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The Myth of Democratic Peace: Why Democracy Cannot Deliver Peace
in the 21st Century
by
James Ostrowski
by James Ostrowski
Note:
This working paper was written in the Spring of 2002, well before
the American/British democratic invasion of Iraq with its sequalae
of democratically-induced violence, terrorism and ethnic and religious
conflict.
"There
is no way to peace; peace is the way."
~ A.
J. Muste
"Seek,
and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."
~ Mat
7:7.13
INTRODUCTION
We
are led to believe that democracy and peace are inextricably linked;
that democracy leads to and causes peace; and that peace cannot
be achieved in the absence of democracy. Woodrow Wilson was one
of the earliest and strongest proponents of this view. He said in
his "war message" on April 2, 1917:
A
steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by
a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government
could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.
It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue
would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who
could plan what they would and render account to no one would
be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can
hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and
prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their
own.
Spencer
R. Weart alleges that democracies rarely if ever go to war with
each other. Even if this is true, it distorts reality and makes
people far too sanguine about democracy’s ability to deliver the
world’s greatest need today – peace. In reality, the main threat
to world peace today is not war between two nation-states, but (1)
nuclear arms proliferation; (2) terrorism; and (3) ethnic and religious
conflict within states. As this paper was being written,
India, the world’s largest democracy, appeared to be itching to
start a war with Pakistan, bringing the world closer to nuclear
war than it has been for many years. The United States, the world’s
leading democracy, is waging war in Afghanistan, which war relates
to the second and third threats noted above – terrorism and ethnic/religious
conflict. If the terrorists are to be believed – and why would they
lie?─they struck at the United States on September 11th
because of its democratically-induced interventions into
ethnic/religious disputes in their parts of the world.
As
I shall argue below, democracy is implicated in all three major
threats to world peace and others as well. The vaunted political
machinery of democracy has failed to deliver on its promises. The
United States, the quintessential democracy, was directly or indirectly
involved in most of the major wars in the 20th Century.
On
September 11, 2001, the 350-year experiment with the modern nation-state
ended in failure. A radical re-thinking of the relationship between
the individual and the collective, society and state is urgently
required. Our lives depend on it. We must seriously question whether
the primitive and ungainly political technology of democracy can
possibly keep the peace in tomorrow’s world. Thus, a thorough reconsideration
of the relationship between democracy and peace is essential. This
paper makes a beginning in that direction.
PART
1 – A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
DEFINITIONS
Does
democracy promote peace? Merely to ask the question is heretical,
and, by now, probably illegal in some democracies. The next problem
is, compared to what? Again, I risk heresy. Do you mean to suggest
there is another political system better than democracy? Even if
democracy is the only palatable system, an awareness that it has
war-like tendencies (if it does) may allow for a certain degree
of amelioration of those tendencies. Further, there are forms
of government other than democracy. This paper will analyze which
forms of government are most conducive to peace.
Starting
then with democracy as our reference point, four distinct forms
of government can be identified:
Democracy
– rulers are selected by the people; the will of the people, imperfectly
revealed through the political process, is the primary determinant
of the powers of the state. "Democracy" is a combination
of two Greek words: demos, meaning "the people,"
and kratis, meaning "to rule." The word "democracy"
is a combination of an adjective – "demo" and a noun
– "cracy." In its purest form, democracy means majority
rule. Certain auxiliary constitutional rights such as freedom
of speech and assembly and procedural due process are assumed.
All such rights, however, are interpreted and enforced by officials
elected by the majority.
Republic
– government strictly limited by a constitution to narrowly defined
functions such as national defense, police protection, and resolution
of disputes through courts. Rulers are selected by the people,
but the will of the people does not sanction violation of the
constitution. The government can only exercise powers delegated
to it by the people.
Self-government
– no state with final authority; each person governs himself or
herself; disputes among people are resolved by private courts
and arbitrators; resort to private courts is encouraged
by self-interest, social pressure, boycott, ostracism and market
forces such as the denial of insurance and of access to real estate
to those with a history of improper self-help.1
Dictatorship
– a person or persons seize power by force and rule by decree.
Peace.
It is hard to think of another word more frequently used and
so rarely defined. A Google Internet search uncovered few sites
which addressed in detail the meaning of "peace." If we
don’t know or care what it is, how can we get there?
Let’s
say that peace is the absence of war and violence. War and violence
involve the physical destruction of or damage to people or property.
Which is not to say the peace is breached only by physical damage.
What about a gun to the head? Okay, we must expand the definition
to include the immediate threat of violence. What about the
fact that the fellow on the bus might punch me in three minutes?
No go; too speculative to involve a breach of the peace. It is clear
however that the palpable threat of force is violent.
What force is threatened then involves an analysis of the social
context. What laws, customs, habits or mores can the individual
reasonably expect to be enforced against him if he does this
or that?
Is
all physical destruction a breach of the peace? What if someone
rips your face off with a knife? That is not necessarily violent
if he is a plastic surgeon, using a surgical knife, and operating
on you with your consent. Thus, the concept of consent
must be an element in the definition of peace. This is consistent
with the etymology of the word "peace" which is derived
from the Latin word pax, meaning agreement or contract. What
if I grab a guy and put him in a headlock? Certainly I have breached
the peace. How? I have interfered with his control over his body,
otherwise known as his liberty. If this happens in the middle of
a wrestling match, however, it is not a breach of the peace because
I have his consent. Neither is it a violation of his liberty. Thus,
liberty, closely related to consent, must be factored into
any definition of peace.
The
theft or destruction of property without the consent of the owner
is violent and unpeaceable. Thus, the concept of rightly owned property
must be part of any definition of peace. Theft or destruction of
property is violent because it overcomes or violates the will of
the owner. The ultimate basis of property is the time and energy
of individuals who either produced the property, acquired it while
it was previously unowned, or traded for it with someone who had
previously owned it. Property is an extension of the self. When
property is stolen or destroyed, the time and energy of the owner
is destroyed or wasted. Time is life. Theft and destruction are
violent because they use others’ lives without their consent. Any
attempt to exclude property rights from the concept of peace is
absurd. Taking the absurdity to its logical conclusion, one could
"peacefully" murder someone merely by snatching food from
his plate for about three weeks.
What
then is peace? Peace is the absence of violence or the palpable
threat of violence against persons and their property. The concept
of peace primarily describes social relations and mental states,
and only secondarily physical action or its absence.2
Violence is the use of physical force against persons or
their property in such a way that their person or property is used
in a manner contrary to their will. One can be in a peaceful relationship
with some people and in an unpeaceful relationship with others.
For example, this author is in a state of peace with the people
of Iceland. None is currently using violence against me or threatening
to do so. However, my relationship with the federal government of
the United States and the State of New York is not peaceful. I must
pay each money regularly or I will be put in prison. This continual
threat of being kidnapped is not conducive to my peace of mind.
What
about the threat of violence against people who wish to assault
others and destroy their property? This threat of violence is not
properly considered a breach of the peace. What about actual violence
against criminals? This is best seen as a breach of the peace by
the criminal. The response by those charged with protecting
people and property is part and parcel of the criminal’s breach
of the peace.
Einstein
was correct when he wrote that "Peace is not merely the absence
of war . . ." Certainly, wars are violent, but overt violence
between states is merely one way to breach the peace. The others
are violence between persons and violence between states and persons.
DEFINITIONAL
PROBLEMS
Peace.
Certainly, if my definition is wrong, any conclusions derived
from it will also be wrong, or at least not proven. Nevertheless,
I believe my definition of peace is unassailable. It defines the
term in a manner that is consistent with its common usage and etymological
origin. It allows the term to be used with equal validity in domestic
or international contexts. Finally, I believe that even those who
will not entirely accept my definition will actually agree with
me on the definition of peace as far as it goes. That is,
I believe almost everyone will agree with me that when violence
or the palpable threat of violence is used against persons or their
property, a breach of the peace has occurred.
It
is at that point that two primary objections will be made. First,
some will argue that it is improper to apply the definition in such
a way that the normal processes of democratic government are deemed
unpeacable. Second, some will argue that peace must also include
the provision of certain basic conditions of life without which
peace in the narrow sense is meaningless and without which breaches
of the peace in the narrow sense are assured.
My
contention is that my imagined opponents are confusing a dispute
over definition with a dispute over values. That is, when some would
carve out of the definition of peace an exception for democratic,
majoritarian law-making, what they are really saying is, they
value democratic decision-making more highly than the avoidance
of violence or the threat of violence against persons on the wrong
end of that decision-making. After all, as a purely empirical
matter, the physical actions and mental states involved with criminal
extortion – "Give me a thousand dollars or I will kidnap you
tomorrow." – are identical to democratic fund-raising – "Give
me a thousand dollars or I will put you in jail tomorrow."
Both, in a strictly factual sense, are breaches of the peace. It
is just that the democrat values democracy more than he values
peace!
Similarly,
when someone argues, "Yes, violence, etc. is a breach of the
peace, but so is poverty," a word game is being played. The
disputant is being intellectually dishonest. He is trying to use
a definitional dispute to disguise a value judgment. He is trying
to smuggle welfare rights into the prestigious concept of peace.
Let’s just be honest about it. What you are really saying is, "Sure,
I like peace, but I am willing be unpeaceable to achieve welfare
rights because I value them more than I value peace."
It
should be noted as well that both lines of thought beg the question.
That is, if the question is, "does democracy promote peace?,"
by inserting the concept of democracy into the concept of peace,
one assumes as true that which is in dispute.
Self-government.
Inclusion of self-government as a form of government
is controversial. Some would argue that what I call self-government
is really anarchy. "Anarchy" is not a very useful term
in political discourse. First, it is a term of derision like "robber
baron," "isolationist," and "sweat shop."
Such terms are not intended to advance reasoned discussion; they
are intended to close off such discussions as beyond the pale. Second,
"anarchy" has several meanings and one has little assurance
that one’s readers will apply the meaning the author intends.
The
most fatal flaw in the use of the term "anarchy" to define
self-government is that such ascription is fundamentally flawed
and simply wrong. To understand why requires an examination of one
the most grievous errors of modern political thought. In its most
neutral, value-free sense, "anarchy" means a situation
in which, between or among private persons (A and B in Figure No.
1) or groups of persons, there is no common lawful authority to
resolve their disputes and avoid resort to self-help.
Figure
No. 1
A
– – – – – – anarchic – – – – – – B
The
truth is, there is no human political system imaginable that is
not anarchic! True, creating a state in a "state of nature,"
will eliminate the anarchic relations among the people in that area.
However, all we have done is create a new form of anarchy, because
now, there is an anarchic relationship between the newly created
state and its own citizens. See, Figure No. 2.
Figure
No. 2

The
fact that citizens can sue the government in government courts,
does not at all mean that the government’s relation to its citizens
is not anarchic. Anarchy, as we are using the term, is a value-neutral,
descriptive term for situations in which there is no common authority
governing the relations of parties. When the government allows citizens
to sue itself in its own courts, all it is doing is exercising a
glorified form of self-help, precisely the horror of horrors
for those who decry anarchy. It is judging its own cause; resolving
a dispute with another in its sole discretion. It is worth noting
that in the last century, states resolved disputes with 170 million
of their own subjects by murdering them.3
Can self-government do worse?
The
situation is even aggravated when there are many states as is the
case today. In that event, two new forms of anarchy are created.
Each state ("S1, S2" in Figure No. 3) is in a relationship
of anarchy with all other states.4
Further, each state is in a state of anarchy with the citizens
of all other states and those citizens continue to be in a state
of anarchy with the citizens of other states. See, Figure No. 4.
We are reminded of this fact by the United States invasion of Afghanistan
in 2001. Villagers who claimed that the United States bombed them
without just cause had no common authority available to seek redress.
Figure
No. 3

Figure
No. 4

Even
a world government would not resolve the problem of anarchy. Assuming
a federal world government (WG), while individual states would no
longer be in a state of anarchy with each other, they would be in
a state of anarchy vis-à-vis the world government. See, Figure
No. 5.
Figure
No. 5

Returning
to the original point, it is misleading to say that self-government
is anarchic since that fails to distinguish self-government from
all other forms of government, all of which have inescapable anarchic
elements.
The
main objection to a regime of self-government is that it would be
disorderly. Like peace, order is a term frequently used but
rarely defined. The concept of order is substantially similar to
the concept of peace. For example, when people use the term civil
disorder, they are usually referring to riots and other forms of
widespread acts of violence against persons or property. In another
sense, order involves, not merely peace, but the provision of some
assurance that peace will continue and that disputes will be amicably
resolved. In this sense, it could be argued that self-government
fails; it provides no reasonable assurance that disputes will be
amicably resolved. This argument is fallacious. What people want
is not merely some reasonable assurance that disputes will be resolved,
but that they will be resolved with at least a rough approximation
to justice: the correct application of the right principles to the
reasonably known facts. While the state in all its forms, even dictatorship,
provides a means to resolve disputes, its capacity to resolve them
justly is subject to serious dispute. Why should we think
the state, even a democratic state, will resolve disputes justly?
An
immediate problem arises, insuperable actually. It is claimed that
a state with a monopoly on dispute resolution powers is the very
prerequisite to a civilized justice system. So such power is bequeathed
upon the state, or seized by it. Now we have a situation in which,
if one wants dispute resolution services, one must go to the state.
As with any monopoly, there is a lack of incentive to provide high-quality
services. Rather, the monopolist, unconcerned about securing or
satisfying customers, tends to be more concerned about looking after
its own interests. Courts in the United States, for example, have
elaborate and fairly inflexible rules of procedure many of which
seem designed to serve the needs of the court, not the litigants.
Litigants are forced to hire expensive attorneys, usually specialists
who know their way around in that particular court. Dispute resolution
agencies which cannot monopolize business, tend to adopt much simpler
procedures. This rather banal example makes the larger point. Government
courts, being monopolies, tend to serve their own interests, not
the litigants’, in all aspects of their work, from procedure to
substantive decision-making. This lack of solicitude is the direct
and inescapable result of the very monopoly powers we are told courts
must have!
Because
power corrupts, corruption, bribery, and favoritism regularly plague
the state’s legal system. For example, in 1999, 580 people were
convicted of "official corruption, including thirty-two federal
law enforcement agents."5 In
1998, 42 police officers in Cleveland were charged with conspiracy
to distribute cocaine.6 Other law
enforcement agents accused of corruption that year included:
- Three
Detroit police officers who were charged with conspiring to
rob approximately $1 million.
- In Starr
County, Texas, the sheriff, a justice of the peace, and five
county jailers who were charged with bribery and conspiracy
to commit bribery.
- Nine current
or former New Jersey police officers who were charged with racketeering
involving protection of prostitution and illegal gambling.7
In
January, 2002, a New York judge was arrested and charged with soliciting
a $250,000 bribe.8 These incidents are merely
examples of an avalanche of official corruption in the state’s legal
system today. The known corruption is likely the visible part of
a giant iceberg.
In
addition to overt corruption, there is a more insidious and invisible
form of corruption that only close observers of the courts can discern.
All judges in a democracy are political animals. It matters not
whether they are elected or appointed. The notion that appointed
judges are apolitical is a fantasy entertained mainly by naïve
and self-appointed "court reformers." In truth, the politics
involving in appointing judges is usually more covert and insidious
than that involving elected judges. The public rarely learns about
why judges were appointed. Who pulled what strings? Who owed what
to whom? Who will owe what to whom in the future? The selection
of elected judges to run for office is more transparent. They are
usually lawyers associated with local political party organizations.
They owe their loyalties to such organizations. However, they usually
have at least some organic connection to the local community else
they would lack the support to be elected. Lawyers appointed
to judgeships usually are more wedded to secretive elite circles.
Whether
judges are elected or appointed, they are all products of
a political power structure. They therefore bring to the bench the
general mindset of that power structure. They will generally favor
the interests of the power structure, because of a similar mindset,
loyalty, gratitude, or a desire for future appointments and other
favors from the power structure for themselves and their families
and associates. Even federal judges, appointed "during good
behavior," tend to look out for the interests of the power
structure whence they came. Perhaps from modest backgrounds, they
are now accepted into elite circles. Having achieved judicial power,
many become social climbers, seeking the acceptance and the numerous
and subtle favors elite circles can now confer. While such judges
may fairly adjudicate disputes between ordinary private persons,
when such persons litigate against the state, or members of the
power elite, judges will tend to discretely favor the elite. They
are usually clever enough to disguise the favoritism. Eighteen years
of civil and criminal litigation make me certain of this conclusion.
The
flaws in government dispute resolution delineated above apply primarily
to disputes between private persons within a state. Much more serous
problems arise when a private person or entity has a dispute with
the state itself. Here, the dispute must be resolved by the state,
else it ceases to be a state with the monopoly power to resolve
disputes. We must, however, point out, in the spirit of the Emperor’s
New Clothes, the long overlooked, but obvious fact that such
dispute resolution is a sham and mockery of justice. We are told
that no one should be the judge of his own cause, yet the state,
in disputes with its own citizens, is always the judge of its own
cause. That this is not so because the state refers such disputes
to its judicial branch, is an incredibly silly and stupid
argument. Similarly, I suppose, the next time I have a dispute with
the United States, I will insist that that the dispute be resolved
by an arbitrator selected by me.
The
contemporary state does no better in providing assurances that other
kinds of disputes will be resolved amicably. Since states are in
an anarchic relation with each other, according to mainstream, Hobbesean
thought, we have no assurance that these disputes will be resolved
amicably. We are thus continually at risk of being murdered by some
foreign state that feels aggrieved by our own state, or, we are
at continual risk of being conscripted by our own state to fight
another state that has purportedly aggrieved our own. Surely, this
is a state of disorder which destroys the tranquility of the human
spirit.
Not
only is our own state in a relationship of anarchy with other states,
but it is also in a state of anarchy vis-à-vis the residents
of other countries. We ourselves are also in a state of anarchy
vis-à-vis other states. This leads to the very kind of chaos
that was supposed to have been prevented by the creation of the
state in the first place. For example, the Afghans, and their executors,
who claimed to have been victims of American air strikes, in spite
of their alleged lack of involvement with the Taliban or Al Qaeda,
are in a state of anarchy with the United States, and have no common
authority to seek justice.
In
sum, the monopoly state provides no assurance that disputes will
be resolved justly, merely that they will be resolved. Of
course, all disputes at all times and all places
are resolved one way or another. Yes, but the state does so without
the use of force, you say. This too is a myth, an illusion. The
state resolves all its disputes by the use of force. The
force, however, is so overwhelming that it does not have to be used,
merely threatened. Even this is false. In the typical year, 373
people were killed or injured by law enforcement officers and 135
law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty in the United
States. Another 56,054 police officers are assaulted.
Yes,
but at least only the state uses force – the disputants do not.
Here, we are pretty far off from the notion that the state, unlike
a market-based justice system, does not use force to resolve disputes.
But even here, the state comes up short. Many innocent people and
criminal suspects have been unjustifiably assaulted or killed by
law enforcement agents. Many law enforcement agents themselves are
killed or assaulted. Many judges, litigants, jurors, lawyers and
witnesses involved in criminal and civil litigation have been murdered,
assaulted or threatened by disgruntled parties.
A
1998 report by Human Rights Watch studied police behavior in fourteen
large American cities from 1995 through 1998. The report concluded:
"Our
investigation found that police brutality is persistent in all
of these cities; that systems to deal with abuse have had similar
failings in all the cities; and that, in each city examined, complainants
face enormous barriers in seeking administrative punishment or
criminal prosecution of officers who have committed human rights
violations. Despite claims to the contrary from city officials
where abuses have become scandals in the media, efforts to make
meaningful reforms have fallen short."9
Further,
many episodes of social violence have resulted from a perception
that government courts or law enforcement officers have not resolved
disputes fairly or protected citizens adequately. In 1992, there
was a major riot Los Angeles sparked by dissatisfaction with an
acquittal in a criminal trial. The riot resulted in 54 persons killed,
2,383 injured, 13,212 arrests, 11,113 fires.10
A similar riot occurred in Liberty City, Florida in 1980 after a
jury acquitted four police officers accused of homicide. Critics
of decentralized dispute resolution rarely acknowledge the state’s
abject failure to resolve conflicts without the use of force by
itself, by litigants, and by their sympathizers in the community.
Thus,
the state does not assure that disputes will be resolved justly
and without using force. Further, there is no reason to believe
that localized violence resulting from disputes over private dispute
resolution would be any greater than the amount of violence currently
arising from the state’s clumsy, unjust, and inefficient dispute
resolution and police services. Many scholars define "war"
by reference to a conflict resulting in at least 1,000 combat deaths.
By that measure, the United States justice system, the world’s most
highly touted, has a "war" every two years! All told,
the number of people killed or injured during the course of the
state’s enforcement of its laws is truly enormous. This is far from
the peaceful and orderly system of legend.
Further,
the state itself exacerbates and stimulates conflict. Its legal
system does this directly and its policies do this indirectly. As
Hoppe and others have argued, the state’s policies, based as they
are on coercion and confiscation, create a moral atmosphere which
encourages the development of aggressive personalities. Further,
the state’s legal system is so complex that no one understands it.
This reduces respect for the law, diminishes its moral force, makes
conflicts more likely and makes them more difficult to resolve.
In most areas of human knowledge, increasing complexity is a sign
of progress, an indication that greater information has been acquired.
Not so with the law. The law’s crucial function is to guide ordinary
people in their interactions with other people; to reduce disputes
and misunderstandings; and to make possible the expeditious and
just resolution of disputes that do arise. Further, since the ultimate
foundation of respect for the law is community sentiment, the law
must be readily understood by most people. The modern statist legal
system has totally failed in its critical function. No one understands
even a small part of it, not even the most brilliant lawyers and
judges. Legal specialists do not even fully grasp all the intricacies
of their own fields.
Legislation
is the primary villain in the unworkable complexity of the law.
The common law system was and is based on application of a few essential
principles to a wide variety of different scenarios. Though the
common law can be complex to be sure, it is no more complex than
the subject matter itself. Further, an ordinary person, armed with
common sense and a general understanding of the basic principles
of the law, and acting reasonably and justly, is in a good position
to conform his behavior to the dictates of the law. Legislation
is a different animal entirely. Legislation is largely based on
the whim of legislators and their desire to please special interest
groups. It is impossible for the average person to deduce their
duties under legislative law from general principles. In fact, most
people could not understand most legislation even if they spent
several hours reading it.
In
contrast to the state system of justice, a regime of self-government
has much to recommend it. Under self-government, the market will
supply dispute resolution services just as it supplies other valuable
goods and services. Consumer choice and competition among businesses
will ensure the availability of competitively priced, high quality
services. The free market, that amazing repository of the creativity
of humanity, should be able to efficiently produce security and
justice for the same reason it has been able to produce a myriad
of other goods and services. The advantage of the market over states
can be summed up in one phrase: the market is self-correcting.
Problems or deficiencies in one firm’s products can be remedied
by other firms producing better products for profit. The market
is superior to government as a problem-solver because market transactions
require the consent of all parties to them. When government interacts
with people, there is always at least one party that is forced to
participate and that is, therefore, abused and exploited. The errors
of states are not self-correcting. Rather, they tend to expand and
duplicate themselves.
In
spite of the theoretical advantages of market provision of justice
services, many will balk and continue to ask, "What about order?
There must be an authority with a final say, else chaos will ensue."
This criticism is fallacious. We look at the cop on the beat or
the government court system, and we conclude, there is where
order resides – with a single authority in charge. This is an illusion.
Such order as exists at any given time is the result, not of
government action, but the diffused public sentiment that allows
that regime to exist in the first place. This fact is critical
to understanding the fallacy of the objections to self-government.
True, the success of a society based on self-government would depend
on the opinions and actions and good will of the bulk of the population.
But the same is the case with democratic regimes. Without
the cooperation, support, and good will of the vast bulk of the
population, democratic regimes would also fail and collapse long
before Election Day!
History
is strewn with examples of military dictatorships whose brute force
was unable to maintain power when the regimes lost the support of
the majority of the people, for example: Iran (1979), the Philippines
(1986), and Romania (1989). Thus, those who worship at the altar
of order, and who mistakenly believe that order is the result of
state action, need to come to the realization that order in society
is actually the result of the mores, habits, and opinions of the
bulk of the population.11 They should
therefore study hard the question, Which kinds of regimes are
best suited to inculcating in the public mind the values of peace,
liberty, order, and harmony? The answer must be those regimes
whose animating principles are peace, order, liberty, and harmony.
There can be little doubt that dictatorial and democratic regimes
violate all these principles. They therefore tend to corrupt
public opinion by continually reinforcing, by example and by rationalization,
the morality and efficacy of the use of force and violence to achieve
social goals.
To
sum up: peace = liberty = order.
The
ultimate fallacy underlying most critiques of self-government is
utopianism. This is ironic as those same critics would undoubtedly
accuse advocates of self-government of being utopian. Who is right?
The utopian fallacy is committed when a political ideal is posited
which cannot, in the nature of things, be achieved. Such schemes
ignore the basic unalterable facts of human nature and the human
condition. They contain internal contradictions, and, since contradictions
cannot exist outside the mind, such schemes, in their intended form,
cannot exist. It is not so much that people are not good enough
for these utopian schemes to work; rather, these utopian schemes
are not good enough for them to work with real people.
For
example, communism was utopian, among other reasons, because it
abolished private property in capital goods. As Mises demonstrated,
without a market in capital goods, there will be no market prices
for such goods. Without prices, we cannot know whether we are taking
lesser-valued goods and converting them into more highly valued
goods, (i.e., producing wealth), or taking more highly valued goods,
and turning them into less highly valued goods (i.e., destroying
wealth).
One
of the underlying premises of utopianism is that there is a political
solution for every human problem. This is why utopians insist that
advocates of self-government detail how self-government will solve
every conceivable social problem. On the contrary, not only is there
not a political solution for most human problems, there is
not an earthly solution of any kind for many human problems. Similarly,
it is typical for utopians to require a complete blueprint for the
future ("the five-year plan") which provides for all contingencies.
Statists who could not assure us that on September 11th
the United States would not suffer a devastating attack, insist
that advocates of self-government set forth every tiny detail of
how a decentralized, privatized justice system would work. This
is utopian folly. All that can be done, and that needs to be done,
is to set forth the essential logic of the system, and to show that
all competing systems of justice have failed. Self-government will
work, or not work, according to the nature and character of the
people in a given society. Should we continue to operate under a
system that has failed – and whose failure was inevitable given
its internal contradictions – and never for all time find out if
there is a workable alterative? Is it possible there will be problems
under a regime of self-government? Yes, and what else is new? The
relevant question is, will the problems under self-government be
worse than the problems of the state monopoly system? It is difficult
to see how they could be.
The
statist system itself is based on utopian thinking. We are told
that a strong central government is necessary because, human nature
being what it is, the public needs to be protected from evil miscreants.
We are then asked to assume that these same evil miscreants will
not do everything they can to gain control of the state apparatus.
This is contrary to all theory and experience and is thus utopian.
Logic tells us that evil people will gravitate to positions of state
power so they can lie, cheat, steal, and murder with the impunity
granted by their legal monopoly.12
Experience tells us that liars, cheats, thieves, and murderers,
such as Hitler, Stalin, Nixon and Clinton have in fact gravitated
to politics to fulfill their foul agendas.
Statists
assure us that irresponsible people will act responsibly. That is,
state officials, who are given power over us, and who therefore
are not responsible to us, will act responsibly. All logic
and experience tell us this is false, and thus utopian. Statists
tell us that no one should be the judge of his own cause because
injustice would result, but that the state may be the judge of its
own cause because its judges will ensure that justice is
done. We know, however, that systems which contain internal contradictions,
cannot exist and are thus utopian in nature.
Democracy/republic.
Distinguishing between these two forms of government is a potential
morass; however, it is also critical to the present undertaking.
Both forms of government feature voting by the people to select
officials. The primary difference between them is that while republican
voting is done for the purpose of choosing officials to administer
the government in the pursuit of its narrowly defined functions,
democratic voting is done, not only to select officials but also
to determine the functions and goals and powers of the government.
The guiding principle of republics is they exercise narrow powers
delegated to them by the people, who themselves, as individuals,
possess such powers. They cannot spring as they do in democracies,
ex nihilo, from the collective whim.
The
problem for our analysis is that many governments are a combination
of democracy and republic. There are very few, if any, modern governments
which approximate our definition of a republic. Perhaps the closest
modern example is peaceful and prosperous Switzerland. The United
States still has remnants of the republican philosophy: a constitution
and bill of rights. However, the dominant ethos in American politics
long ago turned away from republicanism toward democracy. William
Graham Sumner gave the obituary in 1899: "this scheme of a
republic which our fathers formed was a glorious dream which demands
more than a word of respect and affection before it passes away."13
The
rights supposedly retained by the American people, and not subject
to majoritarian override, are interpreted by judges installed by
politicians selected by the majority of voters. Over time, such
rights tend to be narrowly construed so as to allow the majority
will to prevail most of the time. What can be said for present purposes
is that the United States began its life primarily animated by republican
principles. However, over time, those principles, though still felt,
have been overwhelmed by the spirit of modern, majoritarian democracy.
Rousseau has prevailed over Locke.
Summary.
The modern view basically ignores the possibility of self-government
and republican government as understood in 1776. The prevailing
view is thus that democracy, compared to dictatorship, promotes
peace. The present analysis is not so limited. After all, the modern
view could be wrong.
ANALYSIS
OF THE CONCEPTS
It
is apparent from a consideration of the definitions of the concepts
peace and democracy that democracy does not
promote peace. Peace is the absence of violence or the palpable
threat of violence against persons and their property. Democracy
is a form of government which, by and large, places persons and
their property at the mercy of the vagaries of majoritarian politics
over which, as individuals, they have essentially no control, and
to which, therefore, they cannot be deemed, under any view but the
fantastic, to have consented.
In
truth, democracy is nothing more than the numerous and their manipulators
bullying the less numerous. It is an elaborate and deceptive rationalization
for the strong in numbers to impose their will on the electorally
weak by means of centralized state coercion. It takes as its
premise the right of each person to control his destiny, and, by
shifting this right from the individual, to the collective, destroys
it. Advocates of democracy emphasize the self-government
rights of an abstraction called "the people," but ironically
recoil in horror at the prospect of real persons governing their
own selves.
Democracy
is not a formula for peace, domestic or foreign. If democratic states
can impose their will on their own minority populations, why can’t
they impose their will on other countries, states, and peoples,
particularly if they are not democratic? Strange it is, though,
that pugnacious democrats always forget the principle of majority
rule when war comes. They do not seek the prior consent of the majority
of the inhabitants of the nations they seek to conquer, subdue,
and rule.
Having
resolved the issue at the level of pure theory, I will proceed to
examine alternative views and views which utilize different definitions
of the concept of peace. In the process of evaluating such views,
I will adduce a wide variety of empirical evidence which buttresses
the previous conceptual analysis.
PART
II – A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC PACIFISM
THE
THEORY STATED
The
belief that democracy promotes peace, often termed the theory of
democratic pacifism, is broadly held by academics, politicians,
diplomats, and a wide swath of the general public. Though this paper
responds to the theory itself as summarized below, the views of
leading academic proponents of the theory such as R. J. Rummel,
will be discussed. Rummel forth his views most concisely in Power
Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (1997). Spencer
R. Weart is another leading theorist of democratic pacifism.14
I should make it clear at the outset that I agree with much, perhaps
most of what Professor Rummel has to say. For instance, his research
on democide – the state killing its own citizens – has been tremendously
important. My main problem with Rummel is that he doesn’t take his
conclusions far enough.
As
distilled from a variety of sources, the theory of democratic pacifism
can be stated as follows:
-
democracies rarely if ever go to war against each other;
-
democracies tend to be more peaceful than dictatorships;
-
democracies tend to have less internal violence; and
-
this tendency toward peacefulness is structural, that is,
related to the nature of democracy, not an accident or coincidence.
PROBLEMS WITH THE THEORY
Non
sequitur. As the title of his book and its last sentence state,
Rummel’s basic view is that "freedom promotes nonviolence and
power kills." [203] A contradiction in Rummel’s views is immediately
apparent. Though "power kills," he favors democracy, a
regime that bestows tremendous power upon the state. Rummel describes
democracy as "a way of solving without violence disagreement
over fundamental questions." [101, 147] This is true, however,
only if we exclude from the concept of violence, the threat of violence.
For example, when federal troops escorted black students into the
University of Alabama in 1963, because the governor of the state
opposed integration, was that peaceful? If so, then any time one
forces another to do an act by merely threatening, not actually
using force, peace has broken out. This would include bank robberies
where a gun is displayed. To take this to the absurd, concentration
camps are peaceful because the machine guns in the guard towers
are not actually firing. Rummel’s thesis crumbles at the very beginning
for want of a cogent definition of peace.
It
is true that Rummel, at varying times and places expresses sympathy
for the classical liberal state with fairly limited powers, this
sympathy is not consistently manifest. He boasts that special interest
group politics is a normal feature of democracy. [120] He refers
to the "ideological baggage" of classical liberalism.
[page 3] His enthusiasm for "democracy," however, is repeated
continuously and with little reservation. Further, his apparent
personal sympathy for classical liberalism appears to play no role
whatsoever in his theory.15 That
theory vindicates modern democratic states, none of which is a classical
liberal minimal state. Thus, if power kills, one should not support
democracy, but a republican minimal or ultra-minimal state or no
state whatsoever (self-government).
Asking
the wrong question. Does it really matter whether democracies
in general promote peace? Let’s assume that the vast majority of
democracies are peaceful, but that a few are not. Would not that
scenario allow for the generation of statistics which show that
democracies are generally peaceful? Rummel considers this prospect,
but casually dismisses it. He calls focusing on a few bellicose
democracies a "methodological error." [110] However, let’s
assume that the bellicose democracies are the most powerful democracies.
Is it not then a distortion of reality to still maintain that democracies
generally are peaceful?
Imagine
you are visiting an aquarium that features a large shark tank. There
are 100 sharks in the tank. Ninety-five of the sharks are either
docile or too small to injure a human. There are, however, five
hungry great whites. Certainly, the overwhelming majority of the
sharks are harmless, but would you swim in that tank? Similarly,
we should not ask, are democracies peaceful?, but is the United
States peaceful? Are the other militarily powerful democracies
– United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, peaceful? History shows
they are not. See, Figure No. 6. As Gowa writes, "Theory suggests
and empirical studies confirm that major powers are much more likely
than are other states to become involved in armed disputes, including
war."16
Figure
No. 6
WARS
OF THE DEMOCRATIC POWERS17
| Year |
State |
War |
| 1899 |
France |
Chad-France |
| 1899 |
U.S. |
Philippine
Insurrection |
| 1914-18 |
U.S.,
France, U.K. |
World
War I |
| 1916-21 |
U.K. |
Anglo-Irish
(civil war) |
| 1919 |
U.K. |
Afghanistan-British
War |
| 1939-45 |
U.S.,
France, U.K. |
World
War II |
| 1945 |
U.S. |
Chinese
Civil War |
| 1946 |
U.K. |
Indo-China
War |
| 1948 |
Israel |
Arab-Israel
War |
| 1952 |
France |
Algerian
revolution |
| 1950-53 |
U.S. |
Korean
War |
| 1956 |
Israel |
Suez
or Sinai War |
| 1956-1964 |
France |
Vietnam |
| 1962 |
India |
China-India |
| 1965-1973 |
U.S. |
Vietnam |
| 1965 |
India |
India-Pakistan |
| 1967 |
Israel |
Six-Day
War |
| 1971 |
India |
India-Pakistan |
| 1973 |
Israel |
Yom
Kippur War |
| 1975-1984 |
U.K. |
Britain-Ireland |
| 1982 |
Israel |
Israel-Lebanon |
| 1982 |
U.K. |
The
Falkland War |
| 1983 |
U.S. |
Grenada |
| 1991 |
U.S. |
Gulf
War |
| 1999 |
U.S. |
Yugoslavia |
| 2001-02 |
U.S. |
Afghanistan |
Another factor
which skews the analysis is the definition of war used for statistical
analysis by researchers: any conflict with more than 1,000 combat
deaths. It is absurd to lump all such wars together for statistical
analyses as if they were people, apples, or coins. The better
way to proceed is to ask which were the most violent conflicts
and which wars caused the most long-term damage to civilization.
Certainly, the two most destructive wars in the last 100 years
were World War I and World War II. The American Civil War was
one of the bloodiest wars of the 19th century with
620,000 combat deaths and thousands of civilian war-related deaths.
As Rummel observes, the Civil War was the most violent war involving
western states between the Napoleonic wars and World War I.18
To
sum up, the initial question is wrong. Let us not ask, "Are
democracies peaceful?," but, is the most powerful democracy
peaceful? Is the United States peaceful? Does the United States
provoke wars? If so, how terrible are the wars that result?
Wrong
criteria for judging validity. Proponents of the theory such
as Rummel argue that the theory that democracy promotes peace is
proven mainly by the infrequency of wars between and among democracies.
Since democracies tend not to fight each other, if we only democratized
the world, peace could be assured. Though it is no doubt desirable
to avoid wars between nation-states, the argument ignores several
other potential criteria.
Nuclear
war. Arguably, the greatest threat to world peace is the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war increases
with the number of states which have them. The risk of accidental
explosion increases with the number of such weapons as does the
risk of terrorists securing such weapons. Democracies have led the
way in inventing, producing, and exploding nuclear weapons. Currently,
of the eight states that have them, only two are dictatorships.
See, Figure No. 7. The first nuclear power, the United States, developed
them at the same time it was becoming the world’s most powerful
state. Therefore, the nuclear bomb soon became the symbol of global
political power. Other states rushed to develop them. Perhaps they
would have done so anyway, but the fact that the United States,
the world’s most prestigious state, had done so, made such pursuit
irresistible.
Figure
No. 7
NUCLEAR
POWERS
| State |
form
of government |
| Russia |
democracy |
| United
States |
democracy |
| China |
dictatorship |
| France |
democracy |
| United
Kingdom |
democracy |
| India |
democracy |
| Pakistan |
dictatorship |
| Israel |
democracy |
Source:
BBC
News
We
are told that the United States developed these weapons to stop
Hitler. However, production was rushed even after Hitler was defeated,
"to defeat Japan." After Japan was defeated, nuclear weapons
production continued at a vigorous pace. Of course, about one minute
after World War II ended, we were told that we needed them to defend
against our ally, the Soviet Union. The truth is, democratic states
produce nuclear weapons, not to defend against a specific enemy,
but to advance their power, which is after all the coin of
the political realm. The proliferation of nuclear weapons by mostly
democratic states means that democracy has failed to provide
a solution to the greatest danger of our times. Rather, democracies
are a major part of the problem.
Terrorism.
Another leading threat to world peace is international terrorism.
We have already seen that international terrorism led to the American
invasion of Afghanistan, which in turn increased tensions between
Pakistan and India which for a time were on the verge of war, perhaps
nuclear war. As Figure 8 below shows, virtually all of the major
targets for terrorism are democratic countries. Apparently, terrorists
have grievances with these countries because of the foreign or domestic
policies they have pursued. (Notice that numerous democratic states
with non-interventionist foreign policies are rarely plagued by
terrorism.) What we are concerned with here is not a moral evaluation
of terrorism or its antecedents. Rather, the question is, do democracies
provoke or discourage terrorism? The evidence indicates that democracies
do provoke terrorism.
Figure
No. 8
LEADING
TARGETS OF TERRORISM
| State |
form
of government |
| Lebanon |
mixed |
| United
States |
democracy |
| Germany |
democracy |
| France |
democracy |
| United
Kingdom |
democracy |
| Greece |
democracy |
| Argentina |
dictatorship/democracy |
| Israel |
democracy |
| Italy |
democracy |
| Turkey |
democracy |
| Philippines |
democracy |
| Colombia |
democracy |
| Peru |
democracy |
| Spain |
democracy/constitutional
Monarchy |
Source:
Myths
and Realities of Cyberterrorism, P. Flemming, M. Stohl, Office
of International Programs and The Center for Education and Research
in Information Assurance and Security CERIA, Purdue University
Perhaps
the leading cause of organized violence in today’s world, aside
from George Bush’s inferiority complex, is intrastate conflict between
and among ethnic and religious groups. Though many of these conflicts
have taken place under oppressive dictatorships, a large number
of them have occurred either entirely or partially under democratic
regimes as shown in the chart below.
Figure
No. 9
|
Recent
Intrastate Conflicts
(source for dispute type:
Federation
of American Scientists)
|
|
State
|
Type
of Dispute
|
Form
of Gov’t.
|
|
Afghanistan
|
Ethnic/religious
|
dictatorship
|
|
Algeria
|
Religious
|
Mixed*
|
|
Angola
|
Ideological
|
mixed
|
|
Burma
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Burundi
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Colombia
|
Ideological
|
democracy
|
|
Congo
(Congo-Brazzaville)
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Congo-Zaire
|
Ethnic/ideological
|
mixed
|
|
Georgia
|
Ethnic
|
democracy
|
|
India
|
Ethnic/religious
|
democracy
|
|
India
|
Ideological
|
democracy
|
|
Indonesia
|
Religious
|
mixed
|
|
Indonesia
|
Ethnic/ideological
|
mixed
|
|
Indonesia
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Indonesia
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Mexico
|
Ethnic
|
democracy
|
|
Namibia
|
Ethnic
|
democracy
|
|
Nigeria
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Peru
|
Ideological
|
democracy
|
|
Philippines
|
Religious/ethnic
|
democracy
|
|
Russia
|
Ethnic/religious
|
democracy
|
|
Rwanda
|
Ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Sierra
Leone
|
Misc./ethnic
|
mixed
|
|
Solomon
Islands
|
Ethnic
|
constitutional
monarchy
|
|
Spain
|
Ethnic
|
democracy
|
|
Sri
Lanka
|
Ethnic/religious
|
mixed
|
|
Sudan
|
Ethnic/religious
|
mixed
|
|
Turkey
|
Ethnic
|
democracy
|
|
Yugoslavia
|
Ethnic/religious
|
democracy
|
*Changed
between democracy and dictatorship at various times.
Thus,
25 out of 29 recent intrastate conflicts were ethnic or religious
in nature. In 23 of the 25, the prevailing regime was democratic
throughout the dispute or at least at certain times during the dispute.
In certain cases, a democratic government was overthrown because
of the feeling of an ethnic or religious subgroup that its interests
were not being advanced by the democratic state.
The
empirical evidence indicates that democracy promotes ethnic conflict.
An examination of the dynamics of the democratic process explains
why this is so. In democracies, people tend to vote along ethnic/religious
lines. (Since ethnicity and religion are closely linked, they can
be dealt with together.) All experience confirms this. People of
one ethnic group tend to vote for candidates of the same ethnic
group, or candidates known to favor the interests of such group.
For example, 93 percent of Republicans are white according to the
Gallup Poll; while 93 percent of blacks voted for Al Gore for President
in 2000. That being the case, it must be true that the candidates
people vote against are usually identified with other ethnic groups.
Since those voters opposed that candidate, it is reasonable to assume
that they harbor a certain amount of resentment against those whose
votes put that candidate into office. Voters may come to view any
increase in the population of other ethnic groups as a threat to
their well being, portending as it does the election of officials
they believe will harm their interests.
It
is no accident that people tend to vote along ethnic and religious
lines. It is inherent in the nature of democracy. Democracy gives
each person a virtually meaningless single vote. It allows them
to vote for one of the candidates on the ballot, none of whom may
represent the views and values of the voter. The average voter in
a lifetime is unlikely to decide an election with his vote. The
odds of casting the deciding vote in favor of a candidate whose
views precisely mirror your own are millions to one. Since voters
implicitly recognize the virtual meaninglessness of their one vote,
they have little incentive to inform themselves in detail about
candidates, issues, and polices. It is much easier to vote for ethnic
reasons. The ethnic identity of candidates is usually clear. Further,
it takes little additional effort to ascertain which ethnic groups
a candidate serves. Thus, ethnic voting is a rational response
to the problem of rational ignorance about candidates and issues.
Ethnic identity provides valuable information at very low cost.
Given its efficiency, it always has been and likely always will
be a major factor in elections.
Even
if it is argued that people of similar ethnic and religious backgrounds
vote alike, not because of those backgrounds per se, but because
of their similar experiences, situations, values, and needs, we
reach the same conclusion. Since these factors themselves are closely
tied to ethnic and religious identity, the voting patterns they
produce will be closely tied to and, in practice, virtually indistinguishable
from, ethnicity and religion.
Thus,
democracy, inherently, contains the seeds of ethnic conflict.
History shows that, under certain circumstances, people who are
members of ethnic minorities prefer to fight wars of secession,
to escape from the control of majority ethnic groups they believe
are hostile to their interests. The ethnic conflict created by democracy
necessarily worsens over time. The natural tendency of democratic
government is to grow in size, power and scope, a critical fact
that seems to have escaped the notice of the democratic pacifists.19
By its nature, the state is the means by which some people can impose
the costs of achieving their goals onto unwilling others. As Bastiat
put it, "Government is the great fiction, through which everybody
endeavors to live at the expense of everybody else."20
The desire to impose costs on others is virtually limitless. Thus,
governments tend to grow over time. For example, the government
of the United States has been steadily growing in power ever since
1776. Even conservative Republican Presidents increase the power
of the federal government. Every one since Hoover did so.21
The pattern continues. The federal government is much stronger now
than it was in January, 2001, when a conservative President took
office. In all likelihood, it will be even stronger ten years from
now. Government tends to grow until it has substantially destroyed
the society upon which it depredates. As government power increases,
so does the threat perceived by ethnic minorities, and, finally,
their willingness to fight wars of secession. At some point, ethnic
minorities will simply refuse to have their wealth confiscated and
their cultures destroyed by majority ethnic groups. They will
fight.
Ideological
and other civil wars. Though ethnic conflict is the primary
instigator of intrastate war, democracy also fails to deter ideological
civil war. Ironically, democracy was supposed to avoid just
such wars by allowing people to resolve their disputes through elections.
Evidently, this works better in theory than in reality.
American
Civil War. The primordial example is the American Civil War
(War Between the States). It is not well known that the democratic
idea led to the most destructive war ever fought in the Western
Hemisphere. Why did Lincoln order armies into Virginia, which had
not been involved in the attack on Fort Sumter? Let him speak for
himself:
"[W]e
divide upon [all our constitutional controversies] into majorities
and minorities. If a minority . . . will secede rather than acquiesce
[to the majority], they make a precedent which, in turn, will
divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede
from them, whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such
minority . . . the central idea of secession, is the essence of
anarchy."22
Thus,
a substantial motive for Lincoln’s invasion of the South was to
preserve the principle of majority rule, that is, the ability of
the majority to impose its will on the minority. The War Between
the States revealed the true nature of democracy as bullying. It
just so happens that people usually put up with it, and the bullied
minority is scattered throughout the nation. In the War Between
the States, however, the bullied minority was clustered together
and willing to fight. Democracy, ultimately, is majority rule at
gunpoint. Such a philosophy is perfectly consistent with a tendency
to fight wars.
Majority
rule encourages minority groups that feel exploited by the majority
to attempt to secede. The bullying majority rarely lets its subjects
go in peace, and thus war breaks out. The provocateur is
often the majoritarian state, and that state’s rationalization for
fighting is always the preservation of the majority principle. Perhaps
the leading cause of war in the foreseeable future will be the struggle
of peoples who constitute a minority in their countries to escape
from oppressive democratic majority rule by those animated by alien
ethnic, cultural, religious, economic, or philosophic values.
Ideological
Civil Wars. It is commonly thought that left-wing civil wars
arise in response to repressive dictatorships which ruthlessly exploit
the population for the benefit of a few, leaving a large body of
discontents. However, such revolutions do occur in democratic countries.
As indicated in Figure No. 9, such wars have occurred recently in
Colombia, Peru, India, and Indonesia.
Domestic
crime rates. Though not as critical to this study as the
previous three surveys, domestic crime rates can illuminate this
debate. Figure No. 10 presents the twenty-one most murderous nations.
There is nothing magical about the number twenty-one other than
I had to extend the list that far in order to include a single dictatorship!
Figure
No. 10
|
STATE
|
Population
|
Homicide
Rate
(100,000)
|
Form
of government
|
|
South
Africa
|
41,465,000
|
75.30
|
Democracy
|
|
Colombia
|
37,500,000
|
64.60
|
Democracy
|
|
Estonia
|
1,499,257
|
28.21
|
Democracy
|
|
Brazil
|
160,737,000
|
19.04
|
Democracy
|
|
Mexico
|
90,011,259
|
17.58
|
Democracy
|
|
Philippines
|
72,000,000
|
16.20
|
Democracy
|
|
Taiwan
|
21,979,444
|
8.12
|
Democracy
|
|
N.
Ireland
|
1,641,711
|
6.09
|
Democracy
|
|
United
States
|
272,691,000
|
5.70
|
Democracy
|
|
Argentina
|
34,179,000
|
4.51
|
Democracy
|
|
Hungary
|
10,245,677
|
3.53
|
Democracy
|
|
Finland
|
5,088,333
|
3.24
|
Democracy
|
|
Portugal
|
5,138,600
|
2.98
|
democracy
|
|
Mauritius
|
1,062,810
|
2.35
|
Democracy
(British)
|
|
Israel
|
5,261,700
|
2.32
|
Democracy
|
|
Italy
|
56,764,854
|
2.25
|
Democracy
|
|
Scotland
|
5,132,400
|
2.24
|
Democracy
|
|
Canada
|
28,120,065
|
2.16
|
Democracy
|
|
Slovenia
|
1,989,477
|
2.01
|
democracy
|
|
Australia
|
17,838,401
|
1.86
|
Democracy
|
|
Singapore
|
2,930,200
|
1.71
|
Dictatorship
|
Source:
http://www.guncite.com/gun_control_gcgvinco.html
It
is no surprise that democracies lead the world in crime statistics.
Presumably, dictatorships, unrestrained by legal procedures and
popular electoral pressures, can ruthlessly crack down on crime.
If that doesn’t work, they can simply suppress evidence of high
crimes rates or issue phony statistics. Finally, crimes committed
by the state and its allies are defined out of existence. Nevertheless,
we cannot casually dismiss these statistics. Democracies sure are
violent places. Even though democracies afford their citizens the
right to redress their grievances and collectively solve social
problems associated with crime, for some reason, many democracies
cannot seem to prevent widespread crime.
A
review of the statistics reveals some of the reasons for democracy’s
inability to produce safe streets. Some high-crime states such as
South Africa, Northern Ireland (U.K.), the Philippines and the United
States have long histories of ethnic or religious tensions. At least
some portion of the high crime in these states can be attributed
to democracy’s inefficiencies at smoothing ethnic and religious
tensions. Another major factor in high crime rates is drug prohibition.
There are high crime rates in both high-drug-consuming states (e.g.,
United States) and high-drug-producing or selling states (Colombia,
Mexico, and United States). Though dictatorships have gleefully
partaken in the "war on drugs" over the years, drug prohibition
was virtually invented by the democratic United States and
the U.S. has been its leading advocate and supporter since 1914.
Bringing the discussion full circle back to international violence
– beyond increasing street crime, drug profits often flow to rebel
or terrorist groups which control regions where coca leaf trees
and poppies are grown. There is even the possibility that the United
States, prior to September 11, 2001, subsidized terrorism indirectly
by funneling money for anti-drug efforts to the Taliban!
It
is incongruous that democracies which, we are told, are imbued with
an ethic of non-violence, are so violent. Apparently, the ethic
of democratic-decision making has not seeped into the public mind.
Or maybe it has!
Empirical
problems. Critics of the theory of democratic pacifism start
with a frontal assault on the main contention: democracies do not
fight each other. They list the following counterexamples: American
Revolution (1776), Great Britain v. France (1793, 1795), War of
1812, Mexican War (1848), American Civil War (1861), World War I,
and several others.23 The proponents
of the theory respond by arguing either that these examples do not
involve true democracies or that they represent unusual circumstances.
Statistical
issues. Even the essential claim that democracies fight each
other less frequently than non-democracies do so, is hotly debated.
Joanne Gowa, after an exhaustive statistical analysis, concluded:
"the
democratic peace is a Cold War phenomenon: that is, the available
data show that the democratic peace is limited in time to the
years between 1946 and 1980. A democratic peace does not exist
in the pre-1914 world, and it cannot be extrapolated to the post-Cold
War era. As a result, to the extent that U.S. foreign policy
is based on spreading democracy abroad to enhance international
stability, it rests upon very weak foundations."24
Undercounting
democide. Rummel estimates that the democratic United States
was responsible for the unjustified killing of 583,000 people in
the 20th century, and possibly as many as 1,641,000 victims
"all told." He writes, "virtually all of these were
foreigners killed during foreign wars." While this is truly
a horrific record, I contend that Rummel undercounts. The United
States is also responsible for the combat deaths of its own soldiers.
By and large, these soldiers were conscripted and forced to go overseas
to fight wars. The only war in which the United States was attacked
was World War II; however, prior to attack, its leaders were anxious
to get in the war anyway, and there was a long history of mutual
provocation between the United States and Japan, largely based on
American’s imperialistic designs on Asia. As indicated in Figure
No. 11, in the last century, 635,000 Americans died in battle or
from battle. Adding U.S. combat casualties in foreign wars to Rummel’s
low estimate of U.S. democide, we can conclude that U.S.
democide was actually 1,218,000 in the last century.
Figure
No. 11
U.S. SOLDIERS KILLED IN COMBAT IN 20TH CENTURY
| World
War I |
116,000
|
| World
War II |
406,000
|
| Korean
War |
55,000
|
| Viet
Nam War |
58,000
|
| Total |
635,000
|
Are democracies
peaceful because of democracy? If democracies are relatively
pacific, is that because of their democratic elements, their republican
elements (right to bear arms, militias, non-conscription), their
capitalistic elements (low taxes, free trade), or some other yet
to be identified factor? Certain writers, such as Kant, Mises,
and even Rummel at times, who appear to be supportive of the theory
of democratic pacifism, on closer look are actually advocating
more of a republican pacifism model. For example, Mises,
in Human Action, praises democracy as a "means of
preventing revolutions and civil wars. It provides a method for
the peaceful adjustment of government to the will of the majority."25
However, in Socialism, he makes it clear that he favors,
not unrestrained democracy, but a liberal republic:
Grave
injury has been done to the concept of democracy by those who,
exaggerating the natural law notion of sovereignty, conceived
it as a limitless rule of the volonte generale (general
will). There is really no essential difference between the unlimited
power of the democratic state and the unlimited power of the autocrat.
The idea that carries away our demagogues and their supporters,
the idea that the state can do whatever it wishes, and that nothing
should resists the will of the sovereign people, has done more
evil perhaps than the Caesar-mania of degenerate princelings.
Both have the same origin in the notion of a state based on political
might. . . [O]nly within the framework of [classical] Liberalism
does democracy fulfill a social function."26
Mises’
concept of classical liberal democracy is similar to republicanism
as defined above. Further, in Human Action, Mises specifically
ties the type of economic intervention commonly found in contemporary
democratic states to international bellicosity: "Aggressive
nationalism is the necessary derivative of the policies of interventionism
and nation planning."27 With
states controlling much of the economic life of their populations,
economic goals which would otherwise have been pursued in the market
and by free exchange, are necessarily pursued by political means.
War, of course, is the ultimate political means.
Immanuel
Kant, who is often credited with originating the theory of democratic
pacifism, himself drew a distinction between democracies and republics:
The
Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican. The
only constitution which derives from the idea of the original
compact, and on which all juridical legislation of a people must
be based, is the republican. . . . The republican constitution
. . . gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence,
i.e., perpetual peace. . . . In order not to confuse the republican
constitution with the democratic (as is commonly done), the following
should be noted. The forms of a state (civitas) can be
divided either according to the persons who possess the sovereign
power or according to the mode of administration exercised over
the people by the chief, whoever he may be. The first is properly
called the form of sovereignty (forma imperii), and there
are only three possible forms of it: autocracy, in which one,
aristocracy, in which some associated together, or democracy,
in which all those who constitute society, possess sovereign power.
They may be characterized, respectively, as the power of a monarch,
of the nobility, or of the people. The second division is that
by the form of government (forma regiminis) and
is based on the way in which the state makes use of its power;
this way is based on the constitution, which is the act of the
general will through which the many persons become one nation.
In this respect government is either republican or despotic.
Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of
the executive power (the administration) from the legislative;
despotism is that of the autonomous execution by the state of
laws which it has itself decreed. Thus in a despotism the public
will is administered by the ruler as his own will. Of the three
forms of the state, that of democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily
a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which
"all" decide for or even against one who does not agree; that
is, "all," who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction
of the general will with itself and with freedom.28
Kant’s
definition of "republican" is not identical to this writer’s;
however, an overall reading of this passage puts Kant, like Mises,
into the republican camp, opposed to unrestrained majoritarian democracy.
Kant reveals his republican sympathies most clearly elsewhere in
the essay when he writes:
Standing
armies shall in time be totally abolished . . . For they incessantly
menace other states by their readiness to appear at all times
prepared for war; they incite them to compete with each other
in the number of armed men, and there is no limit to this. For
this reason, the cost of peace finally becomes more oppressive
than that of a short war, and consequently a standing army is
itself a cause of offensive war waged in order to relieve the
state of this burden. Add to this that to pay men to kill or to
be killed seems to entail using them as mere machines and tools
in the hand of another (the state), and this is hardly compatible
with the rights of mankind in our own person. But the periodic
and voluntary military exercises of citizens who thereby secure
themselves and their country against foreign aggression are entirely
different.
Opposition
to large standing armies and preference for the militia system alluded
to by Kant, is one of the hallmarks of republican theory. So is
the right to bear arms which is inextricably linked with the militia
system, the militia consisting of most of the able-bodied citizenry,
bearing arms. Thus, those who cite Kant for theoretical support
for the theory of democratic pacifism, are mistaken. He is most
accurately cited in support of the theory of republican pacifism.
The
term "republican" has fallen into disuse, as has republicanism
itself. Discussions of the relationship between the form of government,
peace, and war, have generally used the word "democracy"
and eschewed "republic." Rummel uses the term "democracy"
in his writings. However, even Rummel appears to have recognized
that the pacific benefits of "democracy" may have republic
roots. He even uses the term "libertarian democracy,"
virtually synonymous with republic, as essential to reducing the
risk of war.
Another
leading theorist of democratic pacifism, Spencer R. Weart, bases
much of his theory on the history of what he calls "republics."
His definition and mine differ. He does not see a sharp distinction
between republics and democracies, merely that in republics, fewer
people are allowed to vote. He believes that regimes are peaceful
in direct relationship to the number of people allowed to vote.
Weart’s conclusions are flawed. He completely ignores the other
features of republics such as the right to bear arms, militias,
and strictly limited government. The right to bear arms can be critical
in deterring what Rummel calls democide – a government murdering
its owns citizens. The militia system is essential in providing
other nations with an assurance that they will not be attacked since
the militia system is designed not for invasion, but for protection
of the homeland.
Weart
theorizes that democracies are pacific in part because democratic
leaders use the same methods in foreign policy that they use in
domestic democratic politics. In his view, these include willingness
to negotiate and compromise with opponents and abide by legal procedures.
This rosy scenario ignores other characteristics of democratic politicians:
lying, manipulation, and ruthlessness. One thinks of FDR – promising
to keep the U.S. out of war while conspiring with Churchill to
do the opposite; Nixon – he had a secret plan to end the Viet Nam
war, but then escalated it; Johnson [Gulf of Tonkin], and Clinton
– grossly exaggerating deaths in Kosovo to justify one of history’s
most massive bombing campaigns in Serbia.29
A
more cynical view than Weart’s would say that democratic politicians
gain and keep power domestically, by:
-
lying about the ability of government to improve people’s lives;
-
distorting the truth about their opponents programs and policies;
-
sacrificing the interests of smaller groups to gain the votes
of larger groups;
-
sacrificing the general interest for the benefit of wealthy
or politically powerful interests; and.
-
doing what is likely to procure votes in the short run at the
expense of the long-term good of the nation.
None
of these methods, applied to foreign policy, bodes well
for procuring peace.
Democratic
wars against Dictatorships. Democracies do fight wars against
dictatorships or imperial regimes. They did so in World Wars I and
II. Didn’t the dictatorships start these wars? The United States
was looking for any excuse to get into World War I – against Germany.
Examination of the international law quagmire that led to American
involvement in World War I leads to the conclusion that the United
States had four options: declare war on Germany, declare war on
England, declare war on both, or mind its own business. Democracies,
however, do not seem to mind their own business. What is clear is
that the scope of American involvement in that war far exceeded
anything justified by the alleged cause of that involvement: German
attacks on American shipping in the North Atlantic.
The
United States has always seemed to get attacked just when its leaders
were plotting to drag the nation into war by any means possible
– Fort Sumter, Remember the Maine, the Lusitania, etc. What a relief; we
got attacked. What about Japan and Pearl Harbor? It seems our mind-our-own-business
democracy wanted Japan out of China. Our leaders wanted China in
the hands of the mass murderer Chiang or the mega murderer Mao.
An oil embargo was imposed on a country that had no oil. Thus, the
United States provoked Japan into starting a war. That does not
mean that Japan was justified, merely that it was, in its
own mind, provoked. No democratic provocation, no
war.
Supporting
dictatorships. Paradoxically, democracies, especially the United
States, have a long history of supporting dictatorship. The most
murderous regime in history, the Soviet Union, was the ally of the
United States in World War II. This was in spite of that regime’s
continuous history of mass murder and treachery since its founding
in 1917. "The United States supplied the Soviet Union with
15,000 aircraft, 7,000 tanks, 350,000 tons of explosives, and 15,000,000
pairs of boots."30 Nationalist
China, history’s fourth most murderous regime,31
also received substantial military supplies from the United States
during World War II and thereafter.
These
are the most odious examples of dictatorial regimes supported by
the United States. Yet, the list is long and includes the Shah of
Iran, The House of Saud, Marcos in the Philippines, Pinochet in
Chile, Somoza in Nicaragua, Mobutu in Zaire/Congo, and the Duvalier
family in Haiti.32 In 1991, the United
States went to war to reinstall a dictatorship in Kuwait and stave
off an invasion of another dictatorship, Saudi Arabia. Granted that
many of these attacks on democracy were allegedly for the purpose
of fighting communism. However, the U.S. once was allied with communism
to stamp out Nazism. More recently, the U.S. is allied with dictatorship
in part to stamp out Islamic radicalism. The world’s leading democracy
always seems to have an excuse for supporting dictatorships.
Trading
arms with dictatorships. Yet another way that democracies contribute
to violence is by selling arms to dictatorships. Figure No. 12 shows
the top arms exporters. Figure No. 13 shows the world’s leading
arms importers, including dictatorial United States ally,
Saudi Arabia.
Figure
No. 12
|
Arms
Agreements to the World, by Supplier, 1991-1996
|
|
(in
millions of constant 1996 U.S. dollars)
|
|
Country
|
Form
of government
|
Total
|
|
United
States
|
democracy
|
123,380
|
|
Russia
|
democracy
|
41,954
|
|
France
|
democracy
|
34,646
|
|
U.K.
|
democracy
|
16,838
|
|
China
|
dictatorship
|
5,984
|
|
Germany
|
democracy
|
10,363
|
|
Italy
|
democracy
|
3,960
|
Figure
No. 13
|
Arms
Transfer Agreements and Deliveries of Developing Nations,
1993-1996.
|
|
(In
millions of current U.S. dollars)
|
|
1
|
Saudi
Arabia
|
29,800
|
|
2
|
Egypt
|
6,300
|
|
3
|
Taiwan
|
4,900
|
|
4
|
Kuwait
|
4,400
|
|
5
|
S. Korea
|
3,800
|
|
6
|
China
|
3,000
|
|
7
|
Israel
|
2,400
|
|
8
|
Iran
|
2,300
|
|
9
|
U.A.E.
|
2,300
|
|
10
|
Malaysia
|
2,000
|
Source:
Congressional Research Service,
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 19891996.
Democratic
regimes are unstable. Yet another problem with the theory of
democratic pacifism is the instability of democratic regimes. What
good is having a democracy to promote peace if the regime ceases
to exist? Germany, for example, went from democracy in 1918 to dictatorship
in 1933 to launching the war of the millennium in 1939. Did German
democracy promote peace? What was there about that democracy that
allowed for the rise of Hitler? Democracies have been overthrown
by dictatorships five times in fifty years in Pakistan. Apparently,
many Pakistanis prefer dictatorship because the democratic politicians
run the country so badly. Other democratic regimes overthrown by
coups were Spain (1936), Czechoslovakia (1948), Guatemala (1954),
Brazil (1964), Greece (1967), the Philippines (1972), Chile (1973),
and Argentina (1976).33 It is argued
that the problem in such states is that the democracies are not
"mature." Once mature democracies are established, there
will be peace. Surely that begs the question. If democracy only
promotes peace when the culture in a nation has changed sufficiently
to allow for a democracy to exist, then it is not the democracy
which promotes peace, but the peace which allows a democracy to
exist.
Democratic
regimes are unstable economically as well as politically.
Rummel cites the role of the market economy in promoting a society
based on "negotiation and compromise." [89, 120]
He fails to confront the inherent instability of the democratic
mixed economy demonstrated by Mises. As democratic states move away
from the free market and toward socialism, there is no stopping
point. Each intervention into the market generates problems that
lead to pressures for ever greater intervention to remedy the problems
caused by the initial intervention. For example, minimum wage laws
cause unemployment; unemployment leads to more welfare payments;
this causes taxes to rise; that lowers capital investment; lower
investment reduces wages relative to taxes and leads to pressure
for programs to subsidize the working poor such as food stamps,
free medical care and free education. Eventually, the result is
a completely socialized economy. A command economy eventually
replaces a contract economy and the role of negotiation and
compromise in social relations is drastically reduced.
Summary:
There are numerous theoretical and empirical problems with the
superficially appealing theory of democratic peace. Power kills
and democratic states are quite powerful. The most powerful democratic
states have been quite bellicose. Naturally, they have killed many,
both internally and externally. Many of the pacific elements of
democracies are in fact accidents: not essential elements of democracy
but rather hangovers from the more republican past. It is mistake
to focus on inter-democratic state violence when what really plagues
the world is:
-
violence
between democracies and non-democracies that democracies often
provoke
-
violence
within democratic states
-
the
symbiotic relationships between dictatorships and democracies
-
the
instability of democracy
Democracies
are implicated in the three main threats to world peace today: terrorism,
nuclear war and ethnic/religious conflict. Democratic pacifism truly
is a myth. Not only does it fail to explain how we can achieve world
peace, but the theory itself has caused and, as explained in Part
IV, continues to cause war! It is literally an intellectual dead
end.
PART
III – THE CAUSES OF DEMOCRATIC BELLICOSITY – MEANS
AND ENDS
THE
ENDS OF WAR
Domestic
political goals. A myriad of domestic political concerns have
led democracies into war. Modern democracies tend to extensively
intervene in the free market by means of high taxes, welfare, and
subsidies in order to buy the votes that keep the politicians in
power. As Ludwig von Mises demonstrated, each intervention into
the economy causes problems that lead to the demand for ever further
interventions. Government thereby creates its own demand. Eventually,
the economic problems become intractable, leading to the inevitable
temptation to create a foreign policy distraction.34
Combine that with the fact that war, while undeniably harming the
economy, gives the appearance of stimulating the economy, and we
have a formula for why democratic governments would have a motive
for war.
For
example, the Great Depression was caused by the Federal Reserve’s
expansion of the money supply in the late 1920’s.35
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal had failed to bring America out of
the Great Depression as late as 1941. Many believe that FDR welcomed
American entrance into World War II to distract attention from his
domestic policy failures or in the hope that the war would get the
economy moving again. Such theories cannot definitively be proven.
What cannot be denied is that, on two fronts, FDR did everything
he possibly could do to goad either Germany or Japan into attacking
the United States.
Why
did the United States fight a pointless war in Viet Nam? One theory
is that President Kennedy escalated U.S. involvement because he
had accused President Eisenhower in 1960 of being "soft"
on communism. When Lyndon Johnson came to power, he had ambitious
domestic plans for creating a "Great Society," and could
not afford to lose political capital over the "loss" of
another country to communism.36
Socialists
have often supported war as a means to introduce their command and
control economies. Historian Ralph Raico quotes John Dewey’s enthusiasm
about World War I:
"In
every warring country there has been the same demand that in the
time of great national stress production for profit be subordinated
to production for use. Legal possession and individual property
rights have had to give way before social requirements. The old
conception of the absoluteness of property the world over has
received a blow from which it will never wholly recover. Conscription
has brought home to countries which have been the home of the
individualistic tradition the supremacy of public need over private
possession. No matter how many among the special agencies for
public control decay with the disappearance of the war stress,
the movement will never go backward."37
Special
interest politics. Special interest group politics is a flaw
of democracy overlooked by Rummel.38
By focusing their efforts, votes, and campaign contributions, small
segments of the population can exercise influence on policy all
out of proportion to their numbers. This is frequently seen in domestic
policy. For example, the sugar lobby is responsible for the sugar
quota which limits the amount of foreign sugar that can be imported
into the United States. The result is billions of dollars in sales
that benefit a few companies and their employees. Every other person
in the country suffers. Because the people who gain, gain much,
they are moved to lobby for this law. The people who lose, lose
only a little, and thus do nothing to repeal the law.
Democracies
feature all kinds of absurd laws and policies that benefit a few
at the expense of everyone else. What is rarely remarked, however,
is that this special interest group analysis applies to foreign
policy as well. For example, there are over 150 hundred million
Arabs in the Middle East, mostly Moslems, and they have one billion
coreligionists around the world. Arab countries have vast oil reserves.
Yet, for over fifty years, United States foreign policy has favored
the tiny state of Israel, much to the chagrin of these Arab and
Islamic millions. This is a foreign policy most decidedly not
in the interests of the average American. This policy has dragged
the United States into every aspect of the running fifty-year old
war over the Middle East. In addition to supplying massive military
aide to Israel, American troops have shed blood nearby in Lebanon
in a related conflict. Further, there is reason to believe that
the terrorist attacks on September 11th were in part
in retaliation for American support for Israel. As a result of those
attacks, the United States is now at war in Afghanistan.
There
are other examples of countries getting into wars to advance discrete
private agendas. Ralph Raico writes that most Americans wanted the
United States to stay out of World War I, except for the East Coast
economic and social elite which had close business and social ties
to England.39 The United States has
engaged in numerous military actions at the behest of private corporations
that were foolish enough to invest in countries where property rights
were not secure. The United States fought a major war in Kuwait
and Iraq the only apparent reason for which was to preserve an oriental
despotism. Surely, the actual reason was to protect certain discrete
private interests in oil in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. From any practical
point of view, the dispute did not concern the average American
in the slightest. They would buy their gasoline as usual at the
pump, at prices set by the vagaries of the world oil market, regardless
of which crooked Middle East politician sold the rights to oil (he
had previously stolen) to some private company. Thus, once again,
war was fought by a democracy to advance a special interest.
Messianic
goals. Democracies are vulnerable to messianic crusades. Democratic
politicians have a sense of moral superiority which impels them
to reform other nations just as they seek to reform their own citizens
and societies. Woodrow Wilson is the foremost example of this spirit:
"America is henceforth to stand for the assertion of the right
of one nation to serve the other nations of the world."40
The temptation to add, ". . . whether they like it or not,"
is irresistible. Thus, the messianic impulse (rationalization?)
would launch America into the disastrous World War I, and later
wars such as Viet Nam, the Gulf War, and the bombing of Serbia.
Imperialism.
Oftentimes, democracies end up in wars that were seemingly started
by non-democracies. For example, the United States presumably got
involved in World War II because of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. The reality is more complex. What was in dispute was which
nation would be the dominant power in East Asia. America had staked
its imperial claim forty-three years earlier by going to war with
Spain. Subsequently, in a bloody war, America seized the Philippines
from the natives. Japan invaded China in 1937. America applied diplomatic
and economic pressure on Japan and demanded that Japan leave China.
An oil embargo was imposed. Japan responded by seizing the oil fields
of Malaysia and, anticipating American opposition, struck Pearl
Harbor. The genesis of the conflict, however, was America’s (democratic)
imperial designs on East Asia.
THE
MEANS OF WAR
Democracies
also have the means to fight wars. Analysts of war spend too much
time thinking about why wars are fought and far too little
time contemplating the means of war. The resources for war
are acquired by conscription, taxation, confiscation, and inflation.
Without cannon and cannon fodder, there are no wars. In modern times,
politicians neither fight nor pay for the wars they start or join.
With their aura of legitimacy, democracies are particularly adept
at utilizing all these means. Since citizens tend to identify with
the democratic state, there is usually little trouble conscripting
troops and confiscating the economic resources required for war.
Perhaps this is why democracies tend to win the wars they fight.41
War is the health of the state, but the democratic state is also
the health of war.
True,
dictatorships also seem to be able to secure the resources necessary
for war. Yet, our analysis is not so limited. We must also consider
the ability of self-government and republics to secure these resources.
Regimes of self-government obviously have no taxation or conscription.
Anyone wishing to go to war must convince others to contribute money
or troops. Generally speaking, however, wars are not profitable
activities. The United States, for example, expended huge amounts
of money fighting its major wars. It was able, however, to force
its citizens to pay for these wars against their will by means of
taxation, inflation42 and conscription.
Theoretically,
private groups could still wish to fight wars for economic or other
motives. Possibly, they could perceive these goals as outweighing
the costs. Still, they would have to calculate whether they could
achieve their goals more cheaply through trade or other peaceful
means. It is difficult to conceive of a privately-funded war for
natural resources that would be cheaper than simply buying them
in the market. Further, the warriors would face the prospect of
being ostracized for their violent acts, or losing the war and being
annihilated. All in all, under self-government, frequent or wide-scale
wars would be extremely unlikely.
Republics
also discourage war. Republics differ from democracies in that they
rely on militias, not conscription, for defense. The militia system
is a powerful deterrent to invasion. To achieve victory, an invading
army, with long supply lines, must subdue the entire able-bodied
male population, fighting in their own backyards. As the Civil War
demonstrated, it is a mistake for the invaded state to gather up
its men into standing armies, and then go confront the invading
army in set-piece battles in which the defenders are outnumbered.
Militia and guerilla tactics would probably have carried the day.
Conversely, militias are poor offensive weapons. They therefore
discourage aggressive or imperialistic wars. They also thereby discourage
preemptive strikes by other states that would otherwise fear invasion.
Financially, republics have little or no taxation with which to
fund aggressive war. Aggressive war lies beyond their constitutional
mandate and the pursuit of such a war is likely to be resisted internally
by well-armed citizens. Pure republics are unlikely to start
wars, or lose them.
The
imperial impulse springs mainly from the power elite. Ordinary people
are less interested in conquering far-off places. The problem is,
members of modern power elites are rarely interested in doing any
actual fighting. Nor can a republican militia do the fighting. Thus,
the elites turned inevitably to conscription, a concept alien to
a free society. A brief survey of the history of American conscription
shows its close link to imperial aims. Conscription was first proposed
in the War of 1812 to provide troops to invade Canada. It
was defeated in Congress. Conscription, opposed by New England in
1812, was supported by New England in 1863 to provide the Union
with troops to invade the South. Citizens were conscripted
to fight in Europe in 19171918. Troops were conscripted
to fight in Europe and Asia in 194145. Troops were
conscripted to fight in Korea and Viet Nam. Conscription
must be seen as an important tool of imperialism and war.
Summary.
The history and evidence of democratic bellicosity is thoroughly
explained by a theoretical examination of democracies’ motives for
war and means to wage them.
PART
IV – DOES DEMOCRACY PROMOTE PEACE? – A SUMMARY
From
the above discussion, we can now rank each regime in accordance
with the degree to which it achieves peace, foreign and domestic:
Figure
No. 14
|
Regimes
ranked by their peacefulness –
1.
Self-government
2.
Republics
3.
Democracy
4.
Dictatorship
|
Self-government
is based on the notion that compelling an individual to join a political
society against his will, is a violent and immoral act. The theory
of self-government does not allow for any offensive political
violence whatsoever. This is not to say that aggressive or offensive
violence will not occur under this system, merely that it is not
sanctioned by the theory itself. Thus, in theory, self-government
is the most peaceful form of political organization. Little empirical
evidence exists to confirm this. The reason for this is that by
the time the theory was originated – no earlier than the mid-nineteenth
century, and with greater force and frequency in the past forty
years – the modern nation-state system was fully developed and nearly
intractable. The state tends to grow, not contract, let alone cease
to exist!
Four
or five hundred years of statecraft and indoctrination have made
the viability of self-government unthinkable to the masses. The
popular mind laughs at the prospect of self-government, but is absolutely
certain that the modern state, which pointlessly killed 200 million
people in the last century,43 and
is off to a fast start in this one, can guarantee peace and harmony.
Brainwashed, anyone? Though self-government has yet to prove itself
in action, what cannot be denied is that it is the only political
system which leaves the laboratory of the mind without incorporating
aggressive violence into its very structure. In contrast, the state
system is aggressively violent in both theory and reality, producing
a virtually endless stream of lurid and grotesquely brutal episodes
in its career, murdering hundreds of millions of people it was allegedly
designed to protect, setting back human progress centuries, and
destroying modern man’s peace of mind in ways he may never fully
understand. In today’s world, in large part the product of the rise
of democratic states, tranquility is a state of mind best achieved
by the ingestion of tranquilizers.
Republics.
All other forms of government do sanction political violence, to
greater and lesser degrees. Republics sanction the least amount
of political violence. A republic would insist on a monopoly of
the use of legal power to resolve disputes. Fortunately, beyond
that, the republican form is consistent with peaceful relations
in virtually every other area of life. It is even conceivable, as
I have argued elsewhere, to have a republic that lacks the power
to tax.44 Even in a republic which
could tax, taxes would be limited to payment for narrowly circumscribed
function such as the courts, police, and national defense. Even
there, since republics rely on the militia system, defense costs
are greatly reduced, as is the risk of war, as other states are
assured that a republic will not launch a massive invasion with
a standing army. As Van Creveld observes:
"Once
the modern state started introducing regular, standing armies
and navies, the situation changed. . . . Almost for the first
time in history, there now existed forces that received their
entire incomes from the state . . . Increasingly excluded from
participation in political life, gradually of other functions
such as police work, and deliberately isolated from civilian society,
they possessed unprecedented freedom to devote their full attention
to discovering new and better ways of killing and destroying others
of the same kind."45
Democracies
are the next most peaceful form of government, but far less peaceful
than either self-government or republics. That democracies are generally
less violent than dictatorships is a fact that Rummel unduly celebrates.
The problem is that Rummel’s continuum of regimes runs from democracy
to authoritarian to totalitarian. He simply ignores the possibility
of self-government and the pure Lockean republic. In spite of their
advantage over dictatorships, democracies in fact tend to be aggressive,
imperialistic, and warlike. These tendencies provoke terrorism,
which in turn provokes further foreign intervention, and more terrorism,
in an endless circle of violence. While they tend to be aggressive
abroad, they continually grow domestically, in power, scope and
size. They ever-increase the property and liberty they confiscate.
They stir up ethnic and religious hostilities by pushing towards
one way of life for all groups, whether the politically weaker groups
like it or not.
Though,
in theory, a democracy could choose to be quite libertarian, establishing
a minimal state limited to protecting individual rights and private
property, this is a faint hope. The more realistic view is that
there is an inherent and unavoidable tension between individual
rights and democracy. If individuals are to be allowed to own themselves
and do what they wish with their justly acquired property, what
exactly is the role of the "will of the people" or the
majority or the legislature? Either these democratic mechanisms
will rubber stamp those rights, in which case, these mechanisms
are superfluous, or, they will overrule those rights, in which case
democracy becomes the enemy of libertarian rights and therefore,
an enemy of peace.
Two
of the most important wars in modern history were fought in part
for the express purpose of advancing democratic principles. In the
case of World War I, this is well known. Woodrow Wilson called it
the war "to make the world safe for democracy." We have heard this
refrain over and over again as the rationalization for war: in Korea,
Viet Nam, and the Balkans. As previously discussed, Lincoln explicitly
justified the bloody Civil War as a war to save majority rule.
The
modus operandi of democracies is closer to that of dictatorships
than is commonly thought. Though these regimes differ in the manner
that leaders are selected, they differ little in the manner in which
they relate to their individual subjects on a daily basis: both
regimes impose their will by force! True, most democracies have
in storage pieces of paper with words printed on them (constitutions)
which supposedly limit the amount of force they can use. Alas, as
Orwell taught us, words can mean virtually whatever we want them
to mean.46 At the end of the day,
the democratic state has the most powerful dictionary: the army.
Democracy
has more in common with dictatorship, that other species of the
genus: modern state, than it has in common with self-government
or republics. Similarities include: standing armies, conscription,
restrictions on bearing arms, the use of centralized power to control
vast areas of social and economic life, and the ability to confiscate
a large portion of the resources of their societies. Democracies
and dictatorships also actively cooperate to suppress republican
and self-governmental impulses such as secession and the private
ownership of arms.
While
democracies tend to be less warlike than dictatorships, their relationship
with dictatorships is complex and disturbing. They itch to fight
with dictatorships. They form alliances with them and provide them
vital military supplies and economic aid (Soviet Union, China).
They even covertly assist in overthrowing other democracies to install
dictatorships they believe will advance their interests.
On
the plus side, they do tend to murder their own citizens less than
certain dictatorships have been known to do. This is hardly anything
to brag about, however. I would not brag that I am a better basketball
player than the Pope. Democracies have, however, killed massive
numbers of their own citizens by starting or stumbling into wars,
and conscripting troops to fight them. Democracy is not the best
form of government for preventing democide. That distinction goes
to republics and self-government. By emphasizing the right to bear
arms, banning conscription, minimizing conflict through the free
market and free association, and starving the state of its aggressive
powers and confiscated resources, these regimes offer our best hope
of minimizing domestic death by government.
Ultimately,
the theory of democratic pacifism contains a dangerous contradiction:
- Democracies
do not fight each other
- If all
states were democracies, there would be no war
- War is
bad; peace is good
- Not all
states are democracies
- Non-democracies
are resistant to internal change
- The
goal of world peace requires that the democracies go to war
with the non-democracies to make them peaceful.
Proponents
of the theory, of course, will reject the last premise, but cannot
deny that it is an accurate description of much past history. World
War I in particular comes to mind. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains,
the United States’ intervention into that war, to advance democracy,
was the great catastrophe of the 20th century:
If
the United States had followed a strict non-interventionist foreign
policy, it is likely that the intra-European conflict would have
ended in late 1916 or early 1917 as the result of several peace
initiatives, most notably by the Austrian Emperor Charles I. Moreover,
the war would have been concluded with a mutually acceptable and
face-saving compromise peace rather than the actual dictate. Consequently,
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia would have remained traditional
monarchies instead of being turned into short-lived democratic
republics. With a Russian Czar and a German and Austrian Kaiser
in place, it would have been almost impossible for the Bolsheviks
to seize power in Russia, and in reaction to a growing communist
threat in Western Europe, for the Fascists and National Socialists
to do the same in Italy and Germany. Millions of victims of communism,
national socialism, and World War II would have been saved. The
extent of government interference with and control of the private
economy in the United States and in Western Europe would never
have reached the heights seen today. And rather than Central and
Eastern Europe (and consequently half of the globe) falling into
communist hands and for more than forty years being plundered,
devastated, and forcibly insulated from Western markets, all of
Europe (and the entire globe) would have remained integrated economically
(as in the nineteenth century) in a world-wide system of division
of labor and cooperation. World living standards would have grown
immensely higher than they actually have.
What
is urgently needed is a theory of pacific regimes that does not
require that the whole darn world be of a certain type. This paper
presents such theories. Both self-government and republics, virtually
devoid of aggressive ends and means, are far more likely than democracies
are, to peacefully co-exist with dictatorships.
Dictatorships
are the most violent form of government. They earn this distinction,
not internationally, but domestically, because of their tendency
to murder their own subjects. They do not exist in a vacuum, however.
They usually use hostile democracies to justify their police state
tactics. They often commit their democide during the chaos and fog
of wars which democracies had a hand in starting.
Dealing
with Terrorism. Ironically, in spite of their miserable record,
dictatorships, or perhaps a form of democratic totalitarianism,
may be the wave of the future. One of the lessons taught to us on
September 11 has yet to be fully understood. Due to the ever-increasing
dispersal of scientific and engineering knowledge, individuals now
for the first time in history can inflict tremendous physical damage
on states and societies. This new fact challenges the viability
of states which purport to possess a monopoly on the use of force.
There
appear to be only two possible approaches to deal with this new
reality. First, we could establish a totalitarian police state in
which all human behavior is closely monitored at all times to ensure
that no one abuses his technological powers. The problem with this
approach is that the cure is worse than the disease. Presumably,
most people would rather live in freedom for their entire lifetimes,
even with the possibility of an occasional catastrophic terrorist
attack, than spend their entire lives living in the novel 1984
or on the Gulag
Archipelago.
The
other alternative is more plausible and constructive. It focuses
not on preventing attacks already planned, but on creating societies
which do not produce terrorists or engender terrorism in the first
place. It is evident that only a radical transformation of human
society’s attitude toward the use of force can hope to achieve these
goals. Terrorism is the melodramatic use of force to achieve
political goals. Terrorism flourishes in an environment which features
the widespread use of banal force to accomplish political
goals and the widespread advocacy of the use of force to improve
human life. (The theorists of democratic pacifism are correct in
this respect: regimes do impact social mores.) An inescapable
aspect of such an environment is a large number of people who have
been the victims of violent state action. The natural resentment
this causes creates a ready army for terrorism.
The
pursuit of peace requires that we renounce the use of aggressive
political force to achieve our goals. This would limit the
use of force to self-defense or perhaps the modest amount of force
required to maintain a minimal state republic. More than this can
no longer be justified or tolerated. More than this now threatens
our civilization and our survival.
In
the end, the question is not, does democracy promote peace,
but, does the modern state with its democratic and dictatorial
variants, promote peace? That question has already been answered.
Figure
No. 15
|
Regimes
ranked by their peacefulness –
1. Self-government
2. Republics
3. Modern State
a. Democracy
b. Dictatorship
|
CONCLUSION
In
spite of infinite pronouncements to the contrary, we have every
right to be skeptical about the world’s desire for peace. How does
one reconcile this purportedly sincere and intense desire for peace
with the utter lack of interest in defining the term. If
you don’t know where you are going, you are unlikely to get there
save by accident. Needless to say, the world has yet to stumble
upon peace.
My
suspicion is, even if the world pondered the question and was inexorably
drawn to the common sense definition of peace proffered herein –
the absence of violence or the palpable threat of violence against
persons and their property – most people and most politicians
and most intellectuals would recoil in horror at the prospect of
such a world.
It’s
not that these people don’t like peace in general terms; it’s just
that there are many things they value more highly. Many of these
things can only be achieved by the use of democratic violence or
the palpable threat of democratic violence against persons and their
property. That is why we live in such a violent world. We are lying
in the bed we have made. Most people don’t want peace, not really.
If they did, it could be achieved without enormous difficulty since
"There is no way to peace; peace is the way."
Notes
- See,
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Anarcho-Capitalism:
An Annotated Bibliography.
- Cf.,
"Most basically, then, the fundamental questions of
human behavior, as for social and political violence and their
causes, have to do with mentality and not with material things."
Rummel, Power
Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (1997),
p. 153. But Rummel uses a purely physical definition of peace:
casualties.
- Rummel,
Death
By Government; see also, The
Black Book of Communism.
- See,
Rothbard, For
A New Liberty, p. 221.
- Sourcebook
of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2000, pp. 411412.
- FBI Press
Release, Jan. 14, 1998.
- Id.
- New
York Post, Jan. 26, 2002.
- Shielded
from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United
States, 07/98
- R. Peters,
"Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio,"
July 1996, Foreign Military Studies Office.
- See,
Étienne de la Boétie, The
Politics of Obedience.
- "Why
the Worst Get on Top," F.A. Hayek, The
Road to Serfdom.
- Quoted
in R. Raico, "American Foreign Policy─The Turning
Point, 18981919," at 61, in The
Failure of America's Foreign Wars (edited by Richard
M. Ebeling and Jacob G. Hornberger).
- Never
at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another.
Spencer R. Weart. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Power
Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (1997), p. 24,
n. 1.
- Ballots
and Bullets at
p. 35, citing Bremer, Stuart A. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions
Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 18161965,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1989) pp. 309341.
- "Conflicts,
Coup d'etat, Revolution, Insurrections, Civil Wars, and Wars
of the 20th Century," Brian
Blodgett.
- Power
Kills, supra at 109.
- H. Hoppe,
Democracy:
The God that Failed; Harry Browne: Why
Government Doesn’t Work; Ostrowski, "In Freedom’s
Way," Liberty (Feb. 1993), p. 42.
- Essays
on Political Economy (1872).
- J. Ostrowski,
"Republicans
and Big Government," Mises.org (Feb. 22, 2002).
- First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861. (For further discussion of
this passage, see, J. Ostrowski, "Was the Union Army's Invasion
of the Confederate States a Lawful Act?" in Secession,
State & Liberty,
David Gordon, ed., [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
1998]).
- T. Schwartz
& K. Skinner, "The Myth of Democratic Pacifism,"
Hoover Digest 1999 No. 2.
- Gowa,
Ballots
and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 1999), p. 113.
- Human
Action, 3rd rev. ed. 1966, p. 150.
- Socialism,
p. 6465.
- p. 823,
3rd. rev. ed. 1963.
- Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795) (emphasis added).
- See,
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/Chronicles/January2000/0100Signs.htm
- 2000
U.S. Maritime Service Veterans.
- Rummel,
Death By Government, p. 123 et seq.
- See, T.
Carpenter, "The United States and Third World Dictatorships:
A Case for Benign Detachment," Cato Institute Policy Analysis
58, Aug. 15, 1985.
- T. Carpenter,
supra.
- See,
Walter Karp, The
Politics of War (New York: Harper Colophon, 1979).
- Murray
Rothbard, America’s
Great Depression.
- Interview
with John McCone, former head of the CIA.
- R. Raico,
supra at 73.
- But not
by his protagonist Joanne Gowa, supra at 2324.
- Raico,
supra at 66.
- Id. At
65.
- J. L.
Ray, "Does Democracy Cause Peace," 1998 Annu. Rev.
Polit. Sci. 1:2746.
- Inflation
is a form of theft whereby the state, having arrogated to itself
the right to monopolize the production of money, increases the
amount of money and spends that new money, raising prices and
thereby decreasing the value of the money privately-held.
- R. Rummel,
Death by Government, p. 13.
- "A
21 Trillion Dollar Tax Cut," Mises.org, March 20, 2001.
- The
Rise and Decline of the State, pp. 250251.
- See,
Henry Mark Holzer, Sweet
Land of Liberty?
February
19, 2005
James
Ostrowski is
an attorney in Buffalo, New York and author of Political
Class Dismissed: Essays Against Politics, Including "What’s
Wrong With Buffalo." See his website at http://jimostrowski.com.
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