This article
originally appeared in The Review of Austrian Economics,
vol. 4 (1990), pp. 325.
Introduction
For several
generations now there has existed an interpretation of modern
history conditioning and shaping the views held by nearly all
educated people on the great issue of socialism versus the market
economy.
This interpretation
goes roughly as follows: once there was a "class"
"the" bourgeoisie that rose to prominence with
the colossal economic and social changes of early-modern history,
and strove for domination. Liberalism, which admittedly helped
to achieve a limited degree of human liberation, was the ideological
expression of the bourgeoisie's self-interested struggle.[1]
Meanwhile,
however, another, much larger class came into being, "the"
working class, victims of the triumphant bourgeoisie. This class
strove in its turn for recognition and domination, and, accordingly,
developed its own ideology, socialism. Socialism aimed at the
transition to a higher, broader level of human liberation. The
natural and inevitable conflict of interests of these two classes
basically, of the exploiters and the exploited fills
modern history and has led in the end, in the welfare state of
our own time, to a kind of accommodation and compromise.
With this
historical paradigm I think we are all quite familiar.
Recently,
however, a different interpretation has begun to gain ground.
The outstanding historian Ernst Nolte, of the Free University
of Berlin, has expressed its central point:
The real
and modernising revolution is that of liberal capitalism or
of economic freedom, which began 200 years ago in England and
which was first completed in the USA. This revolution of individualism
was challenged at an early date by the so-called revolutionary
socialism, whose guideline was the archaic community, with its
transparency of social conditions, as the most comprehensive
counterrevolution, namely as the tendency for totalitarian collectivism.[2]
Although
capitalism "radically chang[ed] the living conditions of
all those affected in a relatively short time and improv[ed] them
to an extraordinary degree, at least materially," "it
did not understand how to awaken love."[3]
The great capitalist revolution called forth a socialist movement,
which "in a certain sense [was] thoroughly reactionary, indeed,
radical-reactionary."[4]
The Place
of Liberalism
This more
recent conception suggests a new interpretation of liberalism.
Liberalism is, in fact, the ideology of the capitalist revolution
that prodigiously raised the living standards of the mass of people;
a doctrine gradually elaborated over several centuries, which
offered a new concept of social order, encompassing freedom in
the only form suited to the modern world. Step by step, in practice
and theory, the various sectors of human activity were withdrawn
from the jurisdiction of coercive authority and given over to
the voluntary action of self-regulating society.
Practically
all the peoples of western and central Europe (as well as the
Americans) contributed to the working out of the liberal idea
and the liberal movement. Not just the Dutch, French, Scots, English,
and Swiss, but also, for instance, in Spain, the late scholastics
of the School of Salamanca and at other academic centers,[5]
and a number of Italians, especially at the beginnings of political
economy. In this evolution, the Germans also played an often-overlooked
part.[6]
Particularly
striking for foreigners who have concerned themselves with German
liberalism has been the bitter hostility that it met with in its
own time and at the hands of historians, and which is linked to
the first, conventional interpretation of modern history described
above. Paul Kennedy has quite accurately referred to "the
sheer venom and blind hatred behind so many of the assaults in
Germany upon Manchestertum [Manchesterism, i.e., laissez-faire]."[7]
This hostility
was directed especially against the man who was for two generations
in Germany the representative of the liberal movement that
embraced all civilized nations: Eugen Richter. Malice has now
been replaced by oblivion. Last year, in July, was the 150th anniversary
of Richter's birth, and if any notice was taken of the occasion
in the Federal Republic, aside from my own very modest contribution,[8]
it has not come to my attention.
That should
not be surprising, however. Since both the conservatives and the
socialists the two camps that have by and large written
the history of Germany found Richter insufferable, he has
usually been treated with disparagement or else totally disregarded.
Thus, he remains unknown to the vast majority even of educated
people. Given the older historical interpretation, this circumstance
makes a certain sense; it by no means corresponds to the newer
one. Thus, an attempt to evaluate Richter's significance for German
liberalism and German history is called for and, indeed, overdue.
Differences
of Opinion on Richter
Eugen Richter[9]
was the brilliant, if occasionally too masterful, leader of the
Progressive Party (Fortschrittspartei) and later of the
Liberals (Freisinn), the political expressions of German
"Left Liberalism,"[10]
or "determined" (entschieden) liberalism, through
30 years, in the Imperial German Reichstag and in the Prussian
House of Delegates; he was, moreover, an untiring journalist and
publisher.[11]
Outside of a narrow group of friends and political associates,
the attitudes and opinions on Richter, in his own time and afterward,
have been mostly very negative.[12]
This is naturally
the case on the authoritarian-conservative side. Crown Prince
Wilhelm, later Kaiser Wilhelm II, even hatched a plan (never realized)
to have Richter "beaten up" by six junior officers,[13]
and Richter's old adversary, Prince Bismarck, confided to the
old kaiser, Wilhelm I, that it was among men like Richter that
"the material for deputies to the [French Revolutionary]
Convention" was to be found.[14]
Hans Delbrück, whose portrayal of Richter influenced later writers,
compared him to the Athenian demagogue Cleon and branded him the
leader of a party whose highest passion was reserved for pieces
of silver,[15]
while for the Marxist Franz Mehring, Richter was merely "a
servant and helper of Big Capital."[16]
Richter's "rigidity," "dogmatism," and "carping
doctrinairism" have been repeatedly attacked,[17]
and a present-day German historian simply reflected the nearly
unanimous view of his colleagues when he summarily characterized
Richter as "the eternal nay-sayer."[18]
Yet even
Bismarck was compelled to concede, "Richter was certainly
the best speaker we had. Very well-informed and conscientious;
with disobliging manners, but a man of character. Even now he
does not turn with the wind."[19]
Another opponent, this time from the liberal camp, the first president
of the federal republic, Theodor Heuss, admitted that Richter
was "the most influential leader of 'determined' liberalism,"
and "certainly in detail work [sic] the most knowledgeable
deputy in the German parliaments."[20]
An observer closer in spirit to his subject expressed it more
simply: Richter "was the liberal doctrine incarnate."[21]
Richter's
Career
Eugen Richter
was born on July 30, 1838, in Düsseldorf, the son of a regimental
doctor. The atmosphere in the parental home was "oppositional,"
e.g., the family read the Kölnische Zeitung "eagerly"
evidentially, rather bold behavior for the time. Richter's
"predominantly critical-rational disposition" developed
from his early youth.[22]
He studied political science with Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann
at Bonn and with Robert von Mohl at Heidelberg, where he also
studied public finance with Karl Heinrich Rau, then the most celebrated
expert in the field. While still a student he went to Berlin,
where the proceedings of the Prussian House of Delegates interested
him much more than his university lectures. He began attending
the meetings of the Kongress deutscher Volkswirte (Congress
of German Economists, a liberal reformist organization) and, through
newspapers and journal articles, avidly took part in the growing
movement for economic liberalism; he was also active in the consumer-cooperative
movement.
By 1884 Richter
headed a united Left Liberal party, the Deutschfreisinnige
Partei, that boasted of more than 100 seats in the Reichstag.
Liberalism's hour in Germany seemed to have come: the kaiser,
Wilhelm I, was very old, the crown prince, Friedrich, the most
liberal of all the Hohenzollerns.
It turned
out otherwise than might have been desirable for the Germans.
Bismarck's political skill saw to it that the Freisinnige Partei
was smashed in the next two elections, and when Friedrich finally
ascended the throne, in 1888, he was already mortally ill. These
vicissitudes could make no difference in Richter's political convictions,
however. For another two decades he held fast to the same principles,
which appeared increasingly obsolete and irrelevant. He was the
last authentic liberal leader in the parliament of any European
power.
Social Philosophy
and the Two-Front Strategy
Already as
a young man in his earliest journalistic activity, Richter emphasized
not only the economic disadvantages of the antiquated mercantilist
system but at the same time the infringement of civil and political
freedom bound up with that system. Thus, in his brochure, "On
the Freedom of the Tavern Trade," he attacked the concessions
system, which invested the political authorities with wide-ranging
licensing and regulatory authority for all trades and professions:
As long
as the police administration in our state unites in itself such
legislative, judicial, and executive powers, Prussia does not
yet deserve the name of a Rechtsstaat [state founded
on the rule of law].[23]
Thus from
the start, the cornerstone of Richter's social philosophy was
the connection between political and economic freedom, a conception
that distinguished him, and Left Liberalism in general, from the
mass of "National Liberals." Two decades later Richter
closed his great speech against Bismarck's protective tariff with
the words,
Economic
freedom has no security without political freedom, and political
freedom can find its security only in economic freedom.[24]
This tenet
determined Richter's continuing political strategy. All his life,
he conducted a "two-front war" against Bismarckian "pseudo-constitutionalism"
and a recrudescent mercantilism on the one hand, and the rising
socialist movement on the other.[25]
Richter and
the other entschieden liberals have often been reproached
for this policy. Critics maintain that the Left Liberals should
have allied with the Social Democrats, in a common resistance
to the militarist-authoritarian Second Reich, and Richter's famous
"rigidity" and "dogmatism" are supposed to
be largely responsible for the fact that such a united front never
came into being. Some historians even give the impression that
liberal opposition to social democracy in imperial Germany is
only comprehensible as the product of "fear" of the
"lower orders."[26]
But it can
scarcely be surprising that Richter rejected such an alliance.
He saw himself faced with a socialist party that did not trouble
to conceal its ultimate aim abolition of the system of
private property and the market economy and that viewed
"the class-struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat as
the 'pivot of all revolutionary socialism.'"[27]
After 1875, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) was officially
a Marxist party, and despite later revisionist tendencies, its
acknowledged leaders, like Bebel, Liebknecht, and Kautsky, were
confirmed orthodox Marxists. Of course, the SPD presented various
democratic demands "to start with"; its ultimate goal
remained, however, the social elimination of all nonproletarians.
The social-democratic
standpoint confronting Richter may be illustrated by Franz Mehring,
a major theoretician and the biographer of Marx. In 1903, Mehring
wrote in the Neue Zeit of the German "bourgeoisie"
(and its defenders), "It had to be aware, and basically it
was aware, that, without the help of the working-class, it could
not defeat absolutism and feudalism. It had further to be aware,
and basically it was also aware, that, in the moment of victory,
its previous alliance-partner would face it as an adversary,"
at which point the bourgeoisie would fall victim to the proletariat
in the final, decisive conflict.
Nonetheless,
Mehring insisted that in this alleged state of affairs the bourgeoisie
must draw the conclusion "that a pact with the working class
on tolerable [sic] conditions offers it the only possibility it
has."[28]
But for liberals like Richter, the Marxist scenario was by no
means all that "tolerable." It is understandable, therefore,
that Richter held that the "Social Democratic state of the
future," because it was hypothetical, was for the time being
less dangerous than the existing military-authoritarian state,
yet essentially "much worse."[29]
Even aside
from the fact that "from 1869, meetings of the Progressive
Party in Berlin were violently disrupted by the Social Democrats,"[30]
how would an alliance with them have been at all conceivable?
As liberals, men like Richter viewed socialism as the great modern
counterrevolution, and believed that the achievement of the socialist
goal would lead both to appalling poverty and to state absolutism.
There was nothing in the socialist doctrine of the time that would
suggest otherwise. Historians would do well to recognize that
the blame for the nonoccurrence of a common front against militarism
in Germany must be borne by the Social Democrats themselves.
Pictures
of a Social Democratic Future
The socialists
engaged in a relentless, scathing critique of the liberal economic
order. But, as Richter pointed out,
The Social
Democrats are very garrulous in criticizing the present social
order, but they are careful not to clarify in detail the goal
that is supposed to be achieved through the latter's destruction.[31]
This omission
Richter attempted to make good in his Pictures of a Social
Democratic Future.[32]
In its time, this little book, with its ironic subtitle, "Freely
drawn from Bebel," was a sensation. It was translated into
a dozen languages, with more than a quarter-million copies printed
in Germany alone.
It must be
conceded that in some respects Richter's narrative is dubious.
It leans too heavily on the pathos of family problems under the
new socialist regime, although that was to be expected, since
it was directed at a popular audience. Sometimes the work even
verges on what at first seems absurd, especially in connection
with the relations of social equality that will supposedly obtain
under socialism, e.g., the new socialist reich chancellor must
shine his own boots and clean his own clothes, in Richter's account.
The explanation
for this, however, is that Richter took the egalitarian promises
of the socialists too literally, too seriously. He lacked
any inkling of Marxism's drive to bring to power a new class
of privileged higher-echelon state functionaries.
Still, Richter
was able to anticipate many of the characteristics later displayed
by Marxist states. Emigration is prohibited in Marxist Germany,
since "persons who owe their education and training to the
State cannot be accorded the right to emigrate, so long as they
are of an age when they are obliged to work."[33]
Bribery and corruption are to be found everywhere,[34]
and the products of the nationalized economy are unable to meet
the standards of competition of the world market.[35]
But above
all, Richter again emphasized the connection between economic
and political freedom:
What is
the use of freedom of the press, if the government is in possession
of all the printing presses, what does freedom of assembly avail,
if all the meeting places belong to the government? ... in a
society in which there is no more personal and economic freedom,
even the freest form of the state cannot make political independence
possible.[36]
When the
worst imaginable happens and the socialist state proves incapable
of provisioning the German Army as the Fatherland is invaded by
France and Russia, a counterrevolution breaks out, restoring a
free society.
Marxists
and Conservatives: Mutual Aid
Richter presents
his two-sided campaign as part of one and the same war, by arguing
that it was a question merely of two forms of state paternalism.
Interestingly, this interpretation was supported from an unexpected
quarter, although without Richter's normative charge. Accused
of political offenses, the founder of German socialism, Ferdinand
Lassalle, addressed his judges as follows:
As wide
as are the differences that divide you and me from one another,
Sirs, against this dissolution of all morality [threatening
from the liberal camp] we stand shoulder to shoulder! I defend
with you, the primeval Vestal flame of all civilization, the
State, against those modem barbarians [the laissez-faire liberals].[37]
Richter reiterated
that the right-wing parties the Conservatives and the Anti-Semites
aided socialism "especially [by] the agitation against
mobile capital, against 'the exploitation' it allegedly perpetrates,
and, moreover, by the limitless promises handed out to all occupational
classes of special state help and provision."[38]
In turn, socialism helped the Conservatives and Anti-Semites through
its revolutionary threats, intimidating the middle classes and
driving them into the arms of a strong state power.[39]
State Socialism
and Sozialpolitik
Richter fought
Bismarck's state-socialist program, including the nationalization
of the Prussian railroads and the establishment of state monopolies
for tobacco and brandy, and, naturally, Bismarck's turn toward
protectionism, toward rendering dearer the cost of life's necessities,
by which the great Chancellor, landowner, and hater of the "Manchester
money-bags" manifested his compassion for the poor. Richter
considered the planned tariff wall "the ideal nurturing ground
for the formation of new cartels," which in fact occurred.[40]
While Richter, together with other liberal leaders, like Ludwig
Bamberger, supported the introduction of the gold standard in
the newly formed empire, unlike them he opposed the centralization
of the banking system through the creation of a Reichsbank; such
a central bank, he felt, would tend to privilege "big capital
and big industry."[41]
Probably
Richter's most famous attack in this field was directed against
Bismarck's Sozialpolitik (social reform), with which the
modern welfare state was born. Richter, together with Bamberger,
was the chief speaker in opposition to the program, which began
with the Accident Insurance Bill of 1881, and over the years he
persevered in his point of view when other liberal critics were
converted to the new approach. One remark of his was, and is,
deemed particularly notorious: "A special social question
does not exist for us [the Progressives]. The social question
is the sum of all cultural questions"[42]
by which he meant that, in the last analysis, the standard
of living of working people can only be raised through higher
productivity, a viewpoint perhaps not totally devoid of sense.
It is above
all this opposition to Sozialpolitik with which Richter
is reproached.[43]
If one judges from the standpoint of world history as the tribunal
of the world, Richter was certainly in the wrong. The welfare
state is today conquering the whole globe; even the grandiose
socialist idea is on the point of being reduced to a mere set
of comprehensive welfare programs. Still, at least one of the
reasons Richter advanced against the beginnings of the welfare
state has a certain cogency.
By hindering
or restricting the development of independent funds, one pressed
along the road of state-help and here awoke growing claims
on the State that, in the long run, no political system can
satisfy.[44]
Richter's
words give pause, when one considers the complex of problems gathered
under the heading, "The Over-Straining of the Weimar Social
State" (the "most progressive social state in the world"
in its day), the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and the accompanying
seizure of power of the National Socialists.[45]
One might also reflect on a circumstance that today appears entirely
possible: that, after so many fatal "contradictions"
of capitalism have failed to materialize, in the end a genuine
contradiction has emerged, one that may well destroy the system;
namely the incompatibility of capitalism and the limitless state
welfarism yielded by the functioning of a democratic order.
Civil Liberties
and Rechtsstaat
While the
majority of the Progressives supported the Kulturkampf
it was the celebrated liberal and friend of Richter's,
Rudolf Virchow, who gave the crusade against the German Catholic
Church the label, "struggle of cultures" Richter
generally opposed this fateful conflict, which contributed so
much to hardening the Catholic Church's hostility to liberalism.[46]
Although he did not challenge his own close political collaborators
as much as he might have he claimed the Kulturkampf
did "not particularly excite" him[47]
his own position was basically that of authentic liberalism,
of, for instance, the French Catholic liberals and the Jeffersonians:
absolute separation of state and church, including complete freedom
for private education and a principled rejection of state subsidizing
of any religion.[48]
Particularly
interesting in this connection is that, for Richter, "the
private school was the last possible refuge."[49]
In contrast to the majority of German (and of French and other)
liberals of his time, Richter was not inclined to place obstacles
in the way of the private school system in order to promote his
own secular Weltanschauung. As he expressed it,
Even if
it were true that by using the free private system of instruction
schools would come into being less agreeable to my point of
view than the public schools, I would still not let myself be
led astray, or desist, out of a fear of Catholics or a fear
of socialists.[50]
Similarly,
Richter took to the field against the emerging anti-Semitic movement,[51]
with which Bismarck coquetted in another of his efforts to subvert
the liberals. Richter branded the anti-Semites "unnational,"
referring to them as "this movement damaging to our national
honor." In turn, the anti-Semites labelled the Left Liberals
around Richter "Jew guard-troops,"[52]
and attempted, as had the Social Democrats, to disrupt liberal
meetings in Berlin through violence.[53]
Until the end of Richter's career, the German-Jewish middle classes
formed an important part of the liberal following, in part on
account of the liberal principle of separation of church and state.[54]
In general,
Richter had learned very well from the great theoreticians of
the Rechtsstaat, Dahlmann and Mohl. He fought a bill to
criminalize the slander and mockery of state institutions, of
marriage, and private property.[55]
In the case of the Social Democrats themselves, he opposed the
notorious and futile Socialist Laws, with which Bismarck attempted
to suppress the SPD.[56]
(In this matter, however, Richter appears on one occasion to have
played, in the midst of Reichstag machinations, the politician
rather than the principled liberal.[57]
) Similarly with measures for the suppression of the Poles in
Germany's eastern territories. Ideas and competing cultural values,
in Richter's view, were not to be combated by force.[58]
Richter's
familiarity with the financial affairs of Prussia and of Germany
was unequaled.[59]
From the beginning of his parliamentary service, his attention
was focused most particularly on the military budget, and this
old question, which had produced the great constitutional conflict
of the 1860s and split German liberalism on several occasions,
accompanied him throughout his whole political life. A proponent
of low taxes, especially for the poorer classes,[60]
Richter was concerned with moderating the enormous financial demands
of the military; in this effort he did not shy away even from
wrangling with the venerable Count von Moltke.
Above all,
he was concerned that the authority of the people's representatives,
the Reichstag, should prevail over the Army, that the citizen
should not be submerged in the soldier. Thus, his insistence on
the two-year, rather than three-year, military service, which
led to a further split in the liberal party, in 1893.[61]
His tireless probing into every single expenditure once caused
Bismarck to cry out that in this fashion one would never come
to the end of a budget.[62]
Regarding his interrogation of a minister on a financial matter,
Richter wrote, with proud underscoring, "But I didn't
let go."[63]
In the field of the spending of public money, that could well
have been his lifelong motto.
The great
social scientist Max Weber, who was a National rather than a Left
Liberal, nevertheless declared,
Despite
Eugen Richter's pronounced unpopularity within his own party,
he enjoyed an unshakable power position, which rested on his
unequalled knowledge of the budget. He was surely the last representative
who could check over every penny spent, to the very last canteen,
with the War Minister; at least, this is what, despite any annoyance
they felt, has often been admitted to me by gentlemen of this
department.[64]
In this continuing
feature of Richter's, activity it is possible to see the most
significant example in the whole history of parliamentary liberalism
of the standpoint expressed by Frédéric Bastiat, when he wrote
of peace and freedom and their connection with the "icy numbers"
of a "vulgar state budget,"
The connection
is as close as possible. A war, a threat of war, a negotiation
that could lead to war none of these is capable of coming
to pass except by virtue of a small clause inscribed in this
great volume [the budget], the terror of taxpayers. ... Let
us seek first of all frugality in government peace and
freedom we will have as a bonus.[65]
War, Peace,
and Imperialism
On questions
of war and peace, Richter shared the views of the radical liberals,
or "Manchester men," of the 19th century, who were hostile
to war and highly skeptical of the arguments for large military
establishments and colonial adventures.[66]
In Britain this was the position of Richard Cobden and John Bright,
and later of Herbert Spencer; in France, of Benjamin Constant,
J.-B. Say, Bastiat, and many others. The German liberals, too,
placed a high value on peace (although their attitude was somewhat
skewed by the problem of national unification). John Prince Smith
and his followers were spokesmen for the ideal of "peace
through free trade."[67]
Richter criticized
increases in the strength of German military forces, "which
[have] substantially contributed to a subsequent reciprocal increase
in relation to France and Russia."[68]
Admiral von Tirpitz's Naval Bills, from 1898 on, which, by setting
Germany on a collision course with England, proved to be so fateful,
were rejected and denounced by Richter.[69]
For Wilhelm II's "Weltpolitik" [world politics],
he simply had no understanding. To the question, "What is
'Weltpolitik'?" Richter replied, "Wanting to
be there wherever something is going wrong."[70]
Under his leadership, the Freisinnige Volkspartei continued
to spurn it. The growing hostility between England and Germany
nearly drove him to despair.[71]
Richter experienced
the Age of Imperialism, which began for Germany with Bismarck's
initiatives in 1884-85 in Africa and the South Seas. Although
he repudiated these early initiatives, his attitude eventually
was somewhat ambivalent and requires an examination.
Richter's
initial position, which he expressed in June 1884, was that "colonial
policy is extraordinarily expensive," and
the responsibility
for the material development of the colony, as well as for its
formation, [is] to be left to the activity and entrepreneurial
spirit of our seafaring and trading fellow citizens; the procedure
followed should be less of the form of annexation of overseas
provinces to the German Reich, than of the form of the granting
of charters, on the model of the English royal charters ...
at the same time, to the parties interested in the colony should
essentially be left its governing, and they should be accorded
only the possibility of European jurisdiction and its protection
that we could furnish without having standing garrisons there.
For the rest, we hope that the tree will generally thrive through
the activity of the gardeners who planted it, and if it does
not, then the plant is an abortive one, and the damages affect
less the Reich, since the costs we require are not significant,
than the entrepreneurs, who were mistaken in their undertakings.[72]
Not Total
"Dogmatism," but Occasional Pragmatism was Richter's
Failing
A critic
of Richter's, the afterward-influential Weimar radical-democratic
historian Eckart Kehr, maintained that Richter rejected the Naval
Bills and Weltpolitik merely from "capitalist motives,"
simply because they were not profitable.[73]
The truth is that, as always, Richter supported his position with
statistics and "pragmatic" reasons of all kinds. But
even Kehr had to concede that, for Richter, there were also certain
principles involved. As he put it, Richter's standpoint was
that the
State should leave exports to the exporters, to industry, and
to the merchants, and should not identify itself with the interests
of the exporting class. ... If industry ... values the protection
afforded by warships, let them go and shell out a part of the
surplus profit they have captured in this way and build the
cruisers for themselves.[74]
In other
words, in this question Richter defended the same principle as
on the questions of Sozialpolitik and the protective tariff:
the state exists for the common good, and it ought not to be debased
to an instrument of special interests. As naive as this attitude
may be, it demonstrates that Richter manifested traits of what
can be called the civic humanism or classical republicanism of
the Stein-Hardenberg variety.[75]
The genuine
failing in Richter's approach to imperialism is that he never
systematically posed the question, "Profitable for whom?"
It is true that Richter opposed Bismarck's colonial plans in the
conviction that their core was "the burdening of the relatively
unpropertied to the advantage of the relatively propertied."[76]
Yet, in the next decade, when Germany occupied Kiaochow, in China,
and undertook the construction of a railroad in Shantung, Richter
showed himself more amenable than before.[77]
He declared,
we [the
Freisinn] view the acquisition of [Kiaochow] Bay otherwise
and more favorably than all the previous flag-raisings in Africa
and Australia [i.e., New Guinea]. The difference for us is that
... China is an old civilized country ... and that transformations
that have been introduced into China, especially by the last
Sino-Japanese War, could cause it to appear desirable to possess
a base there for safeguarding our interests.[78]
Yet, Richter's
last parliamentary speeches, in 1904, both in the Reichstag and
in the Prussian House of Delegates, dealt with colonial questions
in a sharply negative manner. Again, he put himself forward as,
above all, "the representative of the whole community, the
representative of the taxpayers," and complained of "the
neglect of urgent needs in domestic policy on account of the demands
of a misconceived colonial policy."[79]
In explaining
Richter's inconsistency in this area, the comment of Lothar Albertin
is pertinent: Richter "remained, in regard to imperialism,
without a theory [theorielos]."[80]
He was never able to advance to the interpretation of imperialism
of a Richard Cobden, for example, according to which economic
expansion supported by means of the state always redounds
to the advantage of certain interests and to the disadvantage
of the taxpayers and the majority. Thus, on this issue Richter
belonged, in Wolfgang Mommsen's suggestive typology, to the "pragmatic"
entschieden liberals, rather than to the "principled"
radical liberals.[81]
The Liberal
Surrender
The final
capitulation of German liberalism was inaugurated by Friedrich
Naumann,[82]
today viewed in what pass for liberal circles in the Federal Republic
as a kind of secular saint. Ambitious and endowed with enormous
drive, Naumann was politically insightful, as well. He recognized
how the rules of the political game had changed:
What fundamentally
destroyed liberalism was the entry of the class-movement into
modern politics, the entry of the agrarian and industrial-proletarian
movements. ... The old liberalism was no representative of a
class-movement, but a world-view that balanced all differences
among classes and social orders.[83]
In some respects,
Naumann anticipated the central insight of the Public Choice School
when he described the development of modern democracy:
The economic
classes contemplated to what end they might make use of the
new means of parliamentarianism ... gradually, they learned
that politics is fundamentally a great business, a struggling
and a haggling [Markten] for advantages, over whose lap collects
the most rewards cast by the legislation-machine.[84]
Richter,
too, understood this.[85]
The small difference, however, was that the opportunist Naumann
endorsed the new rules of the game and wished to see a
revived liberal movement adopt them wholeheartedly.[86]
Together with his close friend, Max Weber, Naumann tried to fashion
a liberalism more "adapted" to the circumstances of
the 20th century, and to win liberal leaders like Theodor Barth
to his strategy. In contrast to the hopelessly prosaic Richter,
Naumann knew how to shape a political vision and offer it to a
new generation alienated from classical-liberal ideas.[87]
In Naumann's
conception, liberalism had to make its peace with Social Democracy,
by taking up the cause of Sozialpolitik and other "claims"
of labor. At the same time, it had to snatch the national cause
from the conservatives, by becoming the most zealous advocate
of Weltpolitik and imperialism, and learning to appreciate
the German drive to authority and prestige in the world (Weltgeltung).
It must both "absorb state-socialist elements"[88]
and develop "an understanding for the power-struggle among
the nations."[89]
In short, liberalism must become "national-social."
Naturally, Naumann was wild about the naval build up. Already
in 1900, he was blissfully convinced that war with England was
a "certainty."[90]
For the sake
of liberalism's future in Germany, Eugen Richter had to be "definitely
fought."[91]
Toward Richter, now the grand old man of Left Liberalism, Naumann
had a kind of good-natured contempt. To one of his National Social
audiences, he declared,
Eugen Richter
is unchangeable, and that is his greatness [laughter].
But under this man, with his unique tenacity in work and will
which must be admired even by those who consider him
a peculiar fossil there are a whole series of people
who say, in assemblies and in private: Of course we are for
the fleet, but as long as Richter is alive the man surely
has his greatness [laughter]. [92]
Evolution
or Dissolution of Liberalism?
Even from
the ranks of the younger leaders of Richter's own party there
was growing criticism of his position on the colonies and the
naval build up. In 1902, on the floor of the Reichstag one of
Richter's own protégés, Richard Eickhoff, thanked the war minister
on behalf of his constituents for a new armaments contract, taking
the opportunity to request still more contracts, and joking that
"l'appétit vient en mangeant [appetite comes in the
eating]."[93]
With Richter's death in 1906, the old-liberal negativity and carping
criticism in military matters and the history of German
Manchesterism came to an end. German Left Liberalism had
no further objections to the imperial military budget. Eight years
later would come that summer of 1914 and the confrontation with
the powerful and hostile coalition including England that Richter
had feared and warned against, and which proved a disaster for
Germany.
A few years
after Richter's death, the then well-known nationalist historian,
Erich Marcks, spoke of the "supersession of the older liberalism."
This liberalism had, to be sure, saturated and impregnated the
whole life of the modern nations; its effects continued to be
felt everywhere. It was indestructible. But, added the biographer
and adulator of Bismarck,
Together
with its own most distinctive political principle it has now
been eclipsed. The idea of increased state force, the idea of
power, has displaced it. And it is this idea that everywhere
fills the leading men mightily and decisively dominates them:
we have met with this same drive, quite apart from Russia, where
it never disappeared, in [Theodore] Roosevelt and [Joseph] Chamberlain,
and recognize it in Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II.[94]
German Liberalism
as "English Trader-Spirit"
Ultimately,
the hostility between England and Germany, which Richter had so
bitterly fought, contributed greatly to the outbreak of the Great
War the hostility, it should be noted, not the economic
competition, since England and America were also in that sense
competitors (and, of course, also customers), a circumstance that
did not result in contention. German hatred of England[95]
found its culmination, and its reductio ad absurdum, in
a work by the scholar who was then probably the most famous economic
historian in the world, Werner Sombart, a leader of the interventionist
Verein für Sozialpolitik. To understand what the German
antiliberalism of the early 20th century meant, the best work
to consult is Sombart's book. Titled Traders and Heroes,[96]
it appeared in the war year 1915.
The underlying
thesis is that there exist two "spirits" whose eternal
strife comprises world history, the trader-spirit and the hero-spirit,
and two peoples who today incarnate each of these. Naturally,
the English are the traders, the Germans the heroes. Sombart's
work, to the extent that it is not a hymn of praise to war and
death, is often amusing, e.g., when the author asserts, "The
foundation of everything English is certainly the unfathomable
spiritual limitedness of this people"[97]
; or when he devotes a chapter to English science without mentioning
even Isaac Newton[98]
; or when he maintains that the English since the time of Shakespeare
have produced no cultural value.[99]
Much more
serious than this claptrap and characteristic for the time is
Sombart's seconding of Ferdinand Lassalle in dismissing the liberal
ideal as merely that of "the nightwatchman state."[100]
Many in the next two generations would echo Sombart's judgment
on German liberalism, when he described its golden age and decline,
But then
there came another bleak time for Germany, when in the 1860s
and 1870s the representatives of the so-called Manchester School
quite shamelessly hawked imported English goods on the streets
of Germany as German products. ... And it is well-known how
today this "Manchester theory" has been contemptuously
shoved aside by theoreticians and practictioners in Germany
as totally mistaken and useless.
The two sentences
that conclude this passage end, however, in question marks:
So that
perhaps we may say that in the conception of the state, it is
the German spirit that in Germany itself has achieved sole sway?
Or does the English trader-spirit still haunt some heads?[101]
As regards
Richter, it would be pointless to deny that a certain air of "trader-spirit,"
or, rather, of a middle-class mentality, always surrounded him.
There is certainly some truth in Theodor Heuss's accusation of
a "monumental petty-bourgeois quality" about Richter.[102]
He knew no foreign languages, and the few times he travelled abroad
it was to vacation in Switzerland. Richter seems to have had little
interest in the affairs of other countries, even in the fortunes
of the liberal movement there. Theodor Barth, spokesman for a
Left Liberalism associated with the big banks and exporting merchant
houses, jokingly replied to the question, what distinguished his
own party from Richter's: if a man can tell Mosel from Rhine wine,
he was a member of Barth's party, if not, then of Richter's.[103]
But Richter's
"petty-bourgeois quality" was something that his followers
in the German middle classes, in the liberal professions and small
business, particularly in the great cities and above all in Berlin,
felt, understood, and responded to.[104]
A dwindling remnant as the years went by, they represented a German
version of William Graham Sumner's "forgotten man."[105]
Six years after Sumner's classic description was published in
the United States, the journalist Alexander Meyer wrote in Richter's
Freisinnige Zeitung that the liberals were
the party
of the small man, who depends on himself and his own powers,
who demands no gifts from the state, but only wants not to be
hindered in improving his position to the best of his abilities
and to strive to leave his children a better lot in life than
came to him.[106]
A rare glimpse
of such a German "forgotten man" is given in the moving
portrayal by the eminent conductor Bruno Walter of his father,
a Berlin Jew,
accountant
in a larger silk firm, for which he worked, in gradually rising
positions and with a growing income, for over fifty years. He
was a quiet man, with a strict sense of duty and total dependability,
and outside of his profession he knew only his family ... he
voted liberal and venerated Rudolf von Virchow and Eugen Richter.[107]
Undeniably
"petty-bourgeois" through and through, such men had
little love for Weltpolitik and invigorating wars or for
the overthrow of all existing social conditions in the name of
a Marxist dream; and they stood by Richter to the end.[108]
"What
Richter Can Still Mean for Us"
In 1931,
the 25th anniversary of Richter's death, the social-liberal historian
Erich Eyck posed the question of whether Eugen Richter could "still
mean something for us."[109]
After all
that the Germans have gone through since Richter's time, it is
easier to ascertain where his significance lies. He was, as regards
Germany, the principal advocate of the liberal world revolution
that constitutes the meaning of modern history. Through four decades
he fought, as politician and publicist, for what Werner Sombart
scorned as the "English trader-spirit": for peace; a
decent life for all classes through the market economy and free
trade; pluralism and the peaceable rather than violent clash of
world-views and cultural values; and citizenly self-respect, instead
of servility. As against all conservative reproaches, he was always
a proud patriot. But he could never understand why it was the
Germans of all people who should not enjoy their
individual rights.
Florin Afthalion
has remarked, in the case of Frédéric Bastiat,
How are
we to explain that a man who fought for free trade a century
before the majority of the industrialized nations made it their
official doctrine, who condemned colonialism also a century
before decolonization ... who, above all, proclaimed an era
of economic progress and the enrichment of all classes of society,
should be forgotten, while the majority of his intellectual
adversaries, prophets of stagnation and of pauperization, who
were wrong, still have freedom of the city?[110]
The case
of Eugen Richter is similar and perhaps even more egregious. Certainly,
in his own time Richter "failed." But if this is proposed
as the grounds for neglecting the most important of the political
leaders of authentic liberalism in Germany, then the ready reply
would be: which politician in modern German history before Adenauer
and Erhard did not sooner or later fail?
For what
he was and what he represented if one may say so: from
the mere fact that this great man "never trusted any government"[111]
the gruff old Rhineland liberal deserves to be better treated
by the historians and, by the Germans, not to be completely forgotten.
Notes
[1]
See, for instance, Theo Schiller, Liberalismus
in Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1979), p. 19: "Our
starting-point is the universally accepted [sic] conclusion
that the social interest-situation of the bourgeoisie was the
foundation of classical liberalism."
[2]
Ernst Nolte, "Between Myth and Revisionism, The Third Reich
in the Perspective of the 1980s," in H.W. Koch (ed.), Aspects
of the Third Reich (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 24.
Nolte notes that the view he presents is that of Domenico Settembrini,
of the University of Pisa.
[3]
Ernst Nolte, Marxism,
Fascism, Cold War, Lawrence Krader (tr.) (Atantic Highlands,
N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982), p. 79.
[4]
Ibid., viii. In fact, the similarities and historical connections
between the conservative and socialist indictments of liberal
capitalism are remarkable; see, for instance, ibid., p. 2330.
[5]
Alejandro A. Chaufen, Christians
for Freedom: Late Scholastic Economics (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1986).
[6]
See Ralph Raico, "Der deutsche Liberalismus und die deutsche
Freihandelsbewegung: Eine Riickschau," Zeitschrift fur
Wirtschaftspolitik 36, no. 3 (1987), pp. 26381.
[7]
Paul M. Kennedy, The
Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 152.
[8]
Ralph Raico, "Eugen Richter: Ein unerbittlicher Liberaler,"
Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik
37 (September 1988), pp. 7780.
[9]
The literature on Richter is very meager. See, above all, Felix
Rachfahl, Eugen Richter und der Linksliberalismus im Neuen Reich,"
Zeitschrift fiir Politik 5, nos. 23 (1912), pp. 261374.
Also, Eugen Richter, Jugenderinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag
"Fortschritt," 1893); idem., Im alten Reichstag:
Erinnerungen, 2 vols. (Berlin: Verlag Fortschritt,"
(18941896); Oskar Klein-Hattingen, Geschichte des deutschen
Liberalismus, vol. 2: Von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart
(Berlin-Schoneberg: Fortschritt-Buchverlag der "Hilfe,"
1912); Leopold Ullstein, Eugen Richter als Publizist und
Herausgeber: Ein Beitrag zum Thema "Parteipresse"
(Leipzig: Reinicke, 1930); and Jesse Rohfleisch, Eugen Richter:
Opponent of Bismarck, unpubl. diss., history, University
of California, Berkeley, 1946. The most recent work on Richter,
Ina Suzanne Lorenz, Eugen Richter: Der entschiedene Liberalismus
in wilhelminischer Zeit 1871 bis 1906 (Husum: Matthiesen,
1980), is noteworthy above all on account of the author's inexhaustible
aversion to her subject and her total lack of understanding
for classical liberalism in Germany and altogether.
[10]
"Left Liberalism" is a direct translation of Linksliberalismus
and refers to the middle- to late-19th century German political
movement in opposition to the regime-oriented National Liberals.
It has no connection with what is often called "left-liberalism"
in the present day.
[11]
Kurt Koszyk and Karl H. Pruys, Wörterbuch zur Publizistik
(Munich-Pullach/Berlin: Verlag Dokumentation, 1970), pp. 22325.
[12]
See also Ralph Raico, "Der deutsche Liberalismus,"
p. 275.
[13]
According to the report of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince
Rudolf; Bngette Hamann, Rudolf: Kronprinz und Rebell
(Munich/Zurich: Piper, 1978), p. 333.
[14]
Otto von Bismarck, Werke in Auswahl, vol. 8, pt. A, Erinnerung
und Gedanke, Rudolf Buchner (ed.), with Georg Engel (Stuttgart:
W. Kohlhammer, 1975), p. 732.
[15]
Hans Delbrück, Vor und nach dem Weltkrieg. Politische und
historische Aufsätze 19021925 (Berlin: Stollberg,
1926), pp. 136-48; Annelise Thirnme, Hans Delbriick als Kritiker
der wilhelminischen Epoche (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1955),
pp. 3132
[16]
Franz Mehring, Gesammelte Schriften, Thomas Höhle, Hans
Koch, and Josef Schleifstein, (eds.), vol. 14, Politische
Publizistik, 1891 bis 1914 ([East] Berlin: Dietz, 1964),
p. 35. Why precisely of "Big Capital" is baffling,
except that it fits Mehring's radical Marxist viewpoint. Richter
fiercely opposed, for instance, the big banks and exporters
who promoted German colonialism.
[17]
See, among innumerable others, Thomas Nipperdey, "Über
einige Grundzüge der deutschen Parteigeschichte," in Moderne
deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (18151918), Emst-Wolfgang
Böckenforde (ed.), with Rainer Wahl (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and
Witsch, 1972), p. 238, where the author writes of Richter's
accentuation of the theoretical orientation of liberalism "to
the very extreme of rigid dogmatism." Typical of many non-German
historians is Kenneth D. Barkin, The Controversy over German
Industrialization, 18901902 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), p. 239, who complains that Richter "had
not shed the dogmatic liberal principle of non-intervention."
[18]
Winfried Baumgart, Deutschland im Zeitalter des Imperialismus,
1890-1914. Grundkräfte, Thesen, und Strukturen, 5th ed.
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1986), p. 135. Curiously, Baumgart
passes this verdict in connection with Left Liberalism's turn
toward support for the aggressive armaments policy of Wilhelm
II, made possible by Richter's death.
[19]
Rachfahl, "Eugen Richter," p. 371. Theodor Barth,
one of Richter's many liberal opponents, declared, "Bismarck
was no match for Richter dialectically, and the frequent eruptions
of the Bismarckian temper against the implacable man of the
opposition often sprang from the feeling that the omnipotent
Chancellor would come up short in dialectical argumentation
with Richter." In Politische Porträts, new ed. (Berlin:
Schneider, 1923), p. 84.
[20]
Theodor Heuss, Friedrich Naumann: Der Mann, das Werk, die
Zeit, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart/Tiibingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1949,
p. 180.
[21]
Rachfahl, "Eugen Richter," p. 372.
[22]
Ibid., pp. 26263.
[23]
Ibid., p. 266.
[24]
Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 2, p. 114.
[25]
August Bebel, leader of the German socialists, described an
early encounter with Richter, "whose chilly, reserved nature
struck me even then. Richter gave the impression that he viewed
all of us with sovereign disdain." August Bebel, Aus
Meinem Leben (1910; reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Europaische
Verlaganstalt, n.d.), p. 92. One wonders why, given Richter's
character and well-known principles, the socialist leader was
in the least surprised.
[26]
See, e.g., Konstanze Wegner, Theodor Barth und die Freisinnige
Vereinigung. Studien zur Geschichte des Linksliberalismus im
wilhelminischen Deutschland (18931910) (Tübingen:
J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1968), p. 138.
[27]
Ernst Engelberg, "Das Verhältnis zwischen kleinbiirglicher
Dernokratie und Sozialdemokratie in den 80er Jahren des 19.
Jahrhunderts," in Otto Pflange (ed.), with Elisabeth Müller-Luckner,
Innenpolitische Probleme des Bismarck-Reiches (Munich/Vienna:
Oldenberg, 1983, p. 26. The East German historian adds: "This
conception was accepted not only by the most influential leaders
around August Bebel, but also by the mass of members and sympathizers."
[28]
Franz Mehring, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 14, p. 553.
[29]
Quoted in Peter Gilg, Die Erneuerung des demokratischen Denkens
im wilhelminischen Deutschland. Eine ideengeschichtliche Studie
zur Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Franz
Steiner, 1965), pp. 13536. Gilg adds, reasonably enough:
"To this opposition [of Richter's] the theory of revolution
of the Social Democratic program, which permitted collaboration
solely as a means to winning autocratic rule, naturally contributed,
as well as the successful competition of Social Democracy in
the struggle for the urban voting masses." Ibid, p. 135.
[30]
Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 2, 63, p. 178. "This
occurred," according to Richter, "with the permission
of the Minister of the Interior." In Britain, the Chartists
had earlier used similar strong-arm methods against meetings
of the anti-Corn Law movement; see Wendy Hinde, Richard
Cobden. A Victorian Outsider (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1987), p. 65.
[31]
Richter, Politisches ABC-Buch: Ein Lexikon parlamentarischer
Zeit- und Streitfragen, 9th ed. (Berlin: Fortschritt Verlag,
1898), p. 307.
[32]
Richter, Sozialdemokratische Zukunftsbilder Frei nach Bebel
([1891] Berlin: Verlagsanstalt Deutsche Presse, 1907). In 1922,
in his Socialism, Ludwig von Mises undertook the same
task, but on a strictly scientific level.
[33]
Richter, Zukunftsbilder, p. 32.
[34]
Ibid., pp. 4243.
[35]
Ibid., p. 48.
[36]
Ibid., pp. 50, 52.
[37]
Quoted in Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden: Patriotische
Besinnungen (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1915),
p. 77.
[38]
Richter, Politisches ABC-Buch, p. 306. Bismarck's hostility
to Richter and the Left Liberals on account of their economic
liberalism was intense, e.g., his demogogic reference to "the
Progressive Party and clique of Manchester politicians, the
representative of the pitiless money-bags, have always been
unfair to the poor, they have always worked to the limit of
their abilities, to prevent the state from helping them. Laissez-faire,
the greatest possible self-government, no restraints, opportunity
for the small business to be absorbed by Big Capital, for exploitation
of the ignorant and inexperienced by the clever and crafty.
The State is supposed to act only as police, especially for
the exploiters." Willy Andreas and K. F. Reinking, Bismarcks
Gespräche: Von der Reichsgründung bis zur Entlassung (Bremen:
Carl Schiinemann, 1965), p. 339.
[39]
Richter, Politisches ABC-Buch, p. 322.
[40]
Fritz Blaich, Kartell- und Monopolpolitik im kaiserlichen
Deutschland. Das Problem der Marktmacht im deutschen Reichstag
zwischen 1870 und 1914 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1973), 230,
p. 259.
[41]
Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 1, p. 112.
[42]
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 86. Emphasis in original.
[43]
See, among many others, Dieter Langewiesche, Liberalismus
in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981, pp. 19596,
where Left Liberal opposition on this question is ascribed in
part to "Manchesterite blindness." Oskar Stillich,
Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland. vol. 2, Der
Liberalismus (Leipzig: Klinkhardt, 1911), p. 125, referred
to "ice-cold laissez-faire in the area of the workers'
question," and even maintained that "Liberalism was
indifferent and without feeling towards the interest of the
broad masses." Erich Eyck, Bismarck, vol. 3 (Erlenbach-Zurich:
Rentsch, 1941), p. 372, demonstrated a rare if limited understanding
for the Left Liberal position: "In spite of all that, that
opposition was not without an internal justification. For it
rests on the idea that the feeling of personal responsibility,
of the individual citizen for his own destiny is indispensable
for the sound development of a people, and that the omnipotence
of the state is, in the long run, incompatible with the freedom
of the individual." Eyck, too, favored the Bismarckian
policy, however, as do all present-day German historians I have
consulted. But it should be obvious that even the question of
the economic effects of the program is not as simple as is usually
supposed, and cannot be resolved by pure assumption: Bismarck's
Sozialpolitik was based, in the last analysis, on deductions
(either direct or indirect) from the wages of labor. Cf. W.H.
Hutt, The
Strike-Threat System: The Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining
(New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1973), p. 20615.
[44]
Richter, Politisches ABC-Buch, p. 173. Emphasis in original.
[45]
Cf. Jurgen von Kruedener, "Die Überforderung der Weimarer
Republik als Sozialstaat," Geschichte und Gesellschaft
11, no. 3 (1985) Kontroversen uber die Wirtschaflspolitik in
der Weimarer Republik, Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), pp. 35876.
[46]
Richter, Im alten Reichslag, vol. 1, pp. 5455.
[47]
Ibid., p. 78.
[48]
Rohfleisch, Eugen Richter: Opponent of Bismarck, pp.
3740, and Rachfahl, "Eugen Richter," p. 278.
[49]
Urs Müller-Plantenberg, "Der Freisinn nach Bismarcks Sturz:
Ein Versuch über die Schwierigkeiten des liberalen Biirgertums,
im wilhelminischen Deutschland um zu Macht und politischem Einfluss
zu gelangen" (unpublished dissertation; Free University
of Berlin, 1971), p. 201.
[50]
Ibid.
[51]
See Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 2, 17683, pp. 20003,
and the articles, "Anti-Semiten" and "Juden,"
in ABC-Buch, pp. 1723 and 17479; also Alfred
D.Low, Jews
in the Eyes of the Germans: From the Enlightenment to Imperial
Germany
(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues,
1979), pp. 39294.
[52]
Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the
Building of the German Empire (New York: Viking/Penguin,
1987), p. 524.
[53]
To protect their meetings against anti-Semitic assaults, the
liberals had recourse to a sort of private police agency; Richter,
Im alten Reichstag, vol. 2, p. 203.
[54]
Low, Jews in the Eyes of the Germans, pp. 38990.
[55]
Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 2, pp. 12829.
[56]
Ibid., pp. 8184; Wolfgang Pack, Das Parlamentarische
Ringen um das Sozialistengesetz Bismarcks 1878-1890 (Diisseldorf:
Droste, 1961), pp. 8182.
[57]
Ibid., pp. 15360.
[58]
Richter's lifelong fight for the Rechtsstaat and the predominance
of parliament is so well known in the literature that Leonard
Krieger's assertion, "Radical liberalism in him tended
to be wholly absorbed in the dogma of economic freedom,"
The German Idea of Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957),
p. 397, can only be explained by simple-minded political bias.
[59]
Rachfahl, "Eugen Richter," pp. 27475.
[60]
See, e.g., Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 1, pp. 103,
127; vol. 2, pp. 58, 6869.
[61]
Müller-Plantenberg, Der Freisinn nach Blsmarcks Sturz.
[62]
Rohfleisch, Eugen Richter: Opponent of Bismarck, p. 103.
[63]
Richter, Im allen Reichstag, vol. 1, p. 68.
[64]
Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, Johannes Wickelmann
(ed.) (Tübingen J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]), 1958, p. 333. Weber's
allusion to Richter's unpopularity refers to others in the liberal
leadership, not to the ordinary liberal voters.
[65]
Frédéric Bastiat, "Paix et liberte, ou le budget républicain,"
Oeuvres complètes, vol. 5 (Paris: Guillaumin, 1854),
pp. 41011. Even Lorenz, in her disparaging work on Richter,
Eugen Richter, p. 235, is forced to admit that, with
all of Richter's haggling over military expenditures, at many
points one can sense "the spirit of unconditional opposition,
that, beyond the saving of money, wanted to spare the people
militarism," as well.
[66]
Cf. E.K. Bramsted and K.J. Melhuish, Western Liberalism.
A History in Documents from Locke to Croce (London/New
York: Longman, 1978), pp. 27884. Richter always kept his
distance from the organized German peace movement, however,
although his cousin, Adolf Richter, and a close political collaborator,
Max Hirsch, were among its leaders. Roger Chickering, Imperial
Germany and a World Without War. The Peace Movement and German
Society, 18921914 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1975), pp. 252, 254.
[67]
Julius Paul Kohler, Staat und Gesellschaft in der deutschen
Theorie der auswärtigen Wirtschaftspolitik und des internationalen
Handels von Schlettwein bis auf Fr. List und Prince-Smith
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1926), pp. 2242.
[68]
Richter, Im alten Reichstag, vol. 1, p. 93.
[69]
Richter, ABC-Buch, "Die deutsche Flotte," pp.
41690.
[70]
Quoted by Müller-Plantenberg, Der Freisinn nach Bismarcks
Sturz, p. 284. In the author's opinion, "no bourgeois
politician fought against the military, naval, and colonial
policy of Wilhelmine Germany as sharply, energetically, and
consistently as Eugen Richter."
[71]
Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 18601914,
pp. 15051.
[72]
Quoted in Hans Spellmayer, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik im Reichstag
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1931), pp. 1516.
[73]
Eckart Kehr, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 1894-1901
(Berlin: Ebering, 1930), p. 293.
[74]
Ibid., pp. 29798.
[75]
A civic humanist, rather than liberal slant is evident also
in Richter's advocacy of a "citizen-army," recruited
by conscription. This was aimed at placing the army under the
control of the people at large, rather than the rulers, the
central issue in the constitutional struggles of the 1860s.
[76]
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Cologne/Berlin:
Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1969), p. 444.
[77]
Spellmayer, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik im Reichstag, pp.
81, 89.
[78]
Quoted in Ludwig Elm, "Freisinnige Volkspartei," in
Die biirgerlichen Partien in Deutschland, Dieter Fricke,
et al. (eds.), ([East] Berlin: Das europaische Buch, 1970),
vol 2, p. 84.
[79]
Rachfahl, "Eugen Richter," pp. 36970.
[80]
Lothar Albertin, "Das Friedensthema bei den Linksliberalen
vor 1914: Die Schwäche Ihrer Argumente und Aktivitaten,"
in Karl Holl und Günther List (eds.), Liberalismus und Imperialistischer
Staat. Der Imperialismus als Problem liberaler Parteien in Deutschland,
1890-1914 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1975), pp.
9293.
[81]
Wolfgang Mommsen, "Wandlungen der liberalen Idee im Zeitalter
des Imperialismus," in ibid., p. 122.
[82]
See Peter Theiner, Sozialer Liberalismus und deutsche Weltpolitik:
Friedrich Naumann im Wilhelminischen Deutschland (18601919),
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983), and William O. Shanahan, "Liberalism
and Foreign Affairs: Naumann and the Prewar German View,"
The Review of Politics, vol. 21, no. 1 (January 1959),
pp. 188223.
[83]
Friedrich Naumann, "Der Niedergang des Liberalismus,"
Werke, vol. 4 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964),
p. 218.
[84]
Ibid., p. 220.
[85]
See, for instance, his remarks regarding Bismarck's legislation
("the foyer of the Reichstag resembled a market-place."),
cited in Raico, "Der deutsche Liberalismus," p. 279.
[86]
Friedrich Naumann, "Klassenpolitik des Liberalismus,"
Werke, vol. 4, pp. 25758.
[87]
Of Richter, Urs Müller-Plantenberg, Der Freisinn nach Bismarcks
Sturz, p. 89, very correctly writes: "In his ABC-Books
for liberal voters, Richter processed a plethora of statistics,
dates, facts, and legislative paragraphs into rational arguments,
which, absent a whole that behind it all might have come to
light, could never have their full effect."
[88]
Friedrich Naumann, "Liberalismus als Prinzip," Werke,
vol. 4, p. 252.
[89]
Friedrich Naumann, "Niedergang des Liberalismus,"
ibid., p. 224.
[90]
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism,
18601914, p. 340. Typical of the historical treatment
of the Richter-Naumann dichotomy, Winfried Baumgart, Deutschland
im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, 18901914, p. 160,
writes of "the mitigation of the earlier [liberal] dogmatism"
in foreign as in domestic policy, that is "to be ascribed
to the work of Friedrich Naumann." When all is said and
done, however, one may well be of the opinion that even more
important than whether a given foreign policy position was or
was not "dogmatic" is whether it promoted peace or
war. One may also question whether the concept of "dogmatism"
itself has much heuristic, in contrast to polemical, value.
[91]
Friedrich Naumann, "Niedergang des Liberalismus,"
Werke, vol. 4, p. 234.
[92]
Ibid., p. 232. Theodor Heuss faithfully follows his mentor Naumann,
when he writes of Richter: he saw "the objective of the
power-state only in the distortion of militarism," Friedrich
Naumann: Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit, p. 242.
[93]
Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World Without War.
The Peace Movement and German Society, 18921914, p.
255.
[94]
Erich Marcks, Männer und Zeiten: Aufsätze und Reden zur neueren
Geschichte 4th rev. ed. (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1916),
p. 260.
[95]
Concerning the equally fateful English hatred of Germany, see
my contribution, "The Politics of Hunger: A Review,"
The Review of Austrian Economics (1988), pp. 25359,
reprinted in my collection, Great Wars and Great Leaders:
A Libertarian Rebuttal.
[96]
Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden: Patriotische Besinnnngen
(Munich/Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1915).
[97]
Ibid., p. 9.
[98]
Ibid., pp. 1734.
[99]
Ibid., p. 48.
[100]
Ibid., p. 25.
[101]
Ibid., p. 75.
[102]
Heuss, Friedrich Naumann: Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit,
p. 180.
[103]
Konstanze Wegner, Theodor Barth und die Freisinnige Vereinigung.
Studien zur Geschichte des Linksliberalismus im wilhelminischen
Deutschland (18931910), p. 100.
[104]
Ibid., pp. 99101.
[105]
William Graham Sumner, "On the case of a Certain Man Who
is Never Thought Of" and "The Case of the Forgotten
Man Further Considered" (1884), in idem., War and Other
Essays, Albert Galloway Keller (ed.), (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1911), pp. 24768.
[106]
Quoted in Müller-Plantenberg, Der Freisinn nach Bismarcks
Sturz, p. 146.
[107]
Bruno Walter, Thema und Variationen; Erinnerungen und Gedanken
(Stockholm Bermann-Fischer, 1947), pp. 16 and 21.
[108]
Cf. Fanz Mehring's view, admittedly sardonic, "that [Richter]
did not create the Freisinnige Partei in his own image, but
that they chose him as their leader, because they saw in him
their most fitting image." Gesammelte Schriflen, Thomas
Höhle, Hans Kock, and Josef Schleifstein (eds.), vol. 15, Politische
Publizistik 1905 bis 1918 ([East] Berlin: Dietz, 1966),
p. 165.
[109]
Erich Eyck, "Eugen Richter," in Auf Deutschlands
Politischem Forum (Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1963), p.
47.
[110]
Florin Afthalion, "Introduction," in Frédéric Bastiat,
Oeuvres économiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1983), p. 8.
[111]
Müller-Plantenberg, Der Freisinn nach Bismarcks Sturz,
p. 200.