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The following
story is part of Walter
Block's Autobiography Archive.
Libertarianism and the Old Right
by
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
In
February 1999, for research he was doing on postwar libertarianism,
Brian Doherty interviewed Lew Rockwell.
The interview was published in the May 12, 1999, issue of SpintechMag.com.
Doherty:
How and under what circumstances did you first become interested
in political philosophy/work? Was it of an individualist/libertarian
orientation from the beginning?
Rockwell:
I've been interested in ideological matters from the earliest age.
My father was a Taft Republican, and trained me well. A good thing
too, for even as a schoolboy, I argued with my teachers over the
New Deal, public accommodations laws, U.S. entry into World War
II, and McCarthy's questioning of the military elites (I'd still
like to know who promoted Peress).
I
told them that Tailgunner Joe should have been attacking the U.S.
government all along, because it was the real threat to our liberties.
That drove my teachers crazy. None of them would be surprised that
I grew up to be a full-time gadfly against the conventional wisdom.
Influences
My
influences included Taft, Garrett, Flynn, Nock, Mencken, Chodorov,
Tansill, and the scholastic just-war tradition. Though a Yankee,
I never subscribed to the Lincoln cult, and I admired the Southern
secessionists for taking the original constitutional compact seriously.
For
my twelfth birthday a friend of my father's gave me Hazlitt's Economics
in One Lesson. That book taught me how to think in economic
terms, and I have been reading in economics ever since, with a special
appreciation for the old French liberal school and the modern Austrians
from Menger to Rothbard.
Once
oriented, I gained reinforcement from a wide range of literature
in high school and as an English major. I found property rights
in German literature, skepticism against the state in English literature,
and a love of liberty in American literature.
I
was also taken with Cicero: his love of liberty and the old republic;
his celebration of natural elites and opposition to egalitarianism;
and, most of all, his fighting, indefatigable spirit. I believed
that he was no less right because his principled stand did not prevail.
There is virtue in the fight regardless of the outcome. The eloquence
and courage of Tacitus influenced me for the same reasons.
Over
time, I became aware that I was not only dissenting from the left
but also from the conservative establishment, which was embroiled
in the Cold War as a first principle. I grew increasingly skeptical
of the official right, especially during the war on Vietnam.
Back
then, the establishment meant National Review. There were
some good people on the masthead, and it wasn't as neoconservative
domestically as it later became, but the magazine's position on
the Cold War came close to calling for a murderous first strike
use of nuclear weapons. I could never understand how a person claiming
to understand the merits of liberty and property, much less a person
schooled in Christian ethics, could entertain such a bloody fantasy.
Goldwater
to the Other McCarthy
In
the 1960s, like Murray, my sympathies were with the anti-war crowd
(but not the unrelated Age of Aquarius bunch). I liked the willingness
to resist, the commitment to principle, the moral tone, the defiance
of the power elites. I had been a reluctant Goldwaterite in 1964,
but by 1968 I worked briefly for Gene McCarthy.
There
were some very sophisticated antistatist writings coming out of
the left at that point. This is what distinguished the New Left
from the Old Left. The Old Left, at least since the Stalin-Hitler
pact, had become cautiously pro-empire and unflinchingly pro-D.C.
bureaucracy. To believe in any central planning, as the Old Left
did, is to cease to be a radical, of course. It means to love what
the bureaucracy was doing and aspired to do.
This
is why the New Left was a breath of fresh air. Its orientation was
anti-government. It focused on a fundamental moral issue whether
the U.S. government should be waging war on foreign peoples and
it was open to historically revisionist scholarship that demonstrated
the evils of the corporate state in American history. The focus
was also correct: on the war profits being garnered by the munitions
manufacturers, exactly as the Old Right had done in the interwar
period. If you read Mises's Liberalism,
you see the same ideological disposition at work at a different
time and a different place.
In
some ways, there was a dovetailing of the New Left and the little
that remained of the Old Right. For instance, hardly anyone remembers
this, but the right was actually divided on Vietnam.
I
remember when Robert Welch of the John Birch Society, harkening
back to a praiseworthy Americanist impulse, criticized the war.
It was then that National Review turned its guns on the JBS,
citing a book Welch had written on Eisenhower some ten years earlier.
It was sheer farce. Buckley tolerated dissent on a wide range of
issues even allied himself with anti-Soviet Marxists like Max
Eastman and Sydney Hook so long as he could consolidate a consensus
for the buildup of the military state.
The
civil-rights movement of the 1960s complicates the picture. My ideological
sympathies were and are with those who resisted the federal government's
attacks on the freedom of association (not to mention the federalist
structure of the Constitution) in the name of racial integration.
I never liked Martin Luther King, Jr. I thought he was a fraud and
a tool. But when he turned his attention to the evils of the U.S.
war on Vietnam, I began to like him. That's also when the establishment
turned against him, and soon he was murdered.
These
days, the neocons say the 1964 Civil Rights Act was an attempt to
remove barriers to opportunity, and only later was distorted with
quotas. That's absurd. Everyone, both proponents and opponents,
knew exactly what that law was: a statist, centralizing measure
that fundamentally attacked the rights of property and empowered
the state as mind reader: to judge not only our actions, but our
motives, and to criminalize them.
Civil-Rights
Juggernaut
The
good folks who resisted the civil-rights juggernaut were not necessarily
ideologically driven. Mostly they resented horrible intrusions into
their communities, the media smears, and the attacks on their fundamental
freedoms that civil rights represented. The brighter lights among
the resistance movement correctly forecast quotas, though few could
have imagined monstrosities like the Americans With Disabilities
Act. Of course, they were and continue to be viciously caricatured
by the partisans of central power.
By
the way, I've recently noticed that mild neoconish critics of the
ADA are saying that it too was passed with the best of intentions,
and only went wrong later. This is a fantasy based on an impulse
to always believe the best of the state and its edicts.
In
the early 1920s, Mises said that no man who has contributed to art,
science, or letters has had anything good to say about the state
and its laws. That is exactly right. Intellectual secession from
the ruling regime is the first step to clear, creative thought.
How
can all these threads in my personal history be reconciled? What
was missing in those days, that the ascendance of libertarian theory
in Rothbard's hands later provided, was an overarching framework
to explain why war resistance, opposing forced integration, and
celebrating individual enterprise were all of a piece. Liberty rooted
in private property is the highest political virtue, and its enemy
is the consolidated state. I have made that my lifetime credo.
Nixonism
But
those were frustrating days and ideological confusion was everywhere.
When Nixon was in power, I could not stand him (though I will admit
to once having had a sneaking appreciation of Agnew). Like many
later political leaders on the right, he talked a good game but
expanded government power in ways the left never could have gotten
away with.
Affirmative
action, the EPA, the CPSC, the CFTC, destruction of the gold standard,
massive inflation, welfarist ideology, huge deficits, price controls,
and a host of other D.C. monstrosities were Nixon creations not
to mention the bloodiest years of the war. Nixon's carpet bombing
of Cambodia, for example, destroyed the monarchy and brought the
Khmer Rouge to power. Nixon, Kissinger, and the rest have the blood
of millions on their hands.
In
intellectual circles, you could find conservatives who would write
passionate articles and give riveting speeches on the glories of
free enterprise. But then the other shoe would drop. Nixon is the
answer, they said, because at least he has his priorities straight:
before restoring free enterprise at home, the U.S. needed to be
a world empire to defeat the Russian army. The Russian army was
defeated, or rather fell under its own weight, and all we're left
with is another evil empire. We're still waiting for free enterprise.
Doherty:
How did you get involved with Arlington House? When did Arlington
House begin, who financed it, what was its philosophy, and why did
it die?
Rockwell:
In the early 1930s, most libertarian literature was published by
mainstream houses. There wasn't much of it, but our ideas did get
a hearing. Hazlitt was published in The Nation and the American
Century, Garrett appeared in the Saturday Evening Post,
and Nock was in the Atlantic, while the Southern Agrarians
were at the height of the literary profession and Mencken had the
American Mercury. American Austrian economists like Benjamin
Anderson and Frank Fetter had very high profiles in academia and
business. And there was Colonel McCormick's Chicago Tribune.
Losing
Our Outlets
But
a decade of the Depression and the New Deal killed off most mainstream
outlets. Opposing the federal government became politically incorrect,
and publishers didn't want to take the risk of calling down the
price-control police or being accused of sedition. The generation
that opposed the New Deal's welfare-warfare state did not reproduce
itself on any serious scale, and those who remained couldn't get
a hearing.
After
Roosevelt tricked the Japanese into firing the first shot, the America
First Committee, which had been a major vehicle for the resistance,
shut down, and after the war, dissident, pro-liberty publishing
houses survived only in a handful of places.
Our
professors had mostly retired, and our journalists were reduced
to the status of pamphleteers. The left enjoyed ridiculing libertarian
political commentary because it was so unmainstream, and they were
able to point to the existence of all these cranky pamphlets to
prove it wasn't serious material. Of course, Trotskyite pamphlets
were never similarly attacked.
The
only real publishers out there were Caxton, Regnery, and Devin-Adair,
which did heroic work, but their distribution channels were limited,
and in the latter case, some of the material cranky and tainted.
Think about it: it was something of a miracle that Mises's books
were able to come to print at Yale University. But we should appreciate
the fact that there was massive internal and external resistance
to each one.
Kirkian
Conservatism
In
the middle 50s, as a consequence of Russell Kirk's book The
Conservative Mind, the word "conservative" came to describe
anyone who was a non-socialist skeptic of federal policy. I was
unhappy with the word, because I was a conscious disciple of the
pre-war Nock-Mencken-libertarian school.
There
was a fundamental difference between the Old and New Right of Kirk's
making. Kirk's book celebrated some good writers and statesmen.
But he distorted what it was that drove them, which was not the
"politics of prudence" but implacable moral and philosophical conviction.
The main thrust of Kirk's influence, I believe, was to turn the
right against its best pre-war instincts.
In
Kirk's hands, conservatism became a posture, a demeanor, a mannerism.
In practice, it asked nothing more of people than to acquire a classical
education, sniff at the modern world, and privately long for times
past. And if there was a constant strain in Kirkian conservatism,
it was opposition to ideology, a word that Kirk demonized. This
allowed him to accuse Mises and Marx of the same supposed error.
In
fact, ideology means nothing more than systematic social thought.
Without systematic thought, the intellectual shiftiness of statist
impulse gets a free ride. You can't fight the massive and organized
powers of statist, centralist, and generally destructionist social
forces armed only with a watch chain and an antique vocabulary.
Ultimately, the question that must be asked and definitively answered
in the world of ideas was posed most famously by Lenin: What is
to be done?
On
the answer to that question rides the fate of civilization itself.
And if those of us who believe in the magnificence of the classical-liberal
vision of society do not answer it definitively, we will lose. Seeing
this, men like Frank Meyer who was a libertarian on all matters
but war and peace blasted Kirk as a statist and an irrationalist.
In the end, however Kirk's moderatism and escapism prevailed because
it was an easier path.
Neil
McCaffrey
Rejecting
this easier path was Neil McCaffrey, an extraordinary man who later
became my friend and professional mentor on many levels. He was
a very close friend of Meyer's, as was Murray. Neil had founded
the Conservative Book Club in 1964, and built a booming market among
National Review and Human Events readers. But he soon
noted that there were not enough books for people to buy.
That's
why Neil founded Arlington House in 1965, and named it after Robert
E. Lee's ancestral home, stolen by Lincoln for a Union cemetery.
(I still hope to see it returned some day.) McCaffrey had hoped
to create a major publishing house that would bring conservative
classics and contemporary titles to a broad public for the first
time in the post-war period.
There
was a series of books forecasting the death of the gold standard
and its consequences, by Bill Rickenbacker and Harry Browne, preeminently.
The only bestseller Arlington ever had was Harry's How
You Can Profit From the Coming Devaluation, and I worked
as his editor. I also edited George Roche's books, and the works
of other many conservative leaders. I was peripherally involved
in the publication of Hazlitt's books.
Preeminently,
I served as editor for new editions of Mises's Theory
and History, Bureaucracy,
and Omnipotent
Government. Reading those books, I became a thoroughgoing
Misesian. I was so thrilled to meet him at dinner in 1968. He was
already in serious decline, but it was still wonderful. That is
also when I got to know his wife, Margit, who later helped me found
the Mises Institute.
Neil
and I disagreed about foreign policy, and it was an uncomfortable
topic. He was opposed to U.S. entry into the two world wars, and
sound on the so-called civil war, but he was a complete cold warrior,
like most people of his generation. However, on economics, Mises
was his guide. One of his favorite topics was the moral and economic
justification of charging interest. He was also a brilliant student
of Catholic theology, literature, and history, and a saintly man.
Intellectually,
I was a libertarian, but I stayed out of the movement, mainly because
I had other interests in the publishing world, and the libertarians
struck me as a strange bunch in the early 1970s. It seemed to be
more a lifestyle movement than a political one, a problem that still
persists. There was a very clear distinction in those days between
libertarian intellectuals like Murray Rothbard, whom I admired,
and the developing movement at large.
Neil
had partners in the business, and he lost control, with Buckley
playing a malicious role. The company was sold to Roy Disney in
the mid-1970s, and eventually phased out.
By
this time, I had gone to work for Hillsdale College. I had known
George Roche while at Arlington, and admired the fact that he was
both anti-war, having written his doctoral dissertation on 1930s
war resistance on the right, and a free enterpriser with Austrian
sympathies. At Hillsdale, I started Imprimis and Hillsdale
College Press, set up a speakers' series, oversaw public and movement
relations, and helped with fundraising.
Murray
as Mises's Successor
It
was clear to me at the time that Murray Rothbard was Mises's successor,
and I followed his writings carefully. I first met him 1975, and
knew immediately that he was a kindred spirit. Like all the other
living intellectuals I respected, he was on the margins, laboring
at a fraction of the salary he deserved, and excluded from conventional
outlets of academic and political opinion.
I
cannot remember the day that I finally came around to the position
that the state is unnecessary and destructive by its nature that
it cannot improve on, and indeed only destroys, the social and economic
system that grows out of property rights, exchange, and natural
social authority but I do know that it was Rothbard who finally
convinced me to take this last step.
Unfortunately,
I could only admire his writings at a distance. I tried to get Hillsdale
to invite him to speak, but that was ruled out immediately. I was
told that he might be a fine economist, but he was a loose cannon,
unconnected from an organized apparatus of conservative thinking.
But
what really did Murray in was not his conviction that the state
was unnecessary, but his position on the Cold War. Libertarians
were said to be tacit supporters of the Sovietization of the world.
It was utter nonsense, but this accusation that Rothbard was a "fine
economist" but nothing else would dog him until the end. I always
saw this as a rationalization to justify fear of a fundamental rethinking
of political philosophy and world affairs.
After
Hillsdale, I turned to editing a journal of socioeconomic medicine
called Private Practice. I worked to integrate the work of
the Austrians and apply it to health economics and government intervention
in that industry. It proved to be a fruitful mix, and in my mind
demonstrated the possibilities of using the Austrian tradition to
explain the way the world works in a very practical way.
Ron
Paul
Doherty:
How did you end up working with Ron Paul?
Rockwell:
In those days, unlike today, I had a keen interest in the affairs
of Congress: the members of each committee, the legislation that
was being considered, and the like. Being a Congressional aide had
always been a dream of mine, as absurd as that may sound today.
When Ron won his first full term, he asked me to work for him.
We
never saw his office as a conventionally political one. It was a
bully pulpit to get the message out. We sent out hundreds of thousands
of tracts on freedom, inserted amazing articles in the Congressional
Record, and drafted libertarian legislation as an educational
effort.
As
for his voting record, Ron had a clear standard: if it meant stealing
people's money, he was against it. If it gave people back the liberty
and property the government had taken, he was for it. Most of the
lobbyists eventually stopped visiting our offices.
He
was always respected by fellow legislators, but they thought of
him as a bit off-kilter. It was Mr. Paul Goes to Washington.
Politicians view their job as trading votes, getting their share
of pork, expanding government, and generally playing the game. They
believe they are being productive when they have helped pass more
spending and regulatory legislation, and the price for their vote
gets high indeed.
Ron
was the opposite. He was a standing rebuke, not only to his colleagues
but to the entire system. He still is.
Not
many people in D.C. understood what Ron was up to. I remember once
when a lobbyist came by and demanded that Ron oppose foreign aid
to the Philippines on grounds that people there killed dogs for
food. Ron was glad to support cutting foreign aid for any
reason. He introduced the bill, and overnight he was celebrated
by animal-rights activists all over the country.
Of
course, the bill didn't pass. It's important to remember that ideology
plays a very small role in legislative affairs except as a kind
of public relations gloss. If a farming bill is passed by a Republican
Congress, it is called the "Freedom To Farm Act." If it is passed
by a Democratic Congress, it is called the "Family Farm Fairness
Act." The text can be identical; only the coloring changes.
D.C.
Scam
Watching
this system up close, all my worst suspicions about government were
confirmed. When I later started the Mises Institute, I swore that
it would not function the way party think-tanks in Britain do: as
intellectual veneer to a gruesome system of legislative exploitation.
Washington
has its own version, of course, and if anyone thinks Congressmen
or their aides study some group's "policy report" on this or that
bill, he knows nothing about the imperial capital of the world.
Its animating force is not ideas but graft, lies, and power. Those
policy studies are for PR. On the other hand, there is a cost to
treating the policy game as if it were some sort of intellectual
club to which we all belong: it imbues the process with a moral
legitimacy it does not deserve.
A
scam was perfected in the early 1980s among leading politicians
and the think-tanks. A group celebrates a politician's supposed
achievements in exchange for which the politician pretends to be
influenced by the group. It's all a public relations game. This
is a major reason why Murray was never able to work within that
system. He had an irrepressible urge to tell the truth regardless
of the consequences. Sure, he was a loose cannon, as any cannon
should be on the ship of an imperial state.
The
Mises Institute
Doherty:
What was the genesis of the Mises Institute? How difficult was it
to get off the ground?
Rockwell:
When I was in D.C., my happiest moments were receiving calls from
students who wanted to know more about Ron and his ideas. He had
a huge amount of support on Texas campuses. He struck students as
smart, principled, and radical. But sending students speeches and
pamphlets only took matters so far. I wanted to do more, but as
I looked around, I didn't see any libertarian organization that
focused on advancing academic scholarship specifically focused on
the Austrian School.
Also,
I worried that Mises had been losing status as a thinker since his
death. Hayek's place was secure because of the Nobel Prize. But
the rationalism of Mises, the tough-edged quality of his thinking
and his prose, the conviction that economics is a logical system
that can justly claim the mantle of science, seemed to be fading.
The
free enterprisers were turning toward murkier thinkers, monetarists,
positivists, and even institutionalists who had no interest in the
grand Misesian project. This also seemed to go along with an unwillingness
to consider difficult and radical questions on grounds that they
were politically unviable.
The
Neocons
There
was overlap here with what was happening in politics. Since the
early 1970s, the conservative movement was increasingly dominated
by former members of the Old Left who had made their way over to
the right. These so-called neoconservatives made the switch in opposition
to George McGovern's foreign policy "isolationism," but they had
not really changed their views on domestic issues.
To
give them credit, the neocons always admitted that they hadn't left
the Democrats; the Democrats had left them. They openly celebrated
the legacies of Wilson, FDR, and Truman mass-murdering would-be
dictators all.
That
position needed to be refuted and fought, but instead, a military-minded
conservative movement embraced the neocons as allies on the only
issue that really mattered to them, the expansion of the warfare
state. There was no place for Mises, whose writings on war and statism
were numerous and profound, in this new consensus.
There
were few alternatives to the Reaganized right. The Beltway libertarians
were drifting more and more toward policy and a generalized concern
with respectability (the two go hand in hand), and away from Austrian
economics and anything that smacked of idealism or a high theoretical
concern. Hosting Alan Greenspan at a cocktail party became the goal.
I
noticed a similar tendency among scholarship-granting institutions.
They seemed interested in subsidizing only Ivy-League students of
a soft classical-liberal bent, rather than promoting the concrete
development and application of radical thought.
Another
approach I rejected was quietism. I've never been impressed with
the idea that we should sit back in complacent satisfaction that
we constitute the remnant, while others eventually join us or not.
Surely ideas do have consequences, but reality dictates that they
need passionate scholars to advance them on every front.
An
Urgent Need
Hence,
Mises as a thinker, who had done so much to resuscitate old-fashioned,
tough-minded liberalism, was falling by the wayside, a victim of
a movement that eschewed all such unrespectable thinkers. Misesian
theory and practice were fading fast. I set out to change that,
and to serve a neglected generation of students. Idealism is what
stirs the young heart, and the only idealism that seemed to be available
to students in those days was from the left. I harkened back to
my lifetime love of Mises, of his brilliance and his courage, and
talked with Margit about the project. She was thrilled, made me
promise to make it my lifetime work, and we got busy.
When
I asked Murray to head academic affairs, he brightened up like a
kid on Christmas morning. We agreed that the goal should be to provide
a support system that would revive the Austrian School as a player
in the world of ideas, so that statism of the left and right could
be fought and defeated.
The
main criticism directed against Austrian economics in those days
was that it was not formal or rigorous because it rejected the use
of mathematics as the tool for constructing economic theory. But
this is absurd. In fact, Murray actually had two majors as an undergraduate:
one in economics and the other in math. What was at stake here was
not the competence of the Austrians but a fundamental methodological
question: can the methods of the physical sciences be imported to
the social sciences via economics? The Austrian answer was no.
At
the same time, there was a grain of truth in the criticisms. American
academia provided no formal setting to study economics from the
Austrian perspective. Most of the then-current practitioners were
self taught, so even they had a limited perspective on the possibilities
of creating an alternative formal system of economics.
I
wanted to make up for this deficiency by creating a shadow university
setting in which students could study economics under the post-Mises
generation of Austrian scholars, especially Murray.
Murray
loved our programs. He would teach all afternoon and stay up until
3:00 and 4:00am talking to students about ideas. He was always accessible,
laughed easily, and was never foreboding. He learned from everyone
around him and rejected the "guru" persona he could have so easily
adopted.
Students
who came to us expecting a stern setting of judgmental theorizing
were shocked to discover something closer to a salon where intellectual
inquiry was free and open-ended. It had to be that way to balance
out the rigor of the content. Murray's spirit still animates all
our programs.
Getting
Off the Ground
The
funding problem was one I dealt with from the beginning. I had wanted
to give Murray a platform, but I quickly discovered that old-line
foundations would not help so long as he was on board. They certainly
would not support an organization that argued for positions like
the abolition of central banking, or funded revisionist historical
scholarship and disagreed with the two-party consensus in Washington.
Corporate
foundations, meanwhile are not very interested in ideas generally,
particularly not ones that threatened the status quo. It's a cliche
now, but I also found that big corporations are not the strongest
supporters of free enterprise.
I
also found that most old-line foundation and corporate money comes
with strings attached. And if there is one institutional feature
I desired for the Mises Institute, beyond its ideological stance,
it was independence.
I
did not want to get roped into supporting cranky policy projects
like vouchers or enterprise zones, and I did not want to be forced
into emphasizing some aspects of Misesian theory simply because
they were trendy, while feeling compelled to deemphasize others.
I never wanted to find myself censoring an associated scholar because
some foundation bigshot didn't like what he was saying.
I
wanted to see the fullness of the Austrian program funded and represented,
consistently, fearlessly, and regardless of the fallout. The Mises
Institute needed to do work that is deep and wide. It needed to
be free to support research in areas like economic methodology,
which doesn't interest corporations, or blast the newest policy
gimmick, a stance that doesn't interest foundations. Finally, government
money was not ever a consideration.
In
the end, our support has come from individual donors and nearly
exclusively so. I had a good-size Rolodex, so I started there. Ron
Paul and others signed letters to their lists, which was a big help,
and I had enough savings to work a few years without a salary.
We've
been in business now for 17 years, and it took a long time to become
viable. But we built slowly and carefully, brick by brick, and now
have a solid edifice. And we still have our independence, and we
still have an edge.
Initial
Opposition
Doherty:
I've heard intimations that Koch interests attempted to stymie the
Mises Institute's development. Is this so, and if so, specifically
how?
Rockwell:
It wasn't exactly subtle. In the early eighties, Charles Koch monopolized
the libertarian think-tank world by giving and promising millions.
That's fine, but he was gradually edging away from radical thought,
which included Austrian economics, and toward mainstreaming libertarian
theory (as opposed to libertarianizing the mainstream) that attracted
him in the first place.
I
have never understood this type of thinking. If being mainstream
is what you want, there are easier ways to go about it than attempting
to remake an intellectual movement that is hostile to government,
into a mildly dissenting subgroup within the ideological structure
of the ruling class.
Murray
and Charles broke at this point, and I won't go into the details.
But it was clear that Koch saw their break as the beginning of a
long war. Early on, I received a call from George Pearson, head
of the Koch Foundation. He said that Mises was too radical and that
I mustn't name the organization after him, or promote his ideas.
I was told that Mises was "so extreme even Milton Friedman doesn't
like him." If I insisted on going against their diktat, they would
oppose me tooth and nail.
Later,
I heard from other Koch men. One objected to the name of our monthly
newsletter, The
Free Market. The idea this time was that the word "free"
was off-putting. Another said that the idea of an Austrian academic
journal was wrong, since it implied we were a separate school, and
mustn't be. All urged me to dump Murray and then shun him, if I
expected any support.
Taken
Aback
I
was taken aback by what I interpreted as pettifoggery, and I had
no idea what we would yet face. I negotiated a contract with Lexington
Books for an annual journal, and put together a pretty good list
of editorial advisers with Murray as the editor. Soon after, what
came to be called "the boycott" began. Letters and calls poured
in from those associated with Koch-dominated organizations. They
resigned and swore eternal enmity. We even lost some big donors.
It was my baptism by fire into the world of research institutes.
It
may seem absurd to talk about this as if it were some sort of conspiracy
against the Mises Institute. Why would a multi-billionaire care
if the Institute existed or not? I mean, we were a gnat compared
to his water buffalo. It's a mystery that even today I do not entirely
understand. In any case, there was blood all over the place by the
time it was over.
Among
threatened programs, the Review
of Austrian Economics was nearly killed, but Murray persevered
and the first issue came out in 1986. We went through ten volumes
of that journal, and it was the key to building up the Austro-Misesian
movement as we know it today. The entire collection is PDF'ed on
Mises.org, and downloaded by students all over the world. And now
we have the higher-profile Quarterly
Journal of Austrian Economics.
Today,
I regard all these early conflicts as water under the bridge. The
Koch Foundation uses our texts in their seminars, and the old antipathies
are dwindling. Koch organizations are no longer shocked to see us
taking different views in areas like vouchers and trade treaties.
They serve one agenda with a particular style, approach, and audience,
and we serve another with a different style, approach, and audience.
One
note about competition among non-profits. From time to time, well-meaning
people suggest that the Mises Institute join with other like-minded
groups. By pooling our resources, we would have a greater impact.
But this rationale is flawed. Competition is as essential in the
non-profit world as it is in enterprise generally. The early opposition
spurred us on to do a better job, never to give up, and never to
give in.
I
still get harassed from time to time about something someone connected
to us has written or said. I'm told that I should do something to
shut him up, and indeed policy institutes can be very restrictive
in the way they treat their scholars. If they are pursuing a political
agenda, I suppose they have to be. But I don't believe in telling
any of our associated scholars and there are fully 200 of them what to think or what to write.
That's
because I founded the Mises Institute to provide a setting for unrestricted
intellectual exploration in the Austrian tradition, no matter how
radical the conclusions may be. There are no speech controls at
our conferences. There is no fear that someone will say something
that lies outside the preset boundaries of respectable opinion.
I
cannot let the temptation to get along with everybody, or fit into
someone else's strategic agenda, stand in the way. In the political
and academic worlds, taboos are piling up by the day, but they are
enemies of serious thought.
The
Mises Institute has a unique place in the division of labor, and
it is to make possible a radical reevaluation of the intellectual
foundations of the modern statist enterprise. Our senior scholars Walter Block, Dave Gordon, Jeff Herbener, Hans Hoppe, Guido Hülsmann,
Peter Klein, Yuri Maltsev, Ralph Raico, Joe Salerno, and Mark Thornton lead the way. Some people say our approach is reckless. I can
only hope that it always remains so.
Institute
Successes
Doherty:
Relate to me what you think the Mises Institute's greatest successes
have been.
Rockwell:
Most recently, I'm thrilled with the restored Human
Action. I was astounded when I first realized how far later
editions of this book had strayed from the original. I mean, the
third edition has Mises endorsing conscription, which was not only
not in the original, but Mises had specifically and persuasively
condemned conscription in his writings.
There
were other problems. Important passages on Nazi economic planning
were eliminated as were whole paragraphs from the section on monopoly.
By comparison, the first edition is a seamless web and I'm so pleased
that it is back in print in a Scholar's Edition. It's been flying
out of our offices.
By
the way, what economics text of 900 pages is still a huge seller
fifty years after it first appeared? I can't think of one. Facts
like this tell me that Mises is here to stay. In the next century,
I'm convinced he'll have a much higher profile that he did in this
one. He was a prophet and a fantastic genius. Not that his work
shouldn't ever be improved or criticized. We have such papers at
every session of our Austrian Scholars Conferences. But we have
to have the material available to learn from before it can be revised,
improved, and reinterpreted.
The
first book the Mises Institute printed was Mises's Theory
and History, with an introduction by Murray. It is still
a big seller. We have brought Murray's Ethics
of Liberty back into print, along with two dozen monographs
on the Austrian School that we have distributed all over the world.
Our
book The
Costs of War has been called the most important piece of
anti-war revisionist scholarship in the second half of this century.
Our book Secession,
State, and Liberty is a success. We brought Man,
Economy, and State back into print, as well as a dozen other
books. We even have a new edition of Murray's America's
Great Depression, with an introduction by Paul Johnson,
and an Austrian economics text for smart high-school students, in
the works.
Oddly,
I never envisioned the Mises Institute as a publishing house, though
it could easily be mistaken for one. We are funding the research
and writing of a major intellectual biography of Mises, a massive
two-volume project. We want one of Rothbard as well. And we have
five regular periodicals: a newsletter on current trends, an interview
publication, a literary review, a scholarly journal, and a news
and information sheet on the Austrian School.
Meanwhile,
our summer Mises University has put a host of PhD students in economics
through a rigorous program that would otherwise be unavailable.
We've trained plenty of historians, philosophers, theologians, and
others too. We've also started a summer Rothbard Graduate Seminar
for advanced PhD students and post-docs, and been overwhelmed by
the worldwide response. There's also our weekly Austrian Economics
Workshop.
Austrian
Renaissance
We
spend the bulk of our money on students and student programs. When
we take on a graduate student in economics, we stick by him or her
for up to six years. That's a huge investment, but look at the results.
We now have professors honeycombed through academia, and they have
made Austrian economics a vital part of their curricula.
Our
Mises and Rothbard Fellows are in demand, and not only because more
and more departments seek genuine diversity at a time of Austrian
renaissance. They are among the best young economists working today.
Not only can they run rings around the mainstream with the mainstream's
own tools, but their praxeological grounding gives them a real leg-up
in understanding actual economic events. They are also blessed with
the vocation to teach, to be scholars in the classical tradition.
This is no way to get rich, and it's not for everyone, but in the
secular world, there is no higher calling.
Over
the long term, this will be where the Mises Institute makes the
biggest difference. Seventeen years ago, Austrians had a hard time
finding positions, much less holding on to them, but these days,
we run out of candidates long before the requests for our students
stop. Demand is outstripping supply.
Hazlitt
told me that he thought the great success of the Mises Institute
was providing a forum for Rothbard at a time when everyone else
had turned his back on him. I am indeed proud of that. I also think
that the Mises Institute has helped raise up an alternative intellectual
framework as freedom of thought and speech has played a smaller
and smaller role in academia.
The
faculty at our conferences speak of their elation at escaping the
stultifying political rules of their home campuses. Our students
feel it too. That kind of freedom and collegiality is what a university
is supposed to be about.
But
I think the key achievement of the Mises Institute is the one Murray
pointed to. Before the Institute, Austrian economics was in danger
of becoming a hard-money investment strategy or an anti-rationalist
process analysis—ironic indeed for a school rooted in Aristotelianism.
The Institute rescued the praxeologically based main trunk of the
school, and restored it to prominence and fruitfulness. Thus the
Austrian School of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Mises, and Rothbard
lives and grows and has increasing influence.
Diversions
Doherty:
Tell me about your involvement with the Libertarian Party, and the
specific reasons for your disenchantment with it.
Rockwell:
I was never an LP person, though I generally like the platform,
which was largely written by Murray. People say that he wasted his
time in the LP. That judgment presumes that geniuses like Murray
should not be allowed to have hobbies and amusements. He loved Baroque
church architecture and 1920s jazz. He loved soap operas and sports.
He loved chess and eighteenth-century oratorios. And he enjoyed,
for many years, his activities with the LP, particularly since it
was a hobby that intersected with his professional interests. It
certainly didn't distract from his scholarly work, which continued
unabated through this entire period.
For
years, as close as we were, I largely ignored what Murray was doing
in the LP. But Ron Paul decided to run for the 1988 presidential
nomination, and he announced in 1986. That's when I got involved.
I feared he wasn't going to get the nomination. To my astonishment,
Russell Means, who didn't seem to be a libertarian at all, had a
real shot at it. I swung into action, and helped orchestrate Ron's
bid for the nomination. But that pretty much burned me out.
I
wasn't pleased with what I saw in the party. I sensed a lack of
interest in ideas and an absurd obsession with petty organizing
details. There was a lot of waste of time and money. I also felt
like the party was creating a false hope of successfully bringing
about reform through politics. And yet, in all these ways, I suppose
it was no different from any other party.
What
bugged me the most, however, was a general tendency among the party
types to downplay libertarian theory in a host of areas. They were
generally sound on tax cuts and drug policy and the like. But there
was no interest at all in foreign policy. In fact, the largest faction
in the party was actually hawkish on war and strangely conventional
on policy particulars. Then there was the perpetual focus on living
a life of liberty. A life of liberty meant, in the first instance,
never wearing a tie or a white shirt.
Murray
Was Booed
The
last time I had any contact with the LP was the summer of 1989 in
Philadelphia. Sweet, sweet Murray, eternally optimistic and good-hearted
Murray, rose to the platform to make the case for electing this
chairman over that chairman. I forget the details. In any case,
they hissed at him. They booed him. They shouted him down and denounced
him. I thought: this is just amazing.
The
greatest libertarian thinker in history, and they can't even treat
him politely? Even more astounding, Murray thought nothing of it.
To him, this was just life in the LP. It was then that I thought:
This is it. I reemphasized to Murray my views on these people, which
he had come to share, and suggested we get out. We did, and his
wife Joey cheered.
Again,
this is water under the bridge. I'm perfectly happy for the LP to
go about its business. Harry Browne said some good things in the
last election. He's generally a man after my own heart. I'm just
not cut out for politics, and I don't think politics holds out much
hope for the future of human liberty.
The
Amazing Murray
Doherty:
Tell me about your relationships with Pat Buchanan and the Randolph
Club.
Rockwell:
Before I do that, let me just emphasize that all these political
goings-on were a mere sidelight in Murray's life. His main project
in these years was the magisterial History
of Economic Thought that came out just after he died. For
most academics, these two volumes would be more than enough to show
for an entire career. But for Murray, they were just a slight piece
of a massive literary output.
His
output was huge, even aside from scholarship. On a typical morning,
I would find a 20-page article on politics on my fax, and a five-page
article on strategy. For him, pounding out these gems was just a
way to pass the time between 100-page scholarly articles and whole
book manuscripts. His output was beyond human comprehension.
That's
why Burt Blumert and I started the Rothbard-Rockwell Report,
whose name Murray was kind enough to suggest. At the Mises Institute,
we could have spent all our time marketing his material to newspapers
and magazines. Instead, we needed a steady place to publish all
his short pieces on political and cultural topics, and as Joey
has mentioned it was one of the joys of his last years.
At
the same time, Murray needed practical ideological recreation to
make his scholarly work possible and add leaven to his life. Leaving
the LP lifted a burden off Murray's shoulders, but I worried that
it would also leave something of a hole in his life. A part of him
loved ideological organization on a grand scale.
Our
first contacts with the paleoconservatives came after their huge
break with the neoconservatives, the most warlike and statist intellectuals
in the country. Murray and Tom Fleming, editor of Chronicles,
exchanged letters and found they agreed on the intellectual errors
on the right. Some people say Murray was becoming more conservative
and conventional. This is unbelievably uncomprehending.
Cultural
Destructionism
Murray
rejected what Mises called the cultural destructionism of the left
because he saw it as a back-door to state building. If you attack
the family by impinging on its autonomy, the family can no longer
serve as a bulwark against state power. So it is with leftist rhetoric
that ridicules the habits, prejudices, traditions, and institutions
that form the basis of settled, middle-class community life. He
saw the relentless attacks on these as paving the way for government
managers to claim more territory as their own.
Moreover,
it was Murray's conviction that government power was the greatest
enemy that a rich cultural heritage has. It is not capitalism that
wrecks the foundations of civilized life but the state. In this,
he was in full agreement with Mises, Hayek, and Schumpeter. And
incidentally, this line of argument, which Murray had long used,
has been picked up by other libertarians in the meantime.
But
the real bond between Tom and Murray was their shared hatred of
the statism, centralism, and global warfarism of the conservative
movement. They were both fed up with a Buckleyized conservatism,
and now, at last, here was a chance to do something about it.
Together
Murray and I watched as the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet
Union dissolved, and we were intensely curious as to how the conservatives
would respond. Would they return to their pre-war, anti-war roots?
Or would they continue to push for the American empire? Well, we
got our answer in 1990 with the beginnings of the Gulf War. It seemed
obvious that this was Bush's attempt to keep the warfare state fat
and thriving.
The
U.S. gave permission to Iraq to annex Kuwait, and then suddenly
reversed positions. The U.S. paid off countries around the world
to be part of its "coalition" and waged a bloody war on Iraq, burying
innocents in the sand and proclaiming victory over the aggressor.
We
waited for the conservatives to denounce the war, but of course
it didn't happen, although I'll always treasure Kirk's last letter
to me, in which he called for hanging the "war criminal Bush" on
the White House lawn. Too bad he never wrote like that in public.
But the neocons were entirely in control of the right and cheered
Bush to the Heavens.
These
were disgusting days. Bush dragged out all his tax-funded missiles
and other weapons of mass destruction and put them on the Washington,
D.C., mall for the boobsoisie to admire. Yellow ribbons were everywhere.
But
the paleos were a different matter. Paul Gottfried, Allan Carlson,
Clyde Wilson, Fleming, and others associated with the Rockford Institute
blasted the war without qualification. They openly called the U.S.
an imperial power and made the argument that we had always made:
that the greatest threat to our liberties was not overseas but in
the District of Columbia.
Meanwhile,
we were alarmed that not even the libertarians seemed prepared to
go this far. Reason magazine and the Republican Liberty Caucus
were for the Gulf War, and Liberty magazine, for whom Murray
had written, was ambivalent on the question. In general, there was
silence from the people who should have been our natural allies.
To us, that merely underscored a more deeply rooted problem in libertarian
circles: the strange combination of cultural alienation and political
conventionality.
The
"Modals"
We
began to write about the errors of the "modal" libertarians. They
were soft on war, sanguine about centralization of power, and friendly
towards the rise of the social-therapeutic aspects of the state
inherent in civil-rights egalitarianism. They were uninterested
in scholarship and unschooled in history. They were culturally fringy
and politically mainstream, which is precisely the opposite of what
Murray and Mises were. I couldn't imagine the old libertarian school
of Nock, Chodorov, Garrett, Flynn, and Mencken at home with this.
The
best of the paleoconservatives, in contrast, were old-fashioned
constitutionalists who took libertarian positions on a range of
issues. They wanted the troops home and the government out of people's
lives. They wanted to abolish the welfare state, and had a very
telling critique of it. Their critique was not based on rights,
but it was serious and sophisticated.
The
Center for Libertarian Studies co-founded the John Randolph Club,
which I named for the aristocratic, anti-egalitarian battler of
centralized power of the early nineteenth century. The word "paleolibertarian"
was mine too, and the purpose was to recapture the political edge
and intellectual rigor and radicalism of the pre-war libertarian
right. There was no change in core ideology but a reapplication
of fundamental principles in ways that corrected the obvious failures
of the Reason and National Review crowd.
I
remember people at the time saying: "Oh no! You're falling in bed
with a bunch of religious rightists!" I would just rub my eyes in
dismay. In the first place, if a person believes in liberty and
also happens to be religious, what is wrong with that? Since when
did atheism become a mandatory view within libertarian circles?
Also, the point was not to fall in bed with anybody but to organize
a new intellectual movement precisely to do battle with the statists
on all sides.
Much
good came out of this. We took out ads in the New York Times
attacking war and we gave the neocons a run for their money. We
had some very good and fun meetings, and Murray had the chance for
a productive exchange of ideas with some of the smartest thinkers
in the country.
But
there were limits to what could be accomplished. As old-fashioned
Burkeans, somewhat influenced by Kirk, they resisted ideology in
principle. That meant an impatience with the rationalism of economic
theory and libertarian political theory. That eventually caused
us problems on issues like trade. All sides opposed Nafta, which
was mercantilist, but we couldn't agree on the urgency of eliminating
trade barriers. Still, the debates were fun. We agreed to cooperate
where we could, and disagree where we must.
Buchananism
Another
problem was that usual evil force in the world: politics. Nearly
alone among Republicans, Pat Buchanan was a strong opponent of the
war on Iraq, denouncing it up until the troops actually landed.
He then began to offer a radical critique of the interventionist
state in a host of areas. In 1991, he challenged Bush for the nomination,
speaking out against Bush's tax increases and welfarism. In some
ways, it appeared that he could become a dream candidate, uniting
a passionate concern for both free enterprise and peace.
Conventional
libertarians didn't like Pat, in part because he was against open
immigration. But it seemed obvious that the patterns of immigration
since 1965 have increased rather than decreased the government's
control over the economy. And there is no obvious libertarian position
on this subject: whether immigration is peaceful or invasive depends
entirely on who owns the property onto which they immigrate, and
whether they make their own way once here. The welfare state and
public schools complicate the picture enormously.
Unfortunately
for everyone, as the campaign progressed, Pat got more and more
protectionist and nationalist. Murray saw that Buchanan was in danger
of jettisoning all his good principles. If the state can and must
plan trade to protect the nation, then why not the rest of the economy?
Sure enough, by 1996, Pat's protectionist theories mutated and took
over his economic thinking entirely. For example, he advocated a
100% tax on estates over $1 million. Pat still says good things
on foreign policy, but the lesson for me is an old one: never hinge
the hopes of a movement on a politician.
Chronicles
is open to libertarians, and the Randolph Club still meets. But,
for me, this chapter in the history of ideological organizing came
to a close with Murray's death. With Murray, anything seemed possible.
We could dabble in practical tactics and strategy, write on every
topic under the sun, and keep cranking out the students and academic
conferences and publications. But without Murray, I needed to concentrate
on what I do best, which was and is internal development. At the
same time, the Mises Institute began to develop the resources to
expand its horizons as broadly as Murray had always wanted.
A
New Movement?
Doherty:
Do you feel you succeeded in creating the paleo movement you speculated
about when you departed from the "modal" libertarian movement?
Rockwell:
To some extent, I would say the present decline in the moral legitimacy
of the executive state represents a paleoization, if you will, a
systematic radicalization of the middle class. As Frank Rich has
pointed out in the New York Times, all the real political
dissidents and radicals, the people who are raising fundamental
objections to the status quo of the American civil project, are
on the right.
They
are homeschoolers fed up with the propaganda in public schools.
They are average Americans who fear and resent anyone with a federal
badge and gun. The pro-lifers are pushing the boundaries of permissible
civil disobedience. Anti-war rallies are as likely to be populated
by old-line constitutionalists as aging New Lefties.
Meanwhile,
the mainstream left is increasingly censorious. It is there that
you find the book burners, the taboo enforcers, the thought police,
and the apologists for federal tyranny.
On
the other hand, and despite the continued growth of the state, we
are seeing the flourishing of enterprise across the country and
the world, an intense and renewed interest in the art of private
life, and a continuing secession from establishment political institutions.
Another way of putting this is that the classical ideal of liberty
and private life is again gaining currency, and a major reason is
the successes that an intellectual vanguard of Austrian scholars
and political dissidents have had in undermining the ideological
foundations of the state.
Murray
anticipated all this with his outreach efforts to marginalized conservatives.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, he had an outstanding strategic
sense. It's just that he was always ahead of everyone else in his
thinking, and so he suffered detraction and calumny. Not that it
mattered to him. Early in his career, he decided to take a certain
path, inspired by the example of Mises, and he stuck with it to
the end.
The
Future of Liberty
Doherty:
What about plans for the future?
Rockwell:
These days, we have more than enough work to do in publishing, funding,
and supporting Austrian and libertarian scholarship, both of which
are in a boom phase. People on the left thought that the collapse
of socialism would mean that anti-socialist intellectual forces
would decline as well. The opposite has happened. At last, it is
clear to anyone who cares about liberty that the real enemy is the
ruling regime in government and academia, and that this ruling regime
resides within our own borders.
The
Internet has been a tremendous boost to the Austrian School and
the classical liberal perspective. Since the second world war, the
biggest hurdle our side has had is in getting the message out. At
last, the net evens the score. Not a day goes by without hosts of
people around the world discovering the world of Misesian-Rothbardian
theory for the first time, just because they run across our website
at Mises.org.
We're
also building a Center for Libertarian Studies site at LibertarianStudies.org
that will feature the back issues of the Journal of Libertarian
Studies and the RRR, as well as Murray's classic Libertarian
Forum and Left and Right journals. [Note: the founding
of LewRockwell.com changed this; JLS (now published by the
Mises Institute) and Left and Right are archived at Mises.org;
we still hope to scan and upload the Libertarian Forum on
LRC.] Our goal always is to provide the resources that keep people's
attention on the conceptual fundamentals: liberty and property versus
the state and its power.
Right
now, we are faced with a historic opportunity. In academia, the
old guard no longer has the same credibility among students. The
left has surrendered the mantle of idealism and radicalism. The
Austrian School is perfectly suited to be the new and fresh alternative.
And in public affairs, we need to take advantage of the declining
status and moral legitimacy of the central state to make a major
push for libertarian ideas. The revolution that struck Eastern Europe
a decade ago has come home in surprising ways, and we need to work
to encourage these trends and direct them towards a consistent stand
for liberty and property.
Many
years ago, Hazlitt gave a speech in which he said it is our moral
obligation to continue the battle no matter what the odds. What
he said then is still true today: we are not threatened with bankruptcy
or jail for holding the opinions we do. All we risk is being called
nasty names. Surely that is not too high a price to pay for defending
the very foundations of civilization.
Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him
mail] is president of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, and editor of LewRockwell.com.
Copyright
© 1999 Center for Libertarian Studies
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