Collapse of the Flanks
by
William S. Lind
by William S. Lind
DIGG THIS
In Iraq and
Afghanistan, the "coalition" defeats continue slowly to
unroll. In Lebanon, it appears Hezbollah may win not only at the
moral and mental, strategic and operational levels, but, astonishingly,
at the physical and tactical levels as well. That outcome remains
uncertain, but the fact that it is possible portends a revolutionary
reassessment of what Fourth Generation forces can accomplish. If
it actually happens, the walls of the temple that is the state system
will be shaken world-wide.
One pointer
to a shift in the tactical balance is the comparative casualty counts.
According to the Associated Press, as of this writing Lebanese dead
total at least 642, of whom 558 are civilians, 29 Lebanese soldiers
(who, at least officially, are not in the fight) and only 55 Hezbollah
fighters. So Israel, with its American-style hi-tech "precision
weaponry," has killed ten times as many innocents as enemies.
In contrast, of 97 Israeli dead, 61 are soldiers and only 36 civilians,
despite the fact that Hezbollah’s rockets are anything but precise
(think Congreves). Israel can hit anything it can target, but against
a Fourth Generation enemy, it can target very little. The result
not only points to a battlefield change of some significance, it
also raises the question of who is the real "terrorist."
Terror bombing by aircraft is still terror.
Understandably,
these events keep Americans focused on the places where the fighting
is taking place. But more important developments may be occurring
on the flanks, largely unnoticed. An analysis piece in the Sunday
Cleveland Plain Dealer by Sally Buzbee of AP notes:
Anger toward
America is high, extremists are on the upswing, and hopes for
democracy in the Middle East lie dashed….
"America,
we hate you more than ever," Ammar Ali Hassan wrote in the
independent Egyptian daily Al-Masry Al-Youm, in the kind
of visceral, slap-in-the-face rhetoric boiling across the region…."
Even many
Arab reformers now believe the United States cares more about
supporting Israel than anything else, including democracy.
Egypt is
one of the three centers of gravity of America’s position in the
Middle East, the others being Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. An article
by Michael Slackman in the Sunday New York Times suggests
that Egyptians’ anger is turning on their own government:
For decades,
the Arab-Israeli conflict provided presidents, kings, emirs and
dictators of the region with a safety valve for public frustration….
That valve
no longer appears to be working in Egypt….
"The
regular man on the street is beginning to connect everything together,
said Mr. (Kamal) Khalil, the director of the Center for Socialist
Studies in Cairo. "The regime impairing his livelihood is
the same regime that is oppressing his freedom and the same regime
that is colluding with Zionism and American hegemony."
Today,
in an interview with the BBC, Jordan’s King Abdullah warned that
the map of the Middle East is becoming unrecognizable and its future
appears "dim."
Washington,
which in its hubris ignores both its friends and its enemies, refusing
to talk to the latter or listen to the former, does not grasp that
if the flanks collapse, it is the end of our adventures in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also, in a slightly longer time frame,
the end of Israel. No Crusader state survives forever, and in the
long term Israel’s existence depends on arriving at some sort of
modus vivendi with the region. The replacement of Mubarak,
King Abdullah and the House of Saud with the Moslem Brotherhood
would make that possibility fade.
To the
region, America’s apparently unconditional and unbounded support
for Israel and its occupation of Iraq are part of the same picture.
For a military historian, the question arises: will history see
Iraq as America’s Stalingrad? If we kick the analogy up a couple
of levels, to the strategic and grand strategic, there are parallels.
Both the German and the American armies were able largely to take,
but not hold, the objective. Both had too few troops. Both Berlin
and Washington underestimated their enemy’s ability to counter-attack.
Both committed resources they needed elsewhere and could not replace
to a strategically unimportant objective. Finally, both entrusted
their flanks to weak allies – and to luck.
Let
us hope that, unlike von Paulus, our commanders know when to get
out, regardless of orders from a leader who will not recognize reality.
August
12, 2006
William
Lind [send him mail]
is an analyst based in Washington, DC.
Copyright
© 2006 William S. Lind
William
Lind Archives
|