In
World
on Fire, Yale law professor Amy Chua fails to prove her
thesis that "the global spread of markets and democracy is
a principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence
throughout the non-Western world." World on Fire does,
however, present convincing evidence for a somewhat different
thesis: that modern democracy is no solution to long-standing
ethnic, religious and racial conflict. This book also leaves no
doubt that racial, ethnic and religious divisions will be a force
in world politics for some time to come, contrary to what the
wishful thinkers of the world would have us believe.
World
on Fire focuses on the phenomenon of "market-dominant
minorities" and the social and political problems that revolve
around them. Examples include: the Chinese in the Southeast Asia,
Lebanese in South America, Jews in post-communist Russia, and
miscellaneous market-dominant minorities in Africa. Freeing up
these economies tends to increase the wealth of these commercially-savvy
minorities. Democratic pressures then eventually lead to a political
backlash, often violent.
There
is little doubt that democratization has tended to lead to backlashes
against economically-successful minorities. Democracy
is a system in which the majority and its manipulators get to
force their will on minorities. Thus, coercion against minorities
is an inherent part of democracy. As I argue elsewhere,
many civil wars have resulted from the desire of a minority ethnic
group to secede from a state controlled by a hostile ethnic majority.
Chua’s
thesis that "free markets" lead to or cause violence,
is problematical. She must prove that the free market peaceful
trade leads to its opposite violence. One of her problems in this
regard is lack of a consistent definition of free markets. She
admits this is difficult to define but repeatedly uses words that
suggest she is speaking of very free markets indeed the
type libertarians support: "raw, laissez-faire capitalism,"
"unrestrained, laissez-faire," "raw, globally-oriented
free market policies," "laissez-faire market conditions."
The problem is that when we look at the actual economies in these
countries after alleged "free market" reforms, we see
not free markets but mixed economies and crony capitalism. The
author herself spells this out, thus creating a disparity between
the labels she uses and the realities she describes. Moreover,
this disparity is critical to understanding the hostility directed
at dominant minorities.
For
example, Chua writes that Chinese businessmen in Burma benefited
from crony capitalism and shared the proceeds with the junta.
In Indonesia, "Chinese plutocrats accumulated great wealth
by exploiting their corrupt ties with the increasingly hated Suharto."
In Mexico, according to Chua, the main beneficiaries of privatization
were the President and his cronies including Lebanese businessman
Carlos Slim. If shrewd minorities get rich through political pull,
that can engender ethnic hatreds that have nothing to do with
free markets. Also, in true free markets, great fortunes cannot
be made without also improving the living standards of the masses.
Better living standards militate against ethnic violence. Crony
capitalism of the type that is common in the third world is a
zero sum game or worse. Thus, Chua fails to prove that the free
market caused these ethnic backlashes. (If she is saying that
crony capitalism which allowed financially-savvy ethnic
minorities to get rich quick through corrupt privatization schemes exacerbates
ethnic tensions, she is on firmer ground.) Chua does deserve credit
for placing greater emphasis on democracy, rather than markets,
as a stimulus to retaliation against market-dominant minorities:
"Adding democracy to markets has been a recipe for instability,
upheaval, and ethnic conflagration."
There
is an additional problem for Chua which she makes no effort to
ignore. These ethnic hatreds precede the state capitalism or crony
capitalism that came later. Certainly, Jewish and Chinese minorities
have been attacked for centuries in various countries. In other
cases such as the Spanish in South America, a minority is resented
because it gained its economic advantage through invasion and
confiscation. If such resentment continues today under "markets,"
how can we say that markets are a cause of the hatred and violence?
Also,
in many cases, the same minorities that did well for decades or
even centuries also did well under crony capitalism. Thus, it
seems that in many countries, certain ethnic minorities simply
outperform the majorities in any system and are hated for
it, and they tend to be subject to retaliation even under modern
democracies. Again, the main lesson of the book is that, contrary
to what the Enlightenment mind would like to believe, ethnicity,
race and religion still count in politics, and democracy does
not, contrary to popular and academic belief, assuage these tensions.
There
are two important and timely ramifications of these truths. First,
poor, economically-unsuccessful majorities tend to use their voting
strength, and their physical strength, to beat up on economically-successful
ethnic minorities. Thus, those who advocate virtually unlimited
immigration into the United States, which eventually will lead
to just such a prospect here, should tell us why they desire such
a dismal American future. This is a practical and empirical argument
against open immigration that transcends the theoretical
debate among libertarians over open borders.
Second,
given that democracies allow ethnic majorities to beat up on ethnic
minorities, it is critically important to support the right of
ethnic and religious minorities to secede and form their
own nations. Secession turns out not to be a crackpot 19th
Century doctrine, but a sophisticated modern theory vindicated
by a large body of contemporary
scholarship of which World on Fire is merely the latest
example.
The
fact that the federal government of the United States is on the
wrong side of this issue is currently causing chaos and the killing
of American troops in Iraq, an artificial country created at gunpoint
by American ally Great
Britain, maintained by Saddam at gunpoint and now patrolled
by Americans who presently hold three captive nations: the Kurds,
the Sunnis and the Shiites.