Mr. Chairman,
thank you for holding this hearing and for providing me the opportunity
to present comments on the important issue of how to maintain
continuity of government if a majority of members of the House
of Representatives are incapacitated. This issue has recently
attracted attention because of the proposal of the "Continuity
of Government (COG) Commission," that the Constitution be amended
to allow appointed persons to fill vacancies in the House in the
event of an emergency.
Since the
COG Commission proposal was introduced I, along with other members
of Congress, journalists, academics, and policy experts have expressed
concerns that having appointed members serve in Congress function
is inconsistent with the House's historic function as the branch
of Congress most directly accountable to the people. A superior
way to address concerns regarding continuity of House operations
in the event of an emergency is contained in HR 2844, the Continuity
of Representation Act, introduced by my distinguished colleague,
House Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner.
Even with
the direct election of Senators, the fact that members of the
House are elected every two years while Senators run for statewide
office every six years, means that members of the House of Representatives
are still more accountable to the people than any other part of
the federal government. Appointed members of Congress simply cannot
be truly representative. Turning once again to Federalist 52,
we find this point eloquently made by Mssrs. Madison and Hamilton:
"As it is essential to liberty that the government in general
should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that the branch of it under consideration should have
an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the
people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy
by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured."
Mr. Chairman,
there are those who say that the power of appointment is necessary
in order to preserve checks and balances and thus prevent an abuse
of executive power. Of course, I agree that it is very important
to carefully guard our constitutional liberties in times of crisis,
and that an over-centralization of power in the executive branch
is one of the most serious dangers to that liberty. However, Mr.
Chairman, during a time of crisis it is all the more important
to have representatives accountable to the people making the laws.
Otherwise, the citizenry has no check on the inevitable tendency
of government to infringe on the people's liberties at such a
time. I would remind my colleagues that the only reason we are
re-examining provisions of the PATRIOT Act is because of public
concerns that this Act gives up excessive liberty for a phantom
security. Appointed officials would not be as responsive to public
concerns.
Supporters
of this plan claim that the appointment power will be necessary
in the event of an emergency and that the appointed representatives
will only be temporary. However, the laws passed by these "temporary"
representatives will be permanent.
Mr. Chairman,
this country has faced the possibility of threats to the continuity
of this body several times throughout our history, yet no one
suggested removing the people's right to vote for members of Congress.
For example, the British in the War of 1812 attacked the city
of Washington, yet nobody suggested the states could not address
the lack of a quorum in the House of Representatives though elections.
During the Civil War, the neighboring state of Virginia (where
today many Capitol Hill staffers and members reside) was actively
involved in hostilities against the United States government.
Yet Abraham Lincoln never suggested that non-elected persons serve
in the House.
The Constitution
already provides the framework for Congress to function after
a catastrophic event. Article I section 2 grants the governors
of the various states authority to hold special elections to fill
vacancies in the House of Representatives. Article I section 4
gives Congress the authority to designate the time, manner, and
place of such special elections if states should fail to act expeditiously
following a national emergency. As Hamilton explains in Federalist
59, the "time, place, and manner" clause was specifically designed
to address the kind of extraordinary circumstances imagined by
COGC. Hamilton characterized authority over federal elections
as shared between the states and Congress, with neither being
able to control the process entirely.
Chairman
Sensenbrenner's bill exercises Congress' power to regulate the
time, place, and manner of elections by requiring the holding
of special elections within 21 days after the Speaker or acting
Speaker declares a majority of House members are incapacitated.
This proposal protects the people's right to choose their representatives
at the time when such a right may be most important, while ensuring
continuity of the legislative branch.
I have no
doubt that the people of the states are quite competent to hold
elections in a timely fashion. After all, it is in each state's
interest to ensure it has adequate elected representation in Washington
as soon as possible. The re-call election in California shows
it is possible to have a gubernatorial election, in the most populous
state in the union no less, in less than three months time. Surely
it is possible to hold an election in a congressional district
in under that amount of time.
In
conclusion, I once again thank the Chairman of this Committee
for allowing me to express my views before the House. I also once
again urge my colleagues to reject any proposal that takes away
the people's right to elect their representatives and instead
support HR 2844, the Continuity of Congress Act, which ensures
an elected Congress can continue to operate in the event of an
emergency. This is what the drafters of the Constitution intended.