Szasz, Vindicated
by Max Raskin
by
Max Raskin
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Like most healthy
people, I have no interest in illness. I am not an expert in bodily
diseases and have not, to my knowledge, ever received a medical
degree. Thus, it may seem beyond my purview to write an article
critical of a review, critical of a book, critical of the history
of psychiatry. Why would we read Paris Hilton’s analysis of the
geo-politics of Southeast Asia?
I am not an
expert in psychiatry, but thanks to Dr. Thomas Szasz and his work,
libertarians are able to push their analysis to the realm of psychiatric
treatment, where the case is made against involuntary hospitalization.
The act constitutes definite bodily aggression directed at the "patient"
from the "humanitarian." Nothing could be more dangerous
than a government that has the power to define who is "sick"
and then throw these undesirables into institutions for indefinite
sentences. As we have erected a barrier between Church and State,
we ought to strive for a wall between Health and State.
When
The Weekly Standard, a publication fervently opposed
to the principles of peace, liberty, and property, published a
scathing review of Szasz’s new book, Coercion
as Cure: A Critical History of Psychiatry, it was obvious
that defending one application of libertarianism, means defending
the entire system’s principles.
So what does
reviewer William Anderson charge against Szasz?
To begin with,
he attacks the very foundation of a free country. Szasz and other
libertarians believe that the foundational rule of society should
be that men should be free, provided they do no harm to others.
This idea is anathema to Dr. Anderson, who instead believes that
coercion is appropriate beyond the protection of person and property.
He asserts that, "civilization requires that certain actions
must be encouraged and others must be prevented. This is accomplished,
all else failing, by coercion. To deny this is idle dreaming,
an adolescent fantasy of anarchic Arcadia."
What are these
"actions" that must be encouraged and prevented? Of course,
Anderson does not explicitly name any. This then puts us on the
slippery slope to tyranny. No dictator ever says that he is being
unethical and immoral. Instead, he claims that there exist certain
higher values and virtues that must be imposed.
What Anderson
does say is that psychiatrists should, "try to apply
scientific medicine in the service of ameliorating disturbances
of thinking, feeling, and action brought about by disturbances of
brain function." Isn’t the sole job of a doctor to treat his
patients?
From this it
can be determined that Anderson believes that violence is justified
as long as we are trying to cure various disturbances brought about
by diseases of the brain. To begin with, the problem with this argument
is that it is not an argument, but rather an unfounded assertion.
Why are psychiatrists exempt from moral law?
But it seems
that people will not intuitively accept this answer. Many, like
Anderson, believe that, "autonomy may be compromised by illness,
that such illness may be treated, and autonomy thus restored."
There are two
answers to this argument. Szasz would claim that the entire concept
of mental illness, as understood by modern psychiatry, is a myth.
Because there is no proof of demonstrable biological problems in
a schizophrenic, he is no more sick than a person who tells "sick"
jokes, or an economy is "sick." Unlike cancer, neurosyphilis,
or head trauma, where scientists can point to lesions which cause
physical aberrations, schizophrenia and other mental "illnesses"
are just ways of denoting socially unacceptable behavior. Szasz
stresses the subjectivity of "craziness" with his famous
quote, "If you talk to God, you are praying; If God talks to
you, you have schizophrenia." By calling undesirable behaviors
diseases, the State now is able to further control society through
"medicine."
Whether his
thesis is true is beyond the scope of this article. One would be
crazy to attack or prove Szasz’s lifework in a single article. Well,
not crazy.
But, even if
mental illness does exist, libertarianism can still oppose
involuntary incarceration. To begin with, there is no reason why
"autonomy-restoration" ought to be the goal of government.
There is nothing immoral about being mentally ill, just as there
is nothing unethical about having cancer. If the government has
any role, it is simply to deal with people who violate the rights
of others. Having a disease is a terrible event, but it does not
warrant a massive Therapeutic State to cure all ills. It is simply
not true that the insane necessarily commit crime. Thus,
any actions by the State to "heal" them are done unjustly,
as the humanitarian has no right to impose himself on others.
But there is
nothing wrong with voluntary humanitarianism. Anderson mistakenly
claims that Szasz’s philosophy offers, "no room for brotherly
love, charity, or assistance to those who may be impaired."
This is a common fallacy that many reviewers commit of not understanding
what they are reading. Nowhere does Szasz say that people cannot
shower their family members and friends with love, charity, puppies,
and assistance. What he says is that all those things must be done
voluntarily to the person. If you continue to "help" me
when I refuse, your paternalism violates my basic right to freedom.
This is the
same problem The Weekly Standard has in portraying a noninterventionist
foreign policy. It does not follow that because there are bad people
in the world, a paternalistic America has to establish a warfare
state that cures all international problems. As with the libertarian
foreign policy, libertarian psychiatry should be guided by voluntary
means. We should not invade countries simply because we disagree
with how they are acting, just as we should not incarcerate people
who are acting strangely. The only time when aggression should be
used is when the country or person has violated the rights of others.
Similarly, we should not treat "crazy" criminals any different
than we treat "normal" criminals, just as we should not
treat Muslim countries different from Christian, Jewish, or secular
countries.
But a mere
mischaracterization of an entire philosophy is not enough for those
opposed to libertarianism. When all else fails, labeling one’s opponent
a murderer is a surefire way to convince people of one’s argument.
Dr. Anderson
tells the story of his friend Jane who committed suicide after Szasz’s
ideas injected her with "a lethal dose of autonomy." To
begin with, even Anderson notes that, "a first-rate psychiatrist
began to treat her. But her illness was such that she declined to
continue her treatment." Read that again. Her illness was such
that, after her doctor failed to treat her, she declined to continue
treatment. Imagine going to a doctor with a cold and the doctor
gives you chemotherapy. Is it the disease’s fault that you would
never see that doctor again?
As cold as
it may seem, however, the simple fact is that a political philosophy
cannot be crafted to protect every single person. Having freedom
means having the freedom to make wrong decisions. Let’s say a person
gets drunk and stumbles off a building. Is being drunk then cause
for incarceration? The very fact that there are so many schizophrenics
alive today proves that they are not inherently suicidal. Like any
group, the mentally insane are not monolithic. Studies have shown
that the mentally ill are actually less likely to be criminals
then us "normal" people.
We see then
the importance of defending Szasz. It is a defense of libertarianism.
Though there is no official libertarian "position" on
the existence of mental illness, it is clear that if one is committed
to the principles of freedom, one ought not condone involuntary
hospitalization. As Murray
Rothbard noted, it is simply another form of involuntary servitude
that must be unconditionally opposed. To those mentally ill who
have committed crimes, they should be treated like everyone
else. Though unequal in other aspects, under the law, all men should
be equal.
And in spite
of his controversial ideas, at base, Szasz professes a position
with great historic precedence. The ideas that people should be
free, that their bad decisions should be their own, and that punishment
should only be meted out to the criminal form the basis of classical
liberalism. Naturally, this is something The Weekly Standard
cannot tolerate.
November
16, 2007
Max
Raskin [send him mail]
goes to high school in New Jersey. He was a summer fellow at the
Mises Institute in 2007.
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© 2007 LewRockwell.com
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