Before
the US House of Representatives, February 4, 2004
There is
plenty of blame to go around for the mistakes made by going to
war in Iraq, especially now that it is common knowledge Saddam
Hussein told the truth about having no weapons of mass destruction,
and that Al Qaida and 9/11 were in no way related to the Iraqi
government.
Our intelligence
agencies failed for whatever reason this time, but their frequent
failures should raise the question of whether or not secretly
spending forty billion taxpayer dollars annually gathering bad
information is a good investment. The administration certainly
failed us by making the decision to sacrifice so much in life
and limb, by plunging us into this Persian Gulf quagmire that
surely will last for years to come.
But before
Congress gets too carried away with condemning the administration
or the intelligence gathering agencies, it ought to look to itself.
A proper investigation and debate by this Congress as were
now scrambling to accomplish clearly was warranted prior to
any decision to go to war. An open and detailed debate on a proper
declaration of war certainly would have revealed that U.S. national
security was not threatened and the whole war could have been
avoided. Because Congress did not do that, it deserves the greatest
criticism for its dereliction of duty.
There was
a precise reason why the most serious decision made by a country
the decision to go to war was assigned in our Constitution to
the body closest to the people. If we followed this charge Im
certain fewer wars would be fought, wide support would be achieved
for just defensive wars, there would be less political finger-pointing
if events went badly, and blame could not be placed on one individual
or agency. This process would more likely achieve victory, which
has eluded us in recent decades.
The president
reluctantly has agreed to support an independent commission to
review our intelligence gathering failures, and that is good.
Cynics said nothing much would be achieved by studying pre-9/11
intelligence failures, but it looks like some objective criticisms
will emerge from that inquiry. We can hope for the best from this
newly appointed commission.
But already
we hear the inquiry will be deliberately delayed, limited to investigating
only the failures of the intelligence agencies themselves, and
may divert its focus to studying intelligence gathering related
to North Korea and elsewhere. If the commission avoids the central
controversy whether or not there was selective use of information
or undue pressure put on the CIA to support a foregone conclusion
to go to war by the administration the commission will appear
a sham.
Regardless
of the results, the process of the inquiry is missing the most
important point the failure of Congress to meet its responsibility
on the decision to go, or not go, to war. The current mess was
predictable from the beginning. Unfortunately, Congress voluntarily
gave up its prerogative over war and illegally transferred this
power to the president in October of 2002. The debate we are having
now should have occurred here in the halls of Congress then. We
should have debated a declaration of war resolution. Instead,
Congress chose to transfer this decision-making power to the president
to avoid the responsibility of making the hard choice of sending
our young people into harms way, against a weak, third world country.
This the president did on his own, with congressional acquiescence.
The blame game has emerged only now that we are in the political
season. Sadly, the call for and the appointment of the commission
is all part of this political process.
It
is truly disturbing to see many who abdicated their congressional
responsibility to declare or reject war, who timidly voted to
give the president the power he wanted, now posturing as his harshest
critics.