Political Economy of Monarchy and Democracy
by
Hans-Hermann Hoppe
by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
Recently by Hans-Hermann Hoppe: War,
Terrorism, and the World State
I. The Comparative
Economics of Private and Public Government Ownership
A government
is a territorial monopolist of compulsion an agency which may
engage in continual, institutionalized property rights violations
and the exploitation in the form of expropriation, taxation and
regulation of private property owners. Assuming no more than self-interest
on the part of government agents, all governments must be expected
to make use of this monopoly and thus exhibit a tendency toward
increased exploitation.[1]
However, not
every form of government can be expected to be equally successful
in this endeavor or to go about it in the same way. Rather, in light
of elementary economic theory, the conduct of government and the
effects of government policy on civil society can be expected to
be systematically different, depending on whether the government
apparatus is owned privately or publicly.[2]
The defining
characteristic of private government ownership is that the expropriated
resources and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation are
individually owned. The appropriated resources are added to the
ruler's private estate and treated as if they were a part of it,
and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation is attached as
a title to this estate and leads to an instant increase in its present
value ("capitalization" of monopoly profit).
Most importantly,
as private owner of the government estate, the ruler is entitled
to pass his possessions on to his personal heir; he may sell, rent,
or give away part or all of his privileged estate and privately
pocket the receipts from the sale or rental; and he may personally
employ or dismiss every administrator and employee of his estate.
In contrast,
in a publicly owned government the control over the government apparatus
lies in the hands of a trustee, or caretaker. The caretaker may
use the apparatus to his personal advantage, but he does not own
it. He cannot sell government resources and privately pocket the
receipts, nor can he pass government possessions on to his personal
heir. He owns the current use of government resources,
but not their capital value.
Moreover, while
entrance into the position of a private owner of government is restricted
by the owner's personal discretion, entrance into the position of
a caretaker-ruler is open. Anyone, in principle, can become the
government's caretaker.
From these
assumptions two central, interrelated predictions can be deduced:
- A private
government owner will tend to have a systematically longer planning
horizon, i.e., his degree of time preference will be lower, and
accordingly, his degree of economic exploitation will tend to
be less than that of a government caretaker; and
- Subject
to a higher degree of exploitation, the nongovernmental public
will also be comparatively more present-oriented under a system
of publicly owned government than under a regime of private government
ownership.
(1) Government
Owners' Time Preferences
A private government
owner will predictably try to maximize his total wealth, i.e., the
present value of his estate and his current income. He
will not want to increase his current income at the expense
of a more-than-proportional drop in the present value of his assets,
and because acts of current-income acquisition invariably have repercussions
on present asset values (reflecting the value of all future expected
asset earnings discounted by the rate of time preference), private
ownership in and of itself leads to economic calculation and thus
promotes farsightedness.
In the case
of the private ownership of government, this implies a
distinct moderation with respect to the ruler's incentive to exploit
his monopoly privilege of expropriation, for acts of expropriation
are by their nature parasitic upon prior acts of production on the
part of the nongovernmental public. Where nothing has first been
produced, nothing can be expropriated; and where everything is expropriated,
all future production will come to a shrieking halt.
Accordingly,
a private government owner will want to avoid exploiting his subjects
so heavily, for instance, as to reduce his future earnings potential
to such an extent that the present value of his estate actually
falls. Instead, in order to preserve or possibly even enhance the
value of his personal property, he will systematically restrain
himself in his exploitation policies. For the lower the degree of
exploitation, the more productive the subject population will be;
and the more productive the population, the higher will be the value
of the ruler's parasitic monopoly of expropriation.
He will use
his monopolistic privilege, of course. He will not exploit. But
as the government's private owner, it is in his interest to draw
parasitically on a growing, increasingly productive and prosperous
nongovernment economy as this would effortlessly also increase his
own wealth and prosperity and the degree of exploitation thus
would tend to be low.
Moreover, private
ownership of government implies moderation and farsightedness for
yet another reason. All private property is by definition exclusive
property. He who owns property is entitled to exclude everyone else
from its use and enjoyment; and he is at liberty to choose with
whom, if anyone, he is willing to share in its usage. Typically,
he will include his family and exclude all others, except as invited
guests or as paid employees or contractors.
Only the ruling
family and to a minor extent its friends, employees and business
partners share in the enjoyment of the expropriated resources
and can thus lead a parasitic life. Because of these restrictions
regarding entrance into government and the exclusive status of the
individual ruler and his family, private government ownership stimulates
the development of a clear "class-consciousness" on the part of
the nongovernmental public and promotes opposition and resistance
to any expansion of the government's exploitative power.
A clear-cut
distinction between the (few) rulers on the one hand and the (many)
ruled on the other exists, and there is little risk or hope of anyone
of either class ever falling or rising from one class to the other.
Confronted with an almost insurmountable barrier in the way of upward
mobility, the solidarity among the ruled their mutual identification
as actual or potential victims of governmental property-rights violations
is strengthened, and the risk to the ruling class of losing its
legitimacy as the result of increased exploitation is heightened.[3]
In distinct
contrast, the caretaker of a publicly owned government will try
to maximize not total government wealth (capital values and current
income), but current income (regardless, and at the expense, of
capital values). Indeed, even if the caretaker wishes to act differently,
he cannot. Because as public property government resources
are not for sale, and without market prices economic calculation
is impossible. Accordingly, it has to be regarded as unavoidable
that public government ownership will result in continual capital
consumption.
Instead of
maintaining or even enhancing the value of the government estate,
as a private owner would tend to do, a government's temporary caretaker
will quickly use up as much of the government resources as possible,
for what he does not consume now, he may never
be able to consume.
In particular,
a caretaker as distinct from a government's private owner has
no interest in not ruining his country. For why should he not
want to increase his exploitation if the advantage of a policy of
moderation the resulting higher capital value of the government
estate cannot be reaped privately, while the advantage of the
opposite policy of increased exploitation a higher current income
can be so reaped? To a caretaker, unlike to a private owner, moderation
has only disadvantages and no advantages.[4]
In addition,
with a publicly owned government, anyone in principle can become
a member of the ruling class or even the supreme power. The distinction
between the rulers and the ruled as well as the class consciousness
of the ruled become blurred. The illusion even arises that the distinction
no longer exists: that with a public government no one is ruled
by anyone, but everyone instead rules himself. Accordingly, public
resistance against government power is systematically weakened.
While exploitation
and expropriation before might have appeared plainly oppressive
and evil to the public, they seem much less so, mankind being what
it is, once anyone may freely enter the ranks of those who are at
the receiving end. Consequently, exploitation will increase, whether
openly in the form of higher taxes or discretely as increased governmental
money "creation" (inflation) or legislative regulation. Likewise,
the number of government employees ("public servants") will rise
absolutely as well as relatively to private employment, in particular
attracting and promoting individuals with high degrees of time preference,
and low and limited farsightedness.
(2) Subjects'
Time Preferences
In contrast
to the right to self-defense in the event of a criminal attack,
the victim of government violations of private-property rights may
not legitimately defend himself against such violations.[5]
The imposition
of a government tax on property or income violates a property owner's
and income producer's rights as much as theft does. In both cases,
the owner-producer's supply of goods is diminished against his will
and without his consent. Government money or "liquidity" creation
involves no less a fraudulent expropriation of private-property
owners than the operations of a criminal counterfeiting gang.
As well, any
government regulation as to what an owner may or may not do with
his property beyond the rule that no one may physically damage
the property of others and that all exchange and trade be voluntary
and contractual implies a "taking" of somebody's property, on
a par with acts of extortion, robbery, or destruction. But taxation,
the government's provision for liquidity, and government regulations,
unlike their criminal equivalents, are considered legitimate, and
the victim of government interference, unlike the victim of a crime,
is not entitled to physically defend and protect his property.
Owing to their
legitimacy, then, government violations of property rights affect
individual time preferences in a systematically different and much
more profound way than crime. Like crime, all government interference
with private property rights reduces someone's supply of present
goods and thus raises his effective time-preference rate. However,
government offenses unlike crime simultaneously raise the time
preference degree of actual and potential victims because
they also imply a reduction in the supply of future goods
(a reduced rate of return on investment).
Crime, because
it is illegitimate, occurs only intermittently the robber disappears
from the scene with his loot and leaves his victim alone. Thus,
crime can be dealt with by increasing one's demand for protective
goods and services so as to restore or even increase one's future
rate of investment return and make it less likely that the same
or a different robber will succeed a second time.
In contrast,
because they are legitimate, governmental property rights violations
are continual. The offender does not disappear into hiding but stays
around, and the victim does not "arm" himself but must (at least
he is generally expected to) remain defenseless. The actual and
potential victims of government property-rights violations respond
by associating a permanently higher risk with all future production,
and systematically adjusting their expectations concerning the rate
of return on all future investment downward.
By simultaneously
reducing the supply of present and expected future goods,
then, governmental property-rights violations not only raise time
preference rates (with given schedules) but also time-preference
schedules. Because owner-producers are and see themselves
as defenseless against future victimization by government agents,
their expected rate of return on productive, future-oriented actions
is reduced all-around, and accordingly, all actual and potential
victims become more present-oriented.[6]
Moreover, because
the degree of exploitation is comparatively higher under a publicly
owned government, this tendency toward present-orientation will
be significantly more pronounced if the government is publicly owned
than if it is owned privately.[7]
II. Application:
The Transition from Monarchy to Democracy (17891918)
Hereditary
monarchies represent the historical example of privately owned governments,
and democratic republics that of publicly owned governments.
For most of
its history, mankind, insofar as it was subject to any government
control at all, was under monarchical rule. There were exceptions:
Athenian democracy, Rome during its republican era until 31 BC,
the republics of Venice, Florence and Genoa during the renaissance
period, the Swiss cantons since 1291, the United Provinces from
1648 until 1673, and England under Cromwell from 1649 until 1660.
Yet these were rare occurrences in a world dominated by monarchies.
With the exception of Switzerland, they were short-lived phenomena.
Constrained
by monarchical surroundings, all older republics satisfied the open-entry
condition of public property only imperfectly, for while a republican
form of government implies by definition that the government is
not privately but publicly owned, and a republic can thus be expected
to possess an inherent tendency toward the adoption of universal
suffrage, in all of the earlier republics, entry into government
was limited to relatively small groups of "nobles."
With the end
of World War I, mankind truly left the monarchical age.[8]
In the course of the one-and-a-half centuries since the French Revolution,
Europe, and in its wake the entire world, have undergone a fundamental
transformation. Everywhere, monarchical rule and sovereign kings
were replaced by democratic-republican rule and sovereign "peoples."
The first assault
of republicanism and the idea of popular sovereignty on the dominating
monarchical principle was repelled with the military defeat of Napoleon
and the restoration of Bourbon rule in France. As a result of the
revolutionary terror and the Napoleonic wars, republicanism was
widely discredited for much of the 19th century.
However, the
democratic-republican spirit of the French revolution left a permanent
imprint. From the restoration of the monarchical order in 1815 until
the outbreak of WWI in 1914, all across Europe popular political
participation and representation was systematically expanded. The
franchise was successively widened and the powers of popularly elected
parliaments increased everywhere.[9]
From 1815 to
1830, the right to vote in France was still severely restricted
under the restored Bourbons. Out of a population of some 30 million,
the electorate included only France's very largest property owners
about 100,000 people (less than 0.5 percent of the population
above the age of 20). As a result of the July Revolution of 1830,
the abdication of Charles X and the ascension to the throne of the
Duke of Orleans, Louis Philippe, the number of voters increased
to about 200,000. As a result of the revolutionary upheavals of
1848, France again turned republican, and a universal and unrestricted
suffrage for all male citizens above the age of 21 was introduced.
Napoleon III was elected by nearly 5.5 million votes out of an electorate
of more than 8 million.
In the United
Kingdom after 1815, the electorate consisted of some 500,000 well-to-do
property owners (about 4 percent of the population above age 20).
The Reform Bill of 1832 lowered the property owner requirements
and extended the franchise to about 800,000. The next extension,
from about 1 million to 2 million, came with the Second Reform Bill
of 1867. In 1884 property restrictions were relaxed even further,
and the electorate increased to about 6 million (almost a third
of the population above age 20 and more than three-fourths of all
male adults).
In Prussia,
as the most important of the 39 independent German states recognized
after the Vienna Congress, democratization set in with the revolution
of 1848 and the constitution of 1850. The lower chamber of the Prussian
parliament was hence elected by universal male suffrage.
However, until
1918 the electorate remained stratified into three estates with
different voting powers. For example, the wealthiest people those
who contributed a third of all taxes elected a third of the members
of the lower house.
In 1867, the
North German Confederation, including Prussia and 21 other German
states, was founded. Its constitution provided for universal, unrestricted
suffrage for all males above the age of 25. In 1871, after the victory
over Napoleon III, the constitution of the North German Confederation
was essentially assumed by the newly founded German Empire. Out
of a total population of around 35 million, nearly 8 million people
(or about a third of the population above 20) elected the first
German Reichstag.
After Italy's
political unification under the leadership of the Kingdom of Sardinia
and Piedmont in 1861, initially the vote was only given to about
500,000 people out of a population of some 25 million (about 3.5
percent of the population above age 20). In 1882, the property requirements
were relaxed, and the minimum age was lowered from 25 to 21 years.
As a result, the Italian electorate increased to more than 2 million.
In 1913, an almost universal and unrestricted suffrage for all males
above 30 and minimally restricted suffrage for males above 21 was
introduced, raising the number of Italian voters to more than 8
million (more than 40 percent of the population above 20).
In Austria,
restricted and unequal male suffrage was introduced in 1873. The
electorate, composed of four classes or curia of unequal
voting powers, totaled 1.2 million voters out of a population of
about 20 million (10 percent of the population above 20). In 1867
a fifth curia was added. And forty years later the curia
system was abolished, and universal and equal suffrage for males
above age 24 was adopted, bringing the number of voters close to
6 million (almost 40 percent of the population above 20).
Russia had
elected provincial and district councils zemstvos since
1864; and in 1905, as a fallout of its lost war against Japan, it
created a parliament the Duma which was elected by
a near universal, although indirect and unequal, male suffrage.
As for Europe's minor powers, universal or almost universal and
equal male suffrage has existed in Switzerland since 1848, and was
adopted between 1890 and 1910 in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Turkey.
Although increasingly
emasculated, the monarchical principle remained dominant until the
cataclysmic events of WWI. Before 1914, only two republics existed
in Europe France and Switzerland. And of all major European monarchies,
only the United Kingdom could be classified as a parliamentary system;
that is, one where the supreme power was vested in an elected parliament.
Only four years
later, after the United States where the democratic principle
implied in the idea of a republic had only recently been carried
to victory as a result of the destruction of the secessionist Confederacy
by the centralist Union government[10]
had entered the European war and decisively determined its outcome,
monarchies had all but disappeared, and Europe turned to democratic
republicanism.[11]
In Europe,
the defeated Romanovs, Hohenzollerns, and Habsburgs had to abdicate
or resign, and Russia, Germany, and Austria became democratic republics
with universal male and female suffrage and parliamentary governments.
Likewise, all of the newly created successor states Poland, Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (with the
sole exception of Yugoslavia) adopted democratic-republican constitutions.
In Turkey and
Greece, the monarchies were overthrown. Even where monarchies remained
nominally in existence, as in Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, monarchs no longer
exercised any governing power. Universal adult suffrage was introduced,
and all government power was invested in parliaments and "public"
officials.[12]
A new world order the democratic-republican age, under the aegis
of a dominating US government had begun.
III.
Evidence and Illustrations: Exploitation and Present-Orientedness
under Monarchy and Democratic Republicanism
From the viewpoint
of economic theory, the end of WWI can be identified as the point
in time at which private government ownership was completely replaced
by public government ownership, and whence a systematic tendency
toward increased exploitation government growth and rising degrees
of social time preference present-orientedness can be expected
to take off. Indeed, this has been the grand, underlying theme of
post-WWI Western history: from 1918 onward practically all indicators
- of governmental
exploitation and
- of rising
time preferences have exhibited a systematic upward tendency.
III.1. Indicators
of Exploitation
There is no
doubt that the amount of taxes imposed on civil society
increased during the monarchical age.[13]
However, throughout the entire period, the share of government
revenue remained remarkably stable and low. Economic historian Carlo
M. Cipolla concludes,
All in all,
one must admit that the portion of income drawn by the public
sector most certainly increased from the eleventh century onward
all over Europe, but it is difficult to imagine that, apart from
particular times and places, the public power ever managed to
draw more than 5 to 8 percent of national income.
And he then
goes on to note that this portion was not systematically exceeded
until the second half of the 19th century.[14]
Until then, of all Western European countries only the United Kingdom
had an income tax (from 1843 on). France first introduced some form
of income tax in 1873, Italy in 1877, Norway in 1892, the Netherlands
in 1894, Austria in 1898, Sweden in 1903, the United States in 1913,
Switzerland in 1916, Denmark and Finland in 1917, Ireland and Belgium
in 1922, and Germany in 1924.[15]
Yet even at the time of the outbreak of WWI, total government expenditure
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) typically had not
risen above 10 percent and only rarely, as in the case of Germany,
exceeded 15 percent. In striking contrast, with the onset of the
democratic-republican age, total government expenditure as a percentage
of GDP typically increased to 20 to 30 percent in the course of
the 1920s and 1930s, and by the mid-1970s had generally reached
50 percent.[16]
There is also
no doubt that total government employment increased during
the monarchical age. But until the very end of the 19th century,
government employment rarely exceeded 3 percent of the total labor
force. In contrast, by the mid-1970s government employment as a
percentage of the total labor force had typically grown to above
15 percent.[17]
The same pattern
emerges from an inspection of inflation and the money supply. The
monarchical world was generally characterized by the existence of
a commodity money typically silver or gold. A commodity
money standard makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a government
to inflate the money supply.
There had been
attempts to introduce an irredeemable fiat currency. But these fiat-money
experiments, associated in particular with the Bank of Amsterdam,
the Bank of England, and John Law and the Banque Royale of France,
had been regional curiosities which ended quickly in financial disasters,
such as the collapse of the Dutch "Tulip Mania" in 1637, and the
"Mississippi Bubble" and the "South Sea Bubble" in 1720. As hard
as they tried, monarchical rulers did not succeed in establishing
monopolies of pure fiat currencies, i.e., of irredeemable government
paper monies, which can be created virtually out of thin air, at
practically no cost.
It was only
under conditions of all-around democratic republicanism, after 1918,
that this feat was accomplished. During WWI, as during earlier wars,
belligerent governments went off the gold standard. Unlike earlier
wars, however, WWI did not conclude with a return to the gold standard.
Instead, from the mid-1920s until 1971, and interrupted by a series
of international monetary crises, a pseudo-gold standard the gold-exchange
standard was implemented. In 1971, the last remnant of the international
gold standard was abolished. Since then, and for the first time
in history, the entire world has adopted a pure fiat-money system
of freely fluctuating government paper currencies.[18]
As a result,
a seemingly permanent secular tendency toward inflation and currency
depreciation has come into existence.
During the
monarchical age, with a commodity money largely outside of government
control, the "level" of prices had generally fallen and the purchasing
power of money increased, except during times of war or new gold
discoveries. Various price indices for Britain, for instance, indicate
that prices were substantially lower in 1760 than they had been
a hundred years earlier; and in 1860 they were lower than they had
been in 1760.[19]
Connected by an international gold standard, the development in
other countries was similar.[20]
In sharp contrast,
during the democratic-republican age, with the world financial center
shifted from Britain to the United States, a very different pattern
emerged. For instance, shortly after WWI, in 1921, the US wholesale-commodity
price index stood at 113.[21]
After WWII, in 1948, it had risen to 185. In 1971 it was 255, by
1981 it reached 658, and in 1991 it was near 1,000. During only
two decades of irredeemable fiat money, the consumer price index
in the United States rose from 40 in 1971 to 136 in 1991, in the
United Kingdom it climbed from 24 to 157, in France from 30 to 137,
and in Germany from 56 to 116.[22]
Similarly,
during more than 70 years, from 1845 until the end of WWI in 1918,
the British money supply had increased about 6-fold.[23]
In distinct contrast, during the 73 years from 1918 until 1991,
the US money supply increased more than 64-fold.[24]
In addition
to taxation and inflation, a government can resort to debt in order
to finance its current expenditures. As with taxation and inflation,
there is no doubt that government debt increased in the course of
the monarchical age. However, as predicted theoretically, in this
field monarchs also showed considerably more moderation and farsightedness
than democratic-republican caretakers.
Throughout
the monarchical age, government debts were essentially war debts.
While the total debt thereby tended to increase over time, during
peacetime at least monarchs characteristically reduced
their debts. The British example is fairly representative. In the
course of the 18th and 19th centuries, government debt increased.
It was 76 million pounds after the Spanish War in 1748, 127 million
after the Seven Years' War in 1763, 232 million after the American
War of Independence in 1783, and 900 million after the Napoleonic
Wars in 1815. Yet during each peacetime period from 17271739,
from 17481756, and from 17621775, total debt actually decreased.
From 1815 until 1914, the British national debt fell from a total
of 900 to below 700 million pounds.
In striking
contrast, since the onset of the democratic-republican age British
debt only increased, in war and in peace. In 1920 it was
7.9 billion pounds, in 1938, 8.3 billion, in 1945, 22.4 billion,
in 1970, 34 billion, and since then it has skyrocketed to more than
190 billion pounds in 1987.[25]
Likewise, US
government debt has increased through war and peace. Federal government
debt after WWI, in 1919, was about 25 billion dollars. In 1940 it
was 43 billion, and after WWII, in 1946, it stood at about 270 billion.
By 1970 it had risen to 370 billion, and since 1971, under a pure
fiat-money regime, it has exploded. In 1979 it was about 840 billion,
and in 1985 more than 1.8 trillion. In 1988 it reached almost 2.5
trillion, and by 1992 it exceeded 3 trillion dollars.[26]
Finally, the
same tendency toward increased exploitation and present-orientation
emerges upon examination of government legislation and regulation.
During the monarchical age, with a clear-cut distinction between
the ruler and the ruled, the king and his parliament were held to
be under the law. They applied preexisting law as judge
or jury.
They did not
make law. Writes Bertrand de Jouvenel,
The monarch
was looked on only as judge and not as legislator. He made subjective
rights respected and respected them himself; he found these rights
in being and did not dispute that they were anterior to his authority.
Subjective rights were not held on the precarious tenure of grant
but were freehold possessions. The sovereign's right also was
a freehold. It was a subjective right as much as the other rights,
though of a more elevated dignity, but it could not take the other
rights away.[27]
To be sure,
the monopolization of law administration led to higher prices and/or
lower product quality than those that would have prevailed under
competitive conditions, and in the course of time kings employed
their monopoly increasingly to their own advantage. But as late
as the beginning of the 20th century, A.V. Dicey could still maintain
that as for Great Britain, for instance, legislative law public
law as distinct from preexisting law private law did not exist.[28]
In striking
contrast, under democracy, with the exercise of power shrouded in
anonymity, presidents and parliaments quickly came to rise above
the law. They became not only judge but legislator, the creator
of "new" law.[29]
Today, notes Jouvenel,
we are used
to having our rights modified by the sovereign decisions of legislators.
A landlord no longer feels surprised at being compelled to keep
a tenant; an employer is no less used to having to raise the wages
of his employees in virtue of the decrees of Power. Nowadays it
is understood that our subjective rights are precarious and at
the good pleasure of authority.[30]
In a development
similar to the democratization of money the substitution of government
paper money for private commodity money and the resulting inflation
and increased financial uncertainty the democratization of law
and law administration has led to a steadily growing flood of legislation.
Presently, the number of legislative acts and regulations passed
by parliaments in the course of a single year is in the tens of
thousands, filling hundreds of thousands of pages, affecting all
aspects of civil and commercial life, and resulting in a steady
depreciation of all law and heightened legal uncertainty.
As a typical
example, the 1994 edition of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), the annual compendium of all US Federal Government regulations
currently in effect, consists of a total of 201 books, occupying
about 26 feet of library shelf space. The Code's index alone is
754 pages. The Code contains regulations concerning the production
and distribution of almost everything imaginable: from celery, mushrooms,
watermelons, watchbands, the labeling of incandescent light bulbs,
hosiery, iron and steel manufacturing, and onion rings made out
of diced onions, revealing the almost-totalitarian power of a democratic
government.[31]
III.2.
Indicators of Present-Orientedness
The phenomenon
of social time preference is somewhat more elusive than that of
expropriation and exploitation, and it is more complicated to identify
suitable indicators of present-orientation. Moreover, some indicators
are less direct "softer" than those of exploitation. But all
of them point in the same direction and together provide as clear
an illustration of the second theoretical prediction: that democratic
rule also promotes shortsightedness (present-orientation) within
civil society.[32]
The most direct
indicator of social time preference is the rate of interest.
The interest rate is the ratio of the valuation of present goods
as compared to future goods. More specifically, it indicates the
premium at which present money is traded against future money. A
high interest rate implies more "present-orientedness" and a low
rate of interest implies more "future-orientation."
Under normal
conditions that is, under the assumption of increasing standards
of living and real-money incomes the interest rate can be expected
to fall and ultimately approach, yet never quite reach, zero. With
rising real incomes, the marginal utility of present money falls
relative to that of future money, and hence under the ceteris paribus
assumption of a given time preference schedule, the interest
rate must fall. Consequently, savings and investment will
increase, future real incomes will be still higher, and so on.
In fact, a
tendency toward falling interest rates characterizes mankind's suprasecular
trend of development. Minimum interest rates on "normal safe loans"
were around 16 percent at the beginning of Greek financial history
in the 6th century BC, and fell to 6 percent during the Hellenistic
period. In Rome, minimum interest rates fell from more than 8 percent
during the earliest period of the Republic to 4 percent during the
first century of the Empire. In 13th-century Europe, the lowest
interest rates on 'safe' loans were 8 percent. In the 14th century
they came down to about 5 percent. In the 15th century they fell
to 4 percent. In the 17th century they went down to 3 percent. And
at the end of the 19th century, minimum interest rates had further
declined to less than 2.5 percent.[33]
This trend
was by no means smooth. It was frequently interrupted by periods,
sometimes as long as centuries, of rising interest rates. However,
such periods were associated with major wars and revolutions.
Furthermore,
whereas high or rising minimum interest rates indicate periods of
generally low or declining living standards, the overriding opposite
tendency toward low and falling interest rates reflects mankind's
overall progress its advance from barbarism to civilization. Specifically,
the trend toward lower interest rates reflects the rise of the Western
World, its peoples' increasing prosperity, farsightedness, intelligence,
and moral strength, and the unparalleled height of 19th-century
European civilization.
Before this
historical backdrop and in accordance with economic theory, then,
it should be expected that 20th-century interest rates would have
to be still lower than 19th-century rates. Indeed, only
two possible explanations exist why this is not so. The
first possibility is that 20th-century real incomes did not exceed,
or even fell below, 19th-century incomes. However, this explanation
can be ruled out on empirical grounds, for it seems fairly uncontroversial
that 20th-century incomes are in fact higher.
Then only the
second explanation remains. If real incomes are higher but interest
rates are not lower, then the ceteris paribus clause can no longer
be assumed true. Rather, the social time preference schedule
must have shifted upward. That is, the character of the population
must have changed. People on the average must have lost in moral
and intellectual strength and have become more present-oriented.
Indeed, this appears to be the case.
From 1815 onward,
throughout Europe and the Western World, minimum interest rates
steadily declined to an historic low of, on the average, well below
3 percent at the turn of the century. With the onset of the democratic-republican
age, this earlier tendency came to a halt and seems to have changed
direction, revealing 20th-century Europe and the United States as
declining civilizations.
An inspection
of the lowest decennial average interest rates for Britain, France,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United States, for instance, shows that during the entire post-WWI
era interest rates in Europe were never as low or lower than they
had been during the second half of the 19th century. Only in the
United States, in the 1950s, did interest rates ever fall below
late 19th-century rates. This was only a short-lived phenomenon,
and US interest rates even then were not lower than they had been
in Britain during the second half of the 19th century.
Instead, 20th-century
rates were universally higher than 19th-century rates,
and if anything they have exhibited a rising tendency.[34]
This conclusion does not substantially change, even when it is taken
into account that modern interest rates, in particular since the
1970s, include a systematic inflation premium. After adjusting recent
nominal interest rates for inflation in order to yield an estimate
of real interest rates, contemporary interest rates still
appear to be significantly higher than they were 100 years ago.
On the average,
minimum long-term interest rates in Europe and the US nowadays seem
to be well above 4 percent and possibly as high as 5 percent that
is, above the interest rates of 17th-century Europe and as high
or higher than 15th-century rates. Likewise, current US savings
rates of around 5 percent of disposable income are no higher than
they were more than 300 years ago in a much poorer 17th-century
England.[35]
Parallel to
this development and reflecting a more specific aspect of the same
underlying phenomenon of high or rising social time preferences,
indicators of family disintegration "dysfunctional families"
have exhibited a systematic increase.
Until the end
of the 19th century, the bulk of government spending typically
more than 50 percent went to financing the military. Assuming
government expenditures to be then about 5 percent of the national
product, this amounted to military expenditures of 2.5 percent of
the national product. The remainder went to government administration.
Welfare spending
or "public charity" played almost no role. Insurance was considered
to be in the province of individual responsibility, and poverty
relief seen as the task of voluntary charity. In contrast, as a
reflection of the egalitarianism inherent in democracy, from the
beginning of the democratization in the late 19th century onward
came the collectivization of individual responsibility.
Military expenditures
have typically risen to 510 percent of the national product in
the course of the 20th century. But with public expenditures currently
making up 50 percent of the national product, military expenditures
now only represent 1020 percent of total government spending. The
bulk of public spending typically more than 50 percent of total
expenditures (or 25 percent of the national product) is now eaten
up by public-welfare spending.[36]
Consequently,
by increasingly relieving individuals of the responsibility of having
to provide for their own health, safety, and old age, the range
and temporal horizon of private provisionary action have been systematically
reduced. In particular, the value of marriage, family, and children
have fallen, because they are needed less as soon as one can fall
back on "public" assistance.
Thus, since
the onset of the democratic-republican age the number of children
has declined, and the size of the endogenous population has stagnated
or even fallen. For centuries, until the end of the 19th century,
the birth rate had been almost constant: somewhere between 30 to
40 per 1,000 population (usually somewhat higher in predominantly
Catholic and lower in Protestant countries).
In sharp contrast,
in the course of the 20th century all over Europe and the US birthrates
have experienced a dramatic decline down to about 15 to 20 per
1,000.[37] At
the same time, the rates of divorce, illegitimacy, single parenting,
singledom, and abortion have steadily increased, while personal
savings rates have begun to stagnate or even fall rather than rise
proportionally with rising incomes.[38]
Moreover, as
a consequence of the depreciation of law resulting from legislation
and the collectivization of responsibility effected in particular
by social security legislation, the rate of crimes of a
serious nature, such as murder, assault, robbery, and theft, has
also shown a systematic upward tendency.
In the "normal"
course of events that is, with rising standards of living it
can be expected that the protection against social disasters such
as crime will undergo continual improvement, just as one would expect
the protection against natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes
and hurricanes to become progressively better. Indeed, throughout
the Western world this appears to have been the case by and large
until recently, during second half of the 20th century, when crime
rates began to climb steadily upward.[39]
To be sure,
there are a number of factors other than increased irresponsibility
and shortsightedness brought on by legislation and welfare that
may contribute to crime. Men commit more crimes than women, the
young more than the old, blacks more than whites, and city dwellers
more than villagers. Accordingly, changes in the composition of
the sexes, age groups, races, and the degree of urbanization can
be expected to have a systematic effect on crime.
However, all
of these factors are relatively stable and thus cannot account for
any systematic change in the long-term downward trend of crime rates.
As for European countries, their populations were and are comparatively
homogeneous; and in the United States, the proportion of blacks
has remained roughly stable. The sex composition is largely a biological
constant; and as a result of wars, only the proportion of males
has periodically fallen, thus actually reinforcing the "normal"
trend toward falling crime rates.
Similarly,
the composition of age groups has changed only slowly; and due to
declining birth rates and higher life expectancies the average age
of the population has actually increased, thus helping to depress
crime rates still further. Finally, the degree of urbanization began
to increase dramatically from about 1800 onward. A period of rising
crime rates during the early 19th century can be attributed to this
initial spurt of urbanization.[40]
Yet, after
a period of adjustment to the new phenomenon of urbanization, from
the mid-19th century onward, the countervailing tendency toward
falling crime rates took hold again, despite the fact that the process
of rapid urbanization continued for about another hundred years.
And when crime rates began to move systematically upward, from the
mid-20th century onward, the process of increasing urbanization
had actually come to a halt.
It thus appears
that the phenomenon of rising crime rates cannot be explained other
than with reference to the process of democratization: by a rising
degree of social time preference, an increasing loss of individual
responsibility, intellectually and morally, and a diminished respect
for all law moral relativism stimulated by an unabated flood
of legislation. Of course, "high time preference" is by no means
equivalent with "crime." A high time preference can also find expression
in such perfectly lawful activities as recklessness, unreliability,
poor manners, laziness, stupidity or hedonism.
Nonetheless,
a systematic relationship between high time preference and crime
exists, for in order to earn a market income a certain minimum of
planning, patience and sacrifice is required. One must first work
for a while before one gets paid. In contrast, most serious criminal
activities such as murder, assault, rape, robbery, theft, and burglary
require no such discipline. The reward for the aggressor is immediate
and tangible, whereas the sacrifice possible punishment lies
in the future and is uncertain. Consequently, if the social degree
of time preference were increased, it would be expected that the
frequency in particular of these forms of aggressive behavior would
rise as they in fact did.[41]
IV. Conclusion:
Monarchy, Democracy, and the Idea of a Natural Order
From the vantage
point of elementary economic theory and in light of historical evidence,
then, a revisionist view of modern history results. The Whig theory
of history, according to which mankind marches continually forward
toward ever higher levels of progress, is incorrect. From the viewpoint
of those who prefer less exploitation over more and who value farsightedness
and individual responsibility above shortsightedness and irresponsibility,
the historic transition from monarchy to democracy represents not
progress but civilizational decline.
Nor does this
verdict change if more or other indicators are included. Quite to
the contrary. Without question the most important indicator of exploitation
and present-orientedness not discussed above is war. Yet if this
indicator were included the relative performance of democratic-republican
government appears to be even worse, not better. In addition to
increased exploitation and social decay, the transition from monarchy
to democracy has brought a change from limited warfare to total
war, and the 20th century, the age of democracy, must be ranked
also among the most murderous periods in all of history.[42]
Thus, inevitably
two final questions arise. What can we expect? And what can we do?
As for the first question, the answer is brief. At the end of the
20th century, democratic republicanism in the United States and
all across the Western world has apparently exhausted the reserve
fund that was inherited from the past. For decades, real incomes
have stagnated or even fallen.[43]
The public debt and the cost of social security systems have brought
on the prospect of an imminent economic meltdown.
At the same
time, societal breakdown and social conflict have risen to dangerous
heights. If the tendency toward increased exploitation and present-orientedness
continues on its current path, the Western democratic welfare states
will collapse as the East European socialist peoples' republics
did in the late 1980s. Hence one is left with only the second question:
what can we do in order to prevent the process of civilizational
decline from running its full course to an economic and social catastrophe?
First, the
idea of democracy and majority rule must be delegitimized. Ultimately,
the course of history is determined by ideas, be they true or false.
Just as kings could not exercise their rule unless a majority of
public opinion accepted such rule as legitimate, so will democratic
rulers not last without ideological support in public opinion.[44]
Likewise, the
transition from monarchical to democratic rule must be explained
as fundamentally nothing but a change in public opinion.
In fact, until the end of WWI, the overwhelming majority of the
public in Europe accepted monarchical rule as legitimate.[45]
Today, hardly anyone would do so.
On the contrary,
the idea of monarchical government is considered laughable. Consequently,
a return to the "ancien rιgime" must be regarded as impossible.
The legitimacy of monarchical rule appears to have been irretrievably
lost. Nor would such a return be a genuine solution. For monarchies,
whatever their relative merits, do exploit and do contribute
to present-orientedness as well. Rather, the idea of democratic-republican
rule must be rendered equally if not more laughable, not in the
least by identifying it as the source of the ongoing process of
decivilization.
But secondly,
and still more importantly, at the same time a positive alternative
to monarchy and democracy the idea of a natural order
must be spelled out and understood. On the one hand, and simply
enough, this involves the recognition that it is not exploitation,
either monarchical or democratic, but private property, production,
and voluntary exchange that are the ultimate source of human civilization.
On the other
hand, psychologically more difficult to accept, it involves the
recognition of a fundamental sociological insight (which incidentally
also helps identify precisely where the historic opposition to monarchy
went wrong): that the maintenance and preservation of a private-property-based
exchange economy requires as its sociological presupposition the
existence of a voluntarily acknowledged "natural" elite a nobilitas
naturalis.[46]
The natural
outcome of the voluntary transactions between various private property
owners is decidedly nonegalitarian, hierarchical, and elitist. As
the result of widely diverse human talents, in every society of
any degree of complexity a few individuals quickly acquire the status
of an elite. Owing to superior achievements of wealth, wisdom, bravery,
or a combination thereof, some individuals come to possess "natural
authority," and their opinions and judgments enjoy widespread respect.
Moreover, because
of selective mating and marriage and the laws of civil and genetic
inheritance, positions of natural authority are more likely than
not passed on within a few noble families. It is to the heads
of these families with long-established records of superior achievement,
farsightedness, and exemplary personal conduct, that men turn with
their conflicts and complaints against each other, and it is these
very leaders of the natural elite who typically act as judges and
peacemakers, often free of charge, out of a sense of obligation
required and expected of a person of authority or even out of a
principled concern for civil justice, as a privately produced "public
good."[47]
In fact, the
endogenous origin of a monarchy (as opposed to its exogenous origin
via conquest)[48]
cannot be understood except before the background of a prior order
of natural elites. The small but decisive step in the transition
to monarchical rule original sin consisted precisely in the
monopolization of the function of judge and peacemaker.
The step was taken, once a single member of the voluntarily acknowledged
natural elite the king could insist, against the opposition
of other members of the social elite, that all conflicts within
a specified territory be brought before him.
From this moment
on, law and law enforcement became more expensive: instead of being
offered free of charge or for a voluntary payment, they were financed
with the help of a compulsory tax. At the same time, the quality
of law deteriorated: instead of upholding the preexisting law and
applying universal and immutable principles of justice, a monopolistic
judge, who did not have to fear losing clients as a result of being
less than impartial in his judgments, could successively alter and
pervert the existing law to his own advantage.
It was to a
large extent the inflated price of justice and the perversions of
ancient law by the kings which motivated the historical opposition
against monarchy. However, confusion as to the causes of this phenomenon
prevailed. There were those who recognized correctly that the problem
lay with monopoly, not with elites or nobility.[49]
But they were far outnumbered by those who erroneously blamed it
on the elitist character of the ruler instead, and who accordingly
advocated to maintain the monopoly of law and law enforcement and
merely replace the king and the visible royal pomp by the "people"
and the presumed modesty and decency of the "common man." Hence
the historic success of democracy.
Ironically,
the monarchy was then destroyed by the same social forces that kings
had first stimulated when they began to exclude competing natural
authorities from acting as judges. In order to overcome their resistance,
kings typically aligned themselves with the people, the common man.[50]
Appealing to
the always popular sentiment of envy, kings promised the people
cheaper and better justice in exchange and at the expense of taxing
cutting down to size their own betters (that is, the kings'
competitors). When the kings' promises turned out to be empty, as
was to be predicted, the same egalitarian sentiments which they
had previously courted now focused and turned against them.
After all,
the king himself was a member of the nobility, and as a result of
the exclusion of all other judges, his position had become only
more elevated and elitist and his conduct only more arrogant. Accordingly,
it appeared only logical then that kings, too, should be brought
down and that the egalitarian policies, which monarchs had initiated,
be carried through to their ultimate conclusion: the monopolistic
control of the judiciary by the common man.
Predictably,
as explained and illustrated in detail above, the democratization
of law and law enforcement the substitution of the people for
the king made matters only worse, however. The price of justice
and peace has risen astronomically, and all the while the quality
of law has steadily deteriorated to the point where the idea of
law as a body of universal and immutable principles of justice has
almost disappeared from public opinion and has been replaced by
the idea of law as legislation (government-made law).
At the same
time, democracy has succeeded where monarchy only made a modest
beginning: in the ultimate destruction of the natural elites. The
fortunes of great families have dissipated, and their tradition
of a culture of economic independence, intellectual farsightedness,
and moral and spiritual leadership has been lost and forgotten.
Rich men still exist today, but more frequently than not they owe
their fortune now directly or indirectly to the state.
Hence, they
are often more dependent on the state's continued favors than people
of far lesser wealth. They are typically no longer the heads of
long-established leading families but "nouveaux riches." Their conduct
is not marked by special virtue, dignity, or taste but is a reflection
of the same proletarian mass-culture of present-orientedness, opportunism,
and hedonism that the rich now share with everyone else; and consequently,
their opinions carry no more weight in public opinion than anyone
else's.
Hence, when
democratic rule has finally exhausted its legitimacy, the problem
faced will be significantly more difficult than when kings lost
their legitimacy. Then, it would have been sufficient by and large
to abolish the king's monopoly of law and law enforcement and replace
it with a natural order of competing jurisdictions, because remnants
of natural elites who could have taken on this task still existed.
Now, this will
no longer be sufficient. If the monopoly of law and law enforcement
of democratic governments is dissolved, there appears to be no other
authority to whom one can turn for justice, and chaos would seem
to be inevitable. Thus, in addition to advocating the abdication
of democracy, it is now of central strategic importance that at
the same time ideological support be given to all decentralizing
or even secessionist social forces; that is, the tendency toward
political centralization that has characterized the Western world
for many centuries, first under monarchical rule and then under
democratic auspices, must be systematically reversed.[51]
Even if as
a result of a secessionist tendency a new government, whether democratic
or not, should spring up, territorially smaller governments and
increased political competition will tend to encourage moderation
as regards exploitation. And in any case, only in small regions,
communities or districts will it be possible again for a few individuals,
based on the popular recognition of their economic independence,
outstanding professional achievement, morally impeccable personal
life, and superior judgment and taste, to rise to the rank of natural,
voluntarily acknowledged authorities and lend legitimacy to the
idea of a natural order of competing judges and overlapping jurisdictions
an "anarchic" private law society as the answer to monarchy
and democracy.
This article
is excerpted from the Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol.
11 Num. 2.
This originally
appeared on Mises.org.
Notes
[1]
On the theory of the state see M.N. Rothbard, For
A New Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1978); idem, The
Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press,
1982); idem, Power
and Market (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews & McMeel, 1977);
H.H. Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1987); idem, A
Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Boston: Kluwer, 1989);
idem, The
Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Boston: Kluwer,
1993); also A.J. Nock, Our
Enemy, the State (Delevan: Hallberg Publishing Co., 1983);
F. Oppenheimer, The State (New York: Vanguard Press, 1914);
idem, System der Soziologie. Vol.2: Der Staat (Stuttgart:
G. Fischer, 1964).
[2]
See on the following also H.H. Hoppe, "Time Preference, Government,
and the Process of De-Civilization From Monarchy to Democracy,"
Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, Vol. V,
No. 4, 1994.
[3]
See also B. de Jouvenel, On
Power (New York: Viking, 1949), esp. pp. 910.
[4]
See M.N. Rothbard, Power
and Market, pp. 188189; also G. Hardin & J. Baden,
eds., Managing the Commons (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman,
1977; and M. Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,"
American Political Science Review 87, 3, 1993.
[5]
In addition to the works quoted in fn.1 above, see L. Spooner, No
Treason: The Constitution of No Authority (Larkspur: Pine
Tree Press, 1966), p. 17.
[6]
On the phenomenon and theory of time preference see in particular
L. von Mises, Human
Action. A Treatise on Economics (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1966),
chs. XVIII, XIX; also W. St. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy
(New York: A. Kelley, 1965); E.v. Böhm-Bawerk, Capital
and Interest, 3 vols. (South Holland: Libertarian Press,
1959); F. Fetter, Capital, Interest, and Rent (Kansas City:
Sheed, Andrews & McMeel, 1977); M.N. Rothbard, Man,
Economy, and State (Los Angeles: Nash, 1970).
[7]
See also H.H. Hoppe, "Time
Preference, Government, and the Process of De-Civilization From
Monarchy to Democracy."
[8]
See on this G. Ferrero, Peace
and War (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press,1969), esp.
ch. 3; idem, Macht (Bern: A. Francke, 1944); E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn,
Leftism
Revisited (Washington D.C.: H. Regnery, 1990); R. Bendix,
Kings
or People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
[9]
For a detailed documentation see P. Flora, State,
Economy, and Society in Western Europe 18151975, Vol.
I (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1983), ch. 3; also R.R. Palmer & J.
Colton, A
History of the Modern World (New York: A. Knopf, 1992),
esp. chs. XIV, XVIII.
[10]
On the aristocratic (undemocratic) character of the early United
States, see Lord Acton, "Political Causes of the American Revolution"
in: idem, The
Liberal Interpretation of History (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1967); also, Ch. Woltermann, "Federalism, Democracy
and the People," Telos, Vol. 26, 1, 1993.
[11]
On the US war involvement, see J.F.C. Fuller, The
Conduct of War (New York: Da Capo, 1992), ch. IX; on the
role of Woodrow Wilson, and his policy of wanting to "make
the world safe for democracy," see M.N. Rothbard, "World War
I as Fulfillment; Power and the Intellectuals," Journal of Libertarian
Studies, 9, no. 1, 1989; P. Gottfried, "Wilsonianism: The Legacy
that Won't Die," Journal of Libertarian Studies, 9, no.
2, 1990; E.v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Leftism Revisited, ch.
15.
[12]
Interestingly, the Swiss Republic, which had been the first country
to establish universal male suffrage (in 1848), was the last to
expand the suffrage also to women (in 1971). Similarly, the French
Republic, where universal male suffrage had existed since 1848,
extended the franchise to women only in 1945.
[13]
See H.J. Schoeps, Preussen. Geschichte eines Staates
(Frankfurt/M.: Ullstein, 1981), p. 405 on data for England, Prussia,
and Austria.
[14]
C.M. Cipolla, Before
the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 10001700
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 48.
[15]
See P. Flora, State, Economy and Society in Western Europe,
Vol. 1, pp. 258259.
[16]
Ibid, ch. 8.
[17]
Ibid, ch. 5. In fact, the share of government employment
in present times must be considered systematically underestimated,
for apart from excluding all military personnel it also excludes
the personnel in hospitals, welfare institutions, social insurance
agencies, and nationalized industries.
[18]
See also M.N. Rothbard, What
Has Government Done to Our Money? (Auburn, Al.: Ludwig
von Mises Institute, 1990); H.H. Hoppe, "How is Fiat Money Possible?
or, The Devolution of Money and Credit," Review of Austrian
Economics, Vol. 7, no. 2, 1994.
[19]
See B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp.468ff.
[20]
Idem, European Historical Statistics 17501970 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1078), pp. 388ff.
[21]
1930 = 100; see R. Paul and L. Lehrmann, The
Case for Gold. A Minority Report to the U.S. Gold Commission (Washington
D.C.: Cato Institute, 1982), p. 165f.
[22]
1983 = 100; see Economic Report of the President (Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).
[23]
See Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics,
p. 444f.
[24]
See M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, A
Monetary History of the United States, 18671960 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.704722; and Economic
Report of the President, 1992.
[25]
See S. Homer & R. Sylla, A
History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1991), pp. 188, 437.
[26]
See J. Hughes, American
Economic History (Glenview: Scott, Foresman,1990), pp.
432, 498, 589.
[27]
B. de Jouvenel, Sovereignty,
pp. 172173; p.189; see also F. Kern, Kingship and Law in the
Middle Ages (London, 1939), esp. p. 151; B. Rehfeld, Die
Wurzeln des Rechts (Berlin, 1951), esp. p. 67.
[28]
See A.V. Dicey, Lectures
on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during
the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1903); also
F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973), chs. 4 and 6.
[29]
See R. Nisbet, Community
and Power (New York: Oxford University Press,1962), pp.
110111.
[30]
B. de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 189; see also R. Nisbet,
Community and Power, ch. 5.
[31]
See D. Boudreaux, "The World's Biggest Government," Free Market,
November 1994.
[32]
See also T.A. Smith, Time and Public Policy (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1988).
[33]
See Homer & Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, pp.
557558.
[34]
See Homer/Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, pp. 554555.
[35]
See Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, p. 39.
[36]
See Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, pp. 5455;
Flora, State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, ch.
8; and p. 454.
[37]
See Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 17501970,
pp. 16ff.
[38]
See A.C. Carlson, Family
Questions. Reflections on the American Social Crises (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992); idem, The
Swedish Experiment in Family Politics (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1993); idem, "What Has Government Done to Our Families?"
Essays in Political Economy, no. 13 (Auburn, Al.: Ludwig
von Mises Institute, 1991); Ch. Murray, Losing
Ground (New York: Basic Books, 1984); for an early diagnosis
see J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942), ch.14.
[39]
See J.Q. Wilson & R.J. Herrnstein, Crime
and Human Nature (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985),
pp. 408409; on the magnitude of the increase in criminal activity
brought about by democratic republicanism and welfarism in the course
of the last hundred years see also R.D. McGrath, Gunfighters,
Highwaymen, and Vigilantes (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984), esp. ch.13; idem, "Treat them to a Good Dose of Lead,"
Chronicles, January 1994.
[40]
See Wilson & Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature, p.
411.
[41]
On the relationship between high time preference and crime see also
E.C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little,
Brown & Company,1974), esp. chs. 3 and 8; idem, "Present-Orientedness
and Crime," in: R.E. Barnett/J. Hagel, eds., Assessing the Criminal
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977); Wilson & Herrnstein, Crime
and Human Nature, pp. 414424.
[42]
On the contrast between monarchical and democratic warfare see J.F.C.
Fuller, The
Conduct of War, esp. chs. 1 and 2; idem, War
and Western Civilization (Freeport: Books for Libraries,
1969); M. Howard, War
in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976),
esp. ch. 6; idem, War
and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1978); B. de Jouvenel, On Power, ch. 8; W.A. Orton,
The
Liberal Tradition (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1969),
pp. 251ff; G. Ferrero, Peace and War, ch. 1.
[43]
For a revealing analysis of US data see R. Batemarco, "GNP, PPR,
and the Standard of Living," Review of Austrian Economics,
vol. 1, 1987.
[44]
On the relation between government and public opinion see the classic
expositions by Ι. de La Boιtie, The
Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude (New
York: Free Life Editions, 1975); D. Hume, Essays.
Moral, Political, and Literary (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1963), esp. "Essay IV: Of the First Principles of Government."
[45]
As late as 1871, for instance, with universal male suffrage, the
National Assembly of the French Republic contained only about 200
republicans out of more than 600 deputies. And the restoration of
a monarchy was only prevented because the supporters of the Bourbons
and the Orleans checkmated each other.
[46]
See also W. Röpke, Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage
(Bern: P.Haupt,1979), pp. 191199; B. de Jouvenel, On Power,
ch. 17.
[47]
See also M. Harris, Cannibals
and Kings. The Origins of Culture (New York: Vintage Books,
1977), pp.104ff on the private provision of public goods by "big
men."
[48]
As a comparative evaluation of theories of the endogenous versus
the exogenous origin of government and a historical critique of
the latter as incorrect or incomplete see W. Mühlmann, Rassen,
Ethnien, Kulturen (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1964), pp. 248319,
esp. pp. 291296.
For proponents
of theories of the exogenous origin of government see F. Ratzel,
Politische Geographie (München, 1923); F. Oppenheimer,
System der Soziologie. Vol. 2: Der Staat; A. Rüstow,
Freedom
and Domination (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980).
[49]
See, for instance, G. de Molinari, The
Production of Security (New York: Center for Libertarian
Studies, 1977), published originally in 1849, in French.
[50]
See on this also H. Pirenne, Medieval
Cities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), esp.
pp. 179180, and pp. 227f; B. de Jouvenel, On Power, ch.17.
[51]
On the political economy of political centralization, and the rationale
of decentralization and secession, see H.H. Hoppe, "Against Centralization,"
Salisbury Review, June 1993; idem, "Migrazione, centralismo
e secessione nell'Europa contemporanea," biblioteca della liberta,
no. 118, 1992; J. Baechler, The
Origins of Capitalism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976),
esp. ch. 7.
Hans-Hermann
Hoppe [send him mail] is distinguished
fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute
and founder and president of the Property
and Freedom Society. His books include Democracy:
The God That Failed
and The
Myth of National Defense.
Visit his website.
The
Best of Hans-Hermann Hoppe
|