First
published by the Future of Freedom Foundation
(1995). An MP3 audio file of this article, narrated by Steven
Ng, is available
for download.
The year
1898 was a landmark in American history. It was the year America
went to war with Spain our first engagement with a foreign
enemy in the dawning age of modern warfare. Aside from a few scant
periods of retrenchment, we have been embroiled in foreign politics
ever since.
Starting
in the 1880s, a group of Cubans agitated for independence from
Spain. Like many revolutionaries before and after, they had little
real support among the mass of the population. Thus they resorted
to terrorist tactics devastating the countryside, dynamiting
railroads, and killing those who stood in their way. The Spanish
authorities responded with harsh countermeasures.
Some American
investors in Cuba grew restive, but the real forces pushing America
toward intervention were not a handful of sugarcane planters.
The slogans the rebels used "freedom" and "independence"
resonated with many Americans, who knew nothing of the
real circumstances in Cuba. Also playing a part was the "black
legend" the stereotype of the Spaniards as bloodthirsty
despots that Americans had inherited from their English forebears.
It was easy for Americans to believe the stories peddled by the
insurgents, especially when the "yellow" press discovered
that whipping up hysteria over largely concocted Spanish "atrocities"
while keeping quiet about those committed by the rebels
sold papers.
Politicians
on the lookout for publicity and popular favor saw a gold mine
in the Cuban issue. Soon the American government was directing
notes to Spain expressing its "concern" over "events"
in Cuba. In fact, the "events" were merely the tactics
colonial powers typically used in fighting a guerrilla war. As
bad or worse was being done by Britain, France, Germany, and others
all over the globe in that age of imperialism. Spain, aware of
the immense superiority of American forces, responded to the interference
from Washington by attempts at appeasement, while trying to preserve
the shreds of its dignity as an ancient imperial power.
When William
McKinley became president in 1897, he was already planning to
expand America's role in the world. Spain's Cuban troubles provided
the perfect opportunity. Publicly, McKinley declared, "We
want no wars of conquest; we must avoid the temptation of territorial
aggression." But within the US government, the influential
cabal that was seeking war and expansion knew they had found their
man. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge wrote to Theodore Roosevelt, now
at the Navy Department, "Unless I am profoundly mistaken,
the Administration is now committed to the large policy we both
desire." This "large policy," also supported by
Secretary of State John Hay and other key figures, aimed at breaking
decisively with our tradition of nonintervention and neutrality
in foreign affairs. The United States would at last assume its
"global responsibilities," and join the other great
powers in the scramble for territory around the world.
The leaders
of the war party camouflaged their plans by speaking of the need
to procure markets for American industry, and were even able to
convince a few business leaders to parrot their line. But in reality
none of this clique of haughty patricians "old money,"
for the most part had any strong interest in business,
or even much respect for it, except as the source of national
strength. Like similar cliques in Britain, Germany, Russia, and
elsewhere at the time, their aim was the enhancement of the power
and glory of their state.
In order
to escalate the pressure on Spain, the battleship USS Maine was
dispatched to Havana's harbor. On the night of February 15, the
Maine exploded, killing 252 men. Suspicion immediately focused
on the Spaniards although they had the least to gain from
the destruction of the Maine. It was much more likely that the
boilers had blown up or even that the rebels themselves
had mined the ship, to draw America into a war the rebels could
not win on their own. The press screamed for vengeance against
perfidious Spain, and interventionist politicians believed their
hour had come.
McKinley,
anxious to preserve his image as a cautious statesman, bided his
time. He pressed Spain to stop fighting the rebels and start negotiating
with them for Cuban independence, hinting broadly that the alternative
was war. The Spaniards, averse to simply handing the island over
to a terrorist junta, were willing to grant autonomy. Finally,
desperate to avoid war with America, Madrid did proclaim an armistice
a stunning concession for one sovereign state to make at
the bidding of another.
But this
was not enough for McKinley, who had his eyes set on bagging a
few of Spain's remaining possessions. On April 11, he delivered
his war message to Congress, carefully omitting to mention the
concession of an armistice. A week later, Congress passed the
war resolution McKinley wanted.
In the Far
East, Commodore George Dewey was given the go-ahead to carry out
a prearranged plan: proceed to the Philippines and secure control
of Manila's harbor. This he did, bringing along Emilio Aguinaldo
and his Filipino independence fighters. In the Caribbean, American
forces quickly subdued the Spaniards in Cuba, and then, after
Spain sued for peace, went on to take over Puerto Rico as well.
In three months, the fighting was over. It had been, as Secretary
of State John Hay famously put it, "a splendid little war."
The quick
US trouncing of decrepit Spain filled the American public with
euphoria. It was a victory, people believed, for American ideals
and the American way of life against an Old World tyranny. Our
triumphant arms would guarantee Cuba a free and democratic future.
Against this
tidal wave of public elation, one man spoke out. He was William
Graham Sumner Yale professor, famed social scientist, and
tireless fighter for private enterprise, free trade, and the gold
standard. Now he was about to enter his hardest fight of all.
On January
16, 1899, Sumner addressed an overflow crowd of the Yale chapter
of Phi Beta Kappa. He knew that the assembled Yalies and the rest
of the audience were brimming with patriotic pride. With studied
irony, Sumner titled his talk "The Conquest of the United
States by Spain."
Sumner threw
down the gauntlet:
We have
beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are submitting to
be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies. Expansionism
and imperialism are nothing but the old philosophies of national
prosperity which have brought Spain to where she is now.
Sumner proceeded
to outline the original vision of America cherished by the Founding
Fathers, radically different from what prevailed among the nations
of Europe:
They would
have no court and no pomp; nor orders, or ribbons, or decorations,
or titles. They would have no public debt. There was to be no
grand diplomacy, because they intended to mind their own business,
and not be involved in any of the intrigues to which European
statesmen were accustomed. There was to be no balance of power
and no "reason of state" to cost the life and happiness
of citizens.
This had
been the American idea, our signature as a nation: "It is
by virtue of this conception of a commonwealth that the United
States has stood for something unique and grand in the history
of mankind, and that its people have been happy."
The system
the Founders bequeathed to us, Sumner held, was a delicate one,
providing for the division and balance of powers and aimed at
keeping government small and local. It was no accident that Washington,
Jefferson, and the others who created the republic issued clear
warnings against "foreign entanglements." A policy of
foreign adventurism would, in the nature of things, bend and twist
and ultimately shatter our original system.
As foreign
affairs became more important, power would shift from communities
and states to the federal government, and, within that, from Congress
to the president. An ever-busy foreign policy could only be carried
out by the president, often without the knowledge of the people.
Thus, the American system, based on local government, states'
rights, and Congress as the voice of the people on the national
level, would more and more give way to a bloated bureaucracy headed
by an imperial presidency.
But now,
with the war against Spain and the philosophy behind it, we were
letting ourselves in for the old European way, Sumner declared
"war, debt, taxation, diplomacy, a grand governmental
system, pomp, glory, a big army and navy, lavish expenditures,
political jobbery in a word, imperialism."
Already,
it seems, the global meddlers had come up with what was to be
their favorite smear word: "isolationist." And already
Sumner had the appropriate retort. The imperialists "warn
us against the terrors of 'isolation,'" he said, but "our
ancestors all came here to isolate themselves" from the burdens
of the Old World. "When the others are all struggling under
debt and taxes, who would not be isolated in the enjoyment of
his own earnings for the benefit of his own family?"
In abandoning
our own system, there would be, Sumner freely admitted, compensations.
Immortal glory is not nothing, as the Spaniards well knew. To
be a part, even a pawn, in a mighty enterprise of armies and navies,
to identify with great imperial power projected around the world,
to see the flag raised on victorious battlefields many
peoples in history thought that game well worth the candle.
Only
only, it was not the American way. That way had been more
modest, more prosaic, parochial, and, yes, middle class.
It was based on the idea that we were here to live out our lives,
minding our own business, enjoying our liberty, and pursuing our
happiness in our work, families, churches, and communities. It
had been the "small policy."
There is
a logic in human affairs, Sumner the social scientist cautioned
once you make a certain decision, some paths that were
open to you before are closed, and you are led, step-by-step,
in a certain direction. America was choosing the path of world
power, and Sumner had little hope that his words could change
that. Why was he speaking out then? Simply because "this
scheme of a republic which our fathers formed was a glorious dream
which demands more than a word of respect and affection before
it passes away."