Neocon Collapse in Washington and Baghdad
by
Jim Lobe
Fourteen months
after reaching the zenith of their influence on U.S. foreign policy
with the invasion of Iraq, neoconservatives appear to have fallen
entirely out of favor, both within the administration of President
George W. Bush and in Baghdad itself.
The signs of
their defeat at the hands of both reality and the so-called "realists,"
who are headed within the administration by Secretary of State Colin
Powell, are virtually everywhere but were probably best marked by
the cover of Newsweek magazine last week, which depicted
the framed photograph of the neocons' favorite Iraqi, Ahmad Chalabi,
which had been shattered during a joint police-U.S. military raid
on his headquarters in Baghdad. "Bush's Mr. Wrong" was
the title of the feature article.
The victory
of the realists, who also include the uniformed military and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), appeared complete Monday with
the unveiling of the interim Iraqi government to which an as-yet
undefined sovereignty is to be transferred from the U.S.-led occupation
authorities Jun. 30.
Not only was
Chalabi's archrival-in-exile, Iyad Allawi, approved by the Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC) as prime minister, but neither Chalabi nor
any of his closest IGC associates, especially Finance Minister Kamel
al-Gailani – who is accused of handing over much of Iraq's banking
system to Chalabi during his tenure – made it into the final line-up.
"It looks
like Chalabi is the big loser," said one congressional aide
who follows Iraq closely. "And neocon has become a dirty word
up here," he added, referring to the Congress, where Republicans
have become increasingly restive as a result of recent debacles
in Iraq, including the scandal over the abuse by U.S. soldiers of
Iraqi detainees and leaks that Chalabi had been passing sensitive
intelligence to Iran, and may have done so for years.
"We need
to restrain what are growing U.S. messianic instincts – a sort of
global social engineering where the United States feels it is both
entitled and obligated to promote democracy – by force if necessary,"
said Senator Pat Roberts, a conservative Kansas member of Bush's
Republican Party and chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
in a speech last week that was understood here as a direct shot
at the neocons.
The neoconservatives,
a key part of the coalition of hawks that dominated Bush's post-9/11
foreign policy, were the first to publicly call for Saddam Hussein's
ouster, which they saw as a way to transform the Arab world to make
it more hospitable to western values, U.S. interests and Israel's
territorial ambitions.
Since the latter
part of the 1990s, when they led the charge in Congress for the
1998 Iraq Liberation Act (ILA), Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress
(INC) was their chosen instrument to achieve that transformation.
While no neocons
were appointed to cabinet-level positions under Bush, they obtained
top posts in the offices of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld –
where Paul Wolfowitz was named deputy defense secretary and Douglas
Feith undersecretary for policy – and Vice President Dick Cheney,
whose chief of staff and national security adviser was I. Lewis
"Scooter" Libby.
On the White
House National Security Council staff, they were able to place former
Iran-contra figure Elliott Abrams and Robert Joseph in key positions
dealing with the Middle East and arms proliferation, respectively.
Rumsfeld's
Defense Policy Board (DPB) was dominated by neocons, notably its
former chairman, Richard Perle, former CIA chief James Woolsey,
former arms-control negotiator Kenneth Adelman and military historian
Eliot Cohen.
Neocons, more
than any other group, pushed hardest for war in Iraq after 9/11
and predicted, backed up by Chalabi's assurances, that the conflict
would be, among other things, a "cakewalk" and that U.S.
troops would be greeted with "flowers and sweets."
Within the
administration, the neocons, again relying heavily on Chalabi's
INC, developed their own intelligence analyses to bolster the notion
of a link between former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the
al-Qaeda terrorist group, and exaggerated Hussein's alleged weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) to provide a more credible pretext for
war.
Their friends
on the DPB and in the media then stoked the public's fears about
these threats through frequent appearances on television and a barrage
of newspaper columns and magazine articles.
While analysts
and regional experts at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the State Department, which had dropped Chalabi as a fraud and a
con-man in the mid-1990s, tried to resist the juggernaut, they were
consistently outflanked by the neocons, whose influence and ability
to circumvent the professionals was greatly enhanced by their access
to Rumsfeld and Cheney, who served as their champions in the White
House and with Bush personally.
Their influence
reached its zenith in early April when Chalabi and 700 of his paid
INC troops were airlifted by the Pentagon to the southern city of
Nasiriya on Cheney's authority against Bush's stated policy that
Washington would not favor one Iraqi faction over another. Bush's
own national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, professed surprise
when informed of the move by reporters.
While they
were still riding high as U.S. troops consolidated their control
of Iraq, the neocons' star began to wane already last August when
it became clear that their and Chalabi's predictions about a grateful
Iraqi populace were about as well-founded as their certainties about
Hussein's ties to al-Qaeda and his WMD stockpiles.
Sensing trouble
ahead, Rice asked former ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill,
to return to the White House, where he had been her boss during
the presidency of George HW Bush, the current leader's father (1989-93).
By October, she and he had formed an inter-agency Iraq Stabilisation
Group (ISG) that gradually wrested control of Iraq policy from the
Pentagon.
It was a process
in which Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) chief Paul Bremer,
who had come to detest Chalabi and his neocon backers in Baghdad
and Washington, was an enthusiastic participant and which was effectively
completed with the announcement late last month that the State Department
was taking over the $14 billion in reconstruction money for Iraq
that the Pentagon has not yet spent.
In the last
month, the neocon retreat has turned into a rout, particularly as
reports of Chalabi's coziness with Iran gained currency and, just
as important, senior military officers indicated that a military
victory over the Iraqi insurgency was not possible.
The public
attention given to a blistering attack on the neocons by the former
chief of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Anthony Zinni, on the popular
television program, 60 Minutes, also demonstrated that the
media, ever cautious about taking on powerful figures, now saw them
as fair game.
When
Perle, Woolsey and several other neocons visited Rice at the White
House on May 1 to protest the shoddy treatment Chalabi was receiving
at the hands of the CIA, Bremer and the State Department, participants
said she thanked them for their views and offered nothing more.
Neither Rumsfeld nor Cheney nor any of their neocon aides attended.
June
2, 2004
Jim
Lobe is Inter Press Service's correspondent in Washington, DC.
Copyright
© 2004 Inter Press Service
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