The Army’s 'Transformation'
by
William S. Lind
The
favorite buzzword in Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon is "Transformation,"
and for the most part it means nothing more than winning through
superior technology, an old but highly profitable delusion (see
Martin van Creveld’s Technology
and War). It is geared almost entirely to fighting other
states, which is to say jousting contests, and has little relevance
to war with non-state entities, which is where real war is headed.
So long as it keeps all the contractors happy (and it does), Washington
is content with it.
But
the U.S. Army seems to be looking for something more. I was recently
invited to join a daylong session of the Army’s "Transformation"
task force dealing with force structure, and I left with the feeling
that the soldiers in the group were striving for real reform (the
contractors were another matter).
It
has been widely reported that the Army intends to replace the division
with the brigade as its basic "building block," as advocated
in Doug Macgregor’s Breaking
the Phalanx. In itself, this is a positive change. Most
armies went to brigades or smaller divisions long ago.
The
problem is that change may be good but insufficient; the French
Army’s development of armored forces in the 1930s is an example.
Is what the Army is defining as "Transformation" sufficient
change to meet the Fourth Generation of modern war, or at least
bring it from the Second Generation (firepower/attrition warfare)
into the Third (maneuver warfare)? The answer is at best unclear.
Two
subsidiary questions might help answer that large question: how
far does the Army’s proposed "Transformation" move it
toward being able to engage non-state opponents effectively, and
if all the proposed reforms were already in place, how much difference
would they make in the two wars the Army is now fighting, in Iraq
and in Afghanistan? From what I saw in my day with the force structure
task force, the answers are a) not very far and b) not very much.
That does not bode well in terms of answering the larger question.
In my opinion, far more radical change is required than merely substituting
brigades for divisions as the basic building block.
Here
are two concrete examples: if "Transformation" truly means
moving the U.S. Army from the Second to the Third Generation, headquarters
above the brigade level would become both fewer and smaller. Will
that happen?
Another
example: a Third Generation military understands John Boyd’s point
that implicit communications are faster and more reliable than explicit
communications. Yet the Army (and the other services) continues
to spend billions making communications explicit, computerizing
anything and everything to the point where commanders drown in "information."
When Boyd asked German Generals Balck and von Mellinthin how computers
would have affected their ability to fight maneuver warfare, they
said, "We couldn’t have done it." Small staffs and a small
officer corps above the company grades, not vast information flows,
are the key to communications for a Third Generation army.
What
seems to be emerging from the Army’s "Transformation"
process is a hybrid of the Second and Third Generations. The concepts,
some of them anyway, are Third Generation. But the Army’s structure
will remain Second Generation. Hybrids are dangerous, because their
internal contradictions can become vast friction generators, and
Clausewitz tells us where that can lead.
The
key issue is not the Army’s force structure, but its culture. Does
it remain Second Generation, focused inward on process, prizing
obedience above initiative and depending on imposed discipline?
Or does it transition to the Third Generation, focusing outward
on the enemy, the situation and the result the situation requires,
prizing initiative over obedience and depending on self-discipline?
A Third Generation culture will eventually fix a Second Generation
force structure, but no force structure can help a Second Generation
military culture.
At
the end of the day, my impression was that the big, green Army dinosaur
has gotten its head up out of the swamp (apologies to you Ranger
types, but from my vantage point it appears to be an herbivore).
The question is whether it can evolve fast enough to match the speed
of change in war itself. If not, it will join the rest of its kind
in the coming mass extinction of Second Generation armies, and of
the states they defend.
January
22, 2004
William
Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the
Free Congress Foundation.
Copyright
© 2004 William S. Lind
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