Our
Inscrutable Iraq Policy: Why We Did It, What To Do Now, and What
Happens Next
by Karen
Kwiatkowski
by Karen Kwiatkowski
The
following is the text of a talk originally given in November 2004
for the University of Virginia, Charlottesville at a public event
sponsored by the UVA Students
for Individual Liberty. Versions were also presented at public
events sponsored by Libertarians
at Virginia Tech (September 2005) and the Appalachian School
of Law (October 2005).
Hello and thank
you. I want to talk tonight about three things. First, it is important
that we understand why we are in Iraq. Secondly, what should we
do now? And lastly, I want to explore how American foreign policy
might be conducted in the future to prevent disasters of the kind
we are experiencing in Iraq.
WHY WE ARE
IN IRAQ
- A little
about me and my perspective on the war on Iraq
- What the
Pentagon senior civilian staff and the President were saying
about Iraq did not match the intelligence I’d been looking at
regularly for over four years. Furthermore, it did not pass
the logic test.
- I moved
my retirement date up a few months and just after I retired,
in July 2003, Knight-Ridder
newspapers published an op-ed where I discussed the functional
isolation of the policy-makers, their cross-agency cliques of
likeminded ideologues, and the groupthink that afflicted them
in the rush to war.
- I realize
today that I was far too kind – improved process in the decision
making for the war in Iraq would have saved few lives. What
we have here is a war designed in fact to take lives, to bring
America to a new place where we are irrevocably physically,
financially and emotionally invested in the Middle East –
not just outsiders interested in peace or oil. It may be our
first war of empire in over a hundred years.
-
There are
two parts to the story of the why – why we were TOLD we went
to war, and why we ARE ACTUALLY AT WAR in Iraq.
- Why did
we invade and occupy Iraq? We were told that:
-
Now, many
people in this country and around the world knew that a lot
of the reasons put forth were invalid, not true, or to be generous,
were the result of a narrow political interpretation of a small
and known to be uncertain data set.
- People
in America, in the Pentagon, at CIA and the State department
knew much of the factual status of Iraq, including that:
- Iraq
was in a weakened military state, with no air force, or navy
and not much of an Army, in part due to the destruction of
the first Gulf War, a dozen years of sanctions and being bombed
by the US and the UK since 1991.
- Iraq
had accounted for over 96% of all suspected WMDs – the 4%
was a matter of debate, was it a mis-estimation, destroyed
or degraded but missing the paperwork, or did it still exist
in a viable form?
- Iraq
last sought material for his nuclear program in the late 1980s,
and under sanctions and US enforcement of the no fly zones,
had made no observed progress in his nuclear program, and
did not seem to be even trying to.
- Iraq
had no relationship with al Qaeda, but in fact they were competitors
and adversaries on governing and religious issues. Two thing
angered Osama bin Laden – US forces in Saudi Arabia, and a
godless Ba-ath dictatorship in Iraq.
- Iraq
had nothing to do with 9-11
-
Many
people knew that Saddam Hussein had not been associated
with a foiled attempt on the life of former President George
H. W. Bush, in 1993 when he and other Bush family members
and friends were visiting Kuwait. President Clinton sent
missiles into Baghdad in retaliation shortly thereafter,
although at the time and more so today, this purported 1993
attempt foiled by the Kuwaitis, did not emanate from Iraq.
-
But we
did invade Iraq, topple Saddam Hussein, destroy the Ba-ath Party
power structure and with it the functional infrastructure of
Iraq’s command economy, and we are occupying the country to
this day. Over 1100 1100, 1500,
over 2000 American servicepeople have died in Iraq, over 7000,
15,000, 25,000 have been seriously injured,
and almost 20,000, 30,000,
40,000 have returned home for less serious physical injuries
or mental or stress reactions. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have
been killed and millions of Iraqis are out of work, nearly three
years after their so-called liberation. Our military and commercial
contractors are "doing" security. We have handpicked
and sponsored the "political leadership," we manage
the energy sector among other sectors, and we make the rules
in Iraq. Why did we do this, and why did we do it in 2003? There
are several real reasons.
- One reason
has to do with enhancing our military-basing posture in the
region. We had been very dissatisfied with our relations with
Saudi Arabia, particularly the restrictions on our basing. There
was dissatisfaction from the people of Saudi Arabia, and thus
the troubled monarchy. So we were looking for alternate strategic
locations beyond Kuwait, beyond Qatar, to secure something we
had been searching for since the days of Carter — to secure
the energy lines of communication in the region. Bases in Iraq,
then, were very important — that is, if you hold that is America’s
role in the world. Saddam Hussein was not about to invite us
in.
- A major
reason for the invasion, and the urgency of it, is that sanctions
and containment had worked, and over the years, almost too well.
They had become counterproductive. Many companies around the
world were preparing to do business with Iraq in anticipation
of a lifting of sanctions. But the U.S. and the U.K. had been
bombing northern and southern Iraq since 1991. So it was very
unlikely that we would be in any kind of position to gain significant
contracts in any post-sanctions Iraq. And those sanctions were
going to be lifted soon, Saddam would still be in place, and
we would get no financial benefit. Some of you may have read
Naomi Klein’s Harpers article, published in September
2003, called "Baghdad
Year Zero." She makes a compelling case for the convergence
of business interests and a kind of neoconservative free market
ideology – and that the invasion and occupation was a clean
slate transformation of a command economy into a free trade
utopia. Neoconservative ideology does not embrace free trade
in the sense that libertarians or Adam Smith embrace it, but
instead prefers significant state involvement and leans towards
a social democratic model of domestic governing. However, Klein’s
article will be eye-opening for those of you who still think
that we went in for the reasons stated by the administration.
- Another
reason is a uniquely American rationale, and it relates to our
currency, and our debt situation. Saddam
Hussein decided in November 2000 to sell his Food for Oil program
oil sales in euros. The oil sales permitted in that program
aren’t very much. But when the sanctions would be lifted, the
sales from the country with the second largest oil reserves
on the planet would have been moving from the dollar to the
euro.
The U.S. dollar is in a sensitive period because we are a bigtime
debtor nation now. Our currency is still popular, but it’s not
backed up like it used to be. If oil, a very solid commodity,
is traded on the euro, that could cause massive shifts in confidence
in trading on the dollar. A recent article by Robert Freeman
called "The
Bush Budget Deficit Death Spiral" has this to say:
This
run-up in debt represents the most rapid, predatory looting
of public wealth in the history of the world. The interest costs
alone will consume the government and, soon, the entire economy.
In fiscal 2004, interest costs came to $321 billion against
a deficit of $415 billion. So three quarters of all the current
year borrowing is spent paying interest on past borrowing. This
is the most immediate symptom of the deficit death spiral.
Freeman also
quotes Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
under Richard Nixon was fond of saying, "Things that can’t
go on forever, don’t."
- In any case,
the first executive order regarding Iraq that Bush
signed in May [2003] switched trading on Iraq’s oil back to
the dollar.
- There are
other reasons, beyond bases, contracts, and stability of the dollar
during bad times. A big one is the general idea embraced by the
neoconservative ideologues in the administration that the best
thing we can do for Israel’s security is to be there. It is not
enough to send several billions in economic and military aid each
year, and it is not enough to veto UN resolutions that are unfavorable
to Israel. It is not enough to have bases in Saudi Arabia and
other conservative Arab monarchies and oligarchies. Some of these
American friends are not friends of Israel, and it makes taking
diplomatic actions against them more difficult. In the view of
many neoconservatives, America needs to be there, militarily and
economically in the region, working closely with Israel, our lone
democratic ally and one that has the human intelligence capability
on the ground that we have never had, and never will have.
-
You may
notice that building civil society, fostering democracy, and
helping improve a bad humanitarian situation are not the reasons
we went to Iraq, or why we are staying. We had no plan and fewer
resources dedicated to building civil society. We actually don’t
like democracies much, like those in Europe for example. We
tend to prefer those we buy to stay bought, and this is the
realm of dictators and monarchs in countries like Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia. Staying bought is a problem for democracies. Consider
the independence we saw in the democracy of Turkey when, in
spite of many millions of loan guarantees and aid we were offering,
they refused to allow our ground troops access to Iraq over
Turkish territory.
-
Lastly,
humanitarian reasons only make sense in an Orwellian scenario,
where we kill people in order to save them. If humanitarian
concern was a driver for our policies in Iraq, the economic
sanctions would have been lifted instead of waiting until after
we took over the country and unleashed chaos.
WHAT WE
SHOULD DO NOW IN IRAQ
Now – if we
understand why we actually went to Iraq, and we can honestly accept
that there were real hard-core reasons (albeit publicly unspoken)
for us to be there, we should be able to find a way ahead, to map
a future.
-
My advice
for the President comes in two versions.
-
The first
version is the moral advice, on what I believe is the correct
way to deal with what we have done in Iraq. The President would
admit he lied, either with foreknowledge or innocently based
on ignorance. He would admit that he based the invasion on false
public reasons. This lying and mendaciousness, and the administration’s
continuing cavalier attitude towards American lives, not to
mention Iraqi lives, trumps the real but hidden reasons. I would
advise that we pull out of Iraq completely, and leave any keys
to our new bases with the local Iraqi in charge, if we can find
him. We instruct our commercial companies in Iraq that they
are no longer going to be subsidized by the American taxpayer
at a monstrous markup, and that they are no longer going to
be protected and served by American troops in armored, and unarmored,
vehicles. Having done the right thing in Iraq, the President
must then immediately fire, and in some cases bring up on charges
the folks who advised him so terribly badly. This includes Cheney,
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, and Condi Rice. Tenet is already
gone. The President would then need to apologize to the American
people, and beg their mercy.
-
For obvious
reasons, this isn’t going to happen. No one, neither hawks
nor doves, wants to give up what we have got in Iraq – for
hawks it is the bases and the ability to leverage the region,
without Saddam as a thorn in our side. For doves, the idea
is that we broke it and somehow we must fix it. We cannot
"fix it" and we cannot stay and conduct military
operations without interference and high expense. Hawks and
doves are both wrong on Iraq.
-
The second
version of my roadmap for how to get out of the quicksand of
Iraq is meant to be pragmatic. It isn’t much different from
the first version, but it could be done. Here’s what we need
to do:
- Disassociate
ourselves immediately from our hand-picked and CIA sponsored
puppets. Offer Allawi (or whoever our current puppet is) and
the other twenty Iraqis who support America’s agenda in Iraq
safe passage and a nice pension.
- Withdraw
militarily to our key bases in Iraq, and stand down in preparation
to depart.
- Send a
presidential representative who has credibility in the region,
to make a farewell visit to major Iraqi political centers. This
representative must not be a neoconservative ideologue. We can
have no James Baker’s or Henry Kissinger’s (or Kissinger protégés
like Jerry Bremer), no Tommy Franks or even John Abizaids. I’m
thinking someone like retired Marine Tony Zinni who knows the
region and the players, and has personal credibility with them.
The guidance for the envoy is to simply diplomatically facilitate
the extrication of America forces from Iraq. The envoy would
work locally with whoever the regional leader is. Sound crazy?
This is exactly how we deal in Afghanistan, working with local
warlords, finding common ground by not dictating how they run
their territory. Do you think Hamid Karzai runs anything outside
Kabul? Some say he doesn’t even run Kabul, yet we are able to
function in Afghanistan because we know how to deal.
- Abandon
all hope of getting our money back, gaining contracts or military
bases in Iraq, having Iraq as a democracy that likes us or even
having Iraq as a single unified state. The new Iraq, or the
various states of the former Iraq, will get to decide if they
want euros or dollars for their petroleum. We might get lucky
on one or more of these things, but probably not. That’s what
happens when you break things. Sometimes they can’t be put back
together. Deal with it.
- After
a short time, we completely depart from Iraq. We have already
moved many of our regional resources from Saudi Arabian bases
into Iraq, so withdrawing from Iraq will seriously reduce our
total military presence in the region from what it was during
the sanction enforcement decade. We and our regional allies
will have to deal with that too.
- Power
struggles in Iraq will continue, and people in Iraq will continue
to suffer and die. However, this will be short-lived once we
leave. If we stay, it continues and can only continue on the
model of Vietnam in this regard. Almost a decade of an insurgency
that only grew more intense and more deadly, consuming lives
on both sides, until one side said "We win," and then
went home. Iraq is not worth 55,000 dead American sons and daughters,
not now or in ten years. It isn’t worth
1100,
1500, over 2000 dead American sons and daughters
today. Most Americans already understand this in their hearts,
but it is painful to admit it.
- Unfortunately,
this road map for the President also requires that he come clean
with the American people on the real reasons for why we are
in Iraq, the horrible mistakes of policy and planning that were
made, and the waste of resources and lives for which this administration
is responsible. We will all have to deal with this no matter
what.
There was a
great book published in late 2003 by Laurence Gonzales called Deep
Survival. It is a book about accidents and surviving disasters.
Gonzales is a contributing editor National Geographic Adventure
magazine, and has studied and written about accidents, risk taking,
and what distinguishes survivors from those who do not survive.
Believe it or not, his book applies to foreign policy as well, especially
foreign policy mistakes and a nation’s ability to survive them intact.
He describes
in his book a term that is well known to orienteering buffs. It
is called "map bending." Map bending occurs when people
are lost or spatially disoriented. Reality no longer fits your paradigm.
Your mental map of how things should be doesn’t fit what you see
with your eyes, hear with your ears, feel and experience in the
moment.
Instead of
taking in the reality all around you and creating a new fact-based
map of reality – the place you are at the moment – the person,
or the administration, simply renames things so that they match
the map. For example, instead of noticing that Iraq is a thriving
ungoverned space that is producing increasingly effective insurgents
and terrorists too, we might say, democracy is taking hold. Instead
of seeing that the foreign businesses and domestic productivity
is lower than it was under the poorly performing command economy
on sanctions under Saddam Hussein, we say "Iraq is a free trade
zone opportunity for the world."
Bending the
map. It is stage three of the five sequential mental stages of being
lost. Stage four comes next. Stage four is a deterioration of the
person (I would suggest the nation as well) both rationally and
emotionally, as the strategy fails to resolve the conflict. Gonzales
writes of the fifth and final stage, describing an individual in
a lost survival situation:
In the
final stage, as you run out of options and energy, you must become
resigned to your plight. Like it or not, you must make a new mental
map of where you are. You must become Robinson Crusoe or you will
die. To survive, you must find yourself. Then it won’t matter
where you are.
We are, as
a nation, bending the map in Iraq. What we need to do instead is
open our eyes, recognize the reality, and make a new map. We need
to find our self, as a nation. Which leads me to the third part
of my talk tonight – how U.S. foreign policy should be conducted.
HOW US FOREIGN
POLICY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED
- We have
some guidance for our foreign policy. The Constitution grants
to the Congress the sole authority to declare war. Holding Congress
accountable to their clear responsibility would save us many of
the problems we have gotten into when we instead allow the executive
to conduct small warlike actions around the planet. During the
Cold War, we made this a bad habit, and bad habits are hard to
break. But we have the means to do it. Simply follow the law,
both the letter and the spirit. Had Congress been asked to declare
war on Iraq, they would have done two things. First, they would
have asked for more information, and the CIA, in providing that
information, would have admitted publicly and privately that their
case that Iraq posed a material threat to America was weak. So
weak in fact that war was not only not necessary, it was laughable.
Secondly, just as appropriately, the Congress would have refused
to declare war on Iraq, and we would have not invaded the country.
However – it is important to know that had the President asked
for a declaration of war, and Congress refused it, that same Congress
would have bent over backwards to try to resolve the problem of
Iraq short of war. Congress would have intently studied our real
or perceived needs regarding Iraq. Our need for better basing
in the Middle East, more investment opportunities and dollar sales
of oil, our need to help Israel and reduce Middle Eastern terrorism,
all would have been a focus for the hundreds of smart people in
our Congress. Answers and solutions would have followed.
The President’s
contemporary national security strategy, published in 2002, declared
we would make pre-emptive war when we felt it necessary. With an
honorable Congress, when George W. Bush suggested that we attack
Iraq under this pretentious "strategy," this request would
have been perceived by the Congress in Shakespearean terms, as "…
a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
Crises
there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign
or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation
to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become
the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge
increase in the newer elements of our defenses; development
of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a
dramatic expansion in basic and applied research – these and
many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself,
may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.
But
each proposal must be weighed in light of a broader consideration;
the need to maintain balance in and among national programs
– balance between the private and the public economy, balance
between the cost and hoped for advantages – balance between
the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance
between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties
imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between the
actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future.
Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually
finds imbalance and frustration.
So we were
told only a few years ago, it seems. If we heed the Constitution,
the law, and the wise words of our greatest presidents, we have
everything we need to conduct a wise and prudent foreign policy.
Would it be slow to anger, quiet instead of loud and noisy, oriented
to peace and real trade and exchange, and not war? Would we lead
the world towards a brighter future? Yes, on all counts.
Would it be
oriented to defense? Absolutely. On September 11, 2001, we were
attacked, and a handful of fighter airplanes were scrambled, accomplishing
nothing. The intelligence communities were caught in a lurch. Trillions
of dollars invested in military might, and a trillion more in the
intelligence infrastructure, and we cannot defend our country. This
is because the investment is not for defense. It is for offense,
for expanding and administering what can be considered an American
empire.
The ingredients
for an improved American foreign policy are available for us today.
We have known it all along. It is within us, within our heritage
as a great nation. Like a person caught in an avalanche, we are
waking up a bit disoriented, and in considerable pain. Our inscrutable
foreign policy seems alien to us in many ways. We feel lost and
without options. But the answer is not to bend the map, but instead
to open our eyes wide to the truth. And our hearts, too. We need
to find ourselves first. To find ourselves, and our nation as well,
we must get back in touch with our core, our Constitution, and our
wisest and best lessons from the past. That this happens to be the
libertarian or classically liberal solution for America in the 21st
century should not frighten anyone. Instead, like successful survivors
in the final stage of being lost, we must resign ourselves to the
reality we find ourselves in, collect and draw on our core values,
and then move forward slowly, cautiously, but with faith and confidence.
Honestly allowing our core values as a nation, our law, and our
best lessons to guide our foreign policy is the quiet answer. It
can, if we let it, resist the excitement and the emotion and the
panic and the greed that sometimes leads us into foreign adventures
that come to no good thing. Our foreign policy, as with our deployed
army, needs to come home.
 October
24, 2005
Karen
Kwiatkowski, Ph.D., [send her
mail] is a retired USAF lieutenant colonel, who spent her final
four and a half years in uniform working at the Pentagon. She lives
with her freedom-loving family in the Shenandoah Valley, and among
other things, writes a bi-weekly column on defense issues with a
libertarian perspective for militaryweek.com.
Copyright ©
2005 LewRockwell.com
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