to achieve the goal of liberty as quickly as possible, it should
be clear that the means must not contradict the ends. For
if they do, the ends are being obstructed instead of pursued as
efficiently as possible. For the libertarian, this means two things:
- that he
must never deny or fail to uphold the ultimate goal of libertarian
victory; and
- that he
must never use or advocate the use of unlibertarian means
of aggression against the persons or just property of others.
Thus, the libertarian
must never, for the sake of alleged expediency, deny or conceal
his ultimate objective of complete liberty; and he must never aggress
against others in the search for a world of nonaggression. For example,
the Bolsheviks, before the revolution, financed themselves partially
by armed robbery in the name of "expropriating" capitalists;
clearly, any use of aggression against private property in order
to finance the libertarian movement, in addition to being immoral
by libertarian principles, would cut against those principles themselves
and their ultimate attainment.
At this point,
any radical movement for social change, including the libertarian
movement, has to face an important, realistic problem: in the real
world, the goal for the libertarian, the disappearance of
the state and its aggressive coercion unfortunately cannot
be achieved overnight. Since that is the case, what should be the
position of the libertarian toward "transition demands";
i.e., toward demands that would move toward liberty without
yet reaching the ultimate goal? Wouldn't such demands undercut the
ultimate goal of total liberty itself?
In our view,
the proper solution to this problem is a "centrist" or
"movement-building" solution: namely, that it is legitimate
and proper to advocate transition demands as way stations along
the road to victory, provided that the ultimate goal of victory
is always kept in mind and held aloft. In this way, the ultimate
goal is clear and not lost sight of, and the pressure is kept on
so that transitional or partial victories will feed on themselves
rather than appease or weaken the ultimate drive of the movement.
Thus, suppose
that the libertarian movement adopts, as a transitional demand,
an across-the-board 50 percent cut in taxation. This must be done
in such a way as not to imply that a 51 percent cut would
somehow be immoral or improper. In that way, the 50 percent cut
would simply be an initial demand rather than an ultimate
goal in itself, which would only undercut the libertarian goal of
total abolition of taxation.
Similarly,
if libertarians should ever call for reducing or abolishing taxes
in some particular area, that call must never be accompanied
by advocating the increase of taxation in some other area. Thus,
we might well conclude that the most tyrannical and destructive
tax in the modern world is the income tax, and therefore
that first priority should be given to abolishing that form of tax.
But the call for drastic reduction or abolition of the income tax
must never be coupled with advocating a higher tax in some
other area (e.g., a sales tax), for that indeed would be employing
a means contradictory to the ultimate goal of tax abolition. Libertarians
must, in short, hack away at the state wherever and whenever they
can, rolling back or eliminating state activity in whatever area
possible.
As an example,
during every recession, Keynesian liberals generally advocate an
income tax cut to stimulate consumer demand. Conservatives, on the
other hand, generally oppose such a tax cut as leading to higher
government deficits. The libertarian, in contrast, should always
and everywhere support a tax cut as a reduction in state robbery.
Then, when the budget is discussed, the libertarian should
also support a reduction in government expenditures to eliminate
a deficit. The point is that the state must be opposed and whittled
down in every respect and at every point: in cutting taxes or in
cutting government expenditures. To advocate raising taxes or to
oppose cutting them in order to balance the budget is to oppose
and undercut the libertarian goal.
But while the
ultimate goal of total liberty must always be upheld and the state
must be whittled down at every point, it is still proper, legitimate,
and necessary for a libertarian movement to adopt priorities,
to agitate against the state most particularly in those areas that
are most important at any given time. Thus, while the libertarian
opposes both income and sales taxes, it is both morally proper and
strategically important to select, say, the income tax as the more
destructive of the two and to agitate more against that particular
tax. In short, the libertarian movement, like everyone else, faces
a scarcity of its own time, energy, and funds, and it must allocate
these scarce resources to their most important uses at any given
time. Which particular issues should receive priority depends on
the specific conditions of time and place.
Within any
radical ideological movement for social change there are bound to
develop two broad and important "deviations" from the correct, centrist,
movement-building position we have been discussing. At one pole
is the deviation of "left-sectarianism" and at the other
the deviation of "right-opportunism." Each, in its own way, abandons
the hope of victory for the radical goal.
The left-sectarian,
in brief, considers any transition demands, any use of strategic
intelligence to determine priorities for agitation, any appeal to
one's audience without sacrificing ultimate principles, in themselves
a "sellout" or betrayal of radical principles. In the
above example, a left-sectarian, for example, would consider the
transition call for repeal of the income tax as per se a
betrayal of the principle of the abolition of taxation, even when
that transition demand is clearly coupled with the ultimate goal
of a tax-free society. To take a deliberately ludicrous example,
the left-sectarian might consider not raising the problem of denationalizing
lighthouses in our current society a betrayal of the principle of
privatizing lighthouses.
In the libertarian
movement, sectarians will simply reiterate such formulas as the
nonaggression axiom, or A is A, or the need for self-esteem, without
grappling with detailed issues. The centrist position, in contrast,
is to begin agitation around currently important issues, examine
them, show the public that the cause of these problems is statism
and that the solution is liberty, and then try to widen the consciousness
of one's listeners to show that all current and even remote problems
have the same political cause.
One form that
left-sectarianism sometimes takes is that of advocating immediate
armed revolution against the existing state, without sufficient
support to be able to succeed. In the modern libertarian movement,
this deviation was pervasive during its early stage, at the time
of the New Left "revolution" in the late 1960s and 1970.
The collapse
of the latter "revolution" as soon as the state began
its armed counteraction at Kent State is testimony to one of the
most important lessons of history: that no armed revolution has
ever succeeded in a country with free elections. All the successful
revolutions, from the American and the French in the 18th century,
to the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban in the 20th, occurred in lands
where free elections were either nonexistent or severely restricted.
Until or unless the United States changes from free elections to
dictatorship, the question of armed revolution is, at the very least,
totally irrelevant to the American scene.
In contrast
to left-sectarianism, which spurns immediate gains toward the ultimate
goal, right-wing opportunists openly believe in hiding or working
against their ultimate goal in order to achieve short-run gains.
Right-wing
opportunism is self-defeating for ultimate goals in several ways.
The major reason for putting forth transition demands is as a way
station to ultimate victory; but, by studiously avoiding the raising
of ultimate goals or principles, the opportunist, at best, short-circuits
the ultimate goal, and betrays it by failing to raise the consciousness
of the public in the explicit direction of the final goal. The ultimate
goal will not be reached automatically, by itself; it can only be
reached if a large group of adherents continues to hold high the
banner of that ultimate, radical objective.
But, if libertarians
refuse to examine and put forward their ultimate goals, who will?
The answer is no one, and therefore that objective will never be
obtained. Indeed, if libertarians fail to keep their ultimate objective
in view, they will themselves lose sight of the objective, and descend
into another gradualist, nonlibertarian reform movement, and the
main purpose of having a movement in the first place will be lost.
Secondly, opportunists
often undercut the ultimate objective, and libertarian principle
as well, by openly advocating measures that undercut that principle
such as a higher sales tax to replace an income tax (as did
the Mid-Hudson chapter of the Free Libertarian Party in early 1976),
or a gradualist Four-Year Plan to advertise their moderation and
alleged reasonableness.
Even in the
short run, opportunism is self-destructive. Any new ideological
movement or party, in order to acquire support as in the
case of new products or firms on the market must differentiate
its product from its established competitors. A libertarian party
which, for example, sounds almost indistinguishable from right-wing
Republicanism (as did the Tuccille campaign for New York governor
in 1974), will fail if only because the voter presented with no
clear alternative will quite rationally remain with right-wing Republicans.
In sum, both
strategic deviations are fatal to the proper goal of the victory
of liberty as soon as it can be achieved left-sectarianism
because it in effect abandons victory, and right-opportunism
because it in effect abandons liberty. Both sides of this
"equation" must be continually upheld.
One curious
propensity is that of a certain number of individuals, in the libertarian
and other radical movements, to shift rapidly from one diametrically
opposed deviation to the other, without ever passing through
the correct, centrist position. Apart from psychological instability
among these individuals, there is a certain logic to these seemingly
bizarre leaps. Take, for example, someone who for years confines
his activities to stating pure principle, without ever doing anything
in the real world to change the situation for the better, without
trying to transform reality. After several years, discouragement
at the lack of progress may set in, after which, desperate for some
gains in the real world, the person leaps into right-opportunism
and accomplishes little there as well.
On the other
hand, someone mired in short-run opportunism for years, disgusted
with the compromises and immorality of that form of politics,
can readily express his disgust and his yearning for pure principle
by leaping straight into sectarianism. In neither manifestation,
however, is the individual willing to engage in a protracted, lifelong
commitment for victory in the real world for principle and
as quickly as the goal can be achieved.
I have touched
on the concept of "cadre." Let us now consider the concept
in more detail; specifically, who makes up the cadre, how is it
generated, and what are the proper relations between cadre and various
groups of noncadre?
The cadre are
simply the consistent libertarians. In the first place, libertarianism
is a set of ideas, and hence the original cadre are bound
to be largely intellectuals, people who are professional or semiprofessional
dealers in abstract ideas. Mises and Hayek have pointed out how
ideas filter out from original theoreticians to scholars and followers,
to intellectuals as dealers in general ideas, and then to the interested
public. Thus the body of intellectuals is of prime importance in
influencing the general movement and, ultimately, the general public.
It is to be
hoped that the cadre begins as a tiny few and then grows in quantity
and impact. But what should be the proper relationship between cadre
and noncadre? First, we might put forward the concept of the "pyramid
of ideology." For while "cadre" and "noncadre" may be a first approximation
to the real-world situation, the actual condition at any given time
is akin to a pyramid, with the cadre at the top of the ideological
pyramid as the consistent and uncompromising ideologists, and then
with others at lower rungs, with varying degrees of approximation
to a consistent and comprehensive libertarian vision. Since people
usually become cadre by making their way up the various steps
or stages of the pyramid from totally nonlibertarian to completely
libertarian some rapidly, some slowly; this implies that
the stages will assume a pyramid form, with a smaller number of
people at each higher stage.
The major task
of the cadre, then, is to try to get as many people as high up the
pyramid as possible. From this task, there follows the importance
of ideological coalitions, of working with allies on various
ideological issues.
A coalition
accomplishes several things. In the first place, it maximizes the
influence of the numerically small cadre on important social issues,
and does so by allying oneself with people who agree on that
particular issue, albeit on few others.
On which
issues the cadre chooses to form alliances depends on a judgment
of importance in relation to the real-world context at the given
time and place. Thus, it would be an evident waste of time and energy
for current libertarians to find shipping interests with whom we
could make a united front agitation in the cause of denationalizing
lighthouses. But coalition strategies for abolishing OSHA or the
income tax, or legalizing marijuana, or (in the late 1960s) pulling
out of the Vietnam War or repealing the draft, might have a high
priority in the agitation of the libertarian movement.
While using
coalitions with numerically larger allies on concrete issues, the
libertarian cadre is also pursuing another strategy recruiting
more people. These recruits can come from the allies themselves,
or from the mass of the public who are being informed about the
specific issues. Normally, the proper tactic will be to begin
with the concerns of the people being worked on, to show that you
are with them on this particular issue, and then to "widen
their libertarian consciousness" by showing them that to be really
consistent on the issues they favor they must also adopt the other
libertarian positions.
Thus, while
working with left-wing civil libertarians in support of commonly
held positions, it can be pointed out to them that libertarians
are the only consistent civil-liberties advocates, that personal
freedom cannot exist without private-property rights, etc. Similarly,
conservative advocates of free enterprise can be shown that outlawing
pornography or drugs violates the very system of private property
and free enterprise that they profess to favor.
Of course,
there are pitfalls in a coalition strategy that must be guarded
against. In the late 1960s, I issued a call for a libertarian alliance
with the New Left, on the twin vital issues of the day: opposition
to the draft and to the Vietnam War (with subsidiary emphasis on
opposition to the public-school system). I still think that this
basic thrust was necessary especially to generate a sharp
and radical break with the conservative movement. But the problem
was that many of our young, tiny cadre, upon cooperating with the
left, became leftists, losing their libertarian grip.
The libertarian
movement at that time had two grave weaknesses that left us wide
open for such defection:
- it was very
small, and therefore had no self-conscious cadre, no organs of
opinion, no mutually reinforcing cadre to talk to and deal with,
and
- partly as
a result of this tiny size, the libertarian movement of that day
had no activity with which to attract young and eager libertarians.
Many is the
time when a new convert to the libertarian system would ask, OK,
now I'm a libertarian, what can I do about it? What activity
can I perform? There was no answer.
If a person
was a budding young scholar, he could go to graduate school and
join the educational wings of the movement; but what if he was not?
As a result, the number of defections from cadre, not just to the
New Left but out altogether, were legion.
And this is
one of the main reasons why the Libertarian Party has been such
a vital and important development in the last few years: It has
given to eager young (and older) libertarians a wide and open-ended
field for continuing energetic activity. In short, because
of the LP, we have a genuine movement rather than just a
small group of thinkers and talkers (as important as the latter
functions may be).
This is also
why it is very important to have "open centers" for libertarians
organizations for budding libertarians to visit and study,
institutions that demonstrate the existence of an organized ideology
and movement. For I am convinced that, for many reasons, including
the libertarian heritage that is partially imbibed by most Americans,
there are many people who are "instinctively" and inchoately
libertarian and don't know it, and who need only a few open reiterations
of the pure radical creed to join up.
Finding
the movement becomes extremely important for isolated actual or
potential cadre. In the late 1940s and for years afterwards, for
example, FEE provided the enormous service of being the only open
center for laissez-faire in existence, and I vividly remember the
vital importance to me and other young libertarians of discovering
libertarian ideas and persons through FEE, and the effect
this stimulus and reinforcement had in radicalizing our own positions.
One of the
most important problems for any minority radical movement is the
question of long-run optimism or pessimism. Namely, while the short-run
prospects for victory may be nonexistent, does the movement believe
that, in the long run, it will win? In my "Left
and Right: The Prospects for Liberty," I pointed out that the
conservative, here and in Europe, is always a long-run pessimist.
The conservative believes that the inevitable march of history is
against him:
Hence, the
inevitable trend runs toward left-wing statism at home and communism
abroad. It is this long-run despair that accounts for the Conservative's
rather bizarre short-run optimism; for since the long-run is given
up as hopeless, the Conservative feels that his only hope of success
rests in the current moment. In foreign affairs, this point of
view leads the Conservative to call for desperate showdowns with
communism, for he feels that the longer he waits the worse things
will ineluctably become; at home, it leads him to total concentration
on the very next election, where he is always hoping for victory
and never achieving it. The quintessence of the Practical Man,
and beset by long-run despair, the Conservative refuses to think
or plan beyond the election.
That conservatism
rarely attracts youth is explainable by Randolph Bourne's incisive
comment that
our elders
are always optimistic in their views of the present, pessimistic
in their views of the future; youth is pessimistic toward the
present and gloriously hopeful for the future. And it is this
hope which is the lever of progress. ...
Furthermore,
conservatism, with its attachment to the feudalistic, theocratic,
and militaristic Old Order, deserves to be pessimistic. Many
libertarians also have tended to be long-run pessimists, partly
in imitation of conservatism (with which some once were allied)
but partly because it is easy to be pessimistic in the 20th century
if one focuses on the continuing advance of state power. But to
adopt this position is to fall prey to what the Marxists call "impressionism,"
i.e., responding only to the journalistic, surface march of events
without analyzing the underlying laws and essences of the real world.
It should be
obvious that long-run optimism is important for the success of any
radical movement. In the libertarian movement, pessimism has led
either to despair, dropping out, confinement of the ideology to
an intellectual game, or to the opportunistic hankering for short-run
gains that leads to betrayal of basic principle and that has governed
the conservative movement; on the other hand, long-run optimism
leads both to a buoyant spirit and to the willingness to engage
in a protracted and determined struggle for ultimate goals.
All this is
psychologically clear. But, if libertarianism is to be grounded
on a rational apprehension of reality, is long-run optimism the
correct stance to take, or is it only a psychological placebo?
It is my contention,
which cannot be elaborated here, that libertarianism will win,
and therefore that long-run optimism is not only psychologically
exhilarating but also rationally correct. In my "Left and Right:
The Prospects for Liberty," I elaborated the basic reasons for this
contention: that, given the commitment by everyone, since
the Industrial Revolution, to industrialism and to mass consumption,
the free market is the only economy that enables the industrial
system, along with above-subsistence living standards for the growing
mass of population, to survive and flourish. In short, moral and
economic truth is of course on our side; but, in addition to this
sometimes-not-very-comforting fact, freedom is necessary
to the survival and prosperity of the industrial world of the modern
age.
But this, of
course, can still be very long-run, and might be cold comfort
to impatient spirits. In various writings since 197374, I
have concluded that Mises's long-run prediction of the "exhaustion
of the reserve fund" that the unfortunate consequences
of government interventionism will one day become glaringly evident
has now come true. We have seen in the past few years a host
of crises: inflationary recession; the breakdown of Keynesianism;
crippling tax rates; the failures of Vietnam; the revelations about
the CIA, FBI, and Watergate; the crises in crime and the public
schools; and much more. At least in the United States, the objective
conditions are now and will continue to exist for an accelerated
leap forward in libertarianism and for a rapid speeding-up of the
"timetable" for victory.
I cannot believe
that the visible great leap forward in the quantity and quality
of the libertarian movement since about 1973 is unrelated to this
new, continuing crisis of the American state. In short, the growth
in the "subjective conditions" for libertarian victory
(the libertarian cadre and movement) is partly a function of the
objective breakdown of statism.
As the Marxists
point out, pessimism stems from impressionism and the failure to
think dialectically. In short, in libertarian terms, while
statism may be marching onward, this march inevitably leads to a
growing breakdown of statism which in turn leads to a growing reaction
in favor of libertarianism and against the state.
The difference
here between libertarians and Marxists stems from their different
theories. Thus, while the Marxists believe that capitalism will
founder on its "inevitable contradictions," giving rise to a proletarian
movement for its eventual abolition, libertarianism holds that statism,
government interventionism, will founder on its inevitable
"contradictions," and that this breakdown will give rise to a libertarian
movement among the public for its eventual abolition and,
further, if my analysis of post-1973 is correct, that this breakdown
of statism has already begun.
Libertarian
victory is thus inevitable in the sense that objective breakdowns
of statism are bound to intensify, and also that such breakdowns
will tend to give impetus to the growth of libertarian ideas
and activists; but, with our belief in individual freedom of will,
it is clear that the free and voluntary adoption of libertarian
ideas is not determined and therefore cannot be inevitable
in the strict sense. But victory can be achieved if the libertarian
movement continues to increase in quantity and quality, and if libertarians
continue to learn about current political issues, bringing their
analysis to bear on problems that the American people face.
It is important
for libertarians to realize that most people are, in normal times,
not interested in political affairs, and therefore willing
to continue passive or active support for the status quo. It is
only the development of "crisis situations" (like skyrocketing
property taxes in California), crises that result from the breakdown
of the existing system and with which the system cannot cope, that
the radical movement can accelerate its strength and possibly achieve
victory (as it did in the case of Proposition 13 in California).
It is such
periods of breakdown that stimulate a massive willingness among
the public to think deeply about the social system and to consider
radical alternatives. Such crisis situations might be economic ones
(such as depression or inflation or skyrocketing taxes), a losing
or a stalemated war, or political repression of free speech and
activity, or any combination of these.
These crisis
situations constitute the necessary "objective conditions"
for a successful radical triumph. In addition to these requisite
objective conditions, there are also the "subjective conditions"
namely, a movement of sufficient strength and influence to
take advantage of these objective conditions: specifically, to prepare
in advance by predicting the crisis, to point out how the crisis
stems systematically from the political system and is not
simply a historical accident, and to point to the radical alternative
by which these crises and others like them can be surmounted.
The ruling
elite of America and elsewhere is beginning to lose its self-confidence,
to suffer a decay of its will. And this indeed is another condition
of victory. As Lawrence Stone has pointed out in an analysis of
the failure of the ruling class,
The elite
may lose its manipulative skill, or its military superiority,
or its self-confidence, or its cohesion; it may become estranged
from the non-elite, or overwhelmed by a financial crisis; it may
be incompetent, or weak or brutal. (Causes
of the English Revolution, 15201642, p. 9)
Thus, the objective
conditions for the triumph of liberty have now, in the past few
years, arrived at last, at least in the United States. Furthermore
the nature of this systemic crisis is such that government is now
perceived as the culprit; it cannot be relieved except through a
sharp turn toward liberty. Therefore, what is basically needed now
is the growth of the "subjective conditions," of libertarian
ideas and particularly of a dedicated libertarian movement to advance
those ideas in the public forum.
Surely, it
is no coincidence that it is precisely in these years, since 1971
and particularly since 1973, that these subjective conditions have
made their greatest strides in this century. For the breakdown of
statism has undoubtedly spurred many more people into becoming partial
or full libertarians, and hence the objective conditions help to
generate the subjective ones. Furthermore, in the United States
at least, the splendid heritage of freedom and of libertarian ideas,
going back beyond revolutionary times, has never been fully lost.
Present-day libertarians, therefore, have solid historical ground
on which to build.
The rapid growth
in these last years of libertarian ideas and movements has pervaded
many fields of scholarship (especially among younger scholars) and
in the areas of journalism, business, and politics. Because of the
continuing objective conditions, it seems clear that this eruption
of libertarianism in many new and unexpected places is an inevitably
growing response to the perceived conditions of objective reality.
Given free will, no one can predict with certainty that the growing
libertarian mood in America will solidify in a brief period of time
and press forward without faltering to the success of the entire
libertarian program. But certainly, both theory and analysis of
current historical conditions lead to the conclusion that the current
prospects for liberty, even in the short run, are excellent indeed.
Reprinted
from Mises.org.

The
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