Uncertainty and
Its Exigencies: The Critical Role of Insurance in the Free
Market
by Hans-Hermann
Hoppe [Posted on Tuesday, March
07, 2006] [Subscribe at email services and
tell others]
Any insurance involves the pooling of
individual risks. Under this arrangement, there are winners and
losers. Some of the insured will receive more than they paid in
premiums and some will pay more into the system than they ever get
back. This is a form of income redistribution from the healthy to
the sick, but the characteristic mark of insurance is that no one
knows in advance who the winners and losers will be. They are
distributed randomly or unpredictably, and the resulting income
redistribution within a pool of insured people is unsystematic.
If this were not the case — if it were possible to predict the
net winners and losers — the insurance losers would not want to pool
their risk with the insurance winners; they would seek to pool their
risk with other "losers" at lower premiums.
For example, let's say my insurance provider wanted to pool the
injury risk of someone like me, who sits behind a desk all day, with
the risk of a professional football player. In that case, we can
easily predict that I will end up being a constant loser: hardly
anything happens to me, but plenty of accidents will happen to the
professional football player, and my premiums would have to cover
his significantly higher risk of injury.
Now even if the insured themselves do not recognize that there
are systematically predictable winners and losers, free competition
in the insurance market would eliminate all systematic
redistribution among the insured.[1] In a
free market, any insurance company that engaged in any systematic
income redistribution (mixing people with objectively different
types of risks into one single group) would be outcompeted by any
company that did not engage in this type of practice. Another
insurance company might realize that there are people who sit behind
desks and rarely fall off their chair and insure themselves. They
would recognize that they could profitably offer a lower premium to
desk jockeys and insure them in a separate pool from the
professional athletes. And by offering lower premiums, they would of
course lure away those people who had previously been misinsured. As
a result, the various companies that had misgrouped people (by
mixing their low-risk clients in the same pool with their high-risk
clients) would have to raise the premiums for their higher-risk
clients to their naturally higher level.
Competition in the insurance market would lead to ever
more-refined subgroupings of people into groups that are internally
homogeneous. The discrimination of groups and subgroups would occur
according to actual group risks and the premiums for all groups
would then reflect the genuine insurance risks for that group, and
prices on the average would tend to fall due to competition.
To put an individual client into the right group, the insurer has
to discriminate according to various criteria. In the case of flood,
hurricane, earthquake, or fire insurance, they would use regional or
geographical criteria. They might use biological or genetic
characteristics in the case of health insurance. They might use
certain behavioral criteria or lifestyles: smokers and non-smokers,
people who are occupied in certain occupations that cause greater or
smaller risks, and so forth.
The Limitations of Insurability
Are there certain risks against which we simply cannot insure
ourselves? Mises defines events that can be insured against as
"risky events" and he uses a definition of what he calls "class
probability" to define these risky events:
We know or assume to know, with regard to the problem
concerned, everything about the behavior of a whole class of
events or phenomena; but about the actual singular events or
phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements of this
class.[2]
And then he gives some examples. For instance:
We have a complete table of mortality for a definite period of
the past in a definite area. If we assume that with regard to
mortality no changes will occur, we may say that we know
everything about the mortality of the whole population in
question. But with regard to the life expectancy of the
individuals we do not know anything but that they are members of
this class of people.
Another example:
Let us assume that ten tickets, each bearing the name of a
different man, are put into a box. One ticket will be drawn, and
the man whose name it bears will be liable to pay 100 dollars.
Then an insurer can promise to the loser full indemnification if
he is in a position to insure each of the ten for a premium of ten
dollars. He will collect 100 dollars and will have to pay the same
amount to one of the ten. But if he were to insure one only of
them at a rate fixed by the calculus, he would embark not upon an
insurance business, but upon gambling.
And then he says, concluding:
The characteristic mark of insurance is that it deals with the
whole class of events. As we pretend to know everything about the
behavior of the whole class, there seems to be no specific risk
involved in the conduct of the business.
Neither is there any specific risk in the business of the
keeper of a gambling bank or in the enterprise of a lottery. From
the point of view of the lottery enterprise the outcome is
predictable, provided that all tickets have been sold. If some
tickets remain unsold, the enterpriser is in the same position
with regard to them as every buyer of a ticket is with regard to
the tickets he bought.
Now note again that this definition of what he calls "class
probability" implies the absence of any systematic redistribution of
income: If I know nothing about any particular person's individual
risk except that he is the member of some group with a known group
risk, then all redistribution must be random. It implies also that
the individual cases that are grouped into one risk pool are
homogeneous. Within the group, we cannot tell the difference between
one individual and another. This implies also that the actual event
comes in the form of an accident — and unpredictable event for the
individual.
Now by exclusion we can also approach the complementary
questions: What sorts of events are uninsurable? When is the pooling
of risks impossible?
An uninsurable risk is one where the following condition holds:
If I know with regard to a particular risk some or all of the
factors that determine its outcome, then such a thing is no longer
accidental; its likelihood can be individually affected, and
therefore cannot possibly be insured. Or, to formulate it somewhat
differently, everything that is within either full or partial
control of an individual actor cannot be insured — cannot be
risk-pooled — but falls within the realm of personal or individual
responsibility.
Every risk that may be influenced by one's actions is therefore
uninsurable; only what is not controllable through individual
actions is insurable, and only if there are long-run frequency
distributions. And it also holds that if something that was
initially not controllable becomes controllable then it would lose
its insurability status. With respect to the risk of a natural
disaster — floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires — insurance is
obviously possible. These events are out of an individual's control,
and I know nothing about my individual risk except whether or not I
am a member of a group that is, as a group, exposed to a
certain flood or earthquake or fire risk.
In contrast, take for example the risk of committing suicide.
Would it be possible to insure oneself (to pool one's risk with
others) against suicide? The answer should be quite obvious: such a
thing is not a viable venture for an insurance company. After all, I
have full control over whether or not I deliberately kill myself. An
insurance company that offered suicide insurance would of course
attract potential suicide candidates. I could go there because I
want to do my wife a big favor, pay the premium, shoot myself dead,
and then my wife will be a millionaire. Insurance companies that
would insure such a thing would likely disappear from the market
very quickly.
Or take another example. Would it be possible to insure oneself
against committing arson — that is against the risk that I will burn
down my own house? Again, the answer seems to be clear that any
event that I can bring about deliberately (or the likelihood of
which I can affect) is, strictly speaking, an uninsurable event. The
risk that my house will be set on fire by lightening can be insured
against; the risk that I set my house on fire is not an insurable
event.
Now take the example of unemployment. As you know, there is
something called "unemployment insurance." In the modern world we
have invented the art of misnaming things, of applying terms that
are completely inappropriate and then trying to fool people into
believing that by changing the words, we have changed the nature of
things.
Unemployment is an uninsurable risk. I have full control over
being employed or not being employed. All I have to do is tell my
boss what I really think of him and I will soon be unemployed. On
the other hand, I can almost always make sure that I will be
employed if I am willing to take drastic wage cuts, for instance. If
I were to work for free, I would be employed. So obviously this is
not a risk that is insurable. It falls into the realm of individual
responsibility.
Here is an example that begins to take us in the direction of the
health insurance question: the risk of not feeling good in the
morning and not getting out of bed. No insurer could ever cover such
a "risk," because people do have at least some control over how they
feel in the morning. If I were insured against this risk — paid
whenever I don't feel so good — you can be pretty sure I would spend
far more time in bed than I currently do.
With respect to all these risks then, I cannot say, "I know
nothing about the particular risk except that I am a person and all
persons are afflicted by these risks with a certain frequency." In
fact I know considerably more about my individual risk, just as you
know considerably more about your individual risk.
Take an example where we have at least partial control. Can I
insure myself against the risk of making business losses? Obviously
not. While I have no direct control over the actions of the buyers
and non-buyers of my products (those who do directly
determine my profits and losses) I do have some control
over my business's success or failure. I have control over my
production costs, as well as the kind and quality and price of the
product I produce. In fact, I can make losses deliberately if I want
to. It would be impossible for me to pool my risk with other
business people, as if losses were something like being struck by
lightening.
Now with this distinction between accidental events, which are
insurable, and events that are uninsurable because individual action
can affect their likelihood, what then can we say about the
possibility of health insurance?
The first thing we can say is that sickness is insurable only
insofar as the health risk for a particular group is purely
accidental. Such is the case with certain forms of accident
insurance, or even for events such as cancer. But for most health
risks, we would have to say that they fall into the province of
individual control, and very little in this field is actually
insurable. Such risks must be assumed individually and must be paid
for out of individual savings.
Now in all recent debate about health insurance and healthcare
reform, the fact that certain things are completely uninsurable is
rarely if ever mentioned. Mises was the exception. In 1922, well
before the current healthcare craze, Mises addressed these issues in
his book Socialism. Here is a quote that is highly
revealing:
To the intellectual champions of social insurance, and to the
politicians and statesmen who enacted it, illness and health
appeared as two conditions of the human body sharply separated
from each other and always recognizable without difficulty or
doubt. Any doctor could diagnose the characteristics of "health."
"Illness" was a bodily phenomenon which showed itself
independently of human will, and was not susceptible to influence
by will.
And then he comments on this by saying:
Now every statement in this theory is false. There is no
clearly defined frontier between health and illness. Being ill is
not a phenomenon independent of conscious will and of psychic
forces working in the subconscious. A man's efficiency is not
merely the result of his physical condition; it depends largely on
his mind and will. Thus the whole idea of being able to separate,
by medical examination, the unfit from the fit and from the
malingerers, and those able to work from those unable to work,
proves to be untenable. Those who believed that accident and
health insurance could be based on completely effective means of
ascertaining illnesses and injuries and their consequences were
very much mistaken. The destructionist aspect of accident and
health insurance lies above all in the fact that such institutions
promote accidents and illness, hinder recovery, and very often
create, or at any rate intensify and lengthen, the functional
disorders which follow illness or accident.
Back to the example I gave before: Assume that we could insure
ourselves against not feeling well enough to get out of bed in the
morning. You can easily see that this would create a class of
malingerers and would discourage people from getting up, regardless
of what their physical condition might be.
Now in light of all of this, when we look at the question of
health insurance, we would expect that most risks would have to be
assumed individually. Insurance (the pooling of risks into groups)
would have to be limited to the strictly accidental variety of
risks, and even there, individuals can fraudulently bring about
apparent "accidents," as is quite frequently the case with workers
compensation.
And, of course, insurance companies would have to offer strictly
limited coverage: There would be no coverage of newly discovered
risks, for instance. There also would be no such thing as "cost
plus" — where, for example, my house burns down and I can force the
insurance company to build me a bigger house. The insurer would only
insure the value of the house up to the value I insured. Under the
current system, we see cost-plus all the time in the form of
Medicare and Medicaid, where whatever the doctors deem necessary is
automatically covered.
Generally, insurance would be in the form of indemnity or cash
payments. Some insurers might offer in-kind services at specified,
restricted providers or providing facilities, but this option would
be less attractive to most customers and to most insurance providers
as well.
Any further expansion of insurance in health matters, if it takes
place at all, would be severely restricted to cases of very small
groups of individuals who, as buyers of individual health
maintenance services from a specified provider, are extremely
homogeneous. We can imagine, for instance, that people would engage
in mutual insurance services if their group can exercise extreme
social control. To make sure there are no malingerers included, the
members of such a group would have to have very similar outlooks on
life.
Now if we look at the present reality of health insurance, we
recognize immediately that the current situation has very little if
anything to do with what we would expect from a free insurance
market. What characterizes the present situation is, first of all,
that manifestly different risk groups are grouped together in a
joint pool. Furthermore, the current healthcare insurance system
covers risks that are, strictly speaking, uninsurable.
To a large extent health insurance has become a form of welfare,
the machinery of income redistribution. How has this happened?
Insurance regulation.
State Regulation of Insurance
Let me give you some examples of the perversions that have been
introduced into the insurance market due to state regulations.
Insurance companies in the United States are regulated at both the
state and federal level. The number of state regulations alone have
risen from a total of 8 mandates in 1965 to close to 1,000 in the
early 1990s. I have not looked into the numbers more recently, but
I'm sure they go up day by day.
- In 49 states, insurance companies are forced to cover
treatment against alcoholism, which is obviously something that
can be individually affected (or even if we say it cannot be
individually effected, we would have to say it does not affect all
people in the same way). Nonetheless all insurance companies must
offer insurance against alcoholism.
- In 27 states, they must cover treatment against drug
addiction. In other words, people who know that they will never
use any addictive drugs nonetheless have to pay through their
premiums for people who do make use of and are affected by this
particular risk.
- The coverage of chiropractors is mandatory in 45 states.
- Podiatrists (foot doctors) in 37 states.
- Psychologists are covered by mandate in 36 of the states.
Again, it should be perfectly clear that the desire to go or not
to go to a shrink can be individually affected. I know people who
go to shrinks all the time. I myself would never ever enter a
shrink's office. Nonetheless, through my health insurance premium
I have to pay for the risk of a group that is clearly different
from my own risk.
- In 22 states, the services of social workers have to be
included in the coverage and of course are reflected then in the
premium.
- Georgia requires coverage for heart transplants. Now again,
heart transplants might certainly be a risk that can be insured
against, but it should be perfectly clear that this risk is
different for different groups. Some people have a genetic
predisposition to heart disease and others don't. You cannot opt
out of this type of coverage. You get it whether you are affected
by it or not and you have to pay whether you are affected or not.
- In Illinois, liver transplants have to be included. In
Minnesota, hairpieces have to be included. Again it should be
pretty clear that different families have different risks of hair
loss.
- Marriage counseling has to be included in California. Pastoral
counseling in Vermont,
- And (very nice) sperm banking in Massachusetts. (If
you were to have predicted a state where that had to be covered,
Massachusetts would of course have come up pretty soon, I'm sure
about that.)
- In more than a dozen states, insurance may not ask any AIDS
related questions. And in Washington DC (again a place where you
would expect this) any HIV testing is prohibited for all insurers.
That is almost the same as if you could burn your house down first
and then retroactively insure yourself against it.
- In California (again, a not-so-surprising candidate for these
sorts of insanities) there can be no discrimination between any
genetic traits that distinguish people. For instance, sickle-cell
anemia affects mostly black men. Nobody is allowed to investigate
this from the outset. Tay-Sachs disease which affects mostly Jews,
but that cannot be considered when insuring against the risk of
the disease. With the advances we make in genetic research, these
types of differentiations would become finer and finer as
scientific progress is made, but insurance companies are barred
from recognizing this type of progress.
Now all of these mandates are at best a mixed blessing for the
insurance companies. On the one hand, as insurance companies have to
cover more and more uninsurable risks, they are continually forced
to raise premiums. State regulation lets them get away with these
higher prices, because competition from more discriminating
insurance providers has been disallowed.
But as prices go up, more and more people drop out of the
insurance market altogether. They recognize that most of the risks
don't apply to them and they make a rational decision between being
"overinsured" at extraordinarily high premiums or uninsured. Keep in
mind that in the current discussion about all of these things, there
is this constant whining about all the people who are uninsured,
without of course emphasizing that to a large extent, this is
precisely the effect of the previous interventionist policies.
It is increasingly rational for people to be uninsured.
Of course, dropping out of the insurance market is a risky thing
to do, but young healthy people are almost crazy to pay the high
premiums that come about from subsidizing all these unhealthy
lifestyles and covering risk that they know don't apply to them.
This is a lesson in the logic of interventionism.[3] The
first interventionist act brought about a big mess — insurance
premiums always go up because insurers are no longer allowed to
discriminate correctly and are even forced to include uninsurable
risks. So now the problem arises of more and more people dropping
out. For those who remain insured, premiums have to be raised to
adjust for the fact that so many are dropping out.
The next step, which we in the United States are on the verge of
taking, is to make health insurance compulsory. No More Dropping
Out! If this step is taken — compulsory health insurance, with all
the other mandates remaining in place — then of course premiums will
skyrocket even more than they have in the past.
What then will be the next step? This too can easily be
predicted: there must be cost controls imposed. There will be a
rebellion on the part of the public, who will say, "The price is out
of control! The government has to do something!" But all the
government can do is engage in price controls. What happens with
price controls? We get either tremendous shortages of certain
services, as in places like Canada where you can't get certain
treatments and there are one- or two-year waits for others.
All healthcare provision will become increasingly politicized:
the government will design lists of good diseases for which you do
get treatment (such as AIDS, I'm sure) and bad diseases, such as
those you get from smoking too much. Those with the bad diseases the
government will let die.
Where does all this lead then? Intervention in the insurance
market creates an ever-increasing loss of individual responsibility,
creates shortsightedness, and creates hazardous risks. Let me give
you another quote from Mises, who was extremely farsighted in all of
this:
The psychic forces which are active in every living thing,
including man, in the form of a will to health and a desire to
work, are not independent of social surroundings. Certain
circumstances strengthen them; others weaken them. The social
environment of an African tribe living by hunting is decidedly
calculated to stimulate these forces. The same is true of the
quite different environment of the citizens of a capitalist
society, based on division of labor and on private property. On
the other hand a social order weakens these forces when it
promises that if the individual's work is hindered by illness or
the effects of a trauma he shall live without work or with little
work and suffer no very noticeable reduction in his income.
Matters are not so simple as they appear to the naive pathology of
the army or prison doctor.
Social insurance has thus made the neurosis of the insured a
dangerous public disease. Should the institution be extended and
developed the disease will spread. No reform can be of any
assistance. We cannot weaken or destroy the will to health without
producing illness.
The Cartels
Let me add some final
remarks on the high prices we have to pay for healthcare. Insurance
regulation is only one reason for this mess. There are also the
significant problems of the FDA and the AMA.
To repair the healthcare system, we need to abolish the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and all bureaus of public health and
safety, which require all pharmaceutical products to be licensed by
them before they can be marketed. These institutions delay the
production and delivery of drugs, raise the costs of production, and
thereby cause unnecessarily high prices as well as the unnecessary
death and suffering that result from the fact that effective drugs
do not appear on the market until many people have died or suffered
for many years.[4]
In addition to insurance regulation and pharmaceutical licensing,
all welfare states have highly restrictive licensing requirements
for medical schools, hospitals, and pharmacies, for medical doctors,
and other healthcare personnel. That is to say, the supply of
doctors, for instance, is systematically restricted. Like all
professions, the medical profession has made the attempt to
cartelize the industry — to reduce the supply of doctors and thereby
raise the price for medical services. The American Medical
Association (AMA) has been more successful in this regard than have
other professions. They have engaged in what are basically
unionizing policies, the cartelizing of their form of labor.
The tool that the AMA used to create and maintain their labor
cartel is government licensing of medical schools. As you know,
there is a huge demand for people to attend medical school. Why then
are there shortages in the provision of medical education? In an
unhampered market, the normal response to such shortages would be
the creation of new medical schools. So why don't these shortages
disappear? Why are there long lines of people who are declined and
cannot go to medical school? The answer is, of course, because the
opening of new medical schools has been outlawed.
And who is behind this outlawing of new schools? The same people
who even attempt to force existing medical schools not to fill all
the open slots they have: the currently established medical
doctors.[5] Now by eliminating all licensing requirements
for medical schools and for medical doctors, the supply of
healthcare products and services would almost instantly rise and
prices would generally fall, and in addition a greater variety of
healthcare products would appear on the market.
What about the quality of the new supply of products and
practitioners? Competing voluntary accreditation agencies would take
the place of the compulsory governmental licensing that exists
currently, assuming that healthcare providers believe that such
accreditation would enhance their reputations, and healthcare
seekers believe it would enhance their safety. Doctors would apply
to the most restrictive accreditation board whose standards they
believe they could meet. Some would apply to the Harvard Medical
Accreditation Board, some to the Tennessee Valley Authority
Accreditation Board, or whatever it happens to be. Customers would
refer to the accreditation or ratings from the boards they most
trust for the doctors they can best afford.
For those who believe that consumer safety would be hurt under
such an open, competitive system (a free market in healthcare), let
me use an analogy. Suppose you were to say, "Look, some people have
crummy Chevy cars, which are less safe and less comfortable. This
falls short of our goal that all consumers get only the best.
Therefore we should insist that all cars live up to the standards of
a BMW or a Mercedes." Would we all wind up with the comfort and
safety of driving luxury cars? Of course not. Many of us would have
to resort to bicycles or go on foot. If all cars had to be luxury
cars, very few of us would be able to ride in any sort of car.
With respect to doctors, a similar situation has been put in
place. We have basically outlawed all Chevy doctors who focus on the
less expensive minor health problems (which is, in fact, all that
most people have) and are forced instead to use Mercedes doctors who
charge Mercedes prices even for ailments that can be fixed by people
with significantly less training.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe is professor of economics at the University of
Nevada at Las Vegas. Send him mail. This article is based on
"The Economics of Risk and Insurance," a talk Professor Hoppe gave
at Mises University 2004 and 2005, available in MP3.
Comment on the blog.
1 Unless of course there is the motive on the part of
the insured to subsidize other groups. If I am a fan of football
players and do not mind paying a higher premium for their risk, then
such a systematic income redistribution can take place.
2 Mises, Human Action, Chapter 6,
Section 3.
3 "Interventionism cannot be considered as an
economic system destined to stay. It is a method for the
transformation of capitalism into socialism by a series of
successive steps." Ludwig von Mises, "Middle of the Road Policy
Leads to Socialism."
4 See Dale Steinreich, "Playing God at the
FDA."
5 See Dale Steinreich's articles for Mises.org, "100 Years of Medical
Robbery," and "Real
Medical Freedom." See also Henry Jones, "How Medical Boards
Nationalized Health Care." You can
receive the Mises Daily Article in your inbox. Go here to subscribe
or unsubscribe.
|