Price Fixing in Ancient Rome
by Robert L. Scheuttinger and Eamonn F. Butler
Recently
by Robert L. Scheuttinger and Eamonn F. Butler:
Wage
and Price Controls in the Ancient World
This article
is excerpted from the book Forty
Centuries of Wage and Price Controls: How Not to Fight Inflation,
chapter 2: "The Roman Republic and Empire."
As might be
expected, the Roman Republic was not to be spared a good many ventures
into control of the economy by the government. One of the most famous
of the Republican statutes was the Law of the Twelve Tables (449
B.C.) which, among other things, fixed the maximum rate of interest
at one uncia per libra (approximately 8 percent), but it is not
known whether this was for a month or for a year. At various times
after this basic law was passed, however, politicians found it popular
to generously forgive debtors their agreed-upon interest payments.
A Licinian law of 367 B.C., for instance, declared that interest
already paid could be deducted from the principal owed, in effect
setting a maximum price of zero on interest. The lex Genucia (342
B.C.) had a similar provision and we are told that violations of
this "maximum" were "severely repressed under the
lex Marcia." Levy concludes that "Aside from the Law of
the Twelve Tables, these ad hoc or demagogic measures soon went
out of use."
The laws on
grain were to have a more enduring effect on the history of Rome.
From at least the time of the fourth century B.C., the Roman government
bought supplies of corn or wheat in times of shortage and resold
them to the people at a low fixed price. Under the tribune Caius
Gracchus the Lex Sempronia Frumentaria was adopted, which allowed
every Roman citizen the right to buy a certain amount of wheat at
an official price much lower than the market price. In 58 B.C. this
law was "improved" to allow every citizen free wheat.
The result, of course, came as a surprise to the government. Most
of the farmers remaining in the countryside simply left to live
in Rome without working.
Slaves were
freed by their masters so that they, as Roman citizens, could be
supported by the state. In 45 B.C., Julius Caesar discovered that
almost one citizen in three was receiving his wheat at government
expense. He managed to reduce this number by about half, but it
soon rose again; throughout the centuries of the empire, Rome was
to be perpetually plagued with this problem of artificially low
prices for grain, which caused economic dislocations of all sorts.
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In order to
attempt to deal with their increasing economic problems, the emperors
gradually began to devalue the currency. Nero (A.D. 5468)
began with small devaluations and matters became worse under Marcus
Aurelius (A.D. 161180) when the weights of coins were reduced.
"These manipulations were the probable cause of a rise in prices,"
according to Levy. The Emperor Commodus (A.D.180192) turned
once again to price controls and decreed a series of maximum prices,
but matters only became worse and the rise in prices became "headlong"
under the Emperor Caracalla (A.D. 211217).
Egypt was the
province of the empire most affected, but her experience was reflected
in lesser degrees throughout the Roman world. During the fourth
century, the value of the gold solidus changed from 4,000 to 180
million Egyptian drachmai. Levy again attributes the phenomenal
rise in prices which followed to the large increase of the amount
of money in circulation. The price of the same measure of wheat
rose in Egypt from 6 drachmai in the first century to 200 in the
third century; in A.D. 314, the price rose to 9,000 drachmai and
to 78,000 in A.D. 334; shortly after the year A.D. 344 the price
shot up to more than 2 million drachmai. As noted, other provinces
went through a similar, if not quite as spectacular, inflation.
Levy writes,
In monetary
affairs, ineffectual regulations were decreed to Combat Gresham's
Law [bad money drives out good] and domestic speculation in the
different kinds of money. It was forbidden to buy or sell coins:
they had to be used for payment only. It was even forbidden to
hoard them! It was forbidden to melt them down (to extract the
small amount of silver alloyed with the bronze). The punishment
for all these offenses was death. Controls were set up along roads
and at ports, where the police searched traders and travelers.
Of course, all these efforts were to no purpose.
The Edict
of Diocletian
The most famous
and the most extensive attempt to control prices and wages occurred
in the reign of the Emperor Diocletian who, to the considerable
regret of his subjects, was not the most attentive student of Greek
economic history. Since both the causes of the inflation that Diocletian
attempted to control and the effects of his efforts are fairly well
documented it is an episode worth considering in Some detail.
Shortly after
his assumption of the throne in A.D. 284, "prices of commodities
of all sorts and the wages of laborers reached unprecedented heights.
" Historical records for determining the causes of this remarkable
inflation are limited. One of the few surviving contemporary sources,
the seventh chapter of the De Moribus Persecutorum, lays
almost all the blame squarely at the feet of Diocletian. Since,
however, the author is known to have been a Christian and since
Diocletian, among other things, persecuted the Christians, we have
to take this report cum grana salis. In this attack on the
emperor we are told that most of the economic troubles of the empire
were due to Diocletian's vast increase in the armed forces (there
were several invasions by barbarian tribes during this period),
to his huge building program (he rebuilt much of his chosen capital
in Asia Minor, Nicomedia), to his consequent raising of taxes and
the employment of more and more government officials and, finally,
to his use of forced labor to accomplish much of his public-works
program. Diocletian himself, in his edict (as we shall see) attributed
the inflation entirely to the "avarice" of merchants and
speculators.
A classical
historian, Roland Kent, writing in the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, concludes from the available evidence that there
were several major causes of the sharp rise in prices and wages.
In the half century before Diocletian, there had been a succession
of short-reigned, incompetent rulers elevated by the military; this
era of weak government resulted in civil wars, riots, general uncertainty
and, of course, economic instability. There certainly was a steep
rise in taxes, some of it justifiable for the defense of the empire
but some of it spent on grandiose public works of questionable value.
As taxes rose, however, the tax base shrank and it became increasingly
difficult to collect taxes, resulting in a vicious circle.
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It would seem
clear that the major single cause of the inflation was the drastic
increase in the money supply owing to the devaluation or debasement
of the coinage. In the late republic and early empire, the standard
Roman coin was the silver denarius; the value of that coin had gradually
been reduced until, in the years before Diocletian, emperors were
issuing tin-plated copper coins that were still called by the name
"denarius." Gresham's law, of course, became operative;
silver and gold coins were naturally hoarded and were no longer
found in circulation.
During the
fifty-year interval ending with the rule of Claudius Victorinus
in A.D. 268, the silver content of the Roman coin fell to one five-thousandth
of its original level. With the monetary system in total disarray,
the trade that had been hallmark of the empire was reduced to barter,
and economic activity was stymied.
The middle
class was almost obliterated and the proletariat was quickly sinking
to the level of serfdom. Intellectually the world had fallen into
an apathy from which nothing would rouse it.
To this intellectual
and moral morass came the Emperor Diocletian and he set about the
task of reorganization with great vigor. Unfortunately, his zeal
exceeded his understanding of the economic forces at work in the
empire.
In an attempt
to overcome the paralysis associated with centralized bureaucracy,
he decentralized the administration of the empire and created three
new centers of power under three "associate emperors."
Since money was completely worthless, he devised a system of taxes
based on payments in kind. This system had the effect, via the
ascripti glebae, of totally destroying the freedom of the
lower classes they became serfs and were bound to the soil
to ensure that the taxes would be forthcoming.
The "reforms"
that are of most interest, however, are those relating to the currency
and prices and wages. The currency reform came first and was followed,
after it had become clear that this reform was a failure, by the
edict on prices and wages. Diocletian had attempted to instill public
confidence in the currency by putting a stop to the production of
debased gold and silver coins.
Read
the rest of the article
June
22, 2009
Robert
Schuettinger was educated in a one-room schoolhouse in Charlotte,
Vermont. He later studied under Nobel Laureate and Mises Institute
founding board member F.A. Hayek at the Committee on Social Thought
of the University of Chicago, where he also edited the New Individualist
Review with Ralph Raico. Eamonn Butler is director of the Adam
Smith Institute. See his website.
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