Don't
Let the Planners Take Charge of Energy
by
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
Well, the Republicans
have some ideas for reducing the price of gasoline.
Don't laugh
before you hear the details, among which: Congress will send a $100
check to American families to compensate for fuel costs, they will
force more money into ethanol, and they will step up prosecutions
of any gas distributor who sells for a price above that which the
government approves.
Okay, now you
can laugh.
If it is widespread
energy that you want, government is the last place you should turn
for a solution. Iraq is a good test case. A report from the US Comptroller
General shows that energy production in Iraq is still lower than
the bad old days when Saddam was in charge.
You know, energy:
as in the stuff that keeps the lights on, the cars running, the
internet roiling, the medical equipment humming, the televisions
squawking, and the ovens baking. Without it, we are reduced to where
all of society was between the beginning of recorded history and
the early twentieth century.
The US has
been managing Iraq for years. Before the war, Iraq produced 2.6
million barrels of oil per day. Iraq now produces about 2 million
barrels per day. Before the war, Iraq's generation capacity was
about 4,300 megawatts. Current capacity is 4,092 megawatts, which
is actually a decline from this time last year.
This isn't
because people are using solar power. Living standards are declining.
And guess what? Iraq has price controls on gasoline, and prosecutes
violators. Nor is there a shortage of money: the supposed reconstruction
effort is plowing through tens of billions of dollars, most of it
going to private companies on the dole.
The amazing
saga of the Al Fatah pipeline, now coming to light, is a case
in point. This pipeline, 130 miles north of Baghdad, is (or was)
the main pipeline that linked Iraq's northern pipelines to refineries
and to Turkey in one of the most oil-rich parts of the world. It
is (or was) critical not only to Iraq but the world supply of oil.
The pipeline
was bombed by the US when it hit the Fatah crossing bridge. The
bombers did not know about or understand the damage it would cause
to the pipeline, or even that the pipeline was there. The general
who ordered the bombing said that he was trying to stop the "enemy"
from crossing the bridge but in the heat of battle, that just means
people, so this action alone constitutes a violation of the old-world
rules of war that forbid bombing civilian infrastructure.
When rebuilding
time came, Congress allocated $680 million in 2003. Kellogg Brown,
& Root got the contract – part of a total $2.4 billion no-bid
contract given to the parent company Halliburton – and many more
hundreds of millions followed.
They had decided
to put new pipelines under the Tigris using "directional drilling"
that require fantastic amounts of money and time. Despite every
warning against it – including some coming from reports commissioned
by KBR – the company went ahead.
The contracts
the KBR awarded in turn specified only that drillers drill every
day, not necessarily complete the job. Why? Well, apparently the
subcontractor had looked into the deal and seen that directional
drilling in this area was a disaster in the making. Plus the subcontractor
was being asked to work in a war zone.
So the subcontractor
managed to get the work order to do as much as they could do for
six months, but with no requirement that the job be completed.
The drilling
began with the goal of putting 15, 30-inch pipelines beneath the
Tigris at shallow angles. But it immediately became clear the ground
would not stay solid enough to create holes that would stay put.
The area was a fault zone filled with rocks, boulders, and gravel,
and so every time the drillers would make an imprint, the ground
would roll back into place. Nothing larger than a 26-inch pipe would
go through.
Four months
later, after endless amounts of digging and waiting and delays,
KBR notified a contracting officer in Baghdad that three-quarters
of the money was gone. The camp was suffering relentless bombardment.
The crew members were charging as much as $100,000 per day – money
paid by you and me – to keep up the appearance of progress.
It was at this
point that the Army Corps of Engineers sent out a US geologist named
Robert Sanders to look at the work being done. What he found was
ghastly: alongside the bombed out bridge and land, there was a 300-foot
long trench created in the course of drilling and yanking and ripping
and tugging. When Sanders talked to the workers and supervisors,
they all agreed: the whole idea was nuts from the beginning. "No
driller in his right mind would have gone ahead," he told the New
York Times.
The US government
in Iraq blasted KBR for having plowed through the money with nothing
to show for it. The penalty? A cut in the bonus fees on the job,
but that's all. For its part, KBR claims that the Army Corps had
received constant updates about its work and that KBR had been instructed
to continue.
Those millions
gone, the US approved another contract for $66 million, this time
going to Parsons Corporation and Worley of Australia. They had a
totally different idea in mind. They would lay the pipes in the
trench and put them in concrete. The Army Corps now says that the
project is completed. But one problem: the state-owned North Oil
Company says that oil is still not flowing through anything at Al
Fatah.
Many people
look at all this situation and see graft (Halliburton is closely
connected to the Bush elite), lack of accountability (KBR should
have heeded warnings), a poorly written contract (why pay for work
instead of results?), cost overruns (no private company in a free
market would spend money this recklessly and stay in business),
terrible military strategy (the general who ordered the bombing
in the first place should have known), and improper oversight (there
are chains of command that should have stopped this fiasco before
it went out of control).
But it is a
mistake to look at government projects in hindsight and observe
all the ways in which it might have been better managed. The more
fundamental question is why does management never work as it should?
Even if every problem identified by the various reports and the
New York Times exposé had been solved, there would have been
other problems that could be easily identified in retrospect.
Indeed, the
same can be said of any government project gone wrong, from Stalin's
campaign for wheat production, to FDR's farm program and TVA, to
Bush's public school reforms. We are forever reading scandalous
stories about huge government programs that turn out not to have
amounted to anything, given millions away to friends of the powerful,
and are rife with bungling, incompetence, cost overruns, and everything
else bad.
The answer
to this seeming mystery rests with Mises's analysis of bureaucratic
management. There is no profit and loss system – a lack of rational
economic accounting – when property is not privately held and where
markets do not permit consumer input and a transfer of title to
capital.
And note that
this critique applies whether the project is being administered
directly by the state or contracted out by the state. No matter
how perfectly crafted the contracts are, the main incentive of the
private firm is to obtain and spend the grant money. If there are
no consumers with the power to judge the final project as a consumable
good, the result will be chaos.
Even more fundamental
questions are raised by the Fatah case. Many on the left say that
the Iraq War has been about spilling blood for oil. But while lots
of blood has been spilled, there is no evidence of increased oil
– a fact which is reflected in the high price for gasoline at US
pumps.
All Iraqi oil
is still owned by the Iraqi state. All questions of how the system
will work to pump, transport, and refine the oil in the ground are
left to the state, which itself is incapable of rational economic
decision making.
If
the US had invaded Iraq and engaged in outright theft of all oil
wells, and then handed the ownership of those wells to private firms,
it would have been unjust, egregious, and probably would have inspired
even more hatred of the US within Iraq (which is probably why the
US didn't do it), but this much we can know: the oil would probably
be flowing by now.
The
Bush administration energy policy in the US, just as in Iraq, relies
on command and control and nothing more. It is a form of low-level
socialism and can be expected to produce results along the same
lines as the much-heralded effort to get oil flowing in Iraq, a
country where the stuff is as common as fog in Northern California.
If the Bush
administration, or the Democrats, are given total charge of getting
us energy, it will be about as accessible here as it is in Iraq,
a country where cars are abandoned for lack of fuel, black markets
abound, and the lights flicker on only rarely.
April
29, 2006
Llewellyn
H. Rockwell, Jr. [send him
mail] is president of the Ludwig
von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, editor of LewRockwell.com
and author of Speaking
of Liberty.
Copyright
© 2006 LewRockwell.com
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