Writing
Well Is the Best Revenge
by
David R. Henderson
by David R. Henderson
DIGG THIS
For the first
years of its existence, radio seemed like an economic loser without
government subsidy. No one could figure out how to make listeners
pay, and, consequently, radio hosts and entertainers usually worked
for free. In 1922, Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, asserted,
"Nor do I believe there is any practical method of payment
from the listeners." But that same year, AT&T discovered
that it could make money by selling ad time on radio. It sounds
obvious now, but it wasn’t then. After that, radio thrived and is
still thriving.
John
Lott tells that story and many others – and tells them well – in
his latest book, Freedomnomics.
Although the title is clunky – it’s obviously a version of the more
famous title Freakonomics
– that’s all that’s clunky. Lott’s book is an analytic tour de force
as he walks the reader through the economics of issues as varied
as the origin and development of American public schools, why government
grows, crime, gun control, political influence, gasoline prices,
the price of wine at restaurants, and voting machines. In each case,
he explains concepts that most people don’t understand but want
to understand – concepts that help us figure out our world. And,
in the process, he makes the case – summed up by the book’s subtitle
– for "Why the Free Market Works and Other Half-Baked Theories
Don’t."
Many of the
half-baked theories Lott refers to are those produced by his rival
and lead author of Freakanomics,
University of Chicago economist Steven Levitt. In case you haven’t
heard, Levitt and Lott are engaged in a feud
right now. Lott alleges that Levitt defamed him in Freakanomics
and sued to enjoin Levitt and his publisher, HarperCollins, from
selling additional copies of the book until they had deleted the
alleged defamatory statement. This part of the suit has already
been thrown out, but what remains to be tried is Lott’s claim that
Levitt defamed him in a private e-mail to an economics professor
named John McCall. Lott, in a July interview, told me that Levitt
had sued Lott’s publisher for using the title Freedomnomics
and that the publisher agreed to put on the cover, "A Rebuttal
to Freakanomics and More." I’m not an expert on defamation,
but as
the late economist Murray Rothbard argued, no one has a right
to a reputation – that is, to be thought of a certain way by people.
I’m inclined to agree with Rothbard. Lott and Levitt should settle
this on the field and not in the courts.
And Lott does
settle it on the field. While Freakanomics
is slick, Freedomnomics
is much more solid analytically. Freakanomics
reads as if written by a journalist who knew some, but not enough,
economics. Freedomnomics
was written by a first-rate economist who knows a ton of economics
and who, by the way, also writes well. Writing well – and knowing
your subject matter – is the best revenge.
Take one of
the big issues that divide the two authors: why violent crime fell
in the 1990s. One controversial explanation, which Levitt and journalist
Stephen Dubner push in Freakonomics, is that liberalized
abortion in the early 1970s caused there to be fewer unwanted babies.
Their idea was that a disproportionately high percentage of these
babies, had they been born, would have committed crimes. But Lott
systematically takes apart their argument. He points out that in
their data analysis, Levitt and his academic co-author, John Donohue,
classified as "banned" states many states in which abortion
was not banned. Rather, abortion was legal when the life or health
of the mother was threatened. In some states, notes Lott, doctors
interpreted this provision quite liberally. In some states that
Levitt and Donohue classified as "banned," abortion rates
were even higher than in some states classified as "legal."
Writes Lott, "Donahue [sic] and Levitt, whose main results
assumed that no legal abortions occurred in any of the ‘banned’
states before 1973, thus began their study with flawed statistics."
Furthermore,
Lott argues that increased abortion leads to increased crime.
How so? The availability of abortion reduces the "cost"
of sex because the downside – an unwanted pregnancy – becomes easier
to eliminate. With this comes an increase in pregnancies, but what
if the woman decides not to have an abortion? The man might feel
tricked into unwanted fatherhood and refuse to marry her. The "shotgun
marriage" that I often heard about in the early 1960s seems
to have pretty much disappeared. The result, then, is a child who
is raised by an unmarried mother. As is well known, children raised
out of wedlock score high on pretty much every social problem, including
crime. So there are two offsetting effects of abortion on crime:
the fewer unwanted children effect and the more children out of
wedlock effect. Which one dominates? Lott cites his own work and
work by Boston Federal Reserve economists Christopher Foote and
Christopher Goetz, both of which find that the latter effect dominates:
more abortion leads to more crime. The Economist magazine
called attention to Foote’s and Goetz’s work, which caught an error
in Donohue’s and Levitt’s work. In an article titled "Oops-onomics,"
The Economist pointed out that in running their test, Donohue
and Levitt made a crucial computer coding error.
Moreover, notes
Lott, if the Roe v. Wade liberalization of abortion really was responsible
for the later reduction in crime, one should see a lower rate of
crime among those born after Roe v. Wade than among those born before.
But Lott presents a graph showing that at each age, the exact opposite
is the case. That is, the murder rate among those born in the four
years after Roe v. Wade was substantially above the murder rate
among those born before. Interestingly, all this evidence was available
and well-known long before Levitt and Dubner wrote Freakanomics.
So what did
cause the 1990s’ reduction in crime? Lott attributes the reduction,
in part, to the death penalty. He points out that the Supreme Court
suspended the death penalty nationwide between 1968 and 1976 and
that during that time murder rates skyrocketed. The 38 states that
reinstituted the death penalty after 1976 had a 38-percent larger
drop in murder rates by 1998 than states that did not reinstitute
it. Interestingly, executions increased significantly during the
1990s, which was when violent crime fell. Also important, writes
Lott, were increases in arrest rates and conviction rates and the
increased passage during the 1990s of laws allowing people to carry
concealed handguns. Lott also points out that his view of concealed
carry is controversial and gives a table listing studies on each
side of the issue. A look at the footnotes here is worthwhile because
he goes through the back and forth between his work and that of
Yale economist Ian Ayres and the aforementioned John Donohue.
Lott has also
done some of the path-breaking academic work on campaign finance
reform and has a nice section on that in his book. He argues that
campaign finance reform has made it much more difficult to have
an insurgent campaign. Antiwar candidate Eugene McCarthy, he argues,
would never have been able to accomplish his strong showing against
President Lyndon Johnson in New Hampshire if the current limits
on individual contributions to candidates had existed in the 1960s.
McCarthy relied heavily on just six big donors and raised almost
as much money, adjusted for inflation, as George W. Bush did from
170,000 donors by the time of the first 2000 primaries.
Lott also addresses
education. Have you ever wondered why so-called public schools –
that is, schools funded by taxes and run by government – have a
geographic monopoly? Lott tells why and it’s likely to upset you.
It had nothing to do with school-aged youths not getting enough
education in the private sector, as the late education economist
E.G. West has pointed out. Rather, in the early 19th
century, state governments in New York and elsewhere were concerned
that Catholic families were sending their kids to – are you sitting
down? – Catholic schools. Oh no! We can’t have that, thought the
government. In the legislative debates at the time, writes Lott,
various politicians expressed the view that Catholic values would
lead the students to a life of crime. So, to instill its beloved
Protestant values, the government started subsidizing Protestant
schools as a way of drawing customers away from the non-government-subsidized
Catholic schools. It worked, kind of. Protestant schools were now
competing with each other for these customers. How do you compete?
By giving the customer what he wants. Thus, they focused on reading,
writing, and math and played down Protestant religious training.
What could
the government do? If competition gives you a result you don’t like,
it’s obvious what to do: kill competition. So the government started
to give subsidies only to the approved Protestant school nearest
a student’s home, thus creating a subsidized geographic monopoly.
When the subsidies got large enough, which they did in New York
in 1867, the government simply took over the subsidized schools.
Robert
Higgs has written that government grew because it acquired powers
during crises in the 20th century that it did not completely
relinquish when the crises end, thus creating a ratchet effect.
Higgs points to the two world wars and the Great Depression as the
three main government-growing crises of the century. But Lott points
to a different explanation that he supports with evidence: giving
women the vote. He notes that women – especially single women or
married women who expect to be divorced – have a different voting
pattern than men. They tend to favor government attempts to make
people more secure with various subsidies and regulations. (Although,
as I point out in "Big
Government – Big Risk," government actually makes people
less secure, but this is not well understood.) So, women’s suffrage,
writes Lott, actually led to the growth of government. Because women
received the vote at the state level in various years, the data
allow him to track what happens to government spending and taxes
as states allowed women to vote. He finds a consistent pattern:
within 11 years of giving women the vote, states’ real per capita
spending had doubled.
Lott also takes
on the issue of gasoline prices. A standard lesson we economics
professors teach students is that price controls designed to eliminate
"price gouging" cause shortages and line-ups and reduce
gasoline sellers’ incentive to save inventory for times of increased
scarcity. Lott lays this out nicely, but he does more. He also shows
why the difference between the full-serve price and the self-serve
price for gasoline is smaller for premium gasoline than for regular
gasoline. For both regular and premium gas, he notes, service stations
charge extra for service. But buyers of premium gasoline tend to
buy more gas at a time than buyers of regular gasoline. So the lower
increment in price per gallon of premium gasoline times the higher
number of gallons purchased makes the overall charges for service
roughly equal.
When it comes
to judging Lott’s work, I should admit my bias. John Lott is a fellow
graduate of the Ph.D. program at UCLA in its glory years from the
early 1970s to the mid-1980s; I graduated in 1976, he in 1984. And
I’ve have found that virtually everything he writes about government
policy makes sense. I don’t know enough about the data to judge
his work on concealed carry laws, which has been the work most challenged
by other academics. It’s simply that his argument makes sense. The
only failing I can find in the book is his reasoning about public
school teachers. He argues that public school teachers have an incentive
to teach that government solves problems, despite the evidence,
because they "have an abiding personal interest in perpetuating
the growth of government." I agree with him about the empirical
fact he is trying to explain: virtually all of my and my daughter’s
public school teachers, to the extent the issue came up, favored
more government. But I’m not sure this was in their interest. The
larger government becomes, the less will it be available to pay
the absurdly high pensions granted to teachers. If I were a public
school teacher just looking out for my own interest, I would favor
smaller government in order to maximize the probability that the
government could afford to pay my pension. Of course, for someone
to see this, he or she would need a detailed understanding of the
budget numbers. My own view is that there is self-selection: people
who want to teach in a government setting tend to be people who
like government.
John
Lott is the most academically published UCLA Ph.D. In fact, his
papers are the sixth
most downloaded on the Social Science Research Network’s web site.
Indeed, if the Nobel committee made its decisions solely on the
basis of the quality and importance of academic work, Lott would
have a good shot at the Nobel Prize in economic science in the next
ten years. For eight of the last twelve years, I have written the
Wall Street Journal article about the Nobel recipient(s)
that appears the day after the economics prize is announced, and
I think Lott already deserves it as much as some of the people who
have received it. His
actual odds, though, are very low for a few reasons. First, he hurt
himself badly by inventing a fictitious
character, Mary Rosh, to defend his views. Second, he upped
the ante in the academic world by suing a competitor rather than
competing with him. Those are the two negatives. But the third reason
is actually a positive: John Lott has had a huge amount of courage,
showing himself willing to fight for unpopular causes when doing
so could, and did, threaten his career. Indeed, he tells one of
the stories in the Introduction to his book. Lott, while at Montana
State University in 1986, supported an initiative that would have
abolished property taxes in Montana. He found that he was the most
articulate person around willing to push for the cut – and so became
a spokesman. He was threatened, he writes, by various University
officials who feared retribution from the state government. In his
department’s evaluation of Lott for "outreach," he was
the only faculty member to score zero out of four. I don’t know
about you, but when I think of outreach, I think of people talking
to the press, not refusing to talk to the press. So he learned early
on that in academia, as in the rest of the life, there are a fair
number of cowards and bullies. But that never stopped him from pushing
on and researching and speaking out about important issues. Can
you imagine the Nobel Prize being given to someone who says that
giving women the vote led to a growth in government? Neither can
I.
July
11, 2007
David
R. Henderson [send
him mail], is
a research fellow with the Hoover Institution and an associate professor
of economics at the Graduate School of Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate
School, in Monterey, California. His latest book, co-authored with
Charles L. Hooper, is Making
Great Decisions in Business and Life (Chicago Park Press,
2006.)
Copyright
© 2007 by David R. Henderson
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