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Was
the Union Army’s Invasion of the Confederate States a Lawful Act?
An Analysis of President Lincoln’s
Legal Arguments Against Secession
by
James Ostrowski
This
paper, included in Secession,
State, and Liberty (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers,
1998), edited by David Gordon, was delivered at the Mises Institute’s
conference on the political economy of secession. It is ©1998
by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. All rights reserved.
On
27 May 1861, the army of the United States of America (the Union)
a nation which had been formed by consecutive secessions,
first from Great Britain in 1776, and then from itself in 1788
invaded the State of Virginia,1
which had itself recently seceded from the Union, in an effort to
negate Virginia’s secession by violent force.
The
results of the efforts begun that day are well known and indisputable:
after four years of brutal warfare, during which 620,000 Americans
were killed, the United States of America forcibly negated the secession
of the Confederate States, and re-enrolled them into the Union.
The Civil War ended slavery, left the South in economic ruins, and
set the stage for twelve years of military rule.
Beyond
its immediate effects, the Civil War also made drastic changes in
politics and law that continue to shape our world 130 years later.
Arthur Ekirch., Jr. writes:
Along with the
terrible destruction of life and property suffered in four long
years of fighting went tremendous changes in American life and
thought, especially a decline in [classical] liberalism on all
questions save that of slavery. . . .
Through
a policy of arbitrary arrests made possible by Lincoln’s suspension
of habeas corpus, persons were seized and confined on the
suspicion of disloyalty or of sympathy with the southern cause.
Thus, in the course of the Civil War, a total of thirteen thousand
civilians was estimated to have been held as political prisoners,
often without any sort of trial or after only cursory hearings
before a military tribunal.2
The
Civil War caused and allowed a tremendous expansion of the size
and power of the federal government. It gave us our first federal
conscription law, our first progressive income tax, and our first
enormous standing army; it gave us a higher tariff, and it gave
us greenbacks. James McPherson writes approvingly:
This
astonishing blitz of laws . . . did more to reshape the relation
of the government to the economy than any comparable effort except
perhaps the first hundred days of the New Deal. This Civil War
Legislation . . . created the blueprint for modern America.3
Albert
Jay Nock was more critical of the war’s impact, especially on the
Constitution:
Lincoln
overruled the opinion of Chief Justice Taney that suspension of
habeas corpus was unconstitutional, and in consequence
the mode of the State was, until 1865, a monocratic military despotism.
. . . The doctrine of “reserved powers” was knaved up ex post
facto as a justification for his acts, but as far as the intent
of the constitution is concerned, it was obviously pure invention.
In fact, a very good case could be made out for the assertion
that Lincoln’s acts resulted in a permanent radical change in
the entire system of constitutional “interpretation” that
since his time, “interpretations” have not been interpretations
of the constitution, but merely of public policy. . . . A strict
constitutionalist might indeed say that the constitution died
in 1861, and one would have to scratch one’s head pretty diligently
to refute him.4
This
paper will attempt to explore Nock’s thesis by examining the central
constitutional issue of the war: was the Union Army’s invasion of
the Confederacy a lawful act? This will be done primarily by analyzing
the legal arguments made by President Abraham Lincoln in support
of the invasion and against the Confederate secession. This method
is justified by several facts. First, the invasion of the Confederacy
was ordered by President Lincoln. Second, President Lincoln was
one of the most brilliant lawyers of his era. As such, it is safe
to assume that his legal argument in support of the invasion was
of the highest quality. Third, it is likely that President Lincoln
read, thought, wrote, and spoke about the legal issues involving
the Civil War more so than any other pro-Union lawyer of his era.
He was aware of the pro-Union arguments made both by his predecessors
as well as by his contemporaries.5 Finally, President Lincoln, a superb writer and
speaker, had strong incentive to make his views against secession
known to the American people in order to secure their support for
the onerous war which was made necessary by his opposition to secession.
From the above facts, we can conclude that if the invasion of the
Confederacy was legally justified, such legal justification can
be found in the writings and pronouncements of President Lincoln.
This
paper will not address the morality of the Union’s invasion
of the Confederacy, except indirectly and only to the extent that
certain moral principles were undoubtedly reflected in the framework
of laws governing the Union in 1861. Thus, whether the Union’s invasion
of the Confederacy can be morally justified, even if found to be
unlawful, will not be answered here.6 It is the case, however, that the officials who
launched the invasion, especially President Lincoln, made no such
argument in 1861. He had previously indicated his views on that
issue by criticizing John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry.7
The
issue of the right of a state to secede is of more than historical
interest. Since the end of the Civil War in 1865, though several
amendments giving the federal government greater power over the
states have been ratified, there have been no textual changes to
the Constitution which explicitly prohibit secession.
There
was no attempt by either side in the Civil War to resort to federal
courts or international arbitrators for a decision on the legality
of secession. Nor has any state attempted to secede since the Civil
War. As settled as secession may be as a political or historical
issue to many, it has never been settled as a legal one. The recent
revival of secession talk and practice worldwide makes the present
undertaking a valuable one.
WAS THE
INVASION JUSTIFIED BY THE SEIZURE OF FORT SUMTER?
In
the context of a legal analysis of state secession, it was the Union’s
invasion of Virginia that is significant, and not the Confederacy’s
firing on Fort Sumter a month earlier. The Confederacy fired on
Fort Sumter to expel what it believed were trespassers on South
Carolina soil and territorial waters. By no means can the seizure
of the fort be construed as a threat to the security of the states
remaining in the Union, the closest of which was 500 miles away.
If
South Carolina illegally seceded from the Union, then both the Union’s
initial refusal to surrender Fort Sumter and its subsequent invasion
were lawful and constitutional. Conversely, if South Carolina had
the right to secede from the Union, then indeed the Union soldiers
in the Fort were trespassers and also a potential military
threat to South Carolina. Thus, assuming the right of secession
existed, the Union had no right to retaliate or initiate war against
the Confederacy. Its subsequent invasion of Virginia then marks
the beginning of its illegal war on the Confederacy.
The
incident at Fort Sumter is largely significant as a political victory
for the Union. President Lincoln, while holding a hostile military
force on southern soil, was able to outmaneuver the Confederacy
into firing the first shot of the war.8
That the shot would be fired, however, was guaranteed by President
Lincoln in his Inaugural Address when he disingenuously announced,
“there shall be [no violence] unless it be forced upon the national
authority.” He then defined the term “national authority” in such
a way as to insure that war would come:
The
power confided in me, will be used to hold, occupy, and possess
the property, and places belonging to the government, and to collect
the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these
objects, there will be no invasion—no using of force against,
or among the people anywhere.9
Whatever
one’s legal, political, or moral views about President Lincoln or
the Civil War, it should be obvious that Lincoln was being dishonest
here. He was suggesting that he would not resist secession, but
would continue to tax the seceders and to hold hostile military
installations on their property an absurdity. Before becoming
president, Lincoln had been more honest. He had simply said “we
won’t let you” secede. The truth is, the southern states wanted
to go in peace, but Lincoln “wouldn’t let them.”10
LINCOLN’S
LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECESSION
Lincoln
set forth his views on secession mainly in his First Inaugural Address
(4 March 1861), and his Special Message to Congress (4 July 1861).
In the first speech, Lincoln made primarily political arguments
against secession, apparently hoping to persuade secessionists with
his arguments. However, with secession already accomplished by 4
July 1861, Lincoln’s Special Address to Congress focused on the
alleged illegality of secession, to establish the legitimacy
of his intended military resistance to it. This paper will therefore
first consider the Special Message’s legal arguments against secession,
then the First Inaugural’s political arguments against secession.
In
his Special Message to Congress, President Lincoln called the doctrine
of the secessionists “an insidious debauching of the public mind.”
He said,
They
invented an ingenious sophism, which, if conceded, was followed
by perfectly logical steps, through all the incidents, to the
complete destruction of the Union. The sophism itself is, that
any state of the Union may, consistently with the national
Constitution, and therefore lawfully, and peacefully,
withdraw from the Union, without the consent of the Union, or
of any other state.
Ironically,
it was not “fire-eating” southern rebels who had originated this
“sophism,” but the man Lincoln called “the most distinguished politician
in our history”—Thomas Jefferson.11 Jefferson, who called Virginia his “country,” planted the seeds
of the secession doctrine when he wrote his Kentucky Resolution
of 1798, in protest to the Alien and Sedition laws:
The
several states composing the United States of America are not
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general
government; but that, by compact, under the style and title of
the Constitution of the United States, and of certain amendments
thereto, they constituted a general government for general purposes,
delegated to that government certain powers, reserving, each state
to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government;
and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated
powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void and of no effect.12
Hannis
Taylor called Jefferson’s compact doctrine the “Pandora’s Box” out
of which flew the “closely related doctrines of nullification and
secession,” which he notes, with less than perfect foresight, “were
extinguished once and forever by the Civil War.”13
Jefferson’s biographer, Willard Sterne Randall agrees:
[Jefferson]
forthrightly held that where the national government exercised
powers not specifically delegated to it, each state “has an equal
right to judge . . . the mode and measure of redress.” . . . He
was, he assured Madison, “confident in the good sense of the American
people,” but if they did not rally round “the true principles
of our federal compact,” he was “determined . . . to sever ourselves
from the union we so much value rather than give up the rights
of self-government . . . in which alone we see liberty, safety
and happiness.”14
Lincoln,
in reply to this “insidious debauching of the public mind,” constructs
a straw man secessionist argument: “This sophism derives much-perhaps
the whole—of its currency, from the assumption, that there is some
omnipotent, and sacred supremacy, pertaining to a State
to each State of our Federal Union.” No secessionist, including
Jefferson, ever made such an argument, though it sounds ominously
like a description of Lincoln’s own feelings about the Union.
Since the states created the Union, Lincoln’s denigration
of the states and glorification of the Union is paradoxical.
Lincoln
challenges the claim of reserved state powers by asserting that
no state, except Texas, had ever “been a State out of the
Union.” In fact, Lincoln argues that the states “passed into the
Union” even before 1776; united to declare their independence in
1776; declared a “perpetual” union in the Articles of Confederation
two years later; and finally created the present Union by ratifying
the Constitution in 1788. There are many problems with his argument.
Lincoln
confuses no fewer than four different concepts of union. Prior to
4 July 1776, the colonies were united by their increasing concern
over the violation of their rights by the British government. Their
representatives met in a Continental Congress which ultimately issued
the Declaration of Independence and organized the Revolutionary
War effort. Prior to 1776, no issue of secession from a union could
have arisen because the colonies still considered themselves part
of Great Britain. Neither were there any legal documents agreed
to by the Continental Congress which directly or indirectly addressed
the issue of secession. Thus, any union that existed prior to 1776
is of no importance at all to the issue of secession.
Next
comes the union created by the Declaration of Independence. The
most notable fact in this context is that the Declaration announces
a lawful secession by the colonies from Great Britain based
on the right of the people to alter or abolish their form of government.
It is thus apparent that the Declaration of Independence establishes
that the right of secession is among the inalienable rights
of men. The Declaration is, therefore, literally the last place
on earth one would hope to find legal justification for a war against
secession. It was adopted by representatives of the thirteen colonies,
and declared that those colonies had become “Free and Independent
States.” However, the Declaration was not a constitution, establishing
any particular type of union among the states, or specifying any
duties binding on them other than a moral commitment to mutually
defend their newly declared independence.
Ironically,
the past “train of abuses” Thomas Jefferson cited in support of
secession reads like a checklist of the tactics Lincoln and his
successors used against the South to prevent secession:
He
has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with
manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has
refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others
to be elected. . . . He has made Judges dependent on his Will
alone. . . . He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent
hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their
substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies
without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render
the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. He
has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign
to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his
Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For quartering
large bodies of armed troops among us. For cutting off our Trade
with all parts of the world. For imposing Taxes on us without
consent. For depriving us in many cases, of the right of Trial
by Jury. For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable
Laws and altering fundamentally our own legislatures, and declaring
themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases
whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us
out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered
our seas, ravaged our Coast, burnt our towns, and destroyed the
lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large Armies
of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation
and tyranny.
The
next union cited by Lincoln is the government established by the
Articles of Confederation, which were ratified on 1 March 1781.
Perhaps the most significant fact about the Articles is that they
specify, both in the preamble and in the body, that the union thus
created is “perpetual.” Article XIII states:
The
Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by
every state, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration
at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration
be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards
confirmed by the legislatures of every state.
In
contrast, however, Article II makes clear that “Each state retains
its sovereignty, freedom and independence and every Power,
Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”15
This sentence is divided into two clauses, the first speaking of
states retaining their sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and
the second reserving to the states those powers and rights not expressly
delegated to the United States.
Resolving
the apparent conflict between Article II and Article XIII as it
respects the issue of secession is unnecessary for our purposes.
Suffice it to say that the Articles expressed a desire for perpetual
union, while recognizing the independence of states, and omitting
any clear mandate or enforcement mechanism that prevents state secession.
They also established a decentralized federal system without a strong
executive power that apparently failed to arouse any secessionist
impulses in its short tenure.
The
union established by the Articles of Confederation, in spite of
its exhortation of perpetuity, was terminated by nothing other than
a secession! The proposed Constitution provided that it would
take effect upon ratification by nine states. On 21 June 1788, New
Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify. On that date, a new
union was formed, exclusive of Virginia, New York, North Carolina,
and Rhode Island, which had not yet ratified. That new union seceded
from the union formed by the Articles of Confederation in violation
of Article XIII, which barred any alteration in the Articles save
by unanimous consent.16
Significantly,
the exhortation of perpetuity from the Articles—which was repeated
five times—was dropped by the new Constitution. In response to this
embarrassing fact, Lincoln argues that the phrase “a more perfect
union” in the preamble implies at least the perpetuity of the Articles.
Evidently, the Framers either disagreed or chose to be silent on
the matter. (Indeed, common sense suggests that perpetual—forced—unions
are less perfect than consensual ones, about which more later.)
Their omission is especially significant since the term “perpetuity”
was part of the full name of the Articles: “Articles of Confederation
and Perpetual Union.” Thus, the Framers could not have missed the
term.
More
importantly, a comparison of the two texts reveals, contrary to
popular thought, that much copying was done by the Framers of the
Constitution. Entire clauses from the Articles were imported virtually
word for word into the Constitution. Examples include the following
clauses: privileges and immunities, extradition, full faith and
credit, congressional immunity while in session, ban on state treaties,
and ban on state imposts and duties. The Framers were clearly conversant
with the text of the Articles, yet no mention of perpetuity appears
in the Constitution.
Neither
does the Constitution explicitly say anything about state secession.
The word “secession” does not appear in the Constitution. The Constitution
neither prohibits a state from leaving the union nor explicitly
authorizes a state to do so. Nor does it explicitly authorize the
federal government to forcibly retain a state that has seceded.
Secession
was apparently not discussed at the Constitutional Convention.17 This may have been a deliberate omission:
It
would have been inexpedient to have forced this issue in 1787,
when the fate of any sort of a central government was doubtful.
But [this] subject [was] probably not even seriously considered
at that time.18
President
Buchanan later argued that if states had the right to secede, all
that anti-federalist concern about potential federal tyranny was
pointless.19 This is a clever, but strange,
legal argument. It uses circumstantial evidence to establish what
certain opponents of the Constitution might have thought
it meant on a point that was not widely discussed or considered
at that time. Such a method of constitutional interpretation is
tertiary at best. This article relies primarily on textual analysis
and secondarily on consideration of the purposes of the drafters
and ratifiers and their historical circumstances. It is not at all
clear why what opponents of the Constitution might have thought
it meant should be a criterion of interpretation.
Even
if it is considered important, however, there are still problems
with the argument, since many historians have concluded that most
people of the time believed the states retained the right to secede.20 Since the Constitution expanded the powers of the federal government,
omission from it of any mention of secession or perpetuity certainly
removes a potential source of opposition to ratification.
Another
problem with Buchanan’s argument is that its initial premise is
dubious. That is, it assumes that if a right to secession existed
under the proposed Constitution, opposition to it would have been
less severe. However, even if the Constitution explicitly
allowed states to secede, opponents of a strong federal government
nevertheless had strong incentive to oppose it for the simple reason
that the new Constitution meant the death of the minimalist Articles
of Confederation. Finally, even if anti-federalists believed that
the states retained the right to secede under the new Constitution,
they could well have thought with perfect foresight
that the federal government would nevertheless ignore that
right, and use military force to prevent such a lawful secession.
Thus, Buchanan’s argument is mere sophistry.
This
review of the legal history of the states contradicts Lincoln’s
claim that the states had always been part of a superior
union that implicitly forbade secession. In fact, such a claim is
preposterous. At various times, the states had been loosely joined
for their common defense without a constitution, while at other
times, certain states had been left entirely out of the union. The
very birth of the states as independent entities took place when
they ratified a Declaration of Independence that enshrined a right
of secession as an inalienable right of the people of each of the
states.21
We
turn next to Lincoln’s discussion of the Constitution as he believes
it relates to secession. He argues that while states have reserved
powers under the Constitution presumably referring to, but
not mentioning, the Tenth Amendment secession is not such
a power since it is “a power to destroy the government itself.”22
This, of course, is hyperbole and abuse of language. To depart from
is to destroy, according to Lincoln. If the union government was
destroyed by secession, what was the entity that put a million troops
in the field during the subsequent war?
Secession
does not destroy the federal government; it merely ends its authority
over a certain territory and sets up a new government to take its
place in that territory. Nevertheless, even if we meet Lincoln halfway
and concede that secession involves a partial destruction of the
power and scope of the federal government, how does that fact alone
prove its unconstitutionality?
It
still remains for Lincoln to confront the limited and delegated
nature of the powers of the federal government, and the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments which transform those principles into positive
law. He dodges:
What
is now combatted, is the position that secession is consistent
with the Constitution is lawful, and peaceful. It
is not contended that there is any express law for it; and
nothing should ever be implied as law, which leads to unjust,
or absurd consequences.23
Nowhere
does Lincoln mention the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Since those
Amendments carry much of the load of the argument for secession,
and were frequently cited by secessionists of the day, the failure
of the brilliant lawyer to grapple with them is strong evidence
of his inability to do so. Lawyers have often treated the weak points
in their cases with silence there and much noise elsewhere.
Not
only does Lincoln ignore the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, he simply
replaces them with an amendment of his own: states have no rights
that are not expressly stated in the Constitution. It was precisely
the point of those amendments, however, to ensure that no serious
lawyer would ever make such an argument.
The
Ninth Amendment states:
The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The
precise purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to respond to the argument
Alexander Hamilton made against attaching a bill of rights to the
Constitution. Hamilton argued that the expression of certain rights
such as free speech and the right to bear arms would, by longstanding
rules of legal interpretation, be construed to deny other possible
rights.24 The Ninth
Amendment was added to the Bill of Rights to make clear that rights
other than those specified were indeed retained by the people.
The
most authoritative source for unenumerated rights is the Declaration
of Independence. Bennett Paterson writes, “The Declaration of Independence
was a forerunner of the Ninth Amendment.”25 As we have seen, in the context of announcing secession from Great
Britain, the Declaration explicitly supports the right to alter
or abolish government. The author of the leading constitutional-law
treatise of the early-nineteenth century wrote:
To
deny this right [secession] would be inconsistent with the principle
on which all our political systems are founded, which is, that
the people have in all cases, a right to determine how they are
governed.26
Thus,
the right of a people to secede from a larger polity would appear
to be among the unenumerated rights that are protected by the Ninth
Amendment.
The
Tenth Amendment states:
The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.
The
Tenth Amendment complements the Ninth27
in providing a persuasive textual argument that the right of secession
is reserved to the states.28
The right to prevent secession is not delegated to the United States.
In fact, the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected a
provision that would have authorized the use of Union force against
a recalcitrant state. On 31 May 1787, the Constitutional Convention
considered adding to the powers of Congress the right
to
call forth the force of the union against any member of the union,
failing to fulfil its duty under the articles thereof.29
The
clause was rejected after James Madison spoke against it:
A
Union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide
for its own destruction. The use of force against a State, would
look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment,
and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution
of all previous compacts by which it might be bound.30
Neither
is the right to secede expressly prohibited to the states. Thus,
under the plain meaning of the Tenth Amendment, the states retain
the right to secede. This position is buttressed by the historical
fact that the states had the right to secede in 1776 and did not
expressly give up that right in ratifying the Constitution. To the
contrary, New York and several other states, in their acts of ratification,
noted which “the powers of government may be reassumed by the people,
whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness.”31
The Tenth Amendment also makes clear that a right or power need
not be expressly granted to the states by the Constitution. Rather,
the states are irrebuttably presumed to have such a power,
unless that power is expressly taken from them by the Constitution.32
Since
the acts of secession were approved by state legislatures, then
ratified by conventions whose delegates were elected by the people
of those states, there is no conflict between the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments in authorizing Confederate secessions.33
Lincoln
was therefore in error in suggesting that the right of secession
had to be spelled out in the Constitution. He did, however, make
an argument in the alternative that secession should not be “implied
as law [because it] leads to unjust, or absurd consequences.” Among
the “unjust” consequences of secession Lincoln cites are the financial
consequences. The federal government had borrowed money to purchase
the territories of several seceding states, and had contracted to
pay the debts of Texas when it entered the union. Also, the seceding
states would allegedly escape their share of the national debt.
All
these issues, however, are collateral to the issue of secession
and are therefore to be regarded as red herrings. We know
that even if the seceding states had hired an accountant, determined
the net amount, if any, owed to the federal government and
tendered payment in that amount, that President Lincoln would nonetheless
have ordered the invasion. Furthermore, if the war was fought to
recover a just debt, then the Union army would only have needed
to confiscate a sufficient quantity of Confederate property to pay
that debt, and leave in peace. That image is as absurd as Lincoln’s
argument. Since Lincoln’s argument is not a bona fide argument
against secession, we need not consider the complex issue of whether
the seceding states actually owed money to the federal government.34
Yet
another part of the Bill of Rights that is ignored by Lincoln is
the Second Amendment, which speaks of “the right of the people to
keep and bear arms” and to form a “well regulated Militia” in order
to protect the security of a “free State.” A reasonable interpretation
of this Amendment, based on its historical origins, is that the
people of the states have the right to defend themselves against
the tyranny of the federal government:
The
Second Amendment was designed to guarantee the right of the people
to have “their private arms” to prevent tyranny and to overpower
an abusive standing army or select militia.35
James
Madison, writing before the ratification of the Second Amendment,
commented:
Let
a standing army, fully equal to the resources of the country,
be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal
government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the
State governments, with the people on their side, would be able
to repel the danger. . . . To these would be opposed a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their
hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting
for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence.36
If
states have the right to protect themselves against federal tyranny
by force, they would appear to have the right to do so by the peaceful
means of secession. While the right of secession is not derived
from the Second Amendment, the denial of such a right renders the
Second Amendment incongruous. Lincoln not only ignored the Second
Amendment, he perverted its intent and undercut the premise
of Madison’s argument by calling out the militias of the
northern states to fight against the militias of the Confederate
States. His agents violated the Second Amendment rights of citizens
in border states by systematically seizing their muskets.37
Lincoln
cites only two clauses in the Constitution in his argument against
the legality of secession: the supremacy clause and the guarantee
clause. Each argument shares the same logical defect. The supremacy
clause, in Article VI, states:
This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
This
clause could arguably be invoked to negate secessionist legislation
as violative of federal laws against treason. Reliance on the supremacy
clause, however, begs the question. The supremacy clause can be
used as an argument against secession only if the Constitution requires
a state to remain part of the union38 it does not apply otherwise, nor, obviously,
does it apply to a state that has left the Union. Thus, arguments
from the supremacy clause assume as a premise precisely what is
in dispute: that the state is still part of the Union and thus bound
by the supremacy clause. In light of the arguments previously made
that the Constitution allows secession, one can just as easily
argue that the supremacy clause barred the Union army’s invasion
of the South!
Article
IV, §4, states that “The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” This clause
was cited by President Lincoln to justify a war to prevent secession:
If
a State may lawfully go out of the Union, having done so, it may
also discard the republican form of government; so that to prevent
its going out, is an indispensable means, to the end,
of maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an end is lawful
and obligatory, the indispensable means to it, are also lawful,
and obligatory.39
John
Adams once complained that “he ‘never understood’ what the guarantee
of republican government meant; ‘and I believe no man ever did or
will.’”40 Nevertheless, Lincoln’s argument again begs the
question. The clause itself applies only to a state in the Union.
Thus, to apply the clause, one must first assume that a state
may not lawfully secede.41
Those
portions of the guarantee clause not cited by Lincoln are instructive:
“The Unites States shall . . . protect each of them from Invasion;
and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”
Lincoln failed to cite the “invasion” clause, of course, since he
himself was planning an invasion of the southern states. Nor could
he very well justify the invasion on the grounds of preventing “domestic
violence” since he lacked the consent of the legislatures of the
Confederate states, to say the least. A plain reading of the Guarantee
Clause as a whole suggests it was written for the benefit of the
states, not to provide a pretext for invading them.
Lincoln’s
evasion of these critical portions of the guarantee clause are symptomatic
of the central fallacy of his constitutional view of secession:
his belief that the Constitution countenanced a military invasion
of the South and resulting extended displacement of its civil authorities
by military rule. To the contrary, the Constitution contemplates
a structure of state-federal relations in which the states must
take an active and voluntary part.42 This contrasts sharply with Lincoln’s
view of the Union as little more than a prison from which unhappy
states are not allowed to escape:
The
Union, in any event, won’t be dissolved. We don’t want to dissolve
it, and if you attempt it, we won’t let you. With the purse
and sword, the army and navy and treasury in our hands and at
our command, you couldn’t do it.43
Lincoln
believed that the Union would be fully preserved if that escape
was prevented by force. But was it? The Constitution uses the word
“State” over a hundred times. It does not establish a prison-inmate
relation, but rather a complex political structure in which powers,
duties, and rights are carefully split between the federal government
and the states. Even the Supreme Court, in two cases critical of
secession, admitted this:
The
States are organisms for the performance of their appropriate
functions in the vital system of the larger polity, of which,
in this aspect of the subject, they form a part, and which would
perish if they . . . ceased to perform their allotted work.44
Without
the States in union, there could be no such political body as
the United States.45
The
states were expected to choose members of the House of Representatives
and elect representatives to “The Senate of the Unites States [which]
shall be composed of two Senators from each State.”46
The states were also supposed to select electors who would then
elect a president. In addition, the states would each maintain militia,
which could be called upon by the President to defend the nation.47
States were required to respect the “Privileges and Immunities”
of the citizens of other states, give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of other states, and return fugitives from
justice to other states.48 The states were expected to actively participate
in the process of amending the Constitution, such amendments requiring
the consent of three-fourths of the states.49
State courts were expected to be bound by the Constitution, treaties,
statutes, and federal court decisions.50
Some
of the state functions listed above are simply not subject to being
effectively compelled by the federal government. Sending representatives
to Congress and participating in the election of a president fall
into this category. It is difficult to conjure an image of a state
being forced at gunpoint to elect a Senator.
Other
functions listed are subject to being compelled. Examples include
recognition of the court decisions of other states and of the federal
government. Such compulsion, however, in the presence of a recalcitrant
state government, requires the establishment of a lasting federal
military government in such state.
To
an extent, the South’s decision to seek secession through military
resistance obscured this fact. The South, having been defeated militarily,
and exhausted by war, reluctantly accepted federal authority in
order to rid itself of military occupation. In contrast, if a state
were to pursue secession by means of non-violent resistance and
complete non-involvement with the federal government, an anti-secessionist
federal government would have to permanently occupy and rule
that state in the manner of a colonial power, exercising even greater
authority than Great Britain held over the American Colonies prior
to 1776!51 That
ugly scenario, however, is precisely what anti-secessionist thinkers
are obliged to assert was the intent of the ratifiers of the Constitution
of 1788, that is, the intent of the thirteen states which had recently
fought long and hard to escape colonial status.
While
it may be true that some of the Framers intended the Union to be
perpetual, it is unlikely that even those Framers believed the Constitution
authorized the establishment of a military dictatorship to keep
it so. Thus, it could be said that while the issue of secession
was perhaps not contemplated by the Constitution, neither was forced
union at the cost of the military occupation of recalcitrant states.52
Such military occupation flatly contradicts the Guarantee Clause
drafted by those same Framers.
From
the moment federal troops occupied the South, the governments of
those states could no longer be considered “republican.” With apologies
to John Adams, by republican I mean a government exercising limited
powers delegated to it by the people, whose officials are answerable
to the people in regular and free elections.53
Since the very purpose of invading the South was to destroy the
state governments established by the people, in militarily occupying
those states, the federal government breached its obligation to
guarantee to each state a republican form of government.54
Since the federal government necessarily violated the Constitution’s
Guarantee Clause by waging war on the seceding states, it should
be evident that it had no constitutional authority to prevent such
secessions.
The
strength of this argument is best seen by noting the absurd linguistic
manipulations used to justify the constitutionality of military
occupation. Andrew Johnson, whom President Lincoln appointed the
military governor of Tennessee, and who, later, as President, would
appoint other military governors in the South, said in 1862 that
his authority to militarily rule Tennessee came to him by way of
the Guarantee Clause!55 The republicanism thus guaranteed by Johnson apparently consisted
of forcing on the people of the state of Tennessee certain forms
of government and policies they evidently did not desire. The rationale?
“[The] right of self-government could be temporarily impaired but
only for the purpose of assuring its eventual and permanent triumph.”56
The
other rationale for military occupation is also self-contradictory.
In Coleman v Tennessee, the Supreme Court held military occupation
lawful, not on constitutional grounds, but by resorting to international
law principles which apply primarily to independent nations.
Though
the late war was not between independent nations, but between
different portions of the same nation, yet having taken the proportions
of a territorial war, the insurgents having become formidable
enough to be recognized as belligerants, the same doctrine must
be held to apply. The right to govern the territory of the
enemy during its military occupation is one of the incidents of
war . . . and the character and form of the government to be established
depend entirely upon the laws of the conquering State or the orders
of its military commander.57
Thus,
to justify the otherwise unconstitutional military occupation of
a state, the Supreme Court treats that state as if it were an independent
nation, implicitly recognizing the validity of its secession.
What
the Court did not cite was any constitutional provision which justified
the war in the first place. Since the invocation of international
law was based on the fact of war, and the Union’s involvement in
that war violated the Constitution, it is evident that the Constitution’s
supremacy clause58 forbade any resort to international law to override
the Constitution. The unconstitutional and amoral nature of the
Court’s reasoning can be seen by assuming that the Confederacy,
in violation of the Constitution, had conquered the North and set
up a military government there. The Supreme Court, by the same logic
they applied in Coleman, would be compelled to endorse the
legality of that military dictatorship!
Much
ink has been spilled over the ancient debate between those, such
as Jefferson and Calhoun, who hold that the Constitution is a compact
among the states, and those, including Marshall and Webster, who
deem it “an instrument of perpetual efficacy” created by the people
of the nation as a group.59
The outcome of this debate can have no impact on the above conclusions,
since those conclusions rest primarily on an analysis of the relevant
texts and secondarily on the historical context in which those texts
were drafted. Nevertheless, because of the historical association
between this debate and the issue of secession, a brief evaluation
is appropriate.
Ironically,
reliance on the compact theory tends to weaken the case for secession
by suggesting that it is not justified by the actual text of the
Constitution. The main textual problem with the compact theory is
that the Constitution does not read like a contract among the states.
The main logical problem is that, while this theory claims that
the Constitution is an implied contract among the states, that document
creates a separate entity the federal government which
would not appear to be bound by the contract because it is not a
contracting party. Thus, secessionists erred in choosing poor ground
on which to do battle with unionists. The compact theory also creates
an insoluble procedural difficulty. If the Constitution is a compact,
the violation of which allows a state to withdraw, who is to judge
whether such a violation has occurred? However, reliance on the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, under which secession is a reserved
power, eliminates this procedural obstacle to secession.60
Nevertheless,
the compact theory contains an essential element of truth. It takes
the long way around the barn to arrive at the rather obvious conclusion
that the states enacted the Constitution for their mutual benefit.
Shifting then, from the quaint, complex, and controversial compact
theory to the indisputable proposition that a constitution should
be interpreted according to the purposes of its ratifiers, it becomes
apparent that the purposes of the Constitution do not envision the
use of armed force against a state that has concluded it is no longer
benefiting from the Union. The Constitution may not be a literal
compact among the states, but neither is it a sentence of perpetual
imprisonment.
While
unionists assert that the compact theory is nothing more than “scholastic
metaphysics,”61
their own view of the Constitution contains elements which fail
to connect with reality at any point. Bryce wrote that the Constitution
was “an instrument of perpetual efficacy, emanating from the whole
people.”62 Yet, as already noted, it contains no such language,
and, in fact, its Framers deliberately chose not to carry over the
use of the term “perpetual union” from the Articles of Confederation
to the Constitution.
Likewise,
the Constitution did not “emanate from the whole people.” Leaving
aside the preamble for the moment, the actual language of the texts
of Articles VII and V is to the contrary:
The
Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States
so ratifying the Same. . . . Done in Convention by the Unanimous
Consent of the States present.
[The
Constitution may be amended] when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths, thereof. . . .
Since
the Constitution was proposed by a convention called by the states,
was ratified by the states, and can only be amended by the states,
any notion that “the government proceeds directly from the people,”63 that it is “of the people” and “by the people,”64 or that it “emanates from the whole people” can
only be described as metaphysical nonsense invented by those who
view the states as a mere inconvenience on the path to creating
an all-powerful central government.
Much
has been made by unionists of the Preamble:
We,
the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution of the United States of America.65
This
reliance is understandable. If one lacks support for one’s view
in the text of the constitution, one seeks it in the preamble.
The italicized phrase, however, has no unambiguous meaning. Its
meaning depends on whether the word “United,” an adjective, or “States,”
a noun, is given greater emphasis. However, there is no need to
resolve this issue, because the presence in the Preamble of the
phrase, “We, the People of the United States” was an accident! It
originally read:
That
the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia
do ordain, declare and establish the following constitution for
the government of ourselves and our posterity.66
Judge
Eugene Gary explains:
It
was amended, not for the purpose of submitting the constitution
to the people in the aggregate, but because the convention could
not tell, in advance, which States would ratify it.67
Even
though unionists have placed great stock in the Preamble, their
recitations rarely extend past the first 15 words. Nothing thereafter
is particularly helpful to their cause. The Union’s creation of
martial law in the South can hardly be within the ambit of “establishing
justice” or “securing the blessings of liberty.” “Domestic tranquility”
was clearly not insured by the bloodiest war ever fought in North
America. The “general welfare” was not promoted when one section
of the nation fought, subdued, and militarily ruled the other for
16 years.68 And
“Providing for the common defense” does not in any way sanction
an attack on eleven states.
Ultimately,
one must look beyond mere logic and the four corners of the Constitution
to identify the unionist spirit that led to the Civil War:
The
union was . . . more than a mere compact between separate entities,
separate states. It was rather a union of early history and future
promise, of generations past and generations still to come, of
agriculture and industry, of plains and seaboard, of the vast
hosts of mystical and emotional forces which give to man a greater
sense of belonging, a greater sense of community.69
Gary
Wills denies the claim that Lincoln “did not really have arguments
for union, just a kind of mystical attachment to it.”70 He argues that Lincoln got most of his pro-union
legal arguments from Daniel Webster. Wills’s discussion of those
arguments (e.g., the Union is older than the states, and the Declaration
of Independence sanctions war against seceding states) tends one
to the view that Webster was a union mystic as well.
A
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Those
still harboring doubts about the constitutionality of secession
in 1861 should attempt a sincere answer to the question: would the
Constitution, as construed by President Lincoln and his allies in
all eras, have been ratified in 1788? To answer this question, we
must first make explicit those provisions Lincoln and his
successors thought were implicit in the Constitution. For
the sake of realism, these provisions will be organized in the form
of an imaginary Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.71 Such an amendment would read as follows:
(Imaginary)
Amendment XI
Section
1. Notwithstanding the Guarantee Clause and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, no state may ever secede from the Union for any reason,
except by an amendment pursuant to Article V.72
Section
2. If any State attempts to secede without authorization, the
Federal Government shall invade such State with sufficient military
force to suppress the attempted secession.
Section
3. The Federal Government may require the militias of all states
to join in the use of force against the seceding State.
Section
4. After suppressing said secession, the Federal Government shall
rule said State by martial law until such time as said State shall
accept permanent federal supremacy and alter its constitution
to forbid future secessions.
Section
5. After suppressing said secession, the Federal Government shall
force said State to ratify a new constitutional amendment which
gives the Federal Government the right to police the states whenever
it believes those states are violating the rights of their citizens.
Section
6. The President may, of his own authority, suspend the operation
of the Bill of Rights and the writ of habeas corpus, in
a seceding or loyal state, if in his sole judgement, such is necessary
to preserve the Union.73
This
imaginary amendment contains a fair summary of what Lincoln thought
the Constitution, ratified in 1788, had to say implicitly about
state secession. Would the Constitution have been ratified if it
contained such an amendment? Would that amendment have been ratified
at any time between 1788 and 1861? The answer to both questions,
according to any intellectually honest historian or constitutional
lawyer, must be a resounding “No!” If that is the case, however,
then the dense fog made up of equal parts of Websterian metaphysics
and Lincolnesque legalese disintegrates to reveal the truth of Albert
Jay Nock’s thesis: the Constitution of 1788 did indeed expire in
1861.
In
1861, the Constitution did not authorize the federal government
to use military force to prevent a state from seceding from the
Union. The Constitution established a federal government of limited
powers delegated to it by the people, acting through their respective
states. There is no express grant to the federal government of a
power to use armed force to prevent a secession, and there is no
clause which does so by implication. To the contrary, the notion
of the use of armed force against the states, and the subsequent
military occupation and rule of the states by the federal government,
does violence to the overall structure and purpose of the Constitution
by turning the servant of the states into their master. Any doubts
about whether the federal government had such a power must be resolved
in favor of the states, since the Ninth and Tenth Amendments explicitly
reserve the vast residue of powers and rights to the states and
to the people of those states.
LINCOLN’S
POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECESSION
While
Lincoln the lawyer made a variety of legal arguments against secession,
Lincoln the politician made two main political arguments against
secession. He argued that the option of secession violated the principle
of majority rule and that it led ultimately to anarchy.74
However, the line between legal and political arguments is not precise.
Further, it is undoubtedly true that considerations of policy and
consequences do impact on judgments about what the law is and should
be. Thus, a brief consideration of Lincoln’s views on that issue
is in order. It must be emphasized, however, that the distinction
between what the law is and what it should be is a real one. Thus,
the conclusions about Lincoln’s legal arguments remain valid,
regardless of the wisdom of his political arguments. In this
context, Lincoln’s arguments can be seen as points which should
have been made at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and incorporated
into the Constitution, but were not.
Lincoln’s
central political arguments against secession are contained in the
following passage from the First Inaugural Address, delivered on
4 March 1861:
We
divide upon [all our constitutional controversies] into majorities
and minorities. If a minority . . . will secede rather than acquiesce
[to the majority], they make a precedent which, in turn, will
divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede
from them, whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such
minority. . . . The central idea of secession, is the essence
of anarchy.75
The
argument contains two closely related elements:
(1) secession violates the principle of majority rule; and
(2)
secession ultimately leads to anarchy.
Majority Rule76
If
anything can be identified as the key axiom of Lincoln’s thought,
it is majoritarianism. He was devoted to the principle despite his
numerous electoral losses and the rejection of his presidential
candidacy by 60 percent of the electorate. Although Lincoln personally
opposed slavery, before the war he had favored allowing the majority
in each southern state to decide the issue.77 For the sake of a majoritarianism which he believed
was undermined by secession, he ordered the invasion of the South.
What Lincoln never confronted was the fact that the Civil War was
a war between two majorities.78
In 1860, Lincoln did not receive a single vote in North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, or Texas.79
The
ultimate justification of majority rule is that it is better than
minority rule. Its value is purely utilitarian more people
get what they want than if we let the minority rule. By its very
nature, the utility of majority rule increases as the political
unit is divided into smaller and more homogeneous units. For example,
if the largely black Roxbury section of Boston seceded from the
city,80 its voters,
currently outvoted by the majority white population, could increase
their utility by electing officials and policies they preferred,
while the white majority would remain able to enact its own preferred
policies.
Secession
therefore, far from being hostile to majority rule, allows multiple
satisfied majorities to be created out of large political units
which can only satisfy one majority bloc at a time. The only difference,
of course, is that the old majority is no longer able to impose
its will on the old minority. It is this loss of power over
the escaped minority and its territory, and not any devotion to
majority rule, that so irks unionists of all eras, often leading
them to start wars to retain power over the seceders. Evidence that
such was the case with the Civil War is contained in the following
passages from journals published at that time:
[The
North] fought . . . for all those delicious dreams of national
predominance in future ages, which she must relinquish
as soon as the union is severed.81
We
love the Union because . . . it renders us now the equal of the
greatest European Power, and in another half century, will make
us the greatest, richest, and most powerful people on the
face of the earth.82
In
examining these two quotes, it is remarkable to note that the first
journal, which was British, pro-South, and post-War, saw the war
in the same nationalistic and imperialistic terms as did the second
journal, which was American, pro-North, and pre-War. It should be
obvious that wars of this type are not sanctioned by the majority
principle; they are condemned by it.
Anarchy
We
have seen how the right of secession and the principle of
majoritarianism both tend to create pressure for smaller political
units. Lincoln argued that the principle of secession led by infinite
regress to anarchy, as each minority seceded to become a majority.
However, this theory is killed by an ugly fact history shows
that secessions, like revolutions, happen only seldom, because “mankind
are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to
right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.”
After all, it takes a “long train of abuses and usurpations” to
instigate secessionist activities.
The
best example of this is, after all, the Civil War itself. There
were unionists in the South and secessionists in the North, however,
no further secessions took place after the start of the war, even
though those were times of great stress and social conflict. Evidently,
the people on both sides used their common sense to put a brake
on Lincoln’s infinite regress.
Even
in theory, an infinite number of secessions is unlikely because
there is unlikely to be an infinite succession of major grievances
which are clearly solvable by secession. Ireland, for example, solved
its perceived major problem by getting rid of the British in 1922
(except in Northern Ireland). Evidently, no further significant
political problem there is sufficiently connected to the option
of further secession to stir any interest in the subject. Norway
seceded from Sweden in 1905 by a vote of 368,208 to 272!83 Since then, little has been heard from Norway
about further secession.
Lincoln
was wrong in believing that the right of secession invariably leads
to the break-up of nations. Rather, the recognition of such a right
will tend to discourage the exploitation of states by the central
government, which in turn will encourage states to remain in the
Union. Applying that principle to 1861, can the possibility be denied
that it was the Union’s militant rejection, over several decades,
of the right to secede that was itself the proximate cause of Confederate
secession? That is, the seceding states knew their secession would
be violently resisted Lincoln had told them so thus,
they made a strategic decision to make this fight before the North
grew any stronger, economically or militarily. Had Lincoln recognized
a right of peaceful secession, the Confederate states may well have
stayed in the Union and tried to work out their differences, knowing
that if such attempt failed, secession remained a viable option.
Jefferson himself believed that if the South ever broke off, it
would eventually return to the Union, presumably after it had renegotiated
its constitutional arrangement.84
In
this sense, secession actually reduces anarchy by allowing a peaceful
resolution of disputes between large political groups.85
In contrast, Lincoln’s policy of forced association led to four
years of anarchy and war in the South, followed by decades of sporadic
violence and lawlessness.
The
most interesting aspect of the topic of secession is how
little attention or discussion there is about the obverse of secession:
the expulsion of a portion of a nation by the larger and
more powerful sector. It is always the case that the people living
in a small part of a nation-state desire to secede; never that the
larger part wants to kick them out. The very fact that a portion
of the nation wants to secede, by the law of demonstrated preference,86 proves that those citizens believe
they are being harmed by being subjects of that nation. Similarly,
the rarity of historical expulsions proves that governments benefit
from ruling over and exploiting the various regions that are within
their control. This fact is consistent with the view of the nation-state
developed by Oppenheimer, Nock, and Rothbard87
as the organization of the political (coercive) means of
acquiring wealth:
There
are two methods, or means, and only two, whereby man’s needs and
desires can be satisfied. One is the production and exchange of
wealth; this is the economic means. The other is the uncompensated
appropriation of wealth produced by others; this is the political
means. . . . The State is the organization of the political
means.88
Another
significant aspect of secession is that, by and large, the parties
that urge various legal, political, and moral arguments for the
right of secession, do so because they are less powerful than the
majority block. If they were more powerful, they would simply secede
and be done with it! In sum, a seceding group is generally the weaker
and economically exploited junior partner in a nation-state. Thus,
in general, we may say that in any given secession dispute, right
is on the side of the proponents of secession, while might
is on the side of their opponents. That being the case, Lincoln’s
political arguments against secession must be rejected.
LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1861
If
states had the right of secession in 1861, have any developments
subsequently removed that right? That is actually a complex question
for which no entirely satisfactory answer exists. This is largely
because of the eternal question: who has the final say on interpreting
the Constitution?
One
fallacy that can be quickly disposed of is that the Civil War answered
the question of secession forever. We may call this fallacy the
Ulysses S. Grant theory of constitutional law: “the right of a state
to secede from the Union [has been] settled forever by the highest
tribunal arms that man can resort to.”89
Questions of constitutional law, however, cannot be settled on the
battlefield:
Throughout
history, force appears as the arbiter of the moment. . . . Reason,
organically slow-reacting against force only when the ill effects
of the latter become so general as to be inevitably obvious
finally confirms or annuls its judgement.90
If
indeed secession was a state and people’s right, all the Union victory
proved was that the stronger party in a constitutional conflict
may violate the law with impunity.
Neither
was the issue of secession settled by various Supreme Court decisions
resolving questions tangential to the issue itself.91 First, in none of those cases was the Court asked to deal squarely
with the issue of state secession when the outcome of the case impacted
on the rights of the seceding states and those states were represented
by counsel before the Court. Second, none of those cases contained
a detailed and serious analysis of the issues, arguments, and constitutional
clauses one would expect to see in a comprehensive treatment of
the issue by the highest court in the land. Therefore, these cases
carry little moral or legal authority.
Furthermore,
if the issue of secession had been taken to the Supreme Court, for
instance by the Confederacy seeking an injunction against President
Lincoln, the Court would likely have responded by refusing to hear
the case on the grounds that it dealt mainly with a political question,
that is, a question which, although a legal one to be sure, is not
suitable for resolution by the Court.92
Thus, secession is a question that has never been satisfactorily
resolved by the Supreme Court, and is not likely to be addressed
by the Court in the future.
Since
the Civil War, there have been two main legal developments impacting
on the issue of secession: the amendment of state constitutions
to prohibit secession, and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While under military control and occupation, the states of Arkansas,
North Carolina, Florida, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Virginia
each enacted new constitutions containing clauses prohibiting secession.93
Soon thereafter, the troops were withdrawn.
Such
clauses, however, did not in any way serve to abolish the right
of those states to secede from the Union. First, these clauses were
added only under duress. It is an ancient principle of law that
agreements made under duress are voidable at the option of the aggrieved
party. Second, those states remain free at any time to amend their
constitutions to delete the ban on secession.94 If they choose not to do so, that merely means
they are choosing not to exercise a legal right, which is quite
distinct from not possessing that right. Finally, since all states
have equal rights in the Union,95 the fact that other states have
not relinquished their right to secede means that these southern
states cannot be deemed to have relinquished theirs.96
The
Fourteenth Amendment, however, poses a more serious problem for
a constitutional doctrine of secession. That Amendment reads in
relevant part:
Section
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
The
Amendment goes on to make apparent reference to the Civil War by
prohibiting any military officer, who, having previously sworn to
support the Constitution, engaged in “insurrection or rebellion”
against it, from serving as a federal official.97 It further provides that no state shall assume
or pay any debt “incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States,” but that no debts incurred in “suppressing insurrection
or rebellion shall be questioned.”98
The
Amendment grants the federal government vast new powers over the
states in the context of a concern over the post-Civil War welfare
of the recently freed slaves. That fact, and the pejorative references
to “insurrection and rebellion” quoted above, allow a persuasive
argument to be made that the Fourteenth Amendment bars secession.
If it did not, states could simply secede, thus defeating the purpose
of the Amendment by avoiding federal regulation under §1 of the
Amendment. Ironically, if this argument is correct, the pre-war
case for secession is strengthened.99
That is, if the Fourteenth Amendment bars secession, then presumably
there was such a right before the Amendment was passed.
Is
there any room for a secessionist argument to be made in the post-Fourteenth
Amendment era? First, the obvious can be stated: the Fourteenth
Amendment does not explicitly prohibit secession. One would have
thought that the pro-unionists who controlled American politics
after the War would have included such a provision. Their failure
to do so, whatever the motive,100
means that resort may still be had to the pro-secession arguments
stated above. Unionists might respond by arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment implicitly bans secession, and, since it was passed
after the other portions of the Constitution, it prevails over them
in any conflict of meaning. That argument would be perfectly valid
if the Amendment explicitly banned secession. However, since
it does not, we are left with the need to resolve an apparent implicit
conflict between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. The best that can be said in this context is that any
secession movement designed to restore blacks to their pre-Civil
War political and economic status would be barred by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Second,
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the seceding states under
the same type of duress which forced several of them to ban secession
in their state constitutions. Indeed, ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment was made a pre-condition of readmission of the states
into the Union by the Reconstruction Act of 1867.101
It was only after such ratification that military rule was ended
in those states. Thus, as it regards the issue of secession, the
Fourteenth Amendment is tainted, having been enacted under the same
duress which this article concludes was a violation of the right
to secession, i.e, the invasion and occupation of the South by the
Union army. Thus, any Fourteenth-Amendment-based argument against
secession is self-negating, since it must implicitly concede a pre-Amendment
right to secede, the violation of which led to the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally,
in resolving any conflict between the Fourteenth and the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, reliance on the doctrine of inalienable rights
would be useful. An inalienable right is one possessed by a human
being that is so basic to his or her welfare that we do not enforce
any contract or agreement in which a person relinquishes such a
right.102 As Murray
Rothbard writes:
There
are certain vital things which, in natural fact and in the nature
of man, are inalienable, i.e., they cannot in fact
be alienated, even voluntarily. Specifically, a person cannot alienate
his will, more particularly his control over his own mind
and body. Each man has control over his own mind and body. Each
man has control over his own will and person, and he is, if you
wish, “stuck” with that inherent and inalienable ownership. Since
his will and control over his own person are inalienable, then so
also are his rights to control that person and will. That
is the ground for the famous position of the Declaration of Independence
that man’s natural rights are inalienable; that is, they cannot
be surrendered, even if the person wishes to do so.103
If
the right of secession is inalienable, then that right, protected
as it is by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, survives any attempt
to relinquish it through the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the
right to “alter or abolish” forms of government does appear to be
a fundamental right that should be considered inalienable.104 It is integral to the protection
of those other rights which Jefferson termed inalienable, such as
the rights to life and liberty. Thus, it is a right that should
survive regardless of its alleged implicit relinquishment under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The
Union’s invasion and subsequent military occupation of the Confederacy
were illegal. Today, however, the Fourteenth Amendment arguably
prohibits secession by implication. Nevertheless, that Amendment,
insofar as it can be interpreted to bar state secession is
tainted. It is the direct result of the illegal invasion and subsequent
military domination of the South. Even the Fourteenth Amendment
does not explicitly outlaw secession, and there remains a conflict
between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
in this regard. This conflict should be resolved by reference to
the doctrine of inalienable rights, of which secession is one.
No
doubt today’s Supreme Court, if it took the case, would rule secession
to be treasonous and illegal, not to mention highly politically
incorrect. The Supreme Court, being an agency of the federal government,
has, since John Marshall’s day, usually given the Constitution that
interpretation which increases the power of the federal government
over states and persons.105 Its continual abdication of
its purported role of guaranteeing constitutionally limited government
is in large part responsible for the recent revival of interest
in the theory and practice of secession. However, far more important
than what the Supreme Court would decide is the people’s own understanding
of the true meaning of the Constitution. The people retain the inalienable
right to alter or abolish a government destructive to their liberties.
The
existence of slavery in the Confederate States in 1861 cannot alter
this truth. The Constitution did not forbid slavery prior to the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, and since chattel slavery
no longer exists in the United States, it can no longer be used
to legally or morally justify war on a seceding state. That is as
it should be, since, ultimately, a policy of violent opposition
to secession is a policy of forced association. As with all forms
of forced association, the stronger party will tend to exploit the
weaker. Such is the case with the master-slave relationship. Such
is the case when a state is forced to remain in the Union against
its will. Both forms of forced association are immoral, and both
should be and are forbidden by the Constitution.
Had
the commander of the Union army, on entering Virginia on 27 May
1861, encountered the ghost of the finest American lawyer who had
yet lived, and asked for advice on the legality of his mission,
Thomas Jefferson would likely have replied, “Go back to your country,
Sir.”
6A moral defense of the Civil War as a crusade to end
slavery would have to begin by answering this question: how is it
justified to use involuntary servitude (conscription), leading to
the deaths of many of the “servants,” as a means of ending the involuntary
servitude of others? See Eugene Converse Murdock, One
Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971). For a view of the
Civil War as an attempt to preserve a vital portion of the American
Empire, see C. Adams, “The Second American Revolution: A British
View of the War Between the States,” Southern Partisan (1st
Quarter 1994): 16. On p. 21, Adams states, “It seems clear that
British war correspondents and writers saw the War Between the States
as caused by the forces that have caused wars throughout history—economic
and imperialist forces behind a rather flimsy facade of freeing
the slaves.”
9President Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address, 4 March
1861, Speeches and Writings, p. 215.
10Abraham Lincoln, speech, 23 July 1856, Galena, Illinois,
cited in The
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy Basler, ed. (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), vol. 2, p. 353.
11Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg, p. 85.
13Ibid., p. 310. The violent tone in which many unionist
writers proclaimed the death of secession is perfectly appropriate
given their ultimate means of dealing with secessionists: “The inextricable
knots which American lawyers and publicists went on tying, down
till 1861, were cut by the sword of the North in the Civil
War and need concern us no longer” (ibid., quoting James Bryce,
American
Commonwealth [New York: MacMillan, 1912], vol. 1, p. 322–3),
emphasis added.
16See James Garfield Randall, Constitutional
Problems Under Lincoln (New York: D. Appleton, 1926), pp.
14-15. The secession of 1788 can probably not be justified by reference
to Article VI: “No two or more states shall enter into any treaty,
confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent
of the united states in congress assembled, specifying accurately
the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long
it shall continue.” The new Constitution was an “alteration” which
had the effect of abolishing the previous government. Thus, such
a measure required the procedure set forth in Article XIII: consent
of Congress plus the unanimous consent of each of the states.
20See Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln,
pp. 15–16, n. 18; see also the classic by Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy
in America (New York: Harper and Row, [1835] 1969), p. 369.
21It should be noted that, while several seceding states
had not been part of the original thirteen, under the “equal footing
doctrine,” states later accepted into the Union share the same legal
rights as the original thirteen. See H. Morse, “The Foundations
and Meaning of Secession,” Stetson Law Review 15 (1986):
419, 429–31.
22Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, pp. 353, 355.
23Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, p. 257, emphasis
added.
25Bennett Paterson, “The Forgotten Ninth Amendment,”
in The Rights Retained by the People, p. 107.
27The
Ninth Amendment “is a companion to and in a measure the complement
of the Tenth Amendment,” according to K. Kelsey, “The Ninth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution,” in The Rights Retained by the People,
pp. 93–94.
28I note in passing the silly argument, advanced by
the New York Times on 12 April 1861, that since the South
claimed to be independent of the United States, it was no longer
able to claim the protection of the Constitution (see Stampp, And
The War Came, pp. 42–43). This is a disingenuous point,
since the Union’s entire justification for the war was that the
Constitution remained in effect in the South. Furthermore, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments protected the right of the states to secede,
while they remained part of the union. Thus, the act of ratifying
secession was a constitutionally protected act. Since the states
left the Union lawfully, the Union thereafter had no lawful authority
over them. Thus, the invasion of the South was unlawful. Having
left the union lawfully, the Southern states were no longer bound
by the various constitutional clauses cited above.
31Quotation from the New York ratifying convention,
cited in Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln,
p. 15, n. 18.
32For
a remarkably similar discussion of the meaning of the Tenth Amendment,
published after the initial presentation of this paper, see U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v Ray Thornton, United States Supreme Court,
115 S.Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995), p. 1876. (Dissenting opinion of Justice
Thomas, joined in by Justices Renquist, O’Connor and Scalia): “the
States can exercise all powers that the Constitution does not withhold
from them.”
33Morse, “The Foundations and Meaning of Secession,”
pp. 435–36.
36The Federalist Papers, no. 46, emphasis
added.
37Dean
Sprague, Freedom Under Lincoln (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1965), pp. 55, 80, 90, 203, and 220.
38See Morse, “The Foundations and Meaning of Secession,”
p. 425, n. 35.
39Lincoln, Special Message, Speeches and Writings,
p. 261.
41Since the seceding states ultimately formed a confederation,
does the constitutional prohibition on states entering into a “confederation”
[Art. I, §10] prohibit secession? Such an argument suffers from
the same logical fallacy as resort to the supremacy and guarantee
clauses. This clause governs only states which are still part of
the United States. Thus, to apply this clause to a state which has
previously seceded, one must assume that the secession was invalid,
which begs the question. Further, the United States did not invade
the southern states because they had formed a confederacy; it invaded
because of the alleged illegality of their secession. In fact, each
state had seceded prior to joining the Confederacy. For example,
by the time the first Confederate Constitution was passed on 8 February
1861, all the member states at that time had already seceded. See
Edward Alfred Pollard, Southern
History of the War (New York: Fairfax Press, 1866), pp.
44-45; Morse, “The Foundations and Meaning of Secession,” p. 436.
42Cf.
“Opinion on Secession by Attorney General Black,” in Great Debates
in American History, pp. 292–93; “Last Annual Message of President
Buchanan,” ibid., pp. 293–305.
43Lincoln, Galena speech, p. 355, emphasis added.
44White v Hart, 646, 650 (1871).
45Texas v White, 74 U.S. 718, 725 (1868).
46U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §3.
47U.S.
Constitution, Art I., §8; U.S. Constitution, Art. II, §2; U.S. Constitution,
Amend. II.
48U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, §1 and 2.
49U.S. Constitution, Art. V.
50U.S. Constitution, Art. VI.
51The colonies, after all, did enjoy limited self-government
through colonial legislatures.
53A
state, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political
community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries,
and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written
constitution and established by the consent of the governed.” Texas
v White, 721.
54
U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, §4. It is true that the South no longer
considered itself governed by the Constitution, including the guarantee
clause. The argument in the text does not rest on an assumption
that the guarantee clause applies to states after they have
successfully seceded. Rather, it merely points out that the federal
government cannot constitutionally use military force to prevent
secession in the first place.
55 See Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, pp. 183–84.
57Coleman v Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1879)
(emphasis added).
58“The Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.” U.S. Constitution, Art. IV.
59Cf. Taylor, The
Origin and Growth of the American Constitution, pp. 296–341;
D. Tipton, Nullification and Interposition in American Political
Thought (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969);
Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, pp. 12–24;
B. Samuel, Secession and Constitutional Liberty (New York:
Neale Publishing, 1920); Daniel Wait Howe, Political
History of Secession to the Beginning of the American Civil War
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1914), pp. 15–36; Eugene Gary, “The
Constitutional Right of Secession,” Central Law Journal 76:
165.
60While Jefferson clearly held the compact theory of
the Constitution, which implies a need to justify a secession, he
simultaneously held to the Ninth and Tenth Amendment approach of
this article, which treats secession as an unconditional right of
each state: “If any State in the Union will declare that it prefers
separation . . . I have no hesitation in saying ‘let us separate.’”
Letter of Jefferson to W. Crawford (20 June 1816), The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, Paul Ford, ed. (New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1899), vol. 10, 1816–1826, pp. 34–35.
61Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the American
Constitution, p. 310.
62Bryce,
American Commonwealth, vol. 1, p. 322.
63McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316 (1819).
64President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, 19
November 1863, Speeches and Writings, p. 536.
66Gary, “The Constitutional Right of Secession,” p.
171.
68The political domination of the South lived well
past the end of Reconstruction. “After the Civil War a century passed
before another resident of the South was elected president. . .
. For half a century after the war, none of the speakers
or presidents pro tem [of the Senate] was from the South.” McPherson,
Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution, p. 13.
70Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg, pp. 125ff.
71The real Eleventh Amendment was not ratified until
1795.
72Which clauses in the Constitution would such an amendment
violate?
73For evidence that during the war the federal government
violated most, if not all, of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution
in the Northern and border states, see, generally, Sprague,
Freedom Under Lincoln.
74A full consideration of the political arguments for
and against secession is beyond the scope of this article. On this,
cf. Lee C. Buchheit, Secession:
The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1978); Buchanan, Secession:
The Morality of Political Divorce; Allen E. Buchanan, “Self-Determination
and the Right to Secede,” Journal of International Affairs
45 (1992): 347; Allen E. Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession,”
Ethics 101 (1991): 322; M. Kampelman, “Secession and Self-Determination,”
Current 5 (November 1993): 35; R. McGee, “A Third Liberal
Theory of Secession,” Liverpool Law Review 14 (1992): 45;
Amitai Etzioni, “The Evils of Self-Determination,” Foreign Policy
89 (Winter 1992/93): 21; Alexis Heraclides, “Secession, Self-Determination
and Nonintervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis,” Journal
of International Affairs 5 (1992): 399; Harry Beran, “A Liberal
Theory of Secession,” Political Studies 32 (1984): 21.
75Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, p. 220.
77See President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address,
4 March 1861.
78He had apparently forgotten his speech in Congress
in 1848: “Any portion of such people that can, may revolutionize,
and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit.
More than this, a majority of any portion of such people may revolutionize,
putting down a minority, intermingled with, or near about them,
who may oppose their movements.” Quoted in Alexander H. Stephens,
A
Constitutional View of the War Between the States (Philadelphia:
National Publishing Company, 1867), vol. 1, p. 520.
79Howe, Political History of Secession, p. 446.
The Republican Party was a purely regional party, and simply was
not on the ballot across the South.
80As
it has tried to do in recent years. See “Seceding From Boston?”
Newsweek (3 November 1986): 30; “The Roxbury Rebellion,”
Common Cause Magazine (Winter 1992): 25.
81The
Athenaeum (6 May 1865), quoted in Adams, “The Second American
Revolution,” p. 19 (emphasis added).
82New
York Courier and Enquirer (1 December 1860), quoted in The
Causes of the Civil War, rev. ed., Kenneth Stampp, ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 55 (emphasis added).
83 Michael Hechter, “The Dynamics of Secession,” Acta
Sociologica 35 (1992): 267, 278.
84 Jefferson, letter to Crawford.
85 Those who blame secessionist movements for the violence
associated with them are blaming the victims. See Kampelman, “Secession
and Self-Determination,” p. 8. The violence invariably is caused
by the opponents of secession.
86“Every action is always in perfect agreement with
[a person’s] scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing
but an instrument for the interpretation of a man’s acting.” Ludwig
von Mises, Human
Action, 3rd rev. ed. (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1966),
p. 95.
88Nock, Our Enemy, The State, pp. 59–60 (emphasis
in original). Nock mentioned tariffs as one way the state appropriates
the wealth of others (ibid., p. 61). There is reason to believe
that the North gained economically at the South’s expense as the
result of the disproportionate impact of tariffs. See Adams, “The
Second American Revolution,” p. 20–22; Buchanan, Secession,
p. 41.
89Quoted in Tipton, Nullification and Interposition
in American Political Thought, p. 50.
90Samuel, Secession and Constitutional Liberty,
p. 14.
91See,
e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862), Mississippi
v Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (1866); Texas v White, 7 Wall.
724 (1868); and White v Hart, 13 Wall. 246 (1871).
92See Luther v Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (a federal
court could not competently decide which state government was in
power).
93Morse, “The Foundations and Meanings of Secession,”
pp. 431–32.
94Relying
on the doctrines of duress or equality of states.
95Morse, “The Foundations and Meanings of Secession,”
pp. 429–31.
97U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV, §3.
98U.S.
Constitution, Amend. XIV, §4.
99See Morse, “The Foundations and Meanings of Secession,”
p. 433.
100Not wanting to implicitly admit a pre-Fourteenth
Amendment right to secede?
102See
Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 135–36, citing Williamson
Evers, “Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts,” Journal
of Libertarian Studies 1 (1977): 3.
103 Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 135
(emphasis in original).
104A United Nations resolution “the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” states: “all peoples have an
inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory.” United
Nations General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Official Records, Supplement
16, Resolution 1514, A/4684 (1960) (emphasis added). While contemporary
international law recognizes a vaguely defined right of self-determination
of peoples, it does not as of yet recognize an absolute right of
secession. See J. Falkowski, “Secessionary Self-Determination: A
Jeffersonian Perspective,” Boston University International Law
Journal 9 (1991): 209; L. Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination:
A Territorial Interpretation,” Yale Journal of International
Law 16 (1991): 177; Note, “Secession: State Practice and International
Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,” Duke
Journal of Competition and International Law 3 (1993): 299;
Note, “The Logic of Secession,” Yale Law Journal 89 (1980):
802; Note, “The Law of Secession,” Houston Journal of International
Law 14 (1992): 521. Neither, however, does it prohibit secession
when such secession is lawful under the constitution of a given
nation.
July
29, 2002
James
Ostrowski is an attorney practicing at 984 Ellicott Square, Buffalo,
New York 14203; (716) 854-1440; FAX 853-1303. See his website at
http://jimostrowski.com.
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